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THE EXPOSITOR

VOL. XVII.

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BARNABAS THE FRIEND OF THE FRIENDLESS.

One cannot resist the feeling that Barnabas is not properly rated by modern Christians. This defect is partly due to the fact that Luke does not trace his career after chapter xv. of Acts. He drops from view under the shadow of the disagreement with Paul whose steps Luke traces all the way to Rome. And then we have no authentic writing of Barnabas. Tertullian and other writers in the West attribute to Barnabas the Epistle to the Hebrews, but the bare possibility of that theory is all that can be admitted. Clement of Alexandria quotes the so-called Epistle of Barnabas as the work of Paul's companion. Origen speaks of the Catholic Epistle of Barnabas and Eusebius mentions the Epistle of Barnabas. The Codex Sinaiticus gives it after the Apocalypse of John, showing that it was esteemed highly in Alexandria, and was read in some churches. But the writer is so hostile to the Mosaic law that it seems impossible to credit it to Joseph Barnabas. Some other Barnabas may have written it. McGiffert (*Apostolic Age*, p. 598 f.) pleads for the idea that Barnabas wrote 1 Peter, but not with convincing arguments.[1] We may pass by the Apocryphal Gospel and the Acts under the name of Barnabas. The result is that we are left with no clearly known writing of Barnabas by which we may measure his life and teachings. We are wholly dependent upon

[1] Moffatt (*Introduction to Literature of the New Testament*, pp. 343 n., 437) shows that Barnabas had no reason to conceal his authorship if he wrote the epistle.

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Acts and Paul's Epistles for our knowledge of this great figure in early Christian history. There are traditions that he was one of the seventy sent forth by Jesus (Luke x. 1), that he preached the gospel in Rome, that he was the founder of the Church in Milan, that he worked in Cyprus till his death at Salamis in A.D. 61. But Luke and Paul enable us to gain a clear picture of Barnabas if we piece together all the incidents wherein he figures. At the Conference in Jerusalem (Acts xv. 1-29; Gal. ii. 1-10), assuming the identity of the visits, the five foremost figures are Paul and Barnabas on one side, Peter, James and John on the other, in the private conference when the program was drawn up and the concordat reached. Lightfoot [1] hardly does Barnabas justice in his able discussion of "St. Paul and the Three." Barnabas, from this standpoint, is a mere figurehead. And yet twice in Acts xv. the order is "Barnabas and Paul." Barnabas spoke before Paul (xv. 12) as the better known in Jerusalem and less offensive to the Church there. In the Letter to the Antioch Church we read: "our beloved Barnabas and Paul, men that have hazarded their lives for the name of our Lord Jesus Christ" (xv. 25 f.). Elsewhere, save in Acts xiv. 14, after Acts xiii. 43, Luke has it Paul and Barnabas. Renan [2] pointedly says of Barnabas: "After St. Paul, he was the most active missionary of the first century." Renan [3] pleads that "Barnabas won at the hands of the Christian world the highest degree of merit." Renan would apparently rank Barnabas next to Paul. That is too high a place for him when one considers John and Peter. But he is entitled to stand with James, the Lord's brother, in the group of foremost men of his generation.

[1] *Commentary on Galatians*, pp. 129–212.
[2] *The Apostles*, tr., p. 124.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 191.

1. *A Liberal Contributor to the Poor Saints in Jerusalem.* It is in this capacity that we first hear of him (Acts iv. 36 f.). His name is Joseph, but not the Joseph Barsabbus Justus of Acts i. 23. His home was in the island of Cyprus and, though a Levite, he owned property (probably there). Originally the Levites owned no land (Num. xviii. 20), but the case of Jeremiah (Jer. xxxiii. 7–15) shows that the rule was not always strictly observed, for a Levite could buy or inherit a piece of land. But in the new Christian community, where most had little wealth, this Levitical irregularity (Furneaux, *Acts*, p. 68) may have stood in the way of the influence of Barnabas. There was no compulsion, but the voluntary surrender of all for the good of the whole at once gave Barnabas a place of prominence and power in the Jerusalem Church, to the envy of Ananias and Sapphira.

Now Barnabas had shown himself the true Levite with the Lord as his portion. He had spiritual wealth (Rackham, *Acts*, p. 63) that far outweighed the value of his land. The use of the singular (τὸ χρῆμα) implies that Barnabas gave the total value of the sale to the support of the poor saints, quite in contrast to the duplicity of Ananias and Sapphira. Our first picture of Barnabas is that of a man of generous sympathies with the common people in spite of his more aristocratic affiliations. He was a cousin of John Mark (Col. iv. 10) whose mother, Mary, was likewise a woman of some wealth since her home in Jerusalem was the gathering place of the Jerusalem Christians (Acts xii. 12).

It is probable that Joseph, the Cyprian Levite, identified himself thoroughly with the Jerusalem Church, and perhaps made his home with Mary. Luke mentions at this point the surname of Barnabas that was given him by the apostles, possibly at a later time, though his unselfish generosity

already predisposed all to cherish the most kindly sentiments toward him.

Luke translates Barnabas by "son of exhortation" (υἱὸς παρακλήσεως), though the Greek covers also the ideas of consolation and of encouragement. There is no English word that can carry all these ideas, and we face the same difficulty with the term "Paraclete" for the Holy Spirit. Scholars are not agreed as to the etymology of the word Barnabas. The Aramaic *Bar* means son, and Nabas may be connected with the Hebrew *Nebi* (prophet), son of prophecy, or with the Aramaic *Nevahah*, refreshment. But Deissmann [1] argues that Barnabas is really Barnebous, Son of Nebo, a name found in a Syrian inscription. At any rate, there is no doubt that Joseph was worthy of the surname. He was a prophet and a teacher (Acts xiii. 1), and an apostle (Acts xiv. 14). He was worthy of all these titles, as we shall see. He was not one of the twelve, as Paul was not, but, like James the Lord's brother (Gal. i. 19), he was an apostle in the wider sense of the term. In the early years in Jerusalem Joseph Barnabas was a tower of strength for the young Church.

2. *Sponsor for Saul when under Suspicion.*

It may seem strange that the conversion of Saul was at most only a rumour in Jerusalem after the space of some three years. But Saul spent most of that time in Arabia, and his own conduct as the leader of the Pharisaic persecution in Jerusalem was enough to throw suspicion upon any reports of his change of heart and life in Damascus. Besides, the Sanhedrin may have spread sinister rumours about Saul's probable motives in his avowal of Christianity. His prolonged absence from Jerusalem was in itself peculiar, and he brought no letters of recommendation from the Christians in Damascus. It is not easy to live down one's

[1] *Bible Studies*, pp. 187 f., 307–310.

past. The very completeness of Saul's work of destruction in Jerusalem made it all the more imperative that no mistake be made this time. The wolf might throw off the sheep's clothing and again ravin the fold. Saul had come "to visit Cephas" (*ἱστορῆσαι Κηφᾶν*, Gal. i. 18). He had not come to be inducted into his apostolic office. That authority he had received from the Lord Jesus, not from man (Gal. i. 1). But Saul wished to carry on his Gentile mission in harmony with the apostles, and there was much that he could learn about the earthly life of Jesus from Simon Peter during these two weeks. It is probable that Peter and Barnabas were both staying at the home of Mary (Acts xii. 12). No other apostles were present in Jerusalem at the time save James the Lord's brother (Gal. i. 19). Evidently Peter and James, as well as the other disciples, were full of fear. "They were all afraid of him" (*πάντες ἐφοβοῦντο αὐτόν*, Acts ix. 26). The imperfect tense pictures the shrinking away from Saul as he presented himself. "He assayed to join himself to the disciples" (*ἐπείραζεν κολλᾶσθαι τοῖς μαθηταῖς*). The imperfect tense again shows that Saul did not give up without a struggle. He was deeply mortified beyond a doubt. "Saul's nature could ill brook mistrust; and there might have been unhappy consequences but for the work of a mediator" (Rackham, *Acts, in loco*). To put it bluntly, they did not believe that Saul was a genuine disciple, not even his own repeated statements to that effect. Saul stood discredited before the very man whom he had come to visit as a brother and co-worker. The memory of Saul's fierce hatred of these men flared up like a flame. Criticism and fear demanded that Saul furnish proof of his sincerity before he be received as a brother in Christ. It was a crucial moment for Saul and for Christianity. A fatal misunderstanding at this moment might have had the most disastrous consequences,

"But Barnabas took him (ἐπιλαβόμενος, taking hold of by the hand, literally) and brought him (ἤγαγεν, perhaps with some reluctance now on Saul's part) to the apostles (πρὸς τοὺς ἀποστόλους, face to face with Peter and James)." Not simply did Barnabas do that, but he "declared unto them how he had seen the Lord in the way, and that he had spoken to him, and how at Damascus he had preached boldly in the name of Jesus" (Acts ix. 27). Saul himself had told his story to Barnabas, who now vouched for the correctness of it and for the genuineness of his conversion. It was a bold and a noble thing to do. It may well be that Saul and Barnabas had been friends at the university of Tarsus before they were Christians, the one a Levite from Cyprus, the other the Pharisee from Tarsus, both Hellenists and loyal young Jews. "It was he who appreciated Paul; it was to him that the Church owes the most extraordinary of her founders. . . . Among the causes of the faith of the world we must count the generous movement of Barnabas, stretching out his hand to the suspected and forsaken Paul; the profound intuition which led him to discover the soul of an apostle under that humiliated air; the frankness with which he broke the ice and levelled the obstacles raised between the convert and his new brethren by the unfortunate antecedents of the former, and perhaps, also, by certain traits of his character." [1] This tribute to Barnabas is not overdone. The life of Barnabas seems to be devoted to the ministry of those in distress. It is a noble ministry for any life. Saul and Peter and James could each tell how they had seen the Risen Christ.[2] As a result of the friendship of Barnabas Saul "was with them going in and going out at Jerusalem" (Acts ix. 28), received on terms of perfect equality as the guest of Simon Peter. It

[1] Renan, *The Apostles*, p. 191.

[2] Swete, *The Appearances of Our Lord after the Resurrection*, p. 88.

is a high sort of courage to champion the cause of a discredited man. The Sanhedrin looked upon Saul as a renegade Jew. The disciples feared him as a hypocrite. Barnabas took him as a brother beloved and risked all his own great reputation to save Saul and Christianity. When the Hellenists in Jerusalem threatened to kill Saul as he had led them to stone Stephen, "the brethren knew it," possibly Barnabas being the first to see Saul's peril, and "they brought him down to Caesarea, and sent him forth to Tarsus" (Acts ix. 30).

3. *Champion of the Greek Christians in Antioch.*

Events moved rapidly. The ministry of Philip in Samaria led to the visit of Peter and John to investigate the work of grace among these half-Jews (Acts viii. 14 ff.). The visit of Peter and the six brethren to Cornelius (Acts x.), a God-fearing Roman and proselyte of the gate in Caesarea, made quite a stir among the Pharisaic party in the Jerusalem Church who called Peter to account for his mingling with the Gentiles (Acts xi. 1–18). But the word of God is not bound, as Peter had found out though with difficulty. Men of Cyprus and Cyrene went as far as Antioch and "spake unto the Greeks also (correct text, in spite of Aleph and B), preaching the Lord Jesus" (Acts xi. 20). There was already a Samaritan Church from Philip's work and a Roman Church in Caesarea from Peter's work. Now a Greek Church had sprung up in Antioch, the third city of the Roman Empire. The situation was a delicate one, and called for careful handling. It is proof of the high position of Barnabas in the Jerusalem Church that he was chosen (Acts xi. 22) as a committee of one (cf. Acts viii. 14) to investigate conditions in Antioch, for "a great number that believed turned unto the Lord" (Acts xi. 21). The Pharisaic party in Jerusalem had acquiesced reluctantly in what had happened in Caesarea (Acts xi. 18). They

were evidently alarmed at the sudden turn of events in Antioch. Barnabas was himself from Cyprus, and may have known some of the brethren from the island. Besides, he was a Hellenist and so better able to appreciate their feelings towards these Greek Christians, perhaps proselytes of the gate like Cornelius, while, as a Levite, he could be trusted to understand Hebrew prejudices (Furneaux, *Acts*, p. 173). All classes in the Jerusalem Church had confidence in Barnabas and in his ability to do justice to the new movement and to decide whether it was of God. Barnabas fully justified their choice of him as the commissioner in this crisis. Luke pauses to bestow a eulogy on Barnabas, quite out of his usual style. It is possible that Barnabas was dead when Luke wrote, "for he was a good man" (xi. 24), perhaps recently deceased. At any rate Luke is fully aware of the significance of the occasion when Barnabas reaches Antioch with the future of Greek Christians in his hands. He knows what the Judaisers had tried to do to Peter in Jerusalem. Barnabas exhibits consummate wisdom at Antioch, and not the least element of his wisdom is his staying there with the Greek Christians and not returning to Jerusalem to make a report for over a year. Barnabas at once saw that the work was due to the grace of God, and he was glad (xi. 23). "A smaller man would have raised difficulties" (Furneaux, *Acts*, p. 173). But Barnabas was able to rise above his Jewish prejudices and to recognise the change wrought in the lives of these Greeks. He saw that a new era had come and that God had broken down the middle wall of partition and had saved these Greeks without their becoming Jews. Barnabas was not the man to lay the burden of Jewish ceremonialism on these Christian freemen. So "he exhorted them all, that with purpose of heart they would cleave unto the Lord" (Acts xi. 23). He kept on exhorting (παρεκάλει) them, for reaction

would come after the first enthusiasm of the new faith. Barnabas saw this peril, and laid himself out to make the work of grace permanent (προσμένειν).

He accepted the new order as a fact. He readjusted his theology, if necessary, to suit the evident work of God, as Peter had done at Caesarea. But Barnabas required no vision on the housetop to see the new truth that God is no respecter of persons (Acts x. 34). The average Jew had the same pride of race that the Germans had before their defeat at the hands of the Allies. Luke tells us how it came to pass that Barnabas was able to see so clearly the hand of God in the spiritual revolution going on in Antioch. "He was a good man" (ἀγαθός, xi. 24), a kindly and a generous man, who was able to let the facts sweep away his prejudices. He had convictions, but he was able to see facts that contravened them and to accept them openly and frankly. This is a severe test of character, and Barnabas stood it. He was "full of the Holy Spirit." He was an inspired man in the true sense of that phrase. He had the gift of *paraclesis* from the Paraclete. As a spirit-filled man, he was able to try the spirits and to discern the true work of grace when he saw it. He was a man "of faith," and so was able to trust God for the future of this work without undue restrictions on the liberty of the brethren. He accepted the Greek Christians as fully on a par with the Jewish Christians. The whole Church lived free from the Jewish ceremonial restrictions (Acts xv. 1; Gal. ii. 11–14). Barnabas was a son of exhortation, consolation, and encouragement to these Greek Christians.

4. *Finding a Place for Saul in Antioch.*

The work grew mightily under the care of Barnabas. "And much people was added unto the Lord" (Acts xi. 25). He saw that he needed help, and he knew where to go. He did not go to Jerusalem. He wished to bring

no disturbing element into the life of the Greek Church in Antioch. Barnabas knew the man for this emergency. Tarsus was not very far from Antioch. Saul had not been idle during the years since he left Jerusalem in flight for his life. He had been preaching in Syria and Cilicia (Gal. i. 21). In his own way Saul had probably preached to the Gentiles in these regions and not without success, for we read of churches here at a later period (Acts xv. 41). Barnabas believed in Saul in spite of his stormy career so far. He was sure that this man was a chosen vessel of God for this very work among the Gentiles. He determined to get Saul to Antioch so that the man and the hour could meet. I find it hard to believe that the Church in Jerusalem had instructed Barnabas to send for Saul if he needed his services. It is rather the insight into character that enabled Barnabas to see that Saul was the master mind to meet this great crisis. The door was open in Antioch for Saul, and Barnabas "had none of the littleness which cannot bear the presence of a possible rival" (Furneaux, *Acts*, p. 174). The language of Luke implies that Barnabas was not sure that he would find Saul in Tarsus, but he went forth on this quest and found him and brought him to Antioch (Acts xi. 25 f.). The result justified the wisdom of Barnabas. He had blessed the church in Antioch, and he had given Saul his great opportunity. Renan overdoes the matter in saying that Saul "was at Tarsus in a forced repose, which to an active man like him was a perfect torture" (*The Apostles*, p. 207), but Barnabas did forget himself and prepared the field for the genius of Saul. "All this is certainly the very climax of virtue; and this is what Barnabas did for Paul. Most of the glory which is due to the latter is really due to the modest man who led him forward" (*ibid.*). Barnabas and Saul had a happy year in Antioch. Here the disciples first won the name of Chris-

tians, for they were not Jews and not heathen. Finally Barnabas and Saul went to Jerusalem with a generous gift from the Greek Church in Antioch to the poor Jewish saints in Jerusalem (Acts xi. 29 f.) at the time of the famine about A.D. 42–4. The Judaisers apparently made no protest, and the apostles were seemingly absent when they arrived. Barnabas had saved the day for Greek Christians and had saved Saul for his great work in the world. "Thus twice over did Barnabas save Saul for the work of Christianity" (Farrar).

5. *Able to take Second Place for the Good of the Cause.*

Barnabas maintained his position of leadership in Antioch on their return from Jerusalem (Acts xii. 25). In the great church at Antioch a democratic spirit prevailed. Five prophets and teachers are mentioned (Acts xiii. 1) apparently in two groups (τε—τε) of three prophets (Barnabas, Symeon called Niger, Fucius of Cyrene) and two teachers (Manaen, foster-brother of Herod the tetrarch, and Saul). The primacy of Barnabas is above dispute, and Saul comes last in the list as a newcomer, possibly the latest to join the band of leaders in Antioch. The other three may have been "the pioneers of Gentile evangelisation at Antioch" (Furneaux, *Acts*, p. 191). They all three had Gentile affiliations. The five names represent five different countries, and too much difference between prophet and teacher is not to be insisted on here (1 Cor. xiv. 3). The same man could have both gifts. Luke is a true historian in preserving the proper perspective here. He does not allow Saul's future greatness to dim the glory of Barnabas, the real leader at this stage of the history of Christian missions. Dr. George Milligan (art. "Barnabas," Hastings' *D.B.*) illustrates how hard it is to preserve the historical perspective when he writes: "Barnabas accompanied Saul (or, as he was now to be known, Paul) on his first missionary journey."

The Holy Spirit names the two men selected for the first great missionary campaign among the Gentiles with Barnabas as chief (Acts xiii. 2). This order is a matter of course with the Antioch Church for none at this date can challenge the position of Barnabas in their esteem. They honour Saul and are glad to see him named as the lieutenant of Barnabas in the enterprise. The hearty prayers of the community of disciples go with the two great leaders as they are formally set apart to their special mission. We are not to think of this occasion as ordination to the ministry or to the apostolic office. Barnabas and Saul had long been fulfilling both functions. It is rather a prayerful dedication to the special task of the dangerous and unknown enterprise which they are undertaking like a farewell service to missionaries now. The Church at Antioch seemed to feel that it was a great step forward. There is no criticism that they undertook to finance the new departure, but they did agree to these two best leaders to go and their prayers went with them. There was no opposition and no saying that there were leaders enough in Antioch. It was a note of great spiritual enthusiasm when Barnabas and Saul and John Mark as attendant, set forth upon their epoch-making journey. It is clearly Barnabas who took along his cousin John Mark. And yet before they leave Cyprus Saul Paul has leaped to the fore as the leader of the party. We shall never be able to explain precisely how it all happened. Beyond a doubt Paul was the abler man with more of the spark of genius. Barnabas was glad to have him use his great powers of speech in various emergencies. In a new environment Paul was no longer under the shadow of Barnabas's great reputation in Antioch. The case of Elymas was very promising as he tried to break the influence of Barnabas and Saul over Sergius Paulus. Evidently Paul's nature could stand it no longer. The

explosive power of Paul on this occasion (Acts xiii. 6–12) probably amazed Barnabas and revealed the tremendous energy of his fellow-labourer. There is no sign of resentment on the part of Barnabas as he sees his assistant take the lead. After all Paul is the pride of Barnabas, and he can rejoice that God has allowed him to bring to the front this great exponent of the faith. Luke quietly notes that "Paul and his company set sail from Paphos, and came to Perga in Pamphylia" (Acts xiii. 13). John Mark apparently disliked the new state of affairs, and went back to Jerusalem, but Barnabas went on with Paul. He was too great a man to break up the partnership because Paul was manifestly the greater and more useful preacher. "In nothing is the greatness of Barnabas more manifest than in his recognition of the superiority of Paul and acceptance of a secondary place for himself" (Furneaux, *Acts*, p. 203). It was Paul who "stood up" in response to the invitation from the rulers of the synagogue to the "brethren" to speak in Antioch in Pisidia (Acts xiii. 15 f.). "Many of the Jews and of the devout proselytes followed Paul and Barnabas" (xiii. 43) when the synagogue broke up. On the next Sabbath Paul was again the speaker till the uproar came when "Paul and Barnabas spake out boldly" (xiii. 46). So they stirred persecution against Paul and Barnabas (Acts xiii. 50). At Lystra Paul was the speaker again (xiv. 9), with the result that the natives took Paul to be Mercury and Barnabas Jupiter, a tribute to the finer personal appearance of Barnabas, as well as to Paul's eloquence as "the chief speaker." Here again Luke reflects the local atmosphere when he mentions "Barnabas and Paul" (xiv. 14). But Barnabas apparently maintained his serenity, and the two apostles came back to Antioch with a glorious report of God's blessing. The door of faith had been opened to the Gentiles (xiv. 27).

6. *Exponent of Gentile Freedom.*

It was a time of rejoicing in Antioch, and no doubt Paul's stature loomed larger in the minds of the Church there than before. When the Judaisers from Jerusalem appeared in Antioch with their abrupt demand that the Gentile Christians be circumcised after the custom of Moses (Acts xv. 1) Paul and Barnabas took a firm stand against them. No doubt Paul revealed himself to the Church at Antioch as the real leader by his powerful exposition of liberty in Christ. This new appreciation of Paul appears in the appointment of " Paul and Barnabas " with certain others to go to Jerusalem for a conference on this grave problem (xv. 2). It is clear that the Greek Church at Antioch stood with Paul and Barnabas. In Jerusalem Barnabas nobly seconded the leadership of Paul with no sign of jealousy. It is here assumed that Acts xv. and Galatians ii. 1–10 refer to the same event. The point is still in dispute, but the best reconciliation of minor discrepancies lies in the broad parallel of the two reports. Luke gives only the public aspects of the meeting, while Paul makes use of the private conference of the leaders to prove his equality with the twelve. In Acts xi. 30 " Barnabas and Saul " went to Jerusalem. In Acts xv. 2 " Paul and Barnabas " attended the conference as in Galatians, and Paul is evidently leader. In both reports (Acts xv. and Gal. ii.) Peter and James co-operate with Paul and Barnabas. It shows Paul's wisdom that Barnabas spoke before he did at the second public meeting (Acts xv. 12). In Jerusalem Barnabas had a great hold, and he had here befriended Paul. This appreciation of Barnabas is reflected in the decision of the conference, probably written by James, which speaks of " our beloved Barnabas and Paul " (Acts xv. 25), but Luke's narrative in verse 22 has Paul and Barnabas. Paul made no point of precedence. Barnabas stood by him loyally

in Jerusalem, and they won a common victory over the Judaisers. But in his own account Paul said : " to me and Barnabas " (Gal. ii. 9).

But in Antioch on their return things did not go entirely well. At first " Paul and Barnabas " taught on as before (Acts xv. 35) after the season of rejoicing over the Gentile victory. Paul and Barnabas had been acknowledged by the Jerusalem leaders (Peter, James and John) as in charge of the work among the Gentiles, as they were at the head of the work among the Jews (Gal. ii. 7–10). Paul did not admit that these " pillars " were above him and Barnabas. He had made the issue acute in Jerusalem by the presence of Titus, a Greek Christian, whose liberty was maintained against pressure for a compromise. Peter and James spoke for Paul in Jerusalem. Later, so the chronology seems to run, Peter came to Antioch and followed the custom of Paul and Barnabas in his social life with the Gentile Christians there (Gal. ii. 11–15). He ate with them. This was a long step forward for Peter, a Palestinian Jew, and the very issue on which he had been arraigned before in Jerusalem by the Judaisers (Acts xi. 1–18). The reappearance of the Judaisers in Antioch with the threat to tell James about Peter and to have him up before the Church again quickly made a coward out of Peter. Social equality had not been passed upon by the Jerusalem conference. It was simply assumed here in Antioch. So Peter weakened and drew back. He was followed in this dissimulation (hypocrisy, Paul calls it) by " the rest of the Jews " till only Paul and Barnabas were left. And then one of the saddest things in Paul's life happened. " Even Barnabas was carried away by their dissimulation." There is a tribute to Barnabas in this way of speaking of his defection. Paul was now alone, *Paulus contra mundum.* But he did not waver. He spoke to Peter face to face, and seems to

have won him back. Barnabas, of course, changed again to his old view. The breach was apparently quickly healed. But it is one of those things that can never be undone, once it has happened. Barnabas, like Peter, had flickered in this supreme crisis. The reins of leadership were, for the moment, left in Paul's hands alone. Paul could never quite forget that fact, nor could Barnabas nor could the church in Antioch. Paul was now undisputed leader of the Gentile Christians. But Barnabas had wrought nobly if he did falter for a moment when Paul and Peter called him to go different paths. Perhaps Barnabas "had never really thought out the principles involved, so as to be able to vindicate them when challenged" (Furneaux, *Acts*, p. 248). It is possible also that John Mark, who was apparently now in Antioch (Acts xv. 37), took the side of Peter against Paul with resentful memories of Perga (Acts xiii. 13), and so helped pull his cousin Barnabas away from Paul. It is plain that a sensitive situation exists in Antioch after Paul's triumph. There was plenty of explosive material at hand.

7. *Defender of Mark's Right to a Second Chance.*

Barnabas is true to his character as friend of the friendless to the end. Even in his inconsistent conduct at Antioch one may be able to trace the course of his conduct. He was a conciliating spirit always. He befriended the Gentile Christians, but he wished not to offend the Jewish brethren. So he faced a policy of vacillation. Perhaps in Antioch Barnabas was a bit restive under Paul's leadership after the recent honours shown him in Jerusalem. But Paul was all the more anxious to smooth things over and to get back to normal relations with Barnabas. The old missionary hunger burned in Paul again, and he proposed to Barnabas (Acts xv. 36–41) that they go back again and visit their old haunts in Cyprus and Galatia. Barnabas readily agreed,

even though he was to start out this time as Paul's assistant, not as chief. But he made one suggestion, that they take along with them (*συνπαραλαβεῖν*, aorist infinitive) John Mark, who began the former tour with them. Instantly Paul took and held (*ἠξίου*, imperfect) a position against that proposal. He could not bear the idea of having along (*συνπαραλαμβάνειν*, present infinitive, note) this man who had played the apostate (*τὸν ἀποστάντα*) at Perga. Mark did not stick to the work then (*μὴ συνελθόντα αὐτοῖς εἰς τὸ ἔργον*) and he might desert in a pinch again. Hippolytus calls Mark "the man with the finger wanting" (*κολοβοδάκτυλος*) because the Romans marked a deserter by cutting off the little finger. Paul's words stung Mark to the quick beyond a doubt, and all the more because of the truth in them. Probably Paul was indignant afresh at Mark for taking sides with Peter against him, and he disliked the suggestion of Barnabas all the more. The old sore has been rubbed again. There is more in the disagreement between Paul and Barnabas than can be put into words. The "sharp contention" (*παροξυσμὸς*, our "paroxysm") represented more than the conduct and character of John Mark. Barnabas now let loose the resentment at Paul's superseding him that he had smothered hitherto. Paul put into his resistance the passionate heat because of the dissimulation of Barnabas and of Mark. The "son of consolation" shows ordinary temper like other men. The apostle who later wrote the noblest hymn on love in existence (1 Cor. xiii.) is unable to control his own bitter thoughts. The dispute has come between these two men who owe so much to each other. The very debt of each to the other made the parting all the harder to bear. And yet each was right and each was wrong, as is usually the case in a quarrel. Barnabas had himself but recently made a false step in his relations with Paul and Peter;

He was not the man to say that John Mark should be thrown to the scrap-heap for his slip at Perga. A man is entitled to a chance to come back. No one of us is perfect, not even Paul. And yet Paul was unwilling to risk the work again with a man who had failed and had not yet made good. He demanded that he prove his mettle before he be trusted so much. There is no way to settle an issue like that. Paul no doubt had the best of the argument so far as logic goes, but Barnabas would not turn Mark down, not even for Paul. So they parted company, apparently abruptly. Barnabas took Mark with him and sailed away to Cyprus and drops out of Luke's narrative. It seems clear that the sympathy of the Church at Antioch is with Paul and Silas, who takes the place of Barnabas. Paul has completely ousted Barnabas in the affections of the Church at Antioch to which Barnabas had brought Paul. This is one of the tragedies of the ministry, that great men cannot always work together. But they can at least work separately. Often more work is thus accomplished. The world is wide and the work is pressing. Our hearts go with Barnabas in tender interest. One could wish that Luke had told us something of the closing years of Barnabas. Certainly he and Paul suffered because of the estrangement. There was no way to avoid that. But time heals many things. Neither of these great men was the man to cherish bitterness. We may be sure that Barnabas was not idle. He did a good turn by John Mark, as he had done by Paul. He helped to shape him for greater usefulness. When Mark appears later with Peter (1 Pet. v. 13) and Paul (Col. iv. 10; 2 Tim. iv. 11), he is useful for ministering to the aged Paul. This change in Mark is largely due to Barnabas, who befriended the young preacher in his hour of crisis. It is a great gift to be able to pick up and to patch up men. Barnabas knew how to do it. When men differed, he had

to make his choice. But the great work that he did for Christianity in befriending Paul and Mark is a permanent contribution. That is his crown of glory, that and the Church at Antioch which was shaped by him and saved from the Judaisers for Paul's master hand. He began the missionary campaign that Paul carried to victory and that is still sweeping on over the earth. Paul clearly rejoiced in the later work of Barnabas, for he spoke kindly of him in 1 Corinthians ix. 6. Luther and Calvin held that Paul refers to Barnabas in 2 Corinthians viii. 18 f., " the brother whose praise in the gospel *is spread* through all the churches." This is pure conjecture, but it is plain that, like Paul, he supported himself while preaching, and had the same spirit of independent manhood. Christianity can never forget the work of Barnabas even though he does not reveal the genius of Paul and John. He was a man for a critical period of early Christianity and helped to tide over the transition from the Jewish to the Gentile phase of Christian activity.

A. T. Robertson.

ST. PAUL TO THE LAODICEANS.

" To the Ephesians " (*πρὸς Ἐφεσίους*) is the name in all surviving manuscripts and versions of the great epistle which purports to have been written by Paul in conjunction with his letters to Philemon and to the Colossians, and which is in reality a more general elaboration of the same structural outline as that of Colossians. Not only is this address the unanimous witness of manuscripts and versions, whose concurrence implies a unanimity of the tradition reaching well back of the year 200 A.D., but some connexion of the kind seems to be implied in the reference of Ignatius, who in about 115 A.D. writes to the Ephesian church :

Ye are fellow-adepts in the mysteries (*συμμύσται*) with Paul, the sanctified, the martyred, worthy of all felicitation . . . who in every letter (*ἐν πάσῃ ἐπιστολῇ*) makes mention of you in Christ Jesus.

Ignatius exaggerates the frequency in Paul's letters of references to the Ephesians (cf. 1 Cor. xv. 32; xvi. 8; 1 Tim. i. 3; 2 Tim. i. 18; iv. 12), but the expression "fellow-adepts in the mysteries with Paul" (*συμμύσται Παύλου*) is hard to account for unless we place alongside it Ephesians i. 8–9:

(The grace) wherein He abounded toward us in all wisdom and insight, having given us *gnosis* (*γνωρίσας ἡμῖν*) of the mystery of His will (*τὸ μυστήριον τοῦ θελήματος αὐτοῦ*).

It would appear that so early even as the period of Ignatius this epistle was currently understood either to have been written by Paul to the Ephesians or at least to have been in some sense intended for them. Yet if any one thing is clearly established in regard to "Ephesians" it is that this early belief as to its origin and destination is contrary to fact. If it be an authentic letter of Paul it cannot have been addressed to Ephesus,[1] or at least not to Ephesus alone.

On this point text and context are at one. The older and more authentic text does not admit the words *ἐν Ἐφέσῳ* in i. 1, and if it did the reading would involve so great contradiction with other portions of the epistle that we should be compelled to regard it as pseudonymous. For it is insupposable that Paul should have written to that church which of all that come within our ken had known him longest and most intimately, as if he had only "heard of the faith which is among you" (i. 15), and as if even his own vocation as Apostle to the Gentiles were a matter which might, or perhaps might not, have come to their ears (iii. 2). Historical imagination balks at the

[1] On the unanimity of modern scholarship see the opening words of Harnack's essay below referred to.

endeavour to conceive this abstract elaboration of themes more concretely presented in Colossians, an essay without local colour, and destitute even of the few personal greetings of its companion epistles, as addressed by Paul to the very headquarters of his missionary work in the Hellenic field, the centre from which he had built it up in a three-years' conflict against "many adversaries" (1 Cor. xvi. 8–9).

No wonder, then, that those who go furthest toward maintaining the authenticity of the title are those who deny the Pauline authorship of the Epistle. To these the lack of correspondence the composition displays with the known facts of Paul's long service in Ephesus (Acts xix. 10) might be a welcome proof of its pseudonymity. Contrariwise, those who maintain the authenticity of the Epistle deny that of the title. These rest their case mainly on the very strong textual evidence against the words *ἐν Ἐφέσῳ* in i. 1; for the oldest manuscripts and witnesses to the text corroborate to this extent the implications of the work, that they give nothing more as its superscription than the enigmatic words "Paul . . . to the saints that are and faithful in Christ Jesus" (*Παῦλος . . . τοῖς ἁγίοις τοῖς οὖσιν καὶ πιστοῖς ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ*).

A favourite explanation of the phenomena among defenders of the Pauline authorship dates back to Archbishop Ussher. It maintains the correctness of the strange reading in i. 1: "To the saints that are," supported as it is by the most important manuscripts [1] and the express testimony of Basil [2] as well as by the comment of Origen,[3] and explains it as intended to be supplemented after the words "which are" (*τοῖς οὖσιν*) by the name of the particular locality

[1] ℵB 67². Lightfoot observes that in the Pauline Epistles this combination almost always represents the true text.

[2] *Adv. Eunom.* ii. 19: *οὕτω καὶ οἱ πρὸ ἡμῶν παραδεδώκασι καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐν τοῖς παλαιοῖς τῶν ἀντιγράφων εὑρήκαμεν.*

[3] Cramer's *Catena ad loc.*

to which the bearer might come. The epistle was intended as a circular, or encyclical, which accompanied Colossians and was carried by Tychicus and Onesimus on their journey to Colossae (Philem.; Col. iv. 7–9). It was intended to be exchanged among the churches of the Lycus Valley, Colossae, Hierapolis and Laodicea (Col. iv. 13) and perhaps as far down the valley of the Maeander as Miletus (Acts xx. 17). Colossians iv. 16, which gives directions for an exchange of epistles between Colossae and Laodicea, has reference to this circular. Ephesus being the most important of the churches in this region the encyclical took its name πρὸς Ἐφεσίους from the copy handed down in that church. Ultimately the words ἐν Ἐφέσῳ were inserted into the text at the point left blank. Their unauthenticity appears from their occurrence only in the later transcriptions and the versions, and from the fact that they did not always appear at the same place in the sentence.

The theory of an encyclical, or circular, letter is entirely in accord with the actual practice of Paul, and has much to commend it in this case. The difficulty is not with the supposition that Paul intended this letter, like the letter "to the churches of Galatia" to go from one locality to another, but with the application of this idea to the textual history of Ephesians i. 1. We may heartily grant that Paul wrote this larger elaboration of the theme of Colossians with the desire and expectation that it should be read in all "the churches of (proconsular) Asia" [1]; but would he in that case have employed the modern device of a blank to be filled up by the church reader according to locality? The example of Galatians (and 1 Cor. i. 2 [2] ?) indicates that he would not. His method would have been to use

[1] 1 Cor. xvi. 19.

[2] See, however, the objections raised by Heinrici and others against the authenticity of "with all . . . in every place," or at least against construing this clause with the salutation.

instead of *ἐν Ἐφέσῳ*, *ἐν Λαοδικείᾳ*, or the like, some more comprehensive geographical designation inclusive of all the readers. Let us go further still with our conclusions, and grant that the first copies of the letter did actually display the device of the blank filled out according to local requirement. Is it likely on such an assumption that all other variants than "in Ephesus" would have disappeared without trace? These are serious objections to the once popular theory of a superscription in blank. But even these are not all. A further recent observation is even more fatal.

Discovery of multitudes of examples of contemporary letter-writing in the Oxyrhynchus papyri led Professor J. Rendel Harris[1] to make an extraordinarily interesting application of the epistolary conventions of the time to certain peculiarities of the Pauline Epistles, in particular to the phenomena of 1 Thessalonians ii. 13; Colossians i. 9, among which, however, must be included Ephesians i. 15 and vi. 21. In all these passages the special emphasis of the Greek upon the personal pronoun (*καὶ ἡμεῖς*, *καὶ ὑμεῖς*, "we *too*," "you *also*") goes to show that some special *relation of reciprocity* exists. As Lightfoot[2] remarked with reference to Colossians i. 9, "*καὶ* denotes the response of the Apostle's personal feeling to the favourable character of the news." The most recent commentator on 1 Thessalonians ii. 13[3] maintains that

> *καὶ* presupposes a letter from the Thessalonians to Paul (cf. iv. 9, 13; v. 1) in which they thanked God, as Paul now thanks Him.

But if the conjunction *καί* in its relation to the emphasised personal pronoun of 1 Thessalonians ii. 13 "presupposes a letter from the Thessalonians to Paul," if in Colossians

[1] "A Study in Letter-writing," EXPOSITOR, VIII. (Dec., 1898).
[2] *Comm. ad loc.*
[3] Frame, *Internat. Crit. Comm.* (1912) *ad loc.*

i. 9 it denotes a "response to news," much more surely must this be the case with the καὶ ἐγώ and καὶ ὑμεῖς of Ephesians i. 15 and vi. 21. Especially will this be true of the double correspondence in vi. 21 καὶ ὑμεῖς . . . τὰ κατ' ἐμέ. The Apostle means: As *I* have been informed through *your* messenger of *your* affairs, so now *you* in turn shall be informed through *my* messenger, Tychicus, of *my* affairs. And if such be the true explanation of these hitherto unexplained phenomena[1] "Ephesians" is the reply to a letter from Paul's correspondents. These had united in a message to him, almost certainly in written form; they cannot, therefore, have been a mere undefined aggregate of believers. In view of the relation of reciprocity implied in Ephesus i. 15 and vi. 21 the theory that this is a general, or circular, letter, adaptable to *any* community by the simple device of a blank in the address, to be filled out according to locality by the bearer, or the church reader, becomes untenable.

Quite apart from this third objection, and in view only of the two first mentioned, Dr. T. K. Abbott was led to reject the idea of an encyclical. He reverts to a view kindred to that of Origen, which assumes the reading τοῖς οὖσιν καὶ πιστοῖς to be correct, and endeavours to give it an intelligible meaning. In fact at an even earlier time so excellent an authority as Dr. Milligan[2] had advocated the curious rendering: "To the saints existing and faithful in Christ Jesus."

[1] Harnack, in the monograph hereinafter referred to (*Sizungsberichte der B. Gk.*, XXXVII., July 21, 1910) attempts to explain the conjunction by reference to the parallel in Col. iv. 7 ff. "You also" *sc.* as well as the Colossians to whom I am sending a companion epistle. Harnack admits, however, that this involves a mental slip on the Apostle's part, since he has omitted to inform his readers of the fact of this companion epistle. For other attempted explanations see the commentaries of Abbott, Robinson, Hofmann, *et al.*

[2] *Enc. Brit.*, 9th ed., *s.v.* "Ephesians."

Probably few will think it credible that Paul is here employing the verb "to be" in the mystical sense imagined by Origen, who sought to use Jehovah's declaration to Moses, "I am that I am," as a parallel. Possibly we might imagine Paul declaring the saints to be sharers in the absolute being (οὐσία), the eternal existence of God; but it is more difficult to conceive him as addressing a letter to persons of this description. If this be not enough to dispose of both Origen's view and Milligan's the unbroken practice of Paul in every other parallel case should suffice.[1]

But Dr. Abbott thinks it entirely possible and satisfactory (?) to render "the saints who are also faithful." According to his view

> This would by no means imply that there might be ἅγιοι who were not πιστοί, but would rather give prominence to the thought that the apostle did not recognise any as ἅγιοι in the technical sense unless they were also πιστοί.[2]

Dr. Abbott's rendering can hardly be regarded as probable, or appropriate to the superscription of a letter; but even if it were so it would not be true to say that the difficulty (which he frankly admits) that in all the parallel passages (of which there are a number in Romans, 1 and 2 Corinthians, 1 Thessalonians and Philippians) Paul invariably *introduces the place-name* after the participle, is "the only" one. On the contrary the grammatical objection is even more fatal that had Paul desired to express the sense Dr. Abbott imputes to him the proper Greek expression for it would have been, not τοῖς οὖσιν καὶ πιστοίς, but simply τοῖς καὶ πιστοῖς *without the participle.*

The upshot of the matter is that neither ancients nor moderns can make sense of the reading τοῖς οὖσιν καὶ πιστοίς. The preponderant evidence, both historical and textual, requires us to accept it in preference to ἐν Ἐφέσῳ; but

[1] See below.
[2] *I.C.C.*, p. 2.

without the addition of *some* geographical term after the participle *οὖσιν* the sentence is unintelligible.

We are driven thus to the consideration of a very ancient alternative, the supposition, assumed to be fact no later than by Marcion himself *ca.* 140 A.D., that this epistle is the letter referred to in Colossians iv. 16 as "the epistle (you can obtain) from Laodicea," a writing of the Apostle's which he wishes to have read in exchange for his Epistle to the Colossians, and that in some way, whether by accident or design, the words *ἐν Λαοδικίᾳ* have disappeared from the text after *οὖσιν* in i. 1.

Tertullian makes the sneering remark that Marcion, by entitling the Epistle in his collection as "To the Laodiceans," gives himself airs as "an indefatigable investigator" (diligentissimus explorator). Does this, or does it not, imply any different text in Ephesians i. 1 in Marcion's *Apostolos* from that which we have seen was known to Origen, and which appears in our own oldest codices?

Many argue that had Marcion offered any other reading than "to the saints that are," Tertullian would surely have charged him with tampering with the text. As it is Tertullian merely says Marcion pretends to superior knowledge where the wisest admit their ignorance. His appeal is not to a better *text* in i. 1, but to a better *title*, the title Epistola and Ephesios (*Πρὸς Ἐφεσίους*), which as we have seen had been current everywhere save in Marcionite circles since the time of Ignatius. The appeal made by Tertullian to the "veritas ecclesiae" instead of the authentic copies (Basil's *παλαίοι ἀντιγράφοι*) does indeed indicate that *Tertullian's* text read "to the saints that are"; but does it show that *Marcion's* also had no more? This hardly follows. Abbott thinks it is implied by the use of the word *titulus* in the phrase Marcion ei titulum aliquando interpolare gestiit, which he renders

" falsify the *title*." Harnack, contrariwise, maintains that *titulus* here means (or at least includes) the superscription in verse 1.

Hence Marcion's bible had the reading Παῦλος ἀπόστολος Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ διὰ θελήματος θεοῦ τοῖς ἁγίοις τοῖς οὖσιν ἐν Λαοδικίᾳ κ.τ.λ., and the words were such because Marcion had thus received them by tradition.

Harnack cites instances which clearly prove that titulus *may* be used in a broader sense, but these will hardly avail against the present context; for Tertullian continues immediately thereafter: nihil autem de titulis interest, as he could hardly have done had he not *in this case* referred to the title only. On the other hand Harnack's contention that Marcion's variant, whether a matter of text and title both, or of title only, was not due to personal conjecture, as Tertullian charges, but was written in good faith according to what he had received from his predecessors, is justified. Abbott also remarks that Marcion had no theological motive for changing the title, and that it is unlikely that he should be led to adopt the title " To the Laodiceans " by the mere fact that mention is made elsewhere of an Epistle (not to, but) " from Laodicea " (Col. iv. 16). There is nothing in the epistle itself to suggest Laodicea, hence Abbott infers as " not improbable that he had seen a copy with ἐν Λαοδικείᾳ in the text." But what is gained by chasing the interpolation one stage further back? Marcion's predecessor's action remains as unaccountable as his own. For while a commentator such as Theodore of Mopsuestia might be so impressed by the phrase " having *heard of* your faith " (ἀκούσας τὴν πίστιν, i. 15) as to date the epistle before Paul's residence in Ephesus conjectures based purely on internal evidence of this kind are quite foreign (as Harnack notes) to the method of Marcion, and are still more improbable the further back we go.

Are we then justified in assuming the currency in

Marcion's time, or earlier, of a variant text in the form *τοῖς οὖσιν ἐν Λαοδικείᾳ*, as well as a variant title? The evidence is, to say the least, precarious. It may well seem strange that a transcriber who superscribed the Epistle with the title *Πρὸς Λαοδικέας* should be content with such an unintelligible reading in i. 1 as *τοῖς ἁγίοις τοῖς οὖσιν καὶ πιστοῖς*; but in reality we have no adequate evidence that either Tertullian or Marcion had anything else,[1] and it is manifest that even an Origen could content himself with it. Transcribers usually consider it their business to transcribe and no more. Even when at a later time *ἐν Ἐφέσῳ* makes its way into the text the approach is likely to have been by way of the title (a field regarded by the scribe as more open to his inventive powers) and not conversely.

The evidence, then, does warrant our maintaining that in the regions of Pauline Christianity whence Marcion came (not over-remote from those to which "Ephesians" was originally addressed) there existed a tradition which named *Laodicea* as its destination. In support of this we have not merely the positive statement of Tertullian but the corroboration of an ancient Prologue almost certainly based upon the Canon of Marcion and preceding in it that entitled "Ad Colosenses." It runs in the extant Latin:

Ad Laodicenses

Laodicenses sunt Asiani. Hi accepto verbo veritatis perstiterunt in fide. Hos conlaudat apostolus scribens eis a Roma de carcere.

[1] Harnack bids us notice that Tertullian does not say of Marcion's perversion, *assutavit* but *interpoluvit* titulum. He himself, however, does not claim more from this than it makes the addition in **i. 1** "wahrscheinlich." The titulus not belonging to the original writing both Tertullian's title and Marcion's were, strictly speaking, "interpolations," with the difference that the one represented the veritas ecclesiae, the other heretical presumption.

Besides this we have the warning of the *Muratorian Canon* against spurious letters "forged in the name of Paul" which propagate "the heresy of Marcion." The first of the two specified is an epistle "Ad Laudicenses," by which beyond doubt "Ephesians" as current in the Marcionite canon is meant. On the other hand the evidence does not quite warrant the assumption that any text known to Marcion contained the words "in Laodicea" in the text, however probable it may be that this title really rests upon an original superscription which contained the words in i. 1.

Have we not, then, already sufficient evidence to make it probable that "Ephesians" is no mere encyclical, but the actual letter referred to by Paul in Colossians iv. 16 as obtainable "from Laodicea" in exchange for a copy of Colossians? So eminent an authority as Lightfoot once regarded this as at least a possibility; for in the exhaustive excursus on "The Epistle from Laodicea" on pages 340–366 of the first edition (1875) of his *Commentary on Colossians and Philemon*, a section omitted in later editions, he wrote as follows regarding the letter in question in Colossians iv. 16:—

> Unlike the Epistle to Philemon it was addressed not to a private person, but to a church, or churches. If therefore it can be shown that the Laodiceans were the recipients, either alone or with others, we have found the object of our search. The arguments in favour of this solution are reserved for the introduction to that epistle.[1] Meanwhile it is sufficient to say that educated opinion is tending, though slowly, in this direction, and to express the belief that ultimately this view will be generally received.

The opinion which here receives the immense weight of Lightfoot's support has two alternative forms covered by the clause "either *alone* or with others." So far as the former is concerned Lightfoot's prediction has remained unfulfilled. It obtained in 1910 one very eminent sup-

[1] Unpublished.

porter. Apart from this once honoured name it seems to have won few if any advocates. Lightfoot himself abandoned it in favour of the "encyclical" theory, and the great body of critics and commentators have as usual followed his lead. Why, then, was the theory adopted which later discovery so strongly tends to disprove,[1] the theory of an encyclical ("with others") and its alternative ("alone") disregarded? Why does Harnack's plea for the correctness of Marcion's title, and the reading τοῖς οὖσιν ἐν Λαοδικίᾳ in Ephesians i. 1, still awaken so little response?

It is not that the abridged expression τὴν [ἐκ Λαοδικίας for "the letter left at Laodicea which you will procure from thence" causes serious difficulty. Lightfoot, in his note *ad loc.*, gives abundant parallels for this "proleptic use" calling it "extremely common." Neither is there insuperable difficulty in accounting for the occurrence of sporadic variants, exhibiting in text or title, or in both, a different geographical name. It is here as in the case of the Darwinian theory, the real crux is not in accounting for the *origin* of variants. These occur continually in every garden, botanical or zoological; and they are just as continually swamped in the overwhelming flood of the normal unless preserved by some *selective* force or agency, "natural" or artificial. In order to have a "survival" some kind of very wide-reaching, long-continued pressure must be exerted, preserving the new type, blotting out the old; and this principle of "selection" applies exactly as well to variant readings as to botanical or zoological 'sports.' We find little difficulty in imagining the origin of a sporadic copy or two of an original letter "To the Laodiceans" appearing under the title "To the Ephesians," with corresponding changes in i. 1. It is very far from easy to account

[1] See above.

for the fact that by the middle of the second century *every* known copy of the letter, with the possible exception of one in the hands of Marcion, or some unknown predecessor, presented either the unintelligible address "to them that are," or else had in i. 1 "to them that are in Ephesus." Until some explanation is furnished of this extraordinary side-tracking of the original superscription and title, those who maintain that Paul originally addressed the letter to the Laodiceans, and that for one reason or another the address was changed, will make little headway. It is of small use to suggest reasons why the change might have been made, if the suggestion does not *also* involve an explanation why within a brief time after it had been made in a necessarily limited number of copies, not *one* of the older, more authentic type had been permitted to survive. It is probably due to its lack of any adequate answer to this second factor of the problem that Harnack's otherwise brilliant suggestion in his essay "Die Addresse des Epheserbriefs des Paulus" met little response.

Harnack's solution of the problem lacks nothing of originality or romantic interest. It might even be called startling to scholars familiar with the history of the transmission of written texts. Harnack maintains that some forty (!) years after the original promulgation of this exceptionally well known and widely utilised epistle of the great Apostle the words *ἐν Λαοδικίᾳ* were *expunged from its superscription* by deliberate and intentional, if not actually concerted, action. This action was taken by the Pauline churches, among whom the letters of Paul first circulated, out of a feeling of indignation against the church in Laodicea, whose condition in 90–95 A.D. may be judged from the message "to the angel of the church in Laodicea" in Revelation iii. 14–22, "I will spew thee out of my mouth."

We may grant Harnack's first contention, that if "the

saints that are " be (as we have shown) an inadmissible reading there is no alternative to his theory of the origin of the change save an *accidental* disappearance of the proper name. This theory of accident is held by Jülicher and other leading German scholars, and was adopted in 1900 by the present writer. It is nevertheless, as Harnack justly charges, a counsel of despair: for the appeal to accident is really equivalent to surrender of the attempt to explain. Moreover it is inconceivable that in the case of so well known a letter transcribers should not have been able to make good the lacuna of any accidentally defective copy, if only from common knowledge orally transmitted. We may therefore welcome as an important contribution the reference to Revelation iii. 14-22, by way of answer to *the first part* of our double question. As an explanation *why the change should have been made* in one or more copies of Paul's letter to the *Laodiceans* it is adequate, and in the language of Lightfoot we may venture to "express the belief that ultimately this view will be generally received."

The weakness of the theory appears in its attempt to answer the second part of the questions, which has reference to the conformation of all (or practically all) variants to the new, and less authentic type. As applied to *a single copy* (from whence a larger or smaller family might descend) Harnack's description of the process of change is the best possible. Antiquity does furnish plenty of examples, both epigraphic and palaeographic, of the erasure of obnoxious names. They were chiselled out from monuments, erased from documents. Harnack presents the probable origin *of the variant form* in the clearest light when he concludes:

> The elimination of the words ἐν Ἐφέσῳ (in i. 1) was not a result of accident; still less was a deception intended. Originally there was no intention of changing anything: the object was only to punish the church so severely arraigned by the apocalyptist for its unfaithfulness - to punish it after the fashion of literary punish-

ment current both then and now. "Thy name be forgotten." The lacuna informed every reader in the primary period that here an execution of sentence had taken place. But a name had to be found for the epistle. This could not be left to share in the punishment! It must rather be conserved as a priceless jewel. Here the name of "Ephesus" suggested itself.

Supposing the change to have begun with the text and afterwards to have extended to the title, this account of its origin could probably not be improved upon. But we have seen that no adequate evidence exists for the currency of any text, even in Marcion's time, which still contained the authentic *ἐν Λαοδικίᾳ*. Is it not at least as probable that the change began with that element which was recognised from the beginning as pertaining to publishers and transcribers and not the author's own? Tertullian himself expressly says with reference to this very case that "titles are a matter of indifference, since what the apostle wrote for some he would equally have addressed to all."[1] If we take our start from the variant of which we have clear and indisputable evidence, the currency of the same epistle in some quarters as "To the Laodiceans," in others as "To the Ephesians," it will be comparatively easy to understand cancellations and substitutions in i. 1. We need only remember that one alteration can hardly have taken place without the other. Whoever altered the title cannot have left a blank. The epistle had to be called either "To the Laodiceans" or "To the Ephesians"; for any other church than Ephesus would hardly be thought of in a letter carried by "Tychicus" (Eph. vi. 21; cf. 2 Tim. iv. 12; Col. iv. 7). The new title would make the text *ἐν Λαοδικίᾳ* of i. 1 untenable. Either there would

[1] Nihil autem de titulis interest, cum ad omnes apostolus scripserit, dum ad quosdam. With this expression of contemporary feeling compare the still earlier Muratorian Fragment on Paul and John writing by name to seven churches only because "in writing to seven churches he nevertheless speaks to all" (licet septem ecclesiis scribat tamen omnibus dicit).

be simple cancellation (the primary recourse of the scribe in perplexity), or conformation to the title by change to ἐν Ἐφέσῳ. These are in fact the actually attested variants, the less intelligible gradually giving way before the simpler.

But still we lack explanation of the suppression of the original ἐν Λαοδικίᾳ from the text, and the almost complete suppression of the original title. Are we to suppose that an œcumenical council was held *ca.* 95 A.D., which resolved to call in all copies of the Epistle and issue a new edition conveying the proper "punishment" upon Laodicea in a new text and title? Obviously the method is impracticable. There may be something piquant to the fancy in imagining such coincident, if not concerted, action by the churches, depriving hundreds of copies of the great Pauline letter of their long-accustomed title and superscription and supplying them with another; but this is not the sober 'historical' imagination taught by experience of fact. Changes as complete as this have occurred. Textual critics can cite examples; but not under the circumstances of the Pauline Epistles in 60–90 A.D. Some other selective agency must be found wider and more persistent in operation than the desire to punish ("strafen") the church in Laodicea, to account for a process which in the very nature of the case would inevitably take the form of a gradual extinction of the less popular text by the increasing predominance of preferred readings. Even so rigid a canon as that of the Massoretic Hebrew could not suppress the variants of the Septuagint, and those which it did suppress cannot have disappeared at once. Still less could this occur with the title and superscription of one of the best known and most widely circulated of the letters of Paul a full generation after its original publication.

The theory of primitive elimination conceals its real weakness under the indefinite phraseology of an impersonal

verb: "*The intention was* to punish the (Laodicean) church." [1] As soon as we ask, *Who* intended this? the real difficulty appears. Only because the example set by some one individual or church proved popular could it obtain a predominance such as ultimately to consign its rival to the limbo of the obsolete. What we really have to account for is a two-fold phenomenon of which the data are these:

(1) Two forms of the title, *a* Πρὸς Λαοδικείς, *b* πρὸς Ἐφεσίους.

(2) Two readings of i. 1, *a* without place-name, *b* with ἐν Ἐφέσῳ.

From (1) considered in conjunction with the contents of the epistle and Colossians iv. 16 it becomes highly probable that *a* represents the original destination of the writing. The fact that it survives only in heretical quarters is no real objection, since it is devoid of heretical animus. Its disappearance in favour of *b* can be accounted for, once the *origin* of *b* is explained, by the very fact that it was almost from the outset stigmatised as a *heretical* invention.[2] The *origin* of *b* may well be dislike of unworthy Laodicea, its triumph over its rival, to the extent of ultimate sole *survival*, was due to a different selective agency—the determination to uproot "the heresy of Marcion."

Under (2) it is necessary to bear in mind that we have no adequate evidence of any third form such as would be required if the epistle was really addressed to Laodicea. If the third form (*c*) with ἐν Λαοδικίᾳ was ever current it has entirely disappeared. Justly or unjustly it was regarded as "Marcionite," and this was fatal. Form *b* needs no further discussion. It is obviously dependent

[1] "Man wollte die . . . Gemeinde strafen." P. 708.

[2] Before Tertullian the Fragment of Muratori (*ca.* 185) classes "ad Laudicenses" with another "ad Alexandrinos" (?) as forged in Paul's name "according to the heresy of Marcion."

upon form *b* of the title. Is this also the case with form *a*? Reluctant as we may be to part with so romantically attractive a theory as that of primitive excision, sober judgment based on the actual practice of transcribers of the text will probably answer in the affirmative. The bringing of the text into conformity with the title may, or may not, have been coincident in time with the change of designation. Reading *c* may, or may not, have been preserved along with form *a* of the title in heretical quarters. All we can say with certainty is that *both* variants of i. 1 can be fully accounted for by the same cause, viz., conformation to a change of title from an original πρὸς Λαοδικείς to a less objectionable πρὸς Ἐφεσίους. In the case of form *a* the disagreement was removed by simple cancellation, in form *b* by substitution. Paul wrote "to the saints which are at Laodicea." Had some less obnoxious name than *Marcion's* stood sponsor for this authentic text it would almost certainly have survived.

B. W. Bacon.

THE GLORY IN THE FOURTH GOSPEL.

(1) The Glory of Christ is revealed in word in the discourse in the Upper Room, and in deed in the Crucifixion and Resurrection. It is with the first that we shall for the most part be concerned.

(i.) The anointing in Bethany and the triumphal entry do not yield very distinctively Johannine theological material. But the keynote of this section of the Gospel is struck in the response given to the request of the Greeks. The crucifixion is represented as glorification, and the necessity of death for the abounding fruitfulness of His work is declared (xii. 23, 24). The same truth is affirmed in the logion in iii. 14, 15, which probably belongs to this context. The

comparison, however, is not to a natural phenomenon, but to a historical occurrence. This necessary death is the world's judgment, the condemnation of its antagonism to Him, and the defeat of its prince (ver. 31, cf. xvi. 8–11). His death is such an exaltation of His person as will invest Him with universal attractiveness (xii. 32). Although the evangelist limits the reference of the lifting up to the Crucifixion, yet it seems to include Resurrection and Ascension also; for probably to this context belongs the logion in vi. 62, "What then if ye should behold the Son of Man ascending where He was before?" and an appropriate sequel may be found in iii. 13, omitting the last clause as most probably a gloss of later date. His ascension is a return, a thought which recurs in the discourse in the Upper Room (xvii. 5). If this series of declarations evoked signs of incredulity in His hearers, can a more fitting close of the speech be imagined than iii. 11, 12 (sayings inappropriate to their present context)? His witness, trustworthy as it is, has not been believed; and it is vain to try and teach the heavenly truths about Himself when His hearers will not believe the earthly.

(ii.) This reconstruction may at first sight appear arbitrary, but several reasons can be given for it. *First of all*, we get an intelligible sequence of thought, the mind of Christ passes from the necessity of His death for the accomplishment of His purpose to His exaltation, equally necessary to make His work universally effective; and from His exaltation reverts to His former state with God. *Secondly*, as has been shown, vers. 25–30 seem to be Synoptic echoes, inappropriate to the present context, and the logia brought together here, and fitting so well into one another, are inappropriate in their present contexts. *Thirdly*, the thoughts thus brought together recur in this period of the ministry, and seem premature disclosures at any earlier stage. *Fourthly*, iii. 13, 14 and vi. 62 have in common the title *Son of Man*,

and it is this title, to which no reference is made in xii. 32 although it occurs in verse 23, which perplexes the hearers (ver. 34), and so must just have been used by Jesus in connexion with the saying about the lifting-up. *Lastly*, this series of sayings gives one the impression, not so much of a discourse addressed to an audience, as a soliloquy in a mood of exaltation of spirit occasioned by the request of the Greeks and the prospect of a world-wide ministry which the request suggested.

(iii.) Jesus does not answer the questions of the multitude directly; but bids them use the present opportunity of enlightenment by the truth which He is teaching them and they can, if they will, understand (vers. 35–36a). He is now moved to make the final appeal (vers. 44–50). Faith in Him is faith in the God whose messenger He is, and so is knowledge of Him knowledge of God. His aim is to enlighten men, and even unbelief He does not judge, as what He seeks is to save; and yet such is His teaching that rejection of it must bring condemnation since He makes not His own message, but gets it from God, and delivers it in obedience to God because He knows that faith brings eternal life.

(iv.) After this final appeal, the evangelist adds his own judgment of the unbelief of his nation and shows that it is in accordance with prophetic prediction; and exposes the cowardice of those who, moved to faith, were restrained from confession by prudence (vers. 37–43). Some of the contents of this chapter suggest that it should be joined to the previous section, *the Judgment*; but not only does verse 23 require its inclusion here, but it would be a mistake to separate this part from the rest of the story of the Passion.

(2) The two questions suggested by chapter xiii.—the trustworthiness of the story of the washing of the disciples' feet, and the reason for the absence of the record of the

institution of the Supper—were dealt with in a previous article, and need not now be touched on.

(i.) The evangelist's interpretation of Jesus' consciousness in verse 3 belongs to his theology, and yet it has its roots in the soil of Jesus' own teaching regarding His relation to God and to His disciples. So solicitous was the love of Jesus that His disciples should be delivered from the spirit of ambition, rivalry and faction, which threatened their unity, and so imperilled the continuance of His work by them, that, conscious of His dignity as Son of God, and also of the urgency of their conversion (cf. Matt. xviii. 3) before He was taken from them, He stooped to the slave's service, mainly as an example of humility (vers. 12–17), even as on the former occasion He set the child before them, but also as the conversation with Peter shows (vers. 6–11), as a symbolic act of the cleansing from sin without which they could not be His disciples, and which He alone could impart. If He approved John's baptism, and appointed baptism for His own community, and if He invested Mary's anointing of His body, primarily a token of her devotion, with the secondary meaning of a preparation for His burial (xii. 7), it is not at all incredible that the one act should bear this double sense, especially as it was by His example that the cleansing would be effected. The familiar phrase of Dr. Chalmers, "the expulsive power of a new affection," may serve as illustration. Affection for Him prompted imitation of Him, and imitation meant liberation from their faults of purpose and spirit.

(ii.) Whether Jesus did anticipate by a covert allusion, as in the words in verse 10, "but not all," the express announcement of Judas' betrayal, or not, He had been foreseeing the base act for some time, but at this moment He realised it with intense emotion (ver. 21). His love had been striving against Judas' hate, and made its last appeal

in the choice morsel offered to him (ver. 26), a token understood only by the beloved disciple, the evangelist. His words "that thou doest, do quickly" (ver. 27) express the final judgment of Jesus on the fixity of his evil purpose, not approval, but acquiescence in his deed. Better that the deed should be done with the possibility of reaction after action, penitence after crime, than that the purpose, hindered or delayed, should breed more inward corruption.

(iii.) Although the announcement of Peter's denial (vers. 36–38) quite appropriately attaches itself to verse 33 in the farewell discourse, yet as Mark, whose informant was Peter, places the warning on the way to Gethsemane (xiv. 27–31), and as it is likely that Jesus would spare Peter as long as He could, we may, without assuming a displacement in the text of the Gospel, suppose that the evangelist, who gives no record of what befell at Gethsemane before the arrest (xviii. 1, 2) has placed the incident where he has by association of ideas.

(3) A preference has already been expressed for Dr. Moffatt's rearrangement of the farewell discourse, according to which chapters xv. and xvi. follow xiii. 31a. The one objection is that verses 34, 35 would most appropriately precede xv. 1–8. As they break the context where they are, they might be placed in that position; and would be most appropriate as the commencement of the discourse. Only after the spirit of Jesus was relieved by the withdrawal of the traitor could the call to mutual love be given. The two thoughts in the conversation at the washing of the disciples' feet were resumed; verses 34, 35 continued the thought of verses 12–17 when this hindrance had been removed, and xv. 1–8 enforced generally the dependence which Peter was taught in verses 6–10, notice especially the common idea of cleansing xiii. 10 and xv. 2, 3. In verse 6 there was surely an allusion to Judas, who had just been cast

forth. Such an arrangement seems the most probable, but at best it is conjectural, and the possibility already suggested must not be excluded, that chapters xv. and xvi. record teaching given earlier on that day or on the previous day in Bethany, as the image of the Vine in xv. 1 may have been suggested not only by the wine on the table (Moffatt), but by a well-known ornament in the Temple. We may now discuss the teaching itself in its broad outline without any attempt at detailed exegesis such as a commentary offers, although the summary must be and is based on such exegesis.

(i.) The common witness of the disciples could be borne, and their common work could be done, only as the small company was kept one in love, and so the teaching about love already given was focussed in the new commandment of such mutual service as Jesus had given an example of in washing their feet ; it was to secure such unity that He had loved them to the uttermost (xiii. 34–35). What discipleship involved was then set forth in the comparison of the Vine and its branches ; the demand was fruitfulness, abundant service ; the condition of its fulfilment constant dependence on Him, in whom alone sufficiency could be found ; the penalty of unfruitfulness severance from Him ; the reward of fidelity, confidence in prayer ; and its still greater result the honour of God's name (xv. 1–8). The thought then reverted to the new commandment. As Jesus' enjoyment of God's love depended on His obedience, so also their joy in His love would be fulfilled only as they fully obeyed. Of His love He had given the surest proof in the sacrifice He was to offer, and now He called them into the more intimate relation of friends, not servants, to whom His confidence would be fully given, and whom He had freely chosen to serve, to have boldness in prayer, to love (vers. 9–17). His love to His disciples and their love

for one another suggested by contrast that hatred of the world, to which they would be exposed, even as He had been, because of the difference of His and their purpose and spirit from the world's. The servants would be persecuted as the Master had been, because of the world's unbelief in His mission. Judgment from which there could be no escape must fall, because hatred of Himself was hatred of His Father, and as groundless was entirely blameworthy (18–15).

(ii.) The verses dealing with the Spirit's function break the continuity of thought, and have already been discussed (vers. 26–27); and the thought of the world's hatred is developed in the following chapters in warnings concerning persecution. These warnings were now given that when the persecution did fall on the disciples, faith might not falter, because the Master had foreseen, and had before His departure foretold all that would befall (xvi. 1–4). Although He had spoken of departure, the disciples had remained incurious as to His destination (ver. 5, which would not have been appropriate after xiii. 36 and xiv. 5), and yet His words had saddened them; and so He at once reassured them that the separation would be brief (vers. 6, 7a and 16). The intervening verses belong to the teaching about the Spirit, and if not disconnected with what goes before, yet do not necessarily belong to this context. This teaching caused perplexity which Jesus at once sought to remove by the assurance that their sorrow in contrast to the world's joy would speedily be changed to joy, even as a woman's in childbirth, by His return to them in a permanent communion, in which all perplexity would be removed, all prayer answered, and joy would abound (vers. 17–24). Recognising that His language now must be figurative, He assured them that then in the new revelation of God there would be no obscurity. That revelation would inspire such

confidence in prayer to God as Father, that they would not need the assurance of His intercession, as they would have the certainty of God's favour upon them, because of their relation of devotion to Himself and recognition of His divine mission both in His descent to earth and ascent to heaven (vers. 25–28). This declaration evoked from the disciples a confession of the intelligibility of His speech, the adequacy of His knowledge, and the certainty of His coming from God (vers. 29, 30). How far was the disciple company capable then and there of such a confession ? Or how far is the evangelist antedating the faith of a later time ? Some words of faith must have evoked the warning that all would forsake Him and leave Him alone with the Father ; but looking beyond the immediate present He assured them that all He had said was spoken in order that amid the trials awaiting them they might be ever able to find in Him, the world's conqueror, their sure peace (vers. 31–33).

It must be added, however, that credible as this sequence of thought appears, a doubt must arise about verse 32, which sounds like an echo of Mark xiv. 27, a warning spoken on the way to Gethsemane, and the occasion of Peter's boast, and the special warning addressed to him.

(iii.) The declaration of His victory over the world was fittingly followed by the affirmation of His present glorification in His death, and His future glorification in His Resurrection. Yet while He was sustained Himself by His assurance, He did not and could not forget that His glorification involved separation from the disciples so dear to Him (xiii. 31b, 32, 33). And so He turned from further speech about Himself to comfort them. The remedy for distress of soul is in faith in God and Himself (xiv. 1 ; we need not now pause to discuss all the alternatives of interpretation offered us by the ambiguous form of the Greek verb πιστεύετε).

His destination was but another abode in God's home for His children, and of this His silence offered assurance. His purpose was to prepare an abode for them also, and to return to welcome them there. (The reference might be to the Second Advent, or to each disciple's death.) They were not ignorant of the mode in which He would reach that destination (namely, the path of obedience to God's will which He was now treading). At once Thomas showed that Jesus was taking too much for granted in assuming their understanding; and so He assured them that in Himself as showing men God's truth, and imparting to them God's life, and Himself alone, could men be brought into such relation to God as would secure them this destination, for so clearly and fully was the Father revealed in Him, that an understanding of Him would bring such a knowledge of God as would have the certainty of a vision. Philip's request for a theophany evoked the declaration of such an immanence of the Father in the Son, and such a revelation in word and deed of the Father by the Son, even in the earthly life, as made any theophany superfluous (vers. 2–11). That revelation would not be ended in the earthly life, for His return to the Father would invest Him with such influence and authority, that through His disciples even that revelation would be transcended, as they by prayer could command His greater resources to the honour of the Father in the Son; but the prayer which could so prevail must be the prayer of obedient love (vers. 12–15). After the interpolation regarding the Spirit in verses 16 and 17 or 16–20, the connexion between love and obedience was more fully developed. Obedience was evidence of a love to Himself which would secure the Father's love and the Son's, and a fuller manifestation (ver. 21), so that they would not be left desolate but would not only know Him as the world could not, but would find their life in Him the Living One.

and in Him God and Man would share a common life (vers. 18–20). These verses may belong to the saying about the Spirit, but may also find a fitting place between verses 21 and 22, as Judas' question takes up the thought of verse 19. In answer to Judas, Jesus showed that only obedient love could receive such a revelation of, and communication from God (vers. 22–24). His last bequest to His disciples was the peace characteristic of Himself in His dependence on and submission to God (ver. 27; cf. Matt. xi. 27–30). His last appeal was that they would not sadden His departure by their fears and griefs, but would in love to Himself try to share His gladness in returning to His Father, to whom He confessed His inferiority and subordination (ver. 28). The very conception of sonship in the Godhead involves the declaration in the words "the Father is greater than I." His last resolve was that, guiltless as He was of any share in the world's sin, He would submit to the Father's will in accepting death (vers. 30, 31).

(iv.) Probably standing around the table, Jesus offered the high-priestly prayer of chapter xvii., in form rather a soliloquy towards God than ordinary petition. Verse 3 has already been described as a gloss, an explanation by the evangelist, or his editor. *First*, Jesus prayed that God would honour Him even in His death as the bearer of eternal life to men, so that He might honour God. As He had honoured God by fulfilling His vocation on earth, so He desired to return to His pre-existent honour. (For Paul the Resurrection was more than a return only to the pre-existent state.) His work had not been vain, as His divine mission had found a full recognition in the disciples, whom the Father had given Him (not by an arbitrary election, but by the drawing of God's Spirit in their enlightenment and quickening; cf. vi. 44, vers. 1–8). *Next*, for a time concentrating His solicitude on His disciples, Jesus, conscious of how great a loss to them His

departure must prove, and to how great perils they would be exposed in a hostile world, committed them to the guidance and guardianship of His Father, so that their unity might be preserved, and they might individually be delivered from the loss of their faith, which Judas had suffered, by the dominant influence of the revelation of truth and grace which He had already given them. As they had a mission in the world even as He had, and as He had devoted Himself to His calling in order that they might be so devoted, He did not desire their withdrawal from the hostile world in which that mission had to be discharged, but only their preservation from the power of evil dominant in that world by their entire devotion and submission to the revelation of God they had received in His teaching (vers. 9–19). *Lastly*, extending His interest beyond the circle of His disciples, Jesus prayed on behalf of the whole Christian community that its unity might so reproduce the divine unity as to convince the world of His divine mission; since He had called all its members to share His relation to His Father, so that through their development into this unity it might be made manifest in His divine mission that the Father's love to Him was extended also to them all. This common participation in the Father's love, which for Him was eternal reality, He desired for them not only in this present experience, but also in their future destiny with Himself. To the righteous Father the plea was in closing offered that in an unbelieving world He had known God, and revealed Him, and His disciples had acknowledged God's revelation in Him of a love which first of all His, had through Him become theirs also (20–26). It has been impossible in this summary to reproduce all the minute details of the discourse, nor did that seem necessary; since we must recognise that we have no *verbatim* report before us, that Jesus' method of speech as the Synoptists reveal it was not of this fashion,

and that the Evangelist brooding over what He had heard for many years turned the thoughts over and over again in His mind, and so is responsible for the subtle distinctions and frequent repetitions. It is in the great leading thoughts that we seem to come into touch with the mind of Jesus Himself.

ALFRED E. GARVIE.

ACCIDENTAL DISARRANGEMENT IN THE FOURTH GOSPEL.

THE object of this paper is to reconsider the hypothesis of Accidental Disarrangement in connexion with the Fourth Gospel. When I dealt with it in these columns three years ago [1] I had not read Spitta's *Das Johannes-Evangelium*, nor did I know of two articles—that by Mr. Strayer on *Transpositions of Text in St. John's Gospel* (Journal of Theological Studies, ii. 137), and that by Mr. Paul *On Two Dislocations in St. John's Gospel* (Hibbert Journal, vii. 662)—which deal with the same problem. The last of these, in fact, anticipates much of what I wrote then, and encourages the attempt to carry the inquiry a step further.

I need not restate the hypothesis of Accidental Disarrangement. I beg leave to assume that transpositions in the text of the Fourth Gospel may have come about accidentally by the disarrangement of whole pages of an archetype in papyrus codex form, and that it may be possible, by examining passages in which disarrangement is suspected on internal grounds, so to reconstruct the *format* of this archetype as to provide an external test of these transpositions, or of others which may suggest themselves.

[1] EXPOSITOR, May, 1915, p. 421.

Our procedure involves in each case a triple inquiry. It must aim at showing, first, that the passage thought to be misplaced may have formed just a page, or a group of pages, in the archetype: for accidental disarrangement can only come about by pages: secondly, that the place which it now occupies in the text may have fallen between the end of one page and the beginning of another: and thirdly, that there may have been a similar gap at the place where, according to internal evidence, it originally stood. In my previous paper I dealt only with the first of these requirements. But that is inconclusive, without the second and third. Yet to satisfy all three would seem to be a matter of considerable difficulty. If they can be satisfied, and that not once only, but in a series of instances, the hypothesis merits more attention than it has received hitherto.

[1.] Spitta's theory of the composition of the Gospel rests upon his analysis of xxi.; and this he believes to have formed, together with ii. 1–12 (the Marriage at Cana) and iv. 46–54 (the Healing of the Courtier's Son), a trilogy of Galilean miracle-stories. In his translation of the Gospel, therefore, he prints both iv. 46–54 and xxi. 1–22 (v. 23–25 he regards as editorial) immediately after ii. 12. Let us take this as a first challenge to the hypothesis of Accidental Disarrangement, and see what results. First, iv. 46–54 consists of 18½ lines in the R.V. Greek Testament.[1] Secondly, if we measure backwards from ii. 12, we find that 85½ lines bring us to the beginning of the Gospel proper at i. 19 (the Prologue, i. 1–18 being regarded as an addition to the text). Now 85½ is almost exactly 17 × 5 (85): supposing 17 lines to represent the amount of text contained in one page of the archetype, ii. 12 will have stood at the end of p. 5. Thirdly, if we measure forward from ii. 13

[1] Clarendon Press, 1901: this edition has been used throughout.

to iv. 45, we find that this block consists of 170 lines, or exactly 10 pages of 17 lines each; so that iv. 45 will have stood at the end of p. 15. That is to say, two out of the three conditions necessary for the accidental transposition of iv. 46–54 from the end of ii. 12 to its present position are satisfied exactly, and the third very nearly so. Indeed we cannot exclude the possibility that iv. 46–54 may have been lengthened from the 17 lines that it should be to the $18\frac{1}{2}$ that it is by editorial additions after transposition:—for instance, the words "where he made the water wine" in v. 46 would not have been needed in the original context of the passage.

With regard to Spitta's third Galilean miracle-story, xx. 1–22, we find that this contains an exact multiple of 17 lines ($51 = 17 \times 3$), and could therefore easily have dropped out of the gap between ii. 12 and 13: its subsequent restoration at the end of the Gospel needs no explanation. Nevertheless it is difficult to believe that this passage, in anything like its present form, stood so early in the Gospel: I prefer to regard it as the Conclusion, and to leave it out of the reckoning.

(ii.) In my previous paper I suggested that iii. 22-30 originally stood in the gap between ii. 12 and 13. This passage consists of $16\frac{3}{4}$ lines, and may well have followed immediately after the trilogy of miracles, to which its opening words "after these things" would refer. But, if so, some other alteration has come about in the text; for a measurement from ii. 13 to iii. 21 gives 64 lines, which is hardly near enough to 68 (17×4) to prove that iii. 21 was the end of a page. That is, we can see how iii. 22-30 may have slipped out of the gap between ii. 12 and 13, but we cannot prove that there was a gap into which it slipped between iii. 21 and 31.

(iii.) The transpositions of v. and vi. is the most commonly

accepted instance of disarrangement in the Gospel. Does our hypothesis throw any light upon it? If v. originally stood after vi., and was accidentally moved to its present position, there should be evidence (1) that it filled 17 or a multiple of 17 lines, and (2) that in the archetype iv. and vi. each ended at the foot of a page. As to this, (1) v. contains 84 lines, almost exactly 17×5 (85); and (2) measuring from iii. 31 to iv. 45 (and assuming that iv. 46–54 did not originally stand here; see (i.) above), we get $89\frac{1}{2}$ lines, which, though not identical with 85, is fairly close to it; and measuring on to the end of vi. we get 221 lines, exactly 17×13. Thus two out of the three requirements for accidental transposition are satisfied to a remarkable degree, and a comparatively small editorial addition to iii. 31–iv. 45 might account for the error in the third figure.

(iv.) The transposition of v. as a whole is inconsistent with the separate disarrangement of v. 19–47, which I favoured in my previous paper: and the passage contains 54 lines, showing perhaps too large a margin of error compared with the comparatively small total 51 (17×3). If any transposition has taken place here, it should probably be looked for at an earlier stage in the history of the text.

(v.) It is generally agreed that something is wrong with the order of vii. Either *vv.* 15–24 or (according to Spitta) *vv.* 19–24 may be out of place, and should stand at the beginning of the chapter, or (so Spitta) after v. 19a. Let us test these suggestions. The passage vii. 15–24 contains almost exactly 17 lines: the subtraction of *vv.* 15–18 from it would make its accidental transposition impossible: therefore, if any disarrangement has taken place, it involves *vv.* 15–24 as a whole. Again, we have already found that our hypothesis allows for a break at the end of vi., but not at the end of v. 19a: Spitta's rearrangement therefore fails. But the other suggestion is equally incapable of

proof : for though *vv.* 15–24 might have been displaced from the beginning of the chapter, the measurement of *vv.* 1–14 ($23\frac{1}{2}$ lines) shows no gap at the point where the passage now stands. Either, then, this way of mending vii. is the wrong one, or alterations subsequent to transposition have covered up some of its traces.

(vi.) The most obvious gap in the Gospel occurs after vii. 52, where the *pericope adulterae* has been inserted. Let us reconstruct our supposed archetype up to this point, and see whether it provides for the gap.

[i. 1–18	$= 25\frac{3}{4}$	lines		
i. 19–ii. 12	$= 85\frac{1}{2}$	,, $(17\times5=85)$	=p. 1–5 of archetype.	
iv. 46–54	$= 18\frac{1}{4}$	,, (17)	=p. 6	,,
[xxi. 1–22	$= 51$	,, $(17\times3=51)$		
iii. 22–30	$= 16\frac{3}{4}$	,, (17)	=p. 7	,,
ii. 13–iii. 21	$= 64$	,, $(17\times4=68)$	=pp. 8–11 (?)	,,
iii. 31–iv. 45	$= 89\frac{1}{2}$			
vi.	$=131\frac{1}{2}$ 221	,, $(17\times13=221)$	=pp. 12–24	,,
v.	$= 84$	,, $(17\times5=85)$	=pp. 25–29	,,
vii. 15–24	$= 17\frac{1}{4}$	,, (17)	=p. 30	,,
viii. 12–20[1]	$= 18$	,, (17)	=p. 31	,,
vii. 1–14	$= 23\frac{1}{4}$	,, (17)	=p. 32 (?)	,,
vii. 25–52	$= 50$	,, $(17\times3=51)$	=pp. 33–35	,,

Omitting the bracketed sections this gives a total of 598, or nearly $(17\times37=)$ 595 lines, and goes some way towards showing that there may have been a gap in the archetype after vii. 52. But it must be added that the *pericope* may have been interpolated at a different stage in the history of the text, or because the context was thought suitable, not because there was a break at the end of a page. The fact that the *pericope* itself consists of 20 lines, not 17, goes against the idea of its accidental transposition.

(vii.) It is significant, however, that there may have been a gap after vii. 52 ; for it supplies one of the requisites for the transposition of viii. 12–20, a passage of 18 lines, which

[1] See (vii.) below.

is awkwardly placed in its present position. It may originally have stood, either by itself, or immediately after vii. 15–24, in the gap to which that passage perhaps belongs (see (v.) above) at the beginning of vii.

(viii.) In my previous paper I gave reasons for thinking that x. 1–18 was not always in its present position, and suggested that it may originally have stood either between x. 28 and 29 or between xvi. 24 and 25. I am not quite convinced by Mr. Strayer's arguments (*Journal of Theological Studies*, ii. 137) for the transposition of x. 22 to the beginning of viii. It seems to me that the removal of x. 1–18 would not only restore x. 19–21 to its proper position as the conclusion of ix., but would also necessitate the retention of x. 22 in its present position as the opening of the next incident. But does our hypothesis allow the accidental transposition of x. 1–18 ? The passage contains 34 lines, exactly two pages of our supposed archetype. Measuring from viii. 21, the last gap, to ix. 41, we get 152 lines, almost exactly ($17 \times 9 = 153$) nine pages. This is evidence of a gap into which x. 1–18 may have been put. Measuring forward from x. 19, 16 lines bring us to the end of v. 28, or $17\frac{1}{2}$ lines to the end of v. 29, at either of which points v. 1-18 would follow appropriately enough. This is a rather remarkable result. The alternative context suggested for x. 1–18, viz., between xvi. 24 and 25, is not corroborated by our hypothesis ; for a measurement from xvi. 1 to 24 gives $45\frac{1}{2}$ lines, which is not commensurable with 17. (For the position of xvi. see (x.) below.)

(ix.) Something is wrong with the end of xii. I suggested in my previous paper that the original order may have been xii. 1–36a, 44–50, 36b–43, followed perhaps by xx. 30–31. Measuring from our last fixed point, the break at x. 19, to xii. 36a, we get 207 lines, corresponding fairly closely to ($17 \times 12 =$) 204. But neither *vv.* 44–50 ($12\frac{3}{4}$ lines),

nor *vv.* 36b–43 (13½ lines) could have filled a page of the archetype. By adding xx. 30–31 (4½ lines) to the latter we do indeed get a page of 18 lines; but we remain unable to explain the transposition of *vv.* 44–50, 36b–43, or the removal of xx. 30–31, as purely accidental. More probably the latter "conclusion" was deliberately moved to its present position, and *vv.* 44–50 inserted in the gap so produced.

(x.) It is widely agreed that the closing words of xiv. 31 mark the original end of the Last Discourse, and that xv.–xvi., perhaps xv.–xvii., are out of place. It has been suggested that they should be inserted between xiii. 32 and 33. If we measure backwards from xiii. 32, we find that 85¼ lines (five pages of our archetype) bring us to the gap at xii. 36a: that is, conversely, there may have been a gap at xiii. 32. Again, measuring forward from xiii. 33 to xiv. 31 we get 69½ lines, very nearly four pages ($17 \times 4 = 68$) of the archetype. Thus, supposing xv.–xvi. or xv.–xxii. to have been accidentally transposed, we can see where they may have come from, and how they may have reached their present position. But we can go little further; for though xv. (49½ lines) and xvii. (49¾ lines) are each nearly three pages long ($17 \times 3 = 51$), xvi. contains 62 lines, and the sum of the three chapters is also incommensurable with 17. It therefore seems more likely, as I suggested before, that xv.–xvii. were not part of the original text, but were subsequently added as an appendix to xiv.

We may now complete our hypothetical reconstruction of the archetype from the point reached under (vi.) above.

[vii. 53–viii. 1	=20	lines.		
viii. 21–ix. 41	=152	,,	$(17 \times 9 = 153)$	=pp. 36–44 of the archetype
x. 19–29	= 17½	,,	(17)	=p. 45 ,,
x. 1–18	= 34	,,	$(17 \times 2 = 34)$	=pp. 46–47 ,,
x. 19–xii. 36a	=207	,,	$(17 \times 12 = 204)$	=pp. 48–59 (?) ,,

xii. 44–50	= 12¾	
xii. 36b–43	= 13½	85¼ lines (17 × 5 = 85) = pp. 60–64 archetype
xiii. 1–32	= 59	
[xv.	= 49½	,,
[xvi.	= 62	,,
[xvii.	= 49¾	,,
xiii. 33–xiv. 31	= 69½	,, (17 × 4 = 68) = pp. 65–68 ,,
xviii. 1–xx. 31	= 239¼	,, (17 × 14 = 238) = pp. 69–82 ,,
[xxi. 23–25	= 8	,,

I do not claim certainty for this hypothesis, or finality for its results. In particular, the counting of lines instead of letters, the likelihood of alterations in the text after transposition, the possibility of disarrangement at other stages in the history of the text, and the complications due to intentional rearrangement by editors of the Gospel --all these possible sources of error have to be taken into consideration before a final verdict can be passed. All I feel inclined to claim is that the frequent emergence of the unit 17 and its multiples in connexion with passages which have been suspected of disarrangement on other grounds, must be something more than a coincidence.

J. M. Thompson.

THE PASSION JOURNEY:

An Analysis of Luke's Account of Jesus' Ascent to Jerusalem (ix. 51; xviii. 14 . . .)

There is no portion of the writings of Luke which presents a more forbidding obstacle to our acceptance of the claims of this evangelist to be an accurate and orderly historian than the section of the Third Gospel which is sometimes called 'the Travel Narrative.' It is the happy hunting ground of the detractors of the historian. And his defenders have sought to gloss over the difficulties that confront us here by suggesting that the 'order' in which Luke declares

he has arranged his material is logical rather than chronological.

But Luke's claim is emphatic and explicit (i. 1–4). He avows he has gone carefully (ἀκριβῶς) over all the Gospel facts from the beginning (ἄνωθεν). These facts, he says, have been handed down to us by those who were eye-witnesses from the commencement (ἀπ' ἀρχῆς) and servants of the Word. And—with a hint that he is not altogether satisfied with some at least of the many previous attempts to record the story—he declares his intention to write the facts out *in order* (καθεξῆς) that his reader may be assured of the solid truth of what he has been taught.

Now it is a *narrative of* established *facts*, not a mere collection of Sayings, Luke has primarily in view. The rôle he essays is that of the *historian* seeking out chronological contexts and sequences, rather than that of the editor joining ideas on the principle of logical or internal affinity. It is surely, therefore, a first charge upon us to respect his claim, to assume that he has weighty testimony behind his arrangement, and to make an earnest endeavour to elicit the facts that support it. The method of explaining his grouping as due to the application of the principle of kinship in subject matter must only be resorted to where the evidence for it is undeniable and where historical probability seems absent. Doubtless, Luke has frequently employed this principle, but even so it must usually have been with the conviction or at least the hope that he was achieving historical probability.

It is quite certain that he has made extensive use of two at least of the " diegeseis " which predecessors had drawn up,—the Petrine tradition embodied in Mark, and the document known as " Q " (or the Logia) of which probably the greater part is embedded in Matthew. But there is much material in Luke which we do not find in either Mark or

Matthew. This is particularly the case in the section of the Gospel which we are proposing to investigate. And if we would fairly interpret Luke's claim to have followed up and traced out (παρηκολουθηκότι) afresh the facts, we must assume that he was at pains not only to test, but also to discover, facts by questioning such original eye-witnesses and servants of the Word as he had access to. Now a study of 'The Acts of the Apostles' gives us a certain insight into the way Luke utilised the depositions of such witnesses. Long passages, each apparently coming from a single source, are set down intact, even though they may overlap in point of time other blocks of information which he subsequently records. Only where there is a main stream of accepted tradition does he interweave his additional details at their appropriate place. Here in the section before us there is no main stream of accepted tradition. May we not, therefore, reasonably expect this characteristic of the writer to furnish us with a clue which may help to guide us through the labyrinth?

Very early in his Gospel he begins to speak of the great journey which Jesus undertook to Jerusalem—to die. It is evident that he is more eager to record the events of the journey than to indicate the historical causes which led to it. Apparently he thinks of the predestined moment in the working out of a heavenly time-table having now arrived (ix. 51), rather than of a vocation having to be fulfilled, deliberations and decisions to be made, amid the conflicts of earth. In the Petrine tradition only three or four incidents of the road are told and then Jerusalem comes into view: whereas some of the special witnesses whom Luke questioned dwelt much on the journey, it would seem. And evidently Luke means his account of it to be one of the special contributions he has to make to the record of the immortal story. All of the sources were agreed that a large

part of the journey lay in regions beyond the exclusively Jewish territory (cf. Mark x. 1; Matt. xix. 1). A Gentile himself, and writing for Gentiles, Luke has a special interest in recording everything that testifies to the wideness of Jesus' sympathies, and this journey through semi-Gentile territory appeals to him as such. He is eager to associate with this journey as many of the saving words and deeds of Jesus as he can. And the possibility of this pardonable bias interfering—unconsciously perhaps—to divert the path of historical accuracy must be reckoned with.

But there is no gainsaying his interest in the journey. Thrice at least he definitely and emphatically gives us to understand that the events he is now recording took place on the road to Jerusalem (ix. 51, xiii. 22, xvii. 11). There are one or two vague time-marks interspersed with these, which seem to indicate the journey-period also, e.g. xi. 53: "when He had set out from thence" (*ἐκεῖθεν ἐξελθόντος αὐτοῦ*[1]); and xiii. 1. "at that time." But there are hints of the road (ix. 53, 56, 57; x. 1, 38; xiii. 31; xiv. 25), echoes of travel in the conversation (ix. 58 ff.; x. 30; xi. 6 (?); xii. 50, 58; xiii. 24, 26, 33, 35; xiv. 27, 31), words of farewell with the suggestion of an imposing return (xii. 36, 37, 38, 40, 43, 45, 46, etc.), stories of entertainment of the passing guest (x. 38; xiv. 1) and of churlish shut doors (ix. 53) which colour the subsequent talk (xi. 9 (?); xii. 36 f.; xiii. 25; xiv. 7–24; xvi. 9; xvii. 7 f.) almost everywhere in the narrative. And if we add to these a group of travel indications close together towards the end of the journey (xviii. 31; xix. 11; xix. 28; cf. also xviii. 28, 35, 37; xix. 1, 4, 5, 12), we become convinced not merely of Luke's anxiety to keep before his reader the fact of this journey, but of the authentic note of travel

[1] The most strongly attested reading. The precise significance of this, and the force of some of the references following, may become apparent later.

running through much of this section of Luke's Gospel. Indeed Luke's Gospel might be called *the Gospel of the Road*. The impression he wishes to convey is that this journey was a prolonged teaching tour through cities and villages in Samaria, Lower Galilee, and beyond Jordan,—pioneered by a great band of out-runners. In all probability it lasted the best part of a year, and there are lengthy periods of it concerning which Luke has nothing to record. There is room, therefore, for all manner of zigzagging and doubling back, even for a visit (or two) to Jerusalem before the end. And such a possibility should put us on our guard against dogmatising about the itinerary.

But it is time to bring these general observations to an end, and proceed to a closer examination of the section.

Sub-divisions of the 'Journey Narrative.'

We find an obvious starting-point for an analysis of this part of Luke's Gospel in the three occasions on which the fact of this great journey is specially underlined by Luke,—ix. 51, xiii. 22, xvii. 11. It seems clear that these are at least three nodal points under which, or in the neighbourhood of which we are to look for 'journey' information which Luke has obtained from trustworthy sources. The first is the opening verse of this whole section; and the point now to be determined is where this *first* strand of eye-witness's testimony ends. When we turn to chap. xi. 1, it strikes us at once that a change of scene has taken place. From the 'certain village' (x. 38) which another tradition leads us to suppose was Bethany, not far from Jerusalem, we find ourselves back in the early days in Galilee, when the new fellowship, in the self-consciousness of its youth, is still contrasting itself with the disciples of the Baptizer (xi. 1). It cannot have been only towards the end that Jesus taught His disciples to pray. And the words with which chap. xi. begins—"and it came to pass"—would also seem to suggest

that Luke, as in ix. 51 and xvii. 11, is making a new beginning here. What follows in the chapter soon confirms our impression. The greater part of it belongs, according to the Petrine tradition, to the early Galilean ministry. Preliminary observation, therefore, suggests ix. 51–x. 42 as the limits within which the first strand of journey information is to be sought.

But with xi. 1 there commences the most perplexing part of the whole section. It contains much that belongs to the Galilean period ; its chief source is apparently the document "Q." And while certain transition points (xi. 59 and xiii. 1) can be detected they do not give any sure indication of the beginning of a new sub-division. We must content ourselves, therefore, meanwhile with a pause at xiii. 21, and await the results which later scrutiny of this long *second* sub-division may yield.

xiii. 22—the second of Luke's finger-posts on the road to Jerusalem—thus becomes the provisional opening of the *third* main sub-division of the narrative. Its phrasing is not so appropriate to the opening of a new paragraph as that of the other two guide-posts. It may rather be set in the heart of a group of road-notes, which begin perhaps at xiii. 1. Subsequent analysis may help us to determine. We may take it as certain, however, that Luke is here again retailing information which, he is assured on first-hand testimony, belongs to the story of the great journey. Where does this third main division end ?

We turn to the beginning of chap. xv. Again there is not, in the form of words, any sure indication that Luke is making a new beginning here, though it is not inappropriate as such. Indeed, the parables thus introduced, dealing as they do with the subject of repentance, continue what seems to be the dominant undertone of the preceding part of the narrative. But if there is such a connexion—and this is by no means

certain : they do not *immediately* follow a repentance theme, —it probably betrays the hand of Luke the *editor* rather than Luke the historian. For (1) the familiar formula, " he that hath ears let him hear " (xiv. 35), does seem to be a definite indication of the end of an address,—and probably also of the end of a division of the narrative. (2) In xv., the scene drastically changes—from a Pharisee's house among guests of considerable social standing (xiv. 1) to a feast with publicans and sinners (xv. 1 f.).[1] (3) More decisive still,—the friendly attitude of Pharisees in the preceding group of incidents gives place here to one of hostility and criticism (xv. 2). (4) Lastly, the two opening verses almost compel us to think of Mark ii. 15 f. (= Matt. ix. 10 f.). This, with the character of the parables that follow, especially in view of Mark ii. 17*b*, makes us all but certain that Luke is recording here, far from its historical context, part of Jesus' table-talk at Levi's feast. Here, therefore, we would seem to be away back behind ' the journey,' and into the early days in Galilee once again. Whether there is any ' journey ' information in this *fourth* sub-division—which is mainly parabolic in character and probably from a documentary source, and which extends to xvii. 10 is a matter for subsequent enquiry.

The *fifth*, and last main sub-division, which is introduced by the third of Luke's guide-posts (xvii. 11), extends, strictly speaking, only to xviii. 14,—Luke's narrative flowing thereafter into the main stream of the Synoptic tradition. But there is so much fresh material interwoven with the Synoptic Passion narrative in Luke that it will be advisable to take these Lucan elements in the Passion story within our purview when we are studying this last sub-division of his ' journey ' narrative.

It will serve as a recapitulation of this provisional sub-

[1] But cf. xiv. 25.

division, and also as an introduction to our study of the separate sub-divisions, if we now exhibit an Analytic Table of the whole 'journey narrative,' prefacing it with an explanatory note or two.

We have arranged the five sub-divisions in parallel columns A B C D E ; we have indicated each incident, discourse, etc., separately ; and we have enclosed in round brackets ( ) such of these pericopae as we have conjectured to be, with respect to the material in their own column, introjections chronologically misplaced by Luke himself and not his informant. These will be seen to be comparatively few in number. With regard to the chronological relation of one sub-division to another, we have placed the pericopae in such a position in their respective columns that if the five columns were telescoped laterally, each of the unbracketed pericopae in the resultant single column would fall into what we judge to be its approximately correct chronological position in the whole course of this so-called journey section of the Gospel. And it has been found possible to do this without displacing any of the unbracketed elements from its position relative to the rest of the material in its own column.

That is to say, when the few editorial insertions are removed, the order of the material in each sub-division taken separately is seen to be already καθεξῆς—interpreting the word in a chronological sense.

Columns B and D, it will be observed, represent the two sub-divisions which seem to rely mainly on sources of a documentary character. Moreover, since these documents are collections of Sayings (" Q ") and parables, it is not probable that historical sequence is their first aim. Now it is just in these two sub-divisions that we find the most extensive employment of pre-journey material, as a glance at the upper portions of Columns B and D will show.

THE "JOURNEY" SECTION IN LUKE'S GOSPEL (ix. 51–xviii. 14).

Synoptic order of events shown by references in Mark.	A Introductory sentence of the sub-division. ix. 51 As the time for His assumption was now due He set His face for the journey to JERUSALEM.	B Introductory sentence to sub-division. xi. 1 He was praying at a certain place, and when He stopped one of His disciples said to Him, "Lord, teach us to pray . . ."	C Introductory sentence to sub-division. xiii. 22 On He went teaching from one town and village to another, as He made His way to JERUSALEM.	D Introductory sentence to sub-division. xv. 1 Now the tax-gatherers and sinners were all approaching Him to listen to Him, but the Pharisees and the scribes complained.	E Introductory sentence to sub-division. xvii. 11 Now it happened that He passed *between* Samaria and Galilee in the course of His journey to JERUSALEM.	Matthean equivalents of pre-journey material in this section of Luke.
		xi. 1–4 Lord's Prayer .	. . . . .	. . . . .	. . . . .	Matt. vi. 9–13
		xi. 5–13 Prayer Logia. .	. . . . .	. . . . .	. . . . .	Matt. vii. 7–11
Mark ii. 15 f.		the midnight borrower	. . . . .	xv. 1–2 [cf. Matt.'s Feast.]	. . . . .	Matt. ix. 10–11
				xv. 3–7 The Lost Sheep .	. . . . .	Matt. xviii. 12–14
Mark iii. 22–35		xi. 14–26 (xii. 10*) "Beelzeboul"	. . . . .	xv. 8–10 The Lost Coin. xv. 11–32 The Lost Son	. . . . .	Mt. ix. 32–34, xii. 22–37
		the garrisoned castle	. . . . .	. . . . .	. . . . .	
		the empty house	. . . . .	. . . . .	. . . . .	xii. 29 f.
		xi. 27–28 A woman's admiration.	. . . . .	. . . . .	. . . . .	xii. 43 f.
Mark iv. 21		xi. 29–32 'A sign' . .	. . . . .	. . . . .	. . . . .	Mt. xii. 38–42
		xi. 33–36 Light-revealing and discerning [with xi. 27 f., 33–36, cf. viii. 16–21.]	. . . . .	. . . . .	. . . . .	Mt. v. 15, vi. 22
Mark vii. 1–23		xi. 37–41 'Defilement' controversy	. . . . .	. . . . .	. . . . .	Mt. xv. 1–20.
		xi. 42 (43), 44 Woes against Pharisees.	. . . . .	. . . . .	. . . . .	Mt. xxiii.
		(xi. 45–52 Woes! against Lawyers.)	. . . . .	. . . . .	. . . . .	
		xi. 53 f. Transition verse [cf. Mark xii. 13.]				

Mark viii. 14–17	. . . . .	(xii. 1 The Leaven of the Pharisees)	. . . . .	. . . . .	. . . . .	Mt. xvi. 6, 11f.
Mark x. 1 (=Matt. xix. 1)	ix. 51 "the journey to JERUSALEM."	xi. 53 "when He had set out from thence."	xiii. 22 "His way to JERUSALEM."	——	xvii. 11 "His journey to JERUSALEM."	Itinerary.
	ix. 52–56 The inhospitable Village. ix. 57–62 Would-be followers. x. 1–3 Sending of the seventy (4–12) [cf. mission of the Twelve.] (x. 13–16 Lament on Lake Cities.)	xii. 2–9,* 11–12 Address to Seventy ? [=Matt. x. 16–20, 23–33 40–42] xii. 13–21 'Divide the inheritance!' The Rich Fool. (xii. 22–34 Treasure and Care.) [=Matt. vi. 19–34.] xii. 35–40 Return of Son of Man Watchers with lamps lit. The Master serves the servants. Thief in the Night. xii. 41–43 To disciples] (=Matt. xxiv. 42ff.) The neglectful steward. Stripes few or many. xii. 49–53 Fire, Baptism, Sword. [51–53=Matt. x. 34–36] xii. 54–59 Signs of the times. [=Matt. xvi. 1–3]				Attempt through Samaria. Back in Galilee. Farewell to Galilee.

THE "JOURNEY" SECTION IN LUKE'S GOSPEL (ix. 51–xviii. 14)—*continued.*

	A	B	C.	D	E	
		xiii. 1–5 Massacre of Galileans, etc. xiii. 6–9 Fruitless fig-tree. xiii. 10–17 Woman healed in synagogue. xiii. 19–21 Mustard seed; Leaven. [=Matt. xiii. 31–33]	[may belong here.]			Moving down Lakeside
			xiii. 23–30 The Strait Gate. [=Matt. vii. 13–23] xiii. 31–33 Herod's designs. (xiii. 34–35 Lament on Jerusalem.) xiv. 1–6 In Pharisee's house: dropsy cured. xiv. 7–11 Chief seats at Feasts. xiv. 12–14 'Entertain the poor!' xiv. 15–24 The Kingdom Feast: the Guests. [=Matt. xxii. 1–10] xiv. 25–35 'Count the cost.' [25–27=Matt. x. 37–38 34–35=Matt. v. 13]			Near Tiberias
				xvi. 1–13 [To disciples] The Wily Factor. (10–13: editorial.)		
					xvii. 12–19 The Ten Lepers	Near Bethshan ? Into Peraea (via Bethabara.)
				(xvi. 14–17 Pharisees and Law.)		
Mark x. 2–12	. . . . .	. . . . .	. . . . .	xvi. 18 Adultery controversy [Matt. xix. 3–12] (xvi. 19–31 *vide infra**) xvii. 1–10 (Offences, Forgiveness), Faith. The Duty-bound Slave.		

	x. 17–20 Return of Seventy (x. 21–24 Return of Twelve ?) x. 25–37 Lawyer and Eternal Life. The Good Samaritan.					xvii. 20 ' When is the Kingdom coming ? '' xvii. 21–25 ' Not with observation,' [22–25 = Matt. xxiv. 26–27] (xvii. 26–35 Apocalyptic) xvii. 37 Carrion and vultures [= Matt. xxiv. 28] xviii. 1–8 Importunate Widow—Advent Faith. (xviii. 9–14 Pharisee and Publican,)	Pella ?
Mark x. 18–16	. . . . .	. . . . .	. . . . .	. . . . .	. . . . .	xviii. 15–17 Children blessed.	[Visit to Jerusalem ? cf. John vii. 1–x. 40]
Mark x. 17–31	. . . . .	. . . . .	. . . . .	. . . . .	xvi. 19–31 Dives and Lazarus (sup.*)	xviii. 18–30 Rich Young Ruler.	Back to Peraea via Jericho Farewell to Pella ?
Mark x. 32–34	. . . . .	. . . . .	. . . . .	. . . . .	. . . . .	xviii. 31–34 Third Announcement of Cross.	On way to Jericho.
Mark x. 46–52	. . . . .	. . . . .	. . . . .	. . . . .	. . . . .	xviii. 35–43 Bartimaeus.	Outskirts of Jericho.
						xix. 1–10 Zacchaeus.	In Jericho.
						xix. 11–27 Parable of Pounds.	Leaving Jericho.
						xix. 28	Ascending to Jerusalem.
Mark xi. 1–6	x. 38–42 Martha and Mary.	. . . . .	. . . . .	. . . . .	. . . . .	xix. 29–34 Fetching the Ass.	Bethany.
Mark xi. 7–10	. . . . .	. . . . .	. . . . .	. . . . .	. . . . .	xix. 35–40 Messianic Approach.	Bethphage and Olivet.
						xix. 41–44 Lament on Jerusalem.	Over against Jerusalem.

If attention is now confined to the lower portion of the whole Analytic Table, the approximate sequence of the incidents of the journey proper can be seen at a glance by passing diagonally from the middle left-hand corner of the Table to the bottom right. In other words, save for these upper portions of columns B and D, Luke has placed these groups of information in their most appropriate chronological sequence to each other, in short he has in the main justified his claim to write καθεξῆς in the historian's sense of the word.

(The notes and references in square brackets [ ] together with the two marginal columns of the Table, explain themselves. The lower portion of the right margin is a suggested itinerary.)

The First Deposition of Eye-Witnesses in 'The Journey Narrative.'

(Investigation of Column A of Analytical Table: Luke ix. 51–x. 42).

(1) *Editorial Intrusions.* There are one or two passages here which at once invite question as to their chronological appropriateness. The Lament over the Cities of the Lake (x. 13–16) must have been spoken in their neighbourhood. It is placed much earlier in Matt.,—just before the return of the Twelve, but in a collection of Sayings of Jesus without any time-marks. They are not impossible here where Luke places them. They are the utterance of One who is reviewing the results of His labours in these towns, presumably therefore towards the close of the Galilean ministry, and on the eve of a departure from the locality. This doubtless weighed with Luke in his placing of them here. He has, however, gone farther. He has reiterated the words of the sending forth of the Twelve (Matt. x. 5–15; cf. Luke ix. 2–5), along with the upbraiding of the cities (Matt. xi. 20–40) and the words spoken probably on the return of the Twelve

(Matt. xi. 25–38), in Matthew's order but in briefer form, associating the first and the last with the mission of the Seventy. We have a clear title to suspect the hand of the editor here, drawing upon Q. Luke may indeed be justified in stating that Jesus repeated the same sort of practical instructions on each occasion, but clearly, from the brevity of his report of the earlier address to the Twelve (ix. 2–5), he is more interested in the wider mission of the Seventy. The words which Luke repeats as the Address to the outgoing Seventy may, however, be allowed, with reservations, to stand. But if Luke is—rightly enough—dissatisfied with Matthew's placing of the Lament where no departure is as yet in view, we may reasonably doubt whether Luke has placed it rightly. There is another occasion on which such words would be more appropriate—at the turning of the tide of enthusiasm in Galilee, when Jesus was about to withdraw to the coasts of Tyre to reconsider the situation. For (*a*) they are natural on the lips of One whose thoughts were turning in that direction (Luke x. 13 f.). (*b*) They are the words of One who had not yet visited that locality or done any mighty work there. But at the point where Luke places these words on the lips of Jesus, this visit of His to Tyre which the other evangelists record must already lie behind Him. Is it not because Luke is conscious of the anachronism that he omits all mention of this northern retreat? (*c*) Moreover, they contain no word of farewell as of One setting out on a journey from which He knew there was to be no return in the flesh. But in Luke's narrative that is precisely what lies clearly before Jesus. We may thus be allowed to conclude that the Lament is editorially misplaced here: it is not part of the first-hand information which Luke is now recording. The same may be said of the latter part of the Address which Luke records as spoken on the Return of the Seventy (x. 21–24). They are borrowed from Matthew (or

Q) where they doubtless represent words spoken amid the enthusiasm and the crowds on the Return of the Twelve in the heyday of the Galilean ministry.

(2) *The first strand of eye-witness's testimony.* Removing these editorial intrusions we have before us a continuous self-consistent story,—peculiar to Luke's Gospel. It contains the incident of the rebuff in Samaria, the organising of a fresh campaign, the call for out-runners, the light-hearted and the hesitating volunteers, the sending of the Seventy and their return, with the parable of the Good Samaritan and the story of Mary and Martha. The main interest of the story is to preserve the missionary tradition of the Seventy. But interwoven with the missionary motive is another. The interest in the Samaritans is obvious. The story of the inhospitable village is recorded apparently to explain why Jesus did not conduct an extensive mission in Samaria. He had tried but had met with a closed door. But the teller makes it clear that He did want to go to the Samaritans ; and also that He took His rebuff in no spirit of offended anger,—rather He is indignant at His followers taking offence. (" He came to save, not to destroy," a later annotator adds.) And then, as if to make Jesus' sympathy with the Samaritans incontestable, the teller recalls the lovely parable of the Good Samaritan, spoken at a later stage of the great journey. And the testimony ends in a beautiful story, illustrating Jesus' interest in, and friendship with, women,—an instance of how the great Missionary Exemplar was sometimes welcomed.

Two other points about the story may perhaps be noted. If Luke is right in setting the Logion : " The harvest truly is great . . . ." at the beginning of the address to the Seventy ; and if it sprang, as usual, to Jesus' lips, suggested by the aspect which nature was wearing at the time, then this last campaign and journey of Jesus lasts from summer

(June perhaps) to the Pascal Week (April) of the following year,—nearly a year therefore. In Matthew the saying occurs (ix. 37 f.) immediately before the sending of the Twelve (x. 1). But (*a*) it seems rather to be editorially coupled with a cognate sentiment of Jesus there (ix. 36). And (*b*) there is reason to suppose that the sending of the Twelve and the speaking of the parable of the Sower are not far removed from each other in point of time. And if this parable was suggested by the seasonal activity, as the opening word, 'Behold,' would seem to suggest, then it was most likely about October—the main-crop sowing time, —in any case at a time (February ?) when no harvest was in sight that the Twelve were sent forth. (*c*) Further, "The harvest truly is *great!*" implies an effort on a more ambitious scale than the mission of the Twelve. (*d*) And moreover, our Lord here urges prayer that God would provide "*more* labourers." The Twelve had already been set apart by Jesus some time before they were sent forth. And *only* the Twelve were sent on that occasion. This saying seems much more like a call for a great augmentation of the disciple-band, to undertake a much more extensive campaign. Luke's placing of the saying thus seems the more appropriate of the two. [The Samaritan interest in John's Gospel, chap. iv.,—in which similar 'harvest' sayings are recorded, should be noted. It is one of the many points in which Luke has affinities with the Fourth Gospel.]

The other comment we wish to make on this chapter of first-hand evidence about the journey to Jerusalem is this. The sending of the Seventy belongs to the beginning of the journey. The return of the Seventy must have been far along the way. Probably at some centre from which Jesus conducted His campaign in the Peraea they began to straggle back by two and two. The last of them may not have returned till He was about to set out on the last stage

of the journey. As the parable of the Good Samaritan suggests the neighbourhood of Jericho, the incident which prompted it should probably be located in that region. The story of the rich young ruler, which seems closely connected with it (cf. x. 25 with xviii. 18) belongs to the same locality. And the Fourth Gospel would suggest Bethany as the scene of the story of Martha and Mary. It seems natural to infer, therefore, that this first eye-witness's testimony has to do not merely with the commencement of the journey, but also with incidents of the later stages of the way. In order to make the placing of these latter stories chronologically correct in Luke, the theory that there were earlier visits to this neighbourhood during the many ramifications of this final campaign is not impossible. Indeed, a visit of Jesus to Jerusalem from the Peraea at the festival of the Booths is very likely (cf. John. x. 40). But we are not concerned to press this. Indeed if the eye-witness was one of the Seventy, he would have little to relate of Jesus' doings during the middle period of this long campaign. It is quite a satisfactory explanation of the setting of these incidents all together here that Luke received them from a single source. The main interest of the story is the mission of the Seventy, and that is chronologically correct. But the setting of it down here recalls to Luke's mind the other incidents which he heard from the same witness,—incidents told by way of supplement and contrast to the episode in Samaria with which the narrative began.

(3) *The Source.* Who was Luke's informant here ? The narrative suggests that it was some one with a missionary or evangelising interest, probably one of the Seventy, and one with a special interest in the Samaritans. (This interest reappears elsewhere in Luke ; cf. xvii. 11–19, etc.). It seems to have been some one too in whose circle there were women followers of the Lord. Now in Luke's second volume—

'The Acts'—we find our author on one occasion "for several days" (Acts xxi. 8 ff.), and later on probably for a year or two (Acts xxiii. 23, 33; xxiv. 27; xxvii. 1 ['we']) in an environment which exactly answers to this. Philip 'the evangelist,' one of the seven Deacons, among whom, according to tradition, were some of the Seventy, was a missionary who carried on a successful campaign in Samaria (Acts viii. 4 ff.) and by and by settled in Caesarea with his four virgin daughters who were ardent gospel-proclaimers ("prophetesses"). Is it not Philip who is anxious to establish Jesus' desire to reach the Samaritans, to explain why His 'journey up' was diverted from Samaria to Lower Galilee and beyond Jordan, yet to affirm Jesus' unwavering sympathy with Samaritans? And may it not well have been from his daughters, who were probably close associates (in Jerusalem), if not themselves members, of the band of ministering women, that this story of Martha and Mary first came to Luke?

A further attractive conjecture is on less firm ground, but is not impossible. Tradition records that the follower who wanted to stay behind and tend an aged father through his closing days, and whose story is here (Luke ix. 59) related, was named Philip. The disciple Philip is, of course, thought of. But it may be said in general of each of the special testimonies which Luke would gather that it would have to do with the eye-witness's own spiritual experience in being won or called by Jesus. May not this be Philip the evangelist's own story, enshrined in the episode of the would-be followers? Very early in the traditions of the Church the disciple and the evangelist begin to pass for each other. It may be rash thus to suggest an early confusion of the Philips, but there is a way of avoiding this. May they not have been one and the same?

Although the Board of Seven (Acts vi.) was a board

appointed to take over the growing financial burden that was falling on the Twelve, there is nothing in the story of the election that obliges us dogmatically to assert that no representative of the Twelve could have served on the new committee. The Seven did not keep strictly to the 'serving of tables.' Some of them—Stephen, Philip, Nicolas—became noted 'ministers of the Word.' And is it not likely that one of the Twelve, who was already conversant with the work, 'the care of the widows in the daily ministration,' should be appointed to give information and guidance to the new board? May it not be that the man who is named second, after Stephen, the board's most distinguished member (and convener), is that Apostle? The character given to Philip in the Fourth Gospel suggests that he was a careful, conscientious, calculating type of man, apt in financial reckoning (John vi. 6 f.). Further, this Apostle with the Greek name, and possibly Greek connexion (John xii. 20 ff.), would be the most acceptable to the 'Grecians who were murmuring' (Acts vi. 1). And Philip the Evangelist is never explicitly distinguished from the Apostle. In the list of the Board he has not even this epithet 'evangelist,' nor when he first goes down to Samaria is he so called (Acts viii. 5, 6, 12, 13, 26, 29 ff., 34, 35 (37), 38–40). Not till after his reputation as an evangelist was established by the great work in Samaria and Philistia is he thus styled (Acts xxi. 8).

Tradition further records that the Apostle Philip settled ultimately in Hierapolis 'along with his two aged *virgin* daughters' (Eus. *H.E.* iii. 31—on the authority of Proclus (3rd cent.), a member of the Montanist sect which arose in this neighbourhood). The same historian also tells us that another daughter 'who lived in fellowship with the Holy Spirit' was buried at Ephesus; from which it seems probable that the family resided there for a time. And the prominence of the Apostle Philip in the Fourth, or

Ephesian, Gospel seems to confirm the fact of his presence in the Ephesian circle. Like Philip the evangelist, who worked in semi-Hellenised Western Samaria, and settled in sea-board cosmopolitan Caesarea, the Apostle was not thirled to Jewry, but had Greek leanings. Two Philips of similar extraction and disposition, each with a family of several virgin daughters who had spiritual or prophetic charismata, and contemporaries in the earliest days of the Christian Church——? Is it so very hazardous to conjecture that they may have been one and the same ?

[There are many points in which Luke's Gospel shews an affinity with the tradition which underlies the Fourth Gospel (cf. Notes on last sub-division of 'Journey Narrative,' infra; cf. also EXPOS. June 1918) The Latin biography of Luke says he returned to the East after the death of Paul. He may therefore once again have had contact with these friends in the Ephesian circle.]

J. A. ROBERTSON.

JEWS AND JUDAISM IN THE EARLIEST CHRISTIAN APOLOGIES.

THE value of the Christian Apologies as a means of recognising the elements of the Hellenistic and Roman culture contained therein has long ago been established. There are, however, very few contributions in the vast literature dealing with the Apologies which throw any light on the problem we are about to discuss, namely, the relation between Jews and Christians, or Christianity and Judaism. This problem remains one of the most important in the history both of the Church and Synagogue. The attempt to describe this relation has not yet been made,[1] and cannot

[1] v. now Jean *Juster*: "Les Juifs dans l'Empire Romain," Paris, 1914.

be accomplished unless it be undertaken by a student who knows the Church Fathers as well as the Talmud and Midras. The latter contain much more material for our problem than is generally known or assumed. The former are very seldom considered from the point of view we are now raising. Moreover, the Christian polemical writings against Judaism have not yet been entirely discovered. This applies also to those books and letters which only, by the way, touch the Jewish problems of their time and their country. Harnack is quite justified in complaining in his recent work on Justin Martyr's Dialogue with the Jew Tryphon, that the importance of the Dialogue is in no relation with the consideration it has had in the last twenty years.

As a matter of fact, the question of Judaism arises in all these Apologies as a matter of third or fourth rate importance, for they aimed merely at the social and political emancipation of the Church and Christianity in the Roman Empire. In such cases it would not have been, of course, advisable or prudent to refer too much to the inner troubles or to the fierce attacks caused by the Jews offensively or defensively. Moreover, the majority at least, if not all, of the writers of the Apologies were heathens born and bred, who obtained their knowledge about Judaism not first hand but from second or even third hand sources. Even Justin made such serious mistakes, as we will see later on, that one almost thinks that he was not well acquainted with the Bible. The Apologies compared with the sayings of the Rabbis teach us that the same problems which occupied the time and patience of the Rabbis were also most pressing problems in the Church. In both circles the questions of Monotheism, the fight against the heathen aspect of the world and creation, the meaning of death and resurrection, demanded explanation and solution. On

the other hand the antagonism between Judaism and Christianity is neither overlooked nor neglected. By this act new light is shed upon many sayings and teachings of the rabbinical literature, which otherwise appear more like playful riddles than popular and serious sermons.

We are about to investigate in the first place the authors individually. We shall consider those statements mentioning Jews, Jewish customs and teachings. Then we shall give an account of the relation which existed between Jewish and Christian teachers in the first three centuries.

I.

We begin with Aristides of Athens, who wrote about 126 C.E. This date is of great importance for establishing the time of many statements in the teaching of the Rabbis. Aristides deals gently with the Jews. This fact is recognised by modern scholars. One (Seeberg) sees in this very fact a remarkable aspect of toleration, another (Geffken) reproaches the author for it. Anyhow, we may see in the course of our investigation how far the one or the other is right. What did Aristides say or know of the Jews? First of all he regards them as the descendants of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob (2. 5, 14. 1 Gr.). Aristides, although belonging to the age of the Apostolic Fathers, nevertheless holds the opinion, not generally held, that the patriarchs were not only the fathers of the Christians, but also of the Jews. Although the idea that the Christians only were the real descendants of the patriarchs is older than Aristides (*see* Gal. vi. 16, xvi. 3, 7 f.; Rom. ix. 7; cf. Nathanael Bonwetsch, *Der Schriftbeweis fuer die Kirche aus den Heiden als das wahre Israel bis auf Hippolyt*, p. 3) he does not agree with the denial of that designation to the Jews. Thus he describes the belief of the contemporary Jews: "There is only one God, who is the creator of the Universe,

who is omnipotent, and none should worship others but the one God" (14. 2). We do not know why Aristides was satisfied with that brief description of the Jewish creed. One thing is quite certain, that the greater part of his theology came from Jewish sources, especially from Philo. However, the above definition is very significant and valuable. It is very interesting to learn what Aristides relates of the Jews; he says: "They imitate God's lovingkindness by charity, by redeeming the captives, by burying the dead, and so on" (14. 3). We lay stress on the expression "to imitate God." The conception that one imitates God by performing good acts of charity is an early rabbinical teaching. We hear the same doctrine from the Rabbis (Sifre Deut. § 49). With reference to Deut. xi. 22: "To go in all His ways. These are the ways of God, as it is written: The Eternal God, merciful and gracious, slow to wrath and abundant in mercy and truth" (Exod. xxxiv. 6–7); and it is said: "Whosoever shall call on the name of God shall be saved" (Joel iii. 5). How can one call on the name of God? It means, as God is called merciful and gracious, so shalt thou be merciful and gracious and doing lovingkindness to all; as God is called righteous (Ps. cxlv. 17) so shalt thou be righteous as well; therefore is it written: "Whosoever shall call on the name of God shall be saved," as it is said: "The Eternal has made all things for His sake" (Prov. xvi. 4). We may assume that this Jewish interpretation is earlier than Aristides, since a similar idea was known to the Apologist in describing the belief of Jews. In the later Agada the Rabbis spoke of the imitation of God even with more clearly defined expressions, similar to those of Aristides, based on the above-mentioned interpretation. It is written: "You shall go after the Eternal, your God" (Deut. xiii. 5); how can man go after God who is a consuming fire? (Deut. iv. 24) or

according to other sources, who has "His way in the whirlwind and in the storm"? "Whose way is in the sea and whose path is in the great waters"? (Ps. lxxvii. 20). How can one go after God? Follow God's example just as He provides the naked with clothes, do thou likewise; as He visits the sick, just as He comforts the mourners, just as He buries the dead, do thou likewise (*see* Abba Saul b. Sabbat, 133*b*; Mechilta, ed. Friedmann, p. 37*a*; ed. Hoffmann, p. 60; R. Hama b. Hanina b. Sota, 14*a*; Bacher, *Agada der Pal. Amoraer*, 1, p. 449; where the last sentence is missing). We can approximately settle the date of the anonymous Agada by the help of Aristides. It is obvious that Aristides knew that teaching from reliable sources, for he adds: "Those traditions were handed down from the fathers to the present generation" (xiv. 3).

"The Jews think that they worship God in the proper way, but it is not so. They worship the angels instead of God by the observance of Sabbath, the new moon, Mazza, the great day, the fast, the circumcision and dietary law, which they do not perform quite properly" (xiv. 4). It is a great pity that the author failed to give us a full account of the mistakes, on the part of the Jews of his day, in the observance of these laws and customs. The alleged worship of the angels recurs in the Predicatio Petri, but no more definitely than in Aristides. He accuses the Jews that "they worship the angels and depend on the moon for their religious rites" (*see* Bonwetsch, l.c. p. 8).[1]

Justin, having dealt thoroughly with the Jewish question of his day in his Dialogue, merely mentions the Jews by the way in his Apologia. Speaking of offerings, he

[1] v. *Dobschütz*, "Kerygma Petri," p, 38, based on Col. ii. 18; Lightfoot, "St. Paul's Ep. to the Colossians," p. 90; *Wendland*, "Hellenistisch-römische Kultur," p. 153; *Leucken*, "Michael," p. 14, p. 62 and p. 100. We hear of sects, who worshipped angels (v. Lardner, Works, III. p. 19), whose relation to Judaism is, however, uncertain.

means apparently not only those of the heathens, but of Jews also. He says: "We have also got the teaching, that God does not need any material offerings from human beings, for we see Him as the One who gives all things" (Apol. i. 10; Ap. i. 13). The offerings were the subject of criticism from the earliest times. Aristides probably raised the same point with the same intention as Justin (i. 6): "God does not want offerings." Barnabas (ii. 4) quotes seven different passages from the scripture to prove that point. Before the time of these writers we find the idea in Philo, Aristeas and Josephus, that God has no need to be glorified by means of offerings, but through faith and the cleanness of the soul (*see* the passages in Friedlaender, *M. Geschichte der juedischen Apologetik*, p. 99). One quotation dealing with this question will illustrate our contention. The saying is an anonymous one: "Say to the Israelites, it is not because I need the offerings, yea, the whole world is mine" (*Pes. Rabbati*, ed. Friedmann, p. 76). In the second and third centuries we find numerous Agadas answering the question: Does God need offerings or not? Schmitz, who dealt lately with this problem in his book, *Die Opferanschauung des spaeteren Judentums und Opferaussagen des N.T.*, S. Tuebingen, 1914, p. 54, took the rabbinical material from second-hand sources and was therefore unable to deal effectively with this side of his subject (*see* P. Fiebig, *Zeitschrift fuer wiss. Theologie*, 53, 1911, p. 253).

As in his Dialogue Justin repeats his accusation that though Jews are in the possession of the Hebrew Books and read therein, yet they do not understand them (Apol. i. 31). The Apologia is considered to be one of the most important sources for the belief that the Jews bitterly hated and persecuted the Christians. Justin endeavoured to show by quoting several passages from the Prophets that

their reports concerning Jesus are the true ones and that more Gentiles than Jews will believe in Him (i. 36). From this statement it seems clear that Justin tried to convince the heathen world that the chief difference between Christians and Jews was the recognition by the former of Jesus (as the Messiah). Justin gives valuable historical material dealing with the conditions in the Holy Land in his time. The destruction of the land was announced long before in Js. lxiv. 10–12. No Jew was permitted to live in Jerusalem, cf. 1 Js. i. 7 and Jer. ii. 15. No Jew could enter the Holy Land, and, in case he did, he would not escape capital punishment (Ap. i. 47). We see, however, from Rabbinical sources that Rabbis went to Jerusalem in order to pray there before God. For instance, *R. Jose b. Chalafta* (b. Berachot, 3*a*), *R. Ismael ben Jose* (Genesis Rabba, chap. lxxxi. 3), *R. Jonathan* (Gen. Rabba, chap. xxxii. 16) go to Jerusalem, in spite of the danger.[1] Harnack (*Texte und Untersuchungen*, 39, 69) states that Justin knew nothing of the teaching so often repeated in Christian circles that God has entirely forsaken Israel. Apol. i. 49 says just the contrary.

Justin probably had a dispute with a Jew about Exodus iii. 5. Christians said that Jesus spoke to Moses from the thorn-bush, while the Jews even up to his days taught that God Himself was speaking to Moses (Apol. i. 63, cf. *Recognitions of Clemens*, i. 33 and 34). There is a tradition of a similar dispute between Rabban Gamaliel II. and a disbeliever. The latter asked: Why did God appear in the thorn-bush? R. Gamaliel answered: What would you say had God revealed Himself in a fig tree or in any other tree? You would surely ask the same question. It should

[1] Cf. *Büchler*, "The Economic Conditions of Judaea after the Destruction of the Second Temple," London, 1912, pp. 16–17; v. also *Monatsschrift*, I, p. 40, note 1; Geiger's "Jüdische Zeitschrift," V. p. 192, and *Monatsschrift*, XIV. p. 469.

teach you that the Sechinah is present everywhere (see *Jewish Review*, v. 68 f.). What was the object of this disputation? Surely nought else but the question whether it was God or Jesus who spoke to Moses. Further on Justin applies to the Jews the reproach of Isaiah i. 3: "The ox knows his owner, but my people does not recognise Me" (Apol. i. 37, 53). How the Rabbis refuted that accusation we see in an anonymous statement: "Israel did not know Me in the past; My people will not become wise (even) in the future" (Sifre Deut. § 317). Apparently they wanted to state that the prophecy did not refer at all to the present conditions and events. The same verse was used later on by the Gnostics against both Jews and Christians (see my *Religionsgeschichtliche Studien*, i. 60).

It is interesting to mention a few of Justin's blunders in Biblical History. Thus, that David lived 1,500 years before Jesus (Ap. i. 42). Again, that Deut. xxx. 19 was spoken to the first Adam by God. Of course it was Moses who uttered the words with reference to the Israelites (Ap. i. 44). According to Justin Jethro was the uncle of Moses (Ap. i. 62). Perchance he confuses Moses with Jacob, who fled to his uncle Laban. It is very doubtful whether Justin merely repeats one of the ancient traditions, when he avers that Moses made a cross (with the serpent) and fixed it up in the appointed tent (Ap. i. 60), or has he blundered here again? [1]

A. Marmorstein.

[1] Cf. *Goldfahn, Monatsschrift*, 1873, p. 55.

(To be continued.)

THE PRINCE OF PEACE.[1]

His name shall be called . . . Prince of Peace.—*Isa.* ix. 6.

MIRACLE and prophecy were the two main grounds on which the first preachers of the gospel relied in commending their message either to Jews or Gentiles. These were like two massive pillars, supporting on either hand the porch of reverent attention through which converts might best pass into the temple of the apostolic Christian faith. And though, when the main fabric of the Creeds had been solidly built up in the age of the Councils, other ways of approach and different grounds of support were also recognised by the Fathers of the Church, yet still the principal and most natural means of access to the assembly of the faithful was by the consideration of miracle and prophecy, and still these were regarded as vital parts in the structure of belief, acting like buttresses in holding up the main fabric of belief in Christ as Lord and Saviour.

The early assaults upon this representation of things, by unbelievers like Celsus and Porphyry, died away, and for centuries the authority of the Church, while allowing an endless liberty to subtle thinkers in the elaboration and development of accepted doctrines, guarded the approaches and foundations of the Faith, and kept them inviolate from criticism, the writ *De comburendis haereticis* being invoked during the Middle Ages when necessary.

[1] The Macbride Sermon on the Jewish Interpretation of Prophecy, preached before the University of Oxford, January 28, 1917.

The disputes of the Reformation period did not concern the approaches or supports of the Creed. But, by the eighteenth century, the smoke and dust of internal conflict had cleared away; the rival societies that now claimed exclusive or concurrent rights as churches had settled down to occupy and maintain the ground that had come into their possession; and criticism of fundamentals began, without fear of injury to life or limb.

Still the bulk of believers built up in their own minds as a matter of course a counterpart of the intellectual fabric which the consentient churches offered with unabated confidence as a true representation of the very core and centre of reality.

But here and there individual inquirers, first by themselves, and then in groups and knots, took upon themselves to ask whether all this imposing structure was indeed securely built of sound materials. Could it be that with the stone and brick of fact and first-hand testimony there had been mixed the wood, hay and stubble of rumour, hearsay and vain imaginations, and that the builders, instead of using upon their work only the cement of reasonable inference, had daubed it with the untempered mortar of fanciful conjecture?

The more impetuous, after a one-sided investigation, sat down quickly and wrote off the whole fabric of ecclesiastical dogma as ill-founded and insecure. Such men were forthwith branded as infidels, having no place within the pale of the Christian Church.

Others, who regarded the main structural elements of Christian doctrine as sound enough, could see in miracle and prophecy no pillars of strength and beauty promising entrance upon the safest and easiest terms, but dangerous encumbrances, threatening ruin of faith to those who would pass in that way. *These* were not infidels, but heretics,

at least in the eyes of the orthodox, while they themselves took pride perhaps in being merely heterodox, or orthodox with an interesting difference.

Then in our lifetime there have been not a few who, while no longer content to regard miracles and prophecy either as the best introduction to the Christian religion, or as furnishing convincing proof of its truth, placed a real value upon them, though not the old value. The Incarnation and Atonement, the Resurrection and heavenly Rule of Christ, securely reached by other avenues of approach, and buttressed by other kinds of proof, could in their turn hold up miracle and prophecy, which could not stand alone but needed to lean against some intellectual construction stronger than themselves.

At this point of view there is still a tinge of depreciation, a certain air of condescension, in regard to miracle and prophecy. So it is natural that some, conscious that honesty in judgment may be robbed of its reward by impatience, have pressed on further, and examined the facts both more closely, and again more broadly. They have cut away the overgrowths of a too exuberant rhetoric. They have removed the shaky scaffolding poles of obsolete theory. They have made allowance for a certain amount of legendary accretion which has clung to the facts like a coating of plaster to stone. And they find an abundance of sound material to bear the thrust of the great conclusions to which miracle and prophecy have always been believed to point.

But they report that these materials have been in the past imperfectly bonded together. The original linkage processes of logical inference and historical connexion by which fact was related to fact have cracked and crumbled with time. And, as old cathedral walls have in our days been made secure by the process of grouting, liquid cement

being forced into all cracks and interstices, so these modern students would fain saturate the old facts with a connective element of sound philosophical method, which may hold them together for this and for later generations.

That the study of the miraculous element in the Bible is beginning to benefit, and will yet benefit still more by the application of a healthily objective treatment, I am persuaded. But to-day we are limited to prophecy, and specially to that aspect of prophecy which is called Messianic.

There was a time, a time which lasted long, when, in judging Hebrew prophecy, all the stress was laid upon its singularity. Especially the predictive element, with which we are concerned to-day, was regarded as unique. It was supposed that God gave the prophets visions, exact in minute detail, of the distant future.

We no longer find such a supposition either probable or edifying. Minute correspondences may always be explained either by coincidence, mistake, or conscious fulfilment; and the argument here presented is entirely independent of such.

We regard the prophets indeed as men who "spake from God, moved by the Holy Ghost," but we find it enough to suppose that the divine Wisdom "from generation to generation passing into holy souls maketh them friends of God and prophets," influencing men indeed, but not interfering with the orderly processes of the human mind.

That they predicted the future does not separate them from other men. It is what we are all doing all the time. Any man, refusing to hazard a guess at the issue in some complex situation, will say, "But I do not *profess* to be a prophet." So we may not, most of us, be professional prophets, but we are incorrigibly devoted amateurs, and

in every plan we make, trivial or grandiose, we count upon some estimate we have formed of the future.

So Hebrew prophecy on its predictive side is not an abnormal excrescence, but the fine flowering of one of the universal powers of the human spirit.

Prophet, it might be said, is but poet writ large. To foresee the future requires a constructive effort of the imagination. The vision may either be built up piece by piece, as the painting grows under the artist's hand, or, after a period long or short of brooding contemplation, it may—as in a moment—front the seer's gaze by a flash of intuition.

But, always, foresight must wait upon insight. The future has infinite, but not indefinite possibilities, as the dreamy enthusiast forgets. You or I may pass through a crisis of conversion. An empire may undergo a revolution. But the state or condition *from* which the individual or the community turns, though it does not determine, really limits and qualifies the state *to* which the transformation is made. To-morrow must start from to-day, even as to-day took its rise from yesterday.

To believe in some kinds of prediction is repugnant to the soul. The hands of a hero and the hands of a clock must not be even remotely compared, as if the achievement of heroic deeds were but a phase in a mechanical problem that could be calculated ahead, if only the factors involved were not too complicated. As a living Oxford philosopher has put it, "prediction [of our conduct] does not matter if it depends on an understanding of what we are, and not on reducing us to what we are not."[1]

No prejudice, therefore, can reasonably be allowed to exclude from the start the consideration of Hebrew prophecy

[1] Bernard Bosanquet, *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, 1912, p. 113 n. 2.

because it is predictive. Predictive prophecy, in the guarded sense just explained, is a natural expression of the human spirit.

But the pious founder of this sermon would not have been justified in predicting that even in the third year of a great war his wishes would still be regarded, neither would you be here to-day, unless there had been found these two characteristic elements, marking off Hebrew prophecy from other examples of predictive activity, the first—its peculiar moral quality, and the second—its unique fulfilment in and through our Lord Jesus Christ.

That Hebrew prophecy, as we read it in the Old Testament, has a high moral intensity, I need not stay to establish. Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, Daniel, the four, commonly called Major Prophets—Hosea, Amos and the rest of the twelve, commonly called Minor Prophets, down to Malachi—as I read the names of the books, they recall, with all their striking differences of style and substance, no difference in this respect—that they all speak as the heralds of a holy and righteous God. Whether herdman, prince or priest, each felt himself to be dwelling amidst a people of unclean lips, and to be, through this association, a man of unclean lips. But to each had come some purging experience, such as that symbolised in the high vision granted to one of the greatest of them. The people with blunted sensibilities knew not their own unworthiness. The prophet, like Job, had seen God, and abhorred himself. And he could only speak with awed spirit his Lord's message to others when the live coal from the altar of sacrifice had cleansed his lips from partiality and self-will.

A further point, that in the lofty moral outlook of the Hebrew prophets, and the high ethical intensity which fired their messages, they were in the strict sense original, I will substantiate by the authority of a man who, by his

courage, insight and industry unto death, lent lustre to Oxford Biblical scholarship, my old teacher, Thomas Kelly Cheyne. No one, I suppose, was more generously hospitable to all evidences of the work of the one inspiring Spirit outside the Bible. Yet in one of his latest works, after discussing the claims made for parallel or prior developments of prophecy in Babylon and Egypt, he declared that "from the comparative point of view but little light could be thrown on pre-exilic Hebrew prophecy." In Babylon the literary class did not try to convert the traditional cosmic scheme into prophecy by infusing into it a moral element. And as for Egyptian literature, he could find in it no trace of striking spiritual capacity and deep religious experience.

The one name that he was prepared to mention by the side of Amos and Hosea was the great Persian sage and seer, Zarathustra, and it was impossible that they should have come under his influence.

Though I may not stay to draw it out in illustrative detail, it is almost impossible to exaggerate the importance of this feature of the work and character of the canonical prophets. Unlike the great majority of those who bore the name and held the office of prophet, these men's insight into things as they were, from which their foresight leapt out to visions of the future, was guided and controlled by a constant double consciousness, of God above them and mankind around them. Jehovah was to them no petty, partial, national God. He *was* "the God of the Hebrews," but to speak of Him as a Hebrew God would have seemed as blasphemous to them as we think it when our opponents speak of the God, who so loved the world that He gave His only begotten Son for the world's salvation, as a German God. Jehovah was already to them a world-ruler, a righteous Judge, strong and patient.

And man was to the prophets before all things a moral being, the creature of God's hands but akin to His Creator, accountable to Him as Judge, and dependent upon Him as Saviour.

But the old Adam was strong in ancient Israel. And the people as a whole loved to think of Jehovah as a kind of Janus, with a Saviour's face of kindness and a Judge's face of wrath, the face of wrath being normally turned towards Israel's foes, and the face of kindness towards Israel. They liked to think that if their Lord was angered, His favour could be bought back by costly sacrifices, in extreme cases even the firstborn son not being withheld. But, like Lord Melbourne in a later age, they hotly resented it if their preachers insisted on connecting religion with conduct.

How the Bible prophets represented the attitude of God to man, a classical quotation will make clear.

" Wherewith shall I come before Jehovah, and bow myself before the high God ? Shall I come before Him with burnt offerings, with calves of a year old ? Will the Lord be pleased with thousands of rams, or with ten thousands of rivers of oil ? Shall I give my firstborn for my transgression, the fruit of my body for the sin of my soul ? He hath showed thee, O man, what is good ; and what doth Jehovah demand of thee, but to do justly, and to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God ? "

Late or early, these words nobly phrase for us the view of practical religion for which the prophets stood with one consent through the centuries.

Late or early, I was obliged to say, for the latest expositor of the book of Micah, following many others, assigns these verses to the period after the return from Babylon.

Much controversy has, of course, taken place about the authorship and date of the prophetic oracles, and the controversies are by no means yet settled.

But, very happily, for our present purpose they are all strictly irrelevant. Clear decision of these controversies will add interest and promote understanding in details. But for the broad survey which alone is within our reach to-day it matters little when or by whom the several words were spoken. In any case they are all pre-Christian. So, again, that foreshortening, to use a familiar but expressive term, by which hopes that could only be fulfilled in a distant future were merged with expectations that lay nearer within the horizon, must throughout be, not merely admitted, but asserted. In any case their very preservation and embodiment in a sacred whole of Canonical Scripture is an indubitably early example of that Jewish interpretation of prophecy which is specifically included by the founder in the scope of this sermon.

Ezra, that is to say, and the other fathers and founders of the Jewish Church properly so called, deliberately included and continued to retain within the compass of the Canon, both the dreadful sentences of doom with which immorality, injustice, and idolatry were threatened upon a stiff-necked and stubborn generation, and the comforting words of hope brought by the messengers of peace to an afflicted and penitent people.

One question most eagerly discussed has been whether the same voices alternately uttered bad news and good news. Always it is true that we are saved by hope. Some spark of hope must smoulder on even in the heart most heavily burdened with fear. Ezekiel is a proof that the same messenger could both hurt and heal. The same floating store of old oriental myths was available in the popular mind to reinforce either threatenings of judgment or promises of salvation.

Yet sure evidences of early date are scanty, and there are in some important instances independent grounds for

believing that later insertions of comfortable words were added to relieve the gloom of earlier collections.

That, however, as has been observed, while involving certain nice points of history and psychology, need not disturb us in our general conclusions.

As the Regius Professor of Divinity [Dr. Scott Holland] in this university showed in last year's Liverpool Lecture [1916] on the Real Problem of Eschatology, the same condensation of a whole mass of high anticipations into the horizon of a single generation is found in the New Testament. Yet neither fears nor hopes then threw Christ or His apostles off their balance, and the sense that the time was short, so far from confusing moral issues, or obscuring practical duties, gave rather a keener edge to insight and exhortation. So we must accept it, not only as mere fact, but as the condition appropriate to that stage of development that the inspired imagination of the prophet habitually overleaped the limitations of time. He saw things in the glass of eternity ; he caught at the breast of God ; and he greatly dared to hope, only because great faith had given birth to overmastering desire. It was the gentleness of God, that would not damp his ardours or cloud his visions, which made the prophet great. So Bacon saw when he wrote that " Divine prophecies have springing and germinant accomplishments throughout many years, though the height or fulness of them may refer to some one age."

Some of you, I suppose, can share with me a boyhood's memory of learning by heart or studying a long chain of Messianic prophecies, such as is baldly listed in the Oxford Helps to the Study of the Bible. We cannot recover now the naïveté with which they were presented to us. But what a loud and long drawn out witness they bear of an inextinguishable hope ! Like the *leit-motiv* that sounds forth in various keys and tones and with various accompani-

ment at intervals throughout some great music-drama, so the call of the Messianic hope, now with flute-like sweetness, and now as with the blast of a trumpet, sounds forth through the successive books of Hebrew Scripture from the first chapter of Genesis onwards.[1] (1) Man, like to God, both by nature, and by his destiny of beneficent world-dominion; (2) the suffering, yet conquering seed of the woman; (3) the posterity that should bring blessing on the world; (4) the holder of the sceptre that should not depart from Judah; (5) the star that should rise out of Jacob; (6) the prophet like unto Moses; (7) the Son of David who should reign for ever; (8) the living Redeemer the vision of whom should give life to the dead; (9) the King set upon Zion who should dash in pieces rebellious nations like a potter's vessel and inherit the ends of the earth; (10) the Divine King whose earthly throne should have eternal and (11) world-wide sway; (12) the priest after the order of Melchizedek who should fight his way through to his victorious seat at the right hand of Jehovah; (13) the infant to be born of a woman in the fulness of time, and, as the instrument of a new fellowship of God with man, to be called Immanuel; (14) the Son to be given, and named, according to our text, the Price of Peace as the last of a series of glorious titles; (15) the spirit-filled ruler who should rise as a shoot out of the stem of Jesse, and bring peace to a waiting world; (16) the King who should reign in righteousness; (17) the man who should be as the shadow of a great rock in a weary land; (18) the suffering servant of Jehovah reconciling many by the

[1] The Biblical references are: (1) Gen. i. 26–28; (2) iii. 15; (3) xii. 1–3 J; xvii. 4–8 P; xxii. 16–18 E; (4) xlix. 10; (5) Num. xxiv. 17; (6) Deut. xviii. 15; (7) 2 Sam. vii. 12–16; (8) Job xix. 25–27; (9) Ps. ii. 6–9; (10) lxxii. 17; lxxxix. 29, 36; (11) lxxii. 8–11; (12) cx.; (13) Isa. vii. 14; (14) ix. 6. 7; (15) xi. 1–10; (16, 17) xxxii. 1, 2; (18) liii.; (19) Jer. xxiii. 5, 6; (20) Ezek. xxxiv. 23, 24; (21) Dan. vii. 13, 14; (22) Micah v. 2–5; (23) Zech. ix. 9. 10; (24) Mal. iii. 1–3.

sacrifice of himself; (19) the righteous branch that should be raised up to David, whose character should be expressed by his name, Jehovah our Righteousness; (20) the new David who should be King over God's people, and their own shepherd; (21) one like unto a son of man, coming with the clouds of heaven, whom all peoples, nations and languages should serve, and whose dominion should be an everlasting dominion; (22) the child to be born at Bethlehem, like David in the humility of his shepherd parentage, yet whose goings forth had been from everlasting, and whose rule should reach to the ends of the earth; (23) the lowly King who should rule victoriously from sea to sea; and finally (24) the messenger of the covenant, who should come with a refiner's fire.

I have been able to give you, as it were, only the bare catalogue entries about a row of imaginary portraits. Each embodied a transcendent hope which the immediate partia fulfilment always disappointed.

What later Jewish rabbis made of these prophecies, others in Oxford have after laborious study from time to time reported, as I can testify in the capacity of a hearer of Dr. Pusey's last course of lectures, of which the subject was the Jewish interpretation of the Messianic psalms.

I must be content to lead you over more familiar ground, where you may indeed more readily catch me if I trip, but where also, if I speak truth, you will be able from your own knowledge to approve and to illustrate further what is said.

I am under no doubt who should be the first Jewish interpreter to be cited. John the son of Zacharias, the last of prechristian prophets, himself more than a prophet, had so overwhelming a sense of the unexhausted meaning and value of the prophecies, and especially of those we call Messianic, that he transformed himself into a voice, uttering

in all ears the tremendous call to repent. He who was coming, mightier than himself, would be to them either Judge or Saviour according as they met Him with hardened or with penitent hearts. Thus the last of the old prophets set his seal to the witness of his predecessors. The two characteristic features that we noted in them, their moral fire and their expectation of an ideal Figure, both Judge and Saviour, are also characteristic of him.

But when he was thrown into prison, and in his enforced inactivity strange and contradictory rumours reached him about that Other from whom he had hoped so much, the flame of conviction died down and he asked, by messenger, "Art Thou He that should come or look we for another?"

So from the forerunner we turn to the one supreme interpreter that has been born of a Jewish mother, Jesus Himself.

Close study of the Synoptic Gospels, begun in Oxford just thirty-five years ago, and renewed at intervals up to last year, has led me to share the conviction, expressed by others better qualified than myself to speak, that these three facts are historically well assured; the first, that in the sayings preserved in St. Mark, and those common to St. Matthew and St. Luke—to go no further—we have substantially accurate reports of Christ's teaching; the second, that these sayings prove that Jesus knew His Bible well, and interpreted it with reverent freedom; and the third, that, in spite of current misconceptions of the Messianic office, He claimed eventually to be the Messiah, and sealed His claim with His blood.

The next two testimonies to be cited are in contradiction with one another. The chief priests and scribes, the authorities of the established Jewish Church of the day, rejected the claim of Jesus. There were two good reasons why they should have done so. They resented the moral sternness, the plain speaking, and the spiritual authority of the

peasant prophet, and they found him totally unlike the conventionalised figure of the Messiah which they had in their minds.

Against the adverse witness of those who had given themselves no fair chance of judging whether Jesus were or were not worthy to be called Messiah, we must now set the verdict of those other Jewish interpreters who from the day of Pentecost onwards, at the risk, and sometimes at the cost, of life not only admitted but triumphantly proclaimed Jesus to be the Christ. These men were not scholars, it is true, if tried by an academic test, but they had been at school with Jesus, and, though dull scholars and slow to learn, they had without His prompting reached the conviction, expressed by their leader, Simon Peter, at Caesarea Philippi, that He was the Christ. And after the dreadful eclipse of their faith when He suffered under Pontius Pilate, the visions of the Risen Lord, followed by the descent of the indwelling Spirit, set them boldly upon a new path of proof. They lived their faith. They expressed their faith in a fellowship of prayer and sacramental communion. They imparted their faith to all who would receive it.

And their faith proved increasingly infectious. Two men of learning and ability, Saul of Tarsus, after a blinding vision of the Lord whom he had persecuted in the persons of His followers, and Apollos, after simple contact with consistent and well-instructed believers, both set their seal in turn to the Jewish Christian interpretation of the Messianic prophecies. Their experience did not make them infallible interpreters of Hebrew literature, but it gave them an undying assurance that "how many soever be the promises of God, in Christ is the yea."

Only a word in passing can be said about modern Jewish interpreters. A fair number of volumes of recent Jewish sermons have come into my hands, and they have all left

the impression, that, apart from its fulfilment in Jesus, Messianic hope is dead in Judaism.

An exception may be made of congregations and individuals who represent what is known as Reformed Judaism. A little time ago I wrote to an old Balliol contemporary, Claude Montefiore, to ask him to lecture in Liverpool on the Old Testament. He had already, from an appreciative, yet still critical standpoint, written a careful commentary in two volumes on the Synoptic Gospels. And his reply was that his leisure for study was now taken up with St. Paul.

If, my brethren, open-minded Jews are beginning freshly to consider Jesus as the greatest of their race, and the culmination of many hopes, ought not we, born and bred in the atmosphere of Christian belief, to ask ourselves whether there are not unexhausted possibilities in Jesus, unrealised hopes, waiting for His Church to give effect to them ?

Such prophecies as we are considering to-day are divine promises when we in our turn view them in the glass of eternity. Yet they are not absolute, but conditional promises.

Christ has, in fact, been verified in this or that aspect of His richly varied Messianic office only so far as communities, composed of individuals united by an active fellowship of adoring faith and loving obedience, have given practical effect to their assurance.

To-day, my brethren, not Christ but the Church is put to a new and unexampled test. He *is* the Prince of Peace : are there enough like-minded Christians in the world to be His instruments in securing the abolition of war ?

Do you realise how large a place is occupied in Hebrew prophecy by the hope of a worldwide peace ? And do you see what sublime audacity was needed for the utterance of such a hope ?

Twice over, in a work on Hebrew eschatology dated just eleven years back, the political insignificance of Israel between the Great Powers of Babylon or Assyria and Egypt is illustrated by a comparison with Belgium between Germany and France.

May it be that the extraordinary example of the hope, conscious or implicit, of the eventual triumph of right given by a little country, Belgium, in face of terrible odds, may prove to have been the torch to kindle such a new hope of international peace as shall realise one more aspect in the Messianic hope as it was so daringly and so persistently enunciated in the little country of Israel!

In some of the prophecies there is no mention of a personal agent as the bringer of peace. Such is the case in the famous passage treasured among the oracles both of Isaiah and Micah. "And it shall come to pass in the latter days," i.e., the Messianic age, "that many peoples shall go, and say, Come ye and let us go up to the house of the God of Jacob, and He will teach us of His ways, and He shall judge between the nations: and they shall beat their swords into ploughshares and their spears into pruninghooks: nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more."

Remember that whoever wrote these bold words of hope was a citizen of a petty and despised country. But he refused to measure greatness by bigness, and trusted the force of truth: for "out of Zion," he said, "will go forth instruction, and the word of Jehovah from Jerusalem."

England is geographically a little country, but the Pax Britannica, founded upon justice, liberty, truth and good faith, has under the shock of war revealed a tenacious and elastic strength, linking great countries round the world, that has astonished friends and foes alike. To-day slavery, duelling, and internal war are unthinkable among the con-

stituent elements of the British commonwealth of peoples.

The psalmist can tell us that this must be due to God, our unseen refuge and strength. "He maketh wars to cease in all the earth; He breaketh the bow, and cutteth the spear in sunder; He burneth the chariots in the fire."

God has already taught the British people so to love peace that they will fight so that others may not be robbed of it, and to fight on rather than submit to a peace that is no peace, a peace that would make wars to abound, instead of one that will make wars to cease in all the earth.

Peace after judgment and through judgment, that is in full harmony with the Spirit who spake by the prophets.

Those prophets caught up fragments of tradition about a long past Paradise, and wove them into a picture of the world as it shall be when God's King shall reign indeed.

From the world-empires of Egypt and Babylon they had learnt large ideas, and they transferred them in sober earnest to their visions of the future that should one day be. Out of the twenty-four word portraits which we passed in review just now, no less than nine involve the idea of worldwide rule, with worldwide peace repeatedly named as its consequence or accompaniment.

The passage from which our text is taken is not the least striking. From the dawn of history the tramp of armed men had resounded along the great through roads of Palestine: it can be heard there again to-day. If Belgium was rightly called the cockpit of Europe, Palestine and Syria were the cockpit of Asia and Africa.

Knowing something at least of this, the prophet cries with assurance, "They joy before thee, . . . for the yoke of his burden, and the staff of his shoulder, and the rod of his oppressor, thou hast broken. . . . For every boot of the booted warrior in the tumult and the garments rolled in blood, shall even be for burning, for fuel of fire."

You know how the old Christmas Day lesson goes on, in words made into splendid music by Handel's genius: "For unto us a child is born . . ." Yet stay a moment just to notice in what orderly fashion the recital of great names passes to its climax, Prince of Peace, for herein is set forth the pathway of divided and tortured Christendom to the better state that is to be.

Christ is for us the Wonderful Counsellor. How the world needs good counsel to-day! If prophets who only have to *speak* of the future need insight and foresight, do not statesmen who have to *build* the future need the same gifts in larger measure?

So let us pray that Christ may be born again, if it be but as a child, in the hearts of the statesmen of all Europe, Christ, with His eyes of flame, that shrivel up falsehood and hate, and miss no glint of mercy and truth.

Then Christ is the mighty God, or more precisely, the Divine Warrior. Till evil submits, He must fight against it, but He will use His might against nought but evil. What inspiration for those who risk life against tyranny, deceit and cruelty! The Captain of the Lord's host is behind them.

Next Christ is Father and Shepherd of His people in perpetuity. Only while His people are loyal to Him and to the family fellowship can they count on the benefits of His rule.

Lastly, Christ is Prince of Peace. So by the stages of Wisdom, Power, and the Love which is at once filial and brotherly, we arrive at the consummation of Peace.

The day of worldwide peace is coming, is nearer than it ever was before. Never before has half the habitable earth been concerned in one conflict, and the whole world looked on at it. Never before have millions of fighting men for so long beheld such aggravated horrors of scientific

warfare. Only let us Christians remember that Christ, whether known by name or working by His Spirit in the heart, can alone make peace by His cross in the world, as once He made peace in His Church between Jews and Gentiles.

Milton, in his famous ode, celebrated in exquisitely classical form the peace that Christ found at His birth. Be it ours to hope and pray and labour for that surer, longer lasting peace which Christ, on some bright morrow, shall, through men of goodwill, establish on earth.

I will therefore close with some ruder words than Milton's, yet words of real prophecy from a British poet:

> It's coming yet for a' that,
> When man to man, the world o'er,
> Shall brothers be and a' that.

POSTSCRIPT, JANUARY 15, 1919.

Some lines, sung on the first Sunday in this year, may serve to point the moral that the hopes, expressed two years ago, and ripened with such marvellous swiftness in four short months of last year, cannot reach their final fruition apart from spiritual conditions, peace within the Church and between the Churches being a necessary factor for security.

THE WAY OF PEACE.

The tide of time was full that day
When Christ was born, in peace;
Who now proclaims a worldwide sway,
A rule that must increase:

"If peace you'd find,
Serve me as King,
And peace I'll bring
To all mankind."

Between the nations Peace must grow,
As truth and right prevail;
Within the nations Peace must go
With love that cannot fail.

"Hark!" Christ doth say,
I give My peace
With large increase:
Come, walk My way."

The Church, man's mother, and Christ's bride
Descending from above, [guide
From weak to strong alone can
Fair Peace, the child of love.

"First to Mine own
My peace I give:
One let them live,
So Mine be known."

G. H.

G. HARFORD.

JEWS AND JUDAISM IN THE EARLIEST CHRISTIAN APOLOGIES.

THERE are a few noteworthy parallels to Rabbinical Agadas in Justin's work. In the chapter where the Apologist proves that Plato knew very well the views about the creation set forth in Genesis, he quotes Gen. i. 1–3 and adds: "The whole of the world was created through God's word by means of already existing elements, mentioned by Moses (Ap. i. 59). We presume that the Rabbis had to deal with similar arguments. A so-called philosopher said to the Patriarch Gamaliel: "God found elements which enabled Him to create the world." Rabban Gamaliel quotes a couple of passages in order to show that God created these elements as well (Gen. rabba, chap. i.). Remarkable is the statement of Bar Kappara, circa 200 C.E., related by R. Huna in the name of the Rabbi. If it had not been written we could not have said it, namely, God created heaven and earth. Wherefrom "and the earth" was תוהו ובהו (Gen. rabba, chap. i.). That is exactly what Justin says.[1] Both Justin and the Agada read in Deut. xxxii. 22 the teaching of the Stoa concerning the advent of a world-fire or world-war (*see* O. Pfleiderer, *Vorbereitung des Christentums in der griech. Philosophie*, 1906, p. 45; Justin, Ap. i. 60, and Sifre Deut. 320).[2] From a passage in the Apol. i. 64 light is thrown upon an obscurely worded teaching of Ben-Zoma, the famous Rabbi (c. 130 C.E.), as follows: "It is not written 'and the spirit of God was blowing' but 'flying' as a bird

[1] In the same way Theophilus writes to Autolycus: "This sacred Scripture teaches us at the outset to show that matter, from which God made and fashioned the world, was in some manner created, being produced by God" (Book ii., chap. x.). A view which agrees exactly with Rabban Gamaliel's statement.

[2] v. now "Revue des Etudes Juives," LXVIII. pp. 168–173.

flies" (Gen. r., chap. x.). If we consider the way in which Justin pictures the legend of Kore, the daughter of Zeus, flying over the water as illustrating the same passage, then we can understand the idea of Ben-Zoma, who was supposed to be well acquainted with Greek mythology and philosophy, according to our historical traditions concerning him in Rabbinical sources. Justin writes: "And now, in order to imitate the spirit of God, concerning which it is said that He blew over the water, they invented the legend of Kore." It seems likely that the Rabbi as well as the Church Father were questioned about Kore as affording a seemingly striking parallel to the narrative of Gen. i. 3. Justin answers: Those Greeks copied the story from the Bible, the Rabbi argues that it is not written מנשבת (blowing) but מרחפת (flying). Clearly we have here two parallel cases before us. We know also that the Rabbis as well as the Church Fathers used the phrase "it is not written thus, but so and so," in order to oppose heretical or polemical statements.[1]

We turn now to the third Apologist, to the writer of the letters to Diogenes. The question put before the writer was: Why do not Christians worship the same God as the Jews? (chap. iii.). They, the Jews, are right in their belief that there is only one God, and they acknowledge Him. However, in the ways they worship Him they are entirely wrong, and more than that, worse than idol-worshippers. God, who created heaven and earth, does not and cannot need or want offerings, blood and fat and similar sorts of things. The Sabbath is a superstition, the circumcision is nonsense, the fasts and new moon festivals all are hypocrisy. The dietary law is wrong, for all things which God created are good and useful. It is blasphemy to say that God forbids man to do good work on Sabbath. They

[1] s. L. *Ginzberg*, "Ha Goren," VIII. pp. 35–51.

look upon the stars and moon in order to establish months and festivals, to divide the days and seasons; who can therein see any signs of fear of God? (chap. iv.). He mentions further that Jews hate Christians! (chap. v.). From the remark about the fixing of the calendar we may infer that the writer lived in Palestine or Galilee, where the calendar was based on observation of the new moon.

There is very little indeed to get from Tatian's Sermon to the Greeks about the Jews. We read with interest the passage: "For just as from one torch many fires are kindled, but the light of the first torch is not lessened by the kindling of many torches, so the Logos, coming forth from the Logos-power of the Father" (chap. v. 5. 4). The same idea is used by Justin in the Dialogue, chap. cxxviii. (*see* M. Friedlaender, *Geschichte der jued. Apologetik*, p. 70). We adduce a few parallels from the Rabbinical literature in order to show that both used the same parable. *Sifre Zuta*, ed. Horowitz, p. 163: לאבוקה שהיא דולקת ודלקו ממנה כמה נרות, אבל אורה של אבוקה לא חסירה כלום.

See Ibid., p. 200: לנר שהיה מונח אל גבי מנורה ודלקו ממנו נרות הרבה אבל אורו של הנר לא היה חסר כלום.

Jelamdenu Numeri, ed. Grünhut, p. 25*a*; *Num. Rabba*, chap. xiv.: למה היה משה דומה באותה שעה לנר שהוא מונח על גבי מנורה הכל דולקין ממנו אין אורו חסר כלום.

In the Midras the relation of the prophet or the teacher to his pupil, in the Letter and Dialogue the influence of the Logos is illustrated by the example of a torch.

We have two important apologetical treatises written by Athenagoras. First let us consider the one which discusses the question of the resurrection of the dead. It deals in the first part with the following objections to that teaching: Has God the ability and the power to revive the dust of the dead? Can God revive those who were killed or eaten by wild animals (chap. iii.) or by fish in the

ocean (chap. iv.) or those slain on the battlefields or in time of starvation (chaps. iv.–viii.) ? (*c*) Can a broken thing be mended ? (chap ix.). The answer is : God can do everything. The " Emperor " asked Rabban Gamaliel : " Can God revive the dead ? You say that there is a resurrection of the dead ; can dust live ? " The daughter of Gamaliel answered as follows : " There were two workmen, one formed figures from earth, the other from water, who is held in higher esteem ? " The Emperor said : " Of course the one who formed them from water." " Now," said the clever lady, " God creates human beings from water ; how much easier will it be for Him to revive them from the dust (of the earth) " (b. Sanh. 91*a*). While this version deals with the problem whether God is able to revive the dead, a second recension of the story shows that God can mend even a broken thing (b. Sanh. 91*a*). Hadrian asked R. Josua b. Chananja : " Whence will God breathe life into the bodies of the dead ? " (s. Gen. rabba, chap. xxviii. 3). Gebiha ben Pesisa proved the possibility of the resurrection thus : " Those who were not living came into existence, how then can you say that those who were alive cannot become alive again ? " (b. Sanh. 91*a*). R. Jose ben Chalafta answered the question in the same way as the daughter of Gamaliel (*see* Gen. rabba, chap. xiv. 8). R. Meir cited to the alleged Cleopatra (T. Q. R. ii. 188) the illustration of corn in order to show that the dead will not appear naked after the resurrection (b. Sanh. 90*b*). An anonymous teaching says : People are wondering, whether God is able to revive the dead (see *Pesikta*, ed. Friedmann, p. 192*b*). We might quote many other instances showing that the dispute continued during the third (s. Antonius and Rabbi, Lev. R., chap. x. 4 ; Gen. r., xxviii. 3) and fourth centuries (Pes. rabb., p. 8*a*) in a similar manner. For our present purpose it suffices to show that the Rabbis were engaged during

the second century in answering questions similar to those dealt with by Athenagoras. Even the question, "How will the mutilated ones revive?" (Gen. r., chap. xcv.) was solved by the Rabbis: [1]

"The mutilated ones," says an anonymous teaching, "will be quickened with their defects, so that people should not say: When they were alive He did not heal, but after death He cured them, perhaps they are not the same people."

For our subject of no less importance is the second part of the treatise. Athenagoras quotes almost the same words as used by Antoninus in the rabbinical sources, the objections to the possibility of a final judgment after death. In both sources it is stated: Both soul and body will have to defend themselves before God. Each will throw the responsibility upon the other. Each will prove that neither can do anything good or evil without the aid of the other. R. Jehudah, the Patriarch, answers with the well-known parable of the lame man and the blind man (*see* b. Sanh. 91*b*, Lev. r., chap. iv.; Tanhuma, ed. Buber, iii. p. 8; see my remarks in the *Orient. Literaturzeitung*, 1913, p. 449).

Though there can be little doubt as to the similarity between some of the sayings of the Apologist of the Church and those of the teachers of the Synagogue, one imagines in reading the Apologia of Theophilus that one is in the world of the Talmud and the Midras. The following quotation will illustrate our contention:—

THEOPHIL. i. CHAP. 2.	B. HULIN, 59*b*–60*a*.
But if you say, "Show me thy God," I would reply, etc. Ibid. i. chap. 5. For if a man cannot look upon the sun,	A man, styled Emperor, asked R. Joshua b. Chananja (before 130 C.E.): "I should like to see thy God!" The Rabbi says:

[1] s. now "American Journal of Theological Studies," XIX. (1915), pp. 577–591.

though it be a very small heavenly body, on account of its exceeding heat and power, how shall not a mortal man be much more unable to see the glory of God, which is unutterable.[1]

"Verily, that is impossible." "Indeed, I will," replied the Emperor. "Well," said the Rabbi, who led him into the sunshine (for the day) happened to be the Tekupha (Solstice) of Tammuz. "Now, look into it!" said R. Joshua b. Chananja. "I cannot," was the answer. "The sun is only one of God's servants," concluded the Rabbi, "and you ought to admit that you cannot look into it, how much less can you behold His glory" (cf. Telamdenu, Num. ed. Grünhut, p. 13*b*: אל הראהו לי, הרי חמה אחד ממשמשי שמשמשים לפניו במרום אין אדם יכול להסתכל בו הקבה על אחת כמה וכמה.[2]

It is remarkable that both were asked the same question (Celsus also asked the same question, *see* Origenes, *Contra Celsum*, vi. 66).[3] People, accustomed to see their gods in wood, stone and metal everywhere, could not picture or imagine an invisible God. Since the Apologia was written between 170 and 190 C.E. naturally the Rabbinical statement is older and has the priority. Still the inner connexion between the two dialogues in the Apologia of the Church Father and in the story of the Rabbi is significant.

There is one other point which will strike any one who knows the Midras. Theophilus brings a proof for the existence of God, saying thus: "As for any person, when he sees a ship on the sea rigged and in sail, and making for the harbour, will no doubt infer that there is a pilot in her

[1] v. M. Gaster, "The Ancient Collection of Agadoth," Ramsgate, 1896, p. 11, No. XII. v. 6, Synh. 39*a*.

[2] Cf. Midrash Abchir, Jalkut, I. § 396.

[3] *See* Minucius Felix, x. 5; cf. Geffken, *Zwei griechische Apologeten*, p. 241.

who is steering her" (I. chap. v.).[1] May be that the great preacher and Apologist, R. Isaac, who lived in the second half of the third century, was influenced by that proof or arrived at the same idea by his own way of thinking. He says: There was one who travelled from place to place, and he saw on his journey a palace in flames. He said: Is it possible that the palace has no owner? Then the landlord appeared before him and said: I am the owner. The same happened to our father Abraham who asked: Is it possible that the world has no leader? then God looked upon him and said: I am the Lord of the world (Gen. r., chap. xxxix. 1).[2] It is obvious that there is something wrong in the parable of the Midras, because there might be a palace on fire without an owner, but anyhow the proof is similar to that of Theophilus.

The question, "What does God do since the creation?" is answered by Theophilus in this manner: "One should not call God idle and vain. For the divine wisdom foreknew that some would trifle and discover a multitude of Gods who do not exist" (2 Book, chap. x.). We have in the question put to R. Jose b. Chalafta by a lady, called Matrona, an instance of those who trifle: "I admit that God created the world in seven days, but what is He doing since then?" (*see* Genesis rabba, chap. xxviii. 4; Tanhuma, ed. Buber, i. p. 2; Leviticus rabba, chap. viii. 1; Num. rabba, chap. iii.; Pesikta of R. Kahana, ed. Buber, p. 11*b*).

Theophilus is worried apparently by the use of the plural in Gen. i. 26, when he says: "Moreover, God is found saying as if needing help, 'Let us make man in our image, after our likeness.' But to no one else than to His

[1] The same proof is used in the source given in note 9.

[2] *See* Gerald Friedländer, *Rabbinic Philosophy and Ethics*, London, 1912, p. 48, who translates the word בירה tower. I kept the translation of the Aruch.

own Word and Wisdom did He say, 'Let us make'" (2 Book, chap. xviii.). The explanation of this verse occurs in the Midras, whence we see that the Rabbis had to answer the same difficulty. Rabbis of the third century, e.g., R. Jonathan (Gen. rabba, chap. viii. 7), R. Joshua Ben Levi (ibid. viii. 3), R. Levi (ibid. viii. 7) and R. Simon (ibid. viii. 5) dealt with the same question (cf. *M.G.W.J.* xvii., p. 19, and xviii. p. 61).

"Why is God said to have walked," was also one of the well-known objections. You might argue that God ought not to be contained in a place, and how can you say that He walked in Paradise? (Gen. iii. 8; 2 Book chap. ii. 22). Theophilus answers: "His Word went into the Garden," etc. R. Abba bar Kahana had to solve the same difficulty when he states: "It is not written מהלך but מתהלך," and he brings the theory of the seven heavens (Gen. rabba, chap. xix. 7; *see* the parallels in the edition of J. Theodor, p. 176).[1]

Again, Theophilus quotes the opinion that God was unjustified in forbidding man to eat of the tree of knowledge. Thus, too, would it have been with Adam, for not as one who grudged him, as some suppose, did God command him not to eat of the tree of knowledge" (2 Book chap. xxv.). The Gnostics are referred to here, as we have shown in another place (see *Revue des Etudes Juives*, Tome 44, p. 188). We see from the saying of R. Joshua in the name of R. Levi (Gen. rabba, chap. xix. 4; Pirke of R. Eliezer, chap. xiii., and cf. the Pseudo-Jonathan Targum to iii. 4) that the Rabbis knew this heretical view as well.

Then we infer that Theophilus had also to deal with the difficulty in Gen. iii. 9 as to God's calling and saying: "Where art thou, Adam?" God did this, not as if ignorant of this, but being longsuffering. He gave him an opportunity of *repentance* and *confession* (Book 2, chap.

[1] s. now I.Q.R.N.S., VIII. (1918), p. 371.

xxvi.). There are many answers in the Rabbinical literature concerning this objection. One anonymous explanation understood the word איכה, not in the sense of "where art thou," but "what happened to thee yesterday according to my view; now according to the view of the serpent that means": Yesterday thou didst obey me, to-day thou dost obey the serpent (Gen. rabba, chap. xix. 9). A similar explanation to Theophilus is to be found in the Midras Aggada (ed. Buber, Vienna, 1894, p. 8). And He said to him: Where art thou? Did not God know where he was? (Yes, He did), but He wanted only to open a way for him; perhaps he might repent; the same was the case with Bileam (Num. xxii. 9). A similar case occurs in Gen. iv. 9. God said to Cain: "Where is thy brother Abel? because God wishes the wicked people to repent" (ibid., p. 11). The Pseudo-Jonathan Targum to Gen. iii. 9: "And God called Adam and said: Behold, the whole world I created is known to Me, darkness as well as light; didst thou think to hide thyself before Me? I see thy hiding place!" The Vita Adami has the same question: Where didst thou hide thyself? Didst thou think I cannot find thee? Can a house be hidden before its builder?" (*see* Kautzsch, *Pseudepigraphen*, p. 522; cf. my *Studien zum Pseudo-Jonathan Targum*, 1, 1905, p. 171). The same idea recurs in Book 2, chap. xxix. "But God, being pitiful, and wishing to afford to Cain, as to Adam, an opportunity of repentance and confession, said: "Where is Abel thy brother?" Similarly in the Pirke of Eliezer, chap. xxi., in the name of R. Jochanan: Was Cain not aware of all the secret things being known to God? What did he do? He took the body of his brother and buried it. God said unto him: Where is thy brother? Cain answered: Lord of the whole world! I was appointed to watch the field, but not to be the watchman of my brother.

Then God said: Thou didst murder, and the voice of thy brother's blood crieth unto Me from the ground. Then Cain repented. Theophilus knew another often mentioned Aggada, also in connexion with the Rabbinical teaching about repentance (Book 3, chap. xx.), as we have shown elsewhere. When Noah announced to his contemporaries that a flood would come, he cried to them saying, "Come hither, God calls you to repentance." We find very often the idea that God wanted the contemporaries of Noah to repent, expressed in the statements of the Rabbis. According to the Pseudo-Jonathan Targum God withheld the flood 120 years, so that the people might repent (chap. vi. verse 3), and on the eve of the great catastrophe after the death of Methusalem God still expected their repentance (chap. vii. v. 10). With more detail is the legend stated by an anonymous writer or preacher (Gen. rabba, chap. xxx. 7). During 120 years Noah planted cedars and then he cut them down. The people asked him: What does this mean? He said: The Lord of the world brings the flood, repent! (*see* Midr. Kohelet rabba, ix. 14 and other parallels in Theodor's, p. 272, and Gen. rabba, chap. xxxii. 7; ibid., p. 293). But not only in the Rabbinical, but in the Apocryphical literature too, is a similar view to be found; so in the Adam Book (*see* Dillmann, in Ewald's *Jahrbuecher*, vol. 4, p. 97*a*) and in the Syriac Adam Book (*see* Bezold's *Schatzhoehle*, p. 17; cf. my *Studien zum Pseudo-Jonathan Targum*, p. 21). Finally, we note another Aggada in Theophilus, common to the Rabbis as well. Salem, according to Theophilus, is the city of Jerusalem (ii. 31). This occurs in the Targum Onkelos and Pseudo-Jonathan (Gen. xiv. 18) and Gen. rabba, chap. xliii. 1 (*see* Theodor, p. 420).

Valuable material for the history of the Jews in Smyrna is preserved in the reports of the martyrdom of St. Poly-

carp (Febr. xxii. 156), and still more in that of Pionius (250). The Jews were present at the martyrdom of Polycarpius (i. 12), they were even more zealous in bringing wood for the burning than the heathens (i. 13). Jews disputed with Christians after the death of Polycarpius (i. 17), and opposed those who wanted to take the body of the Saint (i. 18). This happened on the great Sabbath.[1] The same date is mentioned in the martyrdom of Pionius. Among the crowd gathered before the court were plenty of women, "for it was Sabbath, and the Jewish women do not perform any work because of the Sabbath" (chap. iii.). In the speech of Pionius a good deal is said about the Jews, supposed to be present. First of all they were reminded of Exod. xxiii. 5 and Prov. xxiv. 17, not to rejoice at the downfall of the enemy (chaps. iv. and v.). Then he asks how can they laugh at the poor victims who are forced by the officers of the government to sacrifice the idols (chap. iv. 8). Further on Pionius proves it from the Bible that Jews are idol-worshippers and are guilty of adultery and bloodshed (chap. iv. 11). The three sins just mentioned were the cardinal sins mostly despised by the Jews. Theophilus, who knew Judaism very well, says (ii. 34): "And they (the prophets) taught us to refrain from unlawful idolatry, adultery and murder." It was surely very hard to Jews to hear such an accusation! And indeed that reproach was very often repeated and denied by the preachers and the teachers of the Synagogue. A few examples will suffice. The first is attributed to an authority as far back as the second century, R. Eliezer of Modaim. "In the future (on the day of judgment) all the princes of the nations of the world will come before God and complain of Israel, saying: They are not different from other nations,

[1] For the history of the great Sabbath, see Goldfahn, *Jued. Literaturblatt*, xv. 156 ff. and xxv. 60 ff.

the Jews are idol-worshippers even as the heathen ; both are adulterers and both murderers ; why should these enter Paradise and those Hell ? " (*see* Midras Hazit, ii. 1, and Midras Psalms, ed. Buber, p. 21). The second statement is almost in the same wording by R. Azarja in the name of R. Juda (M. Chazit, viii. 8 ; Midr. Ruth, at the begin. ; Midras Psalms, p. 117), and the third is given anonymously (Midr. Psalms, p. 174 ; *see* my *Religionsgeschichtliche Studien*, i., p. 21). We may take it for granted that the allegation uttered by Pionius here was considered by the Rabbis in their sermons.

That there is a close connexion between the Apologia and the Aggada cannot be denied when we consider that the same parable brought by Pionius (iv. 14) is used by the Rabbis with the same tendency. Both use the parable of chaff and grain. Pionius says : " Imagine a threshing floor, full of wheat. When the man turns the wheat with a fork or with his own hands, then the light chaff will be blown away by the wind, but the heavy grain remains in the proper place." In the Midras we read : " Straw, chaff and stubble quarrel with one another. Each says : For my sake was the field sown. When the time comes straw, chaff and stubble are blown away by the wind and the man takes the wheat only. Thus the nations of the world say : We are the *true Israelites* and *for our sake was the world created*. We say : *We are the true Israelites*, etc. Wait until the day of God comes, then we will say for whose sake was the world created " (*see* Midr. Cant. r. ; M. Psalms, p. 4 ; cf. my *Relig. Studien*, i. p. 14). It is quite obvious that the parable in the Midras is older and more original.

Pionius quotes what the Jews very often said in his early years. He mentions that Jews very often call Christians to the Synagogue (chap. xiii.). Jews say further : Jesus was not the Messiah, for He died as any other ordinary

man. Finally that the Jews think the resurrection after death will be by means of exorcism (chap. xiv.). An idea for which we cannot find any trace.

II.

If we consider the trains of thought concerning our subject in the works dealt with, we gather three points to which we draw attention. First of all, the method and aim are common to Judaism and Christianity. Both wanted to settle difficult passages of the Bible. The belief in God and resurrection was attacked by heathen opponents, and answered by the teachers. Often the same ideas and almost the same passages recur in different Apologies. There can be no doubt, from what we saw above, e.g. in the case of Theophilus, that there was direct and mutual influence connecting Rabbis and Church Fathers.[1] If we were to infer from the Apologies merely the date of many anonymous Rabbinical statements, the aid afforded by the Apologies and Church Fathers would be considerable; how much more is that the case since they enable us to understand many Rabbinic sentences and sermons properly. Yet, more than that, we see that even the phrases, as in Tatian's case, are similar.

Secondly, we hear the complaint made by the Christians. "Jews hate Christians," says Justin (Letter to Diogenes), and Jews do not believe in the Messiah. The Apologists speak further of an alleged Jewish angel worship of the folly involved in the Jewish offerings and the keeping of the Law, and finally that Israel is a forsaken nation. Since we have dealt elsewhere with the latter problem, whether Jews or Christians are the true Israel (*see* my *Religionsgeschichtliche Studien*, i., p. 10 ff.), we may turn to the other two problems. I think that many Rabbis in the third cen-

[1] The influence of Philo, of course, must not be ignored.

tury were endeavouring to prove that those allegations were false. R. Jochanan and R. Chanina dispute whether the angels were created on Monday or Thursday (Gen. rabba, i. 4). The tendency was to show they were not helping God at the creation. When Justin says that mankind was created by the angels (Dial., chap. lxii.), the Rabbis had several legends about the angels opposing the creation of man (Gen. rabba, chap. viii. 9; ibid., chap. xvii. 5). In the same manner they taught that the angels disliked the giving of the Torah to Israel through Moses (b. Sabbat, 88*b*; R. Joshua ben Levi, Pesikta Rabbati, p. 97*a*, 128*a*; Tanhuma, ed. Buber, v. p. 51). These legends can only be understood as the denial of the often repeated idea that Moses received the Torah from the angels (see *Apostl.* vii. 53, 58; Hebr. ii. 2; Galat. iii. 19; cf. Gfroerer, *Das Jahrhundert des Heils*, i. p. 226, and J. Oppenheim, *Haasif*, v. p. 6).

The Rabbis dealt with the other problems as well. It is impossible to give here even a brief account of the whole material. It must suffice to point out merely the main questions. Jews were asked: Does God need offerings at all? Why does God need them? Were the offerings not punishments? We have shown above that although the problem was dealt with in the second century, nevertheless the force of these objections was felt even in the third century. An anonymous preacher says: "Thou shalt not be led astray by the evil inclination saying: God needs light; see what is written Exod. xxvii. 21." In the appointed tent without the partition veil. It (the light) was given within the partition veil, why not outside? In order that thou mayest know that God does not need any light. However, why is it commanded? To give thee the merit of lighting it (Tanh. ed. Buber, ii. p. 98; Jelamdenu, Num. ed. Gruenhut, p. 15*b*; Numeri rabba, chap. xv.;

Exodus rabba, chap. xxxvi.). With the same problem we see R. Jochanan (died 278) dealing. "The eye is white, the dark part is in the middle, whence does one see — from the dark or from the white part? You might think from the white part, but it is not so; one has the power of seeing from the dark part. You are unable to explain the reason for this fact and try to understand My ways. Do not be inclined to say, God needs light" (Tanhuma, ibid., p. 97). A contemporary of R. Jochanan, R. Simon ben Lakish, says: "There are many commandments in the Bible commencing 'bring Me,' but their purpose is merely to give thee a reward." R. Jehudah relates in the name of R. Simon ben Pazzi: "Hear, my son, and receive my sayings (Prov. iv. 10), very often did I say 'bring Me' in order to give thee merits. I said, take a red cow (Num. xix. 2). Wherefore, perhaps for my sake? No, but to cleanse thee (Num. xix. 19). I said, take Me a heave offering (Exod. xxv. 2). Why? Because I shall dwell among you. I said, and let them make a sanctuary, that I will dwell among you (Exod. xxv. 8). I said further, that they bring thee clear olive oil (Exod. xxvii. 20). Do I need your light? It is said, 'the light dwelleth with him' (Daniel ii. 22). All this is but merely to give you merit, to atone for your soul, for (the light) is compared with your soul. Now, I say and ye shall take you on the first day the fruit of the tree Hadar (Lev. xxiv. 40; Leviticus rabba, chap. xxx. 12) in order to give you merit. Possibly we should include here the anonymous teaching which points out: It is not said here "bring a heave offering," but "bring Me," teaching us that wherever it is said "bring Me" the reference is to this world and the to world to come. Instances given are Lev. xxv. 23 (the land is mine), Num. viii. 17 (the firstborn are mine, *see* Tanh. Buber, ii. 90). Original and most remarkable from the historical point of view

is the sermon of Rabbi Revi, c. 300 C.E., trying to deal with these questions. R. Pinchas (b. Hama) in the name of R. Levi said: Once there was a king, whose son became haughty and he would not eat properly slaughtered meat, then the king said, Well, he shall have it always and he will of his own free will abhor it." The Israelites had been used to worship the idols, they brought their offerings to the demons (Lev. xvii. 7), and they shall no more sacrifice their sacrifices unto the hairy ones, i.e. the devils; as Deut. xxxii. 17 says: They sacrificed their offerings on the heights and were punished. God said therefore: Sacrifice before Me in the appointed tent whenever you desire your sacrifices, and you will separate yourself from the idol-worship, and so be saved, as it is written Lev. xvii. 3. What man soever there be of the house of Israel, etc. (Lev. rabba, xxii. 5). With deep historical sense and religious feeling R. Levi recognised in this, as well as on several other occasions, the real value of the Law. It was not the Rabbi's fault that the idea only became widespread among Jews in the twelfth century through Maimonides. It cannot be our purpose to give reference on this occasion to the whole material; anyhow we see that the Rabbis considered such questions from various points of view.

Finally we learn here a few details about the condition of the Jews in their own land, and we hear interesting opinions about the relation of the Church to the Synagogue. The sad condition of the Holy Land may be especially pointed out (Justin), since the very fact of devastation of the land, the destruction of the city and temple were a proof that God had abandoned them, which cannot be underestimated when we consider the history of the Church in the first three centuries. It was the outer sign of the teaching that God had entirely forsaken His people. We can imagine the striking influence of such an idea on the

proud Jews. Indeed, their leaders dealt with the problem thoroughly and defended their rights. Still we see that some of the Apologists were not unjust and regarded them (the Jews) as the real descendants of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. The Apologists could not deny Israel's higher glory, that they recognised the Father in heaven, the Creator of the Universe. Moreover, they admitted partly that Jews are imitating God in mercy and lovingkindness. On the other hand we cannot wonder when we are taught that there was antagonism between Jews and Christians. There was, despite of the several common interests between them, an unseen barrier which separated them. Justin and the reports of the martyrs speak of the fierce hate of the Jews. It might have been local and temporal, yet generally we cannot regard the conditions from this standpoint (see my *Religionsgeschichtliche Studien*, i. p. 26 ff.).

We may, however, say, as a result of our study, that the teachers of both Church and Synagogue had common aims, common methods, used each other's weapons in the common fight, yet they defended their own standpoint and fought against each other. The fight was a spiritual one, the fight between misunderstanding and truth, which will last till the Lord of Truth will reveal it to all the children of Adam.

A. Marmorstein.

OUR LORD'S COMMAND TO BAPTIZE.

1. *Fresh Interest in the Subject.*

One would think that the controversy over Matthew xxviii. 19 had pretty well run its course since F. C. Conybeare (*Zeitsch. für die Neutest. Wissensch.*, 1901, pp. 275 ff.; *The Hibbert Journal*, October, 1902) and Kirsopp Lake (Inaugural Lecture at Leiden, January 27, 1904) argued that the command to baptize in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit was not a part of the original text in the Gospel of Matthew, but was interpolated for dogmatic reasons (Trinitarian and ecclesiastical) into the text. In particular it was urged that Eusebius gave the true text in the short form: "Go, disciple all the nations in my name." It was pointed out also that nowhere else in the New Testament is the Trinity associated with baptism. The points at issue were thoroughly threshed out and answered by Riggenbach in his *Der Trinitarische Taufbefehl Matth., Beiträge zur Förderung Christ. Theol.*, 1903), and in particular by Chase, "The Lord's Command to Baptize" (*The Journal of Theological Studies*, July, 1905). To my thinking there was little left of the attack on Matthew xxviii. 19 when Chase was through with it. Maclear (Baptism in *Hastings' Dictionary of the Apostolic Church*) says that the careful refutation of the view of Conybeare and Luke by Riggenbach and Chase "has made this position untenable, and we can with confidence assert that the full text is part of the First Gospel." But Scott in the one-volume *Hastings' Dictionary of the Bible* hesitates to appeal to Matthew xxviii. 19 since "the authenticity of this passage has been challenged on historical as well as on textual grounds." In an article in *The Watchman-Examiner*, of New York, January 3, 1918, Dr. H. C. Vedder declares

that no one who is "intellectually honest" can affirm that Jesus commanded baptism in view of the doubt about Matthew xxviii. 19. To do so is to use "the language of either ignorance or dishonesty." Dr. T. H. Bindley has a short note on "The Lord's Command to Baptize" in *The Journal of Theological Studies*, July, 1918, and a luminous paper on "The Original Meaning of Matthew xxviii. 19" in *The Interpreter*, October, 1918. The question is one of more than academic interest. If Jesus did not give any command to baptize, we have still His own example in submitting to baptism at the hands of the Baptist. If it was becoming to Jesus thus to fulfil righteousness, surely those who claim to be His followers cannot easily shirk the same obligation. But it remains true that Jesus did not Himself baptize any one, though His disciples did for a time. After the early months of the ministry in Judea and Samaria we hear no more of baptizing by the disciples of Jesus. But on the great Day of Pentecost Peter suddenly enjoins baptism in the name of Jesus Christ upon all the three thousand converts. And they were baptized. From that day forward baptism regularly follows confession and faith as in the ministry of John the Baptist. It is too much to say that without the command of Jesus in Matthew xxviii. 19 the Christian is free from any obligation to follow the Lord in baptism. But it is equally clear that the Lord's command to baptize, as an integral part of the Great Commission, has been a tremendous force upon the consciences of those who follow Him as Lord and Saviour. One cannot view with unconcern the effort to discredit this passage that has been one of the battle cries of Christendom through the ages. But neither does a modern Christian desire to be the pious dupe of an ecclesiastical formula which is foreign to the mind of Christ. Obscurantism has no place in the program of enlightened Christianity to-day.

No verse of the New Testament can be held if it is a mere fetish or a magic charm. If Matthew xxviii. 19 has to go, let it go. Only one wishes to be quite sure that this great Logion of Jesus must go to the scrap-heap before he throws it out. To my way of thinking the argument of Plummer on this passage in his really great commentary on Matthew is conclusive. But let us look at the facts.

2. *Is It a Genuine Part of Matthew's Gospel?*

The external evidence for it is absolutely overwhelming. Every known Greek Manuscript of this portion of Matthew, both uncial and cursive, contains the Lord's command to baptize in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit. Every extant version that has this portion of Matthew has it also. The *Didaché* (7) about A.D. 100 has it with the addition of "in living water." Justin Martyr (A.D. 150–160) gives it (*Apol.* i. 61). The text of Matthew is further given by the Doctrine of Addai (Burkitt, *Evangelion da-Mepharusche*, i. 173; 153), by Irenaeus (*Lat.* III. xvii. 1), and three times by Eusebius (*Ep. Caes.*; *c. Marc. Anc.*, i. 1; *Theol. Eccl.*, iii. 5). But elsewhere Eusebius often quotes the passage freely without the command to baptize. The case against the passage, so far as external evidence goes, turns wholly upon the failure of Eusebius always to quote the passage in full. Why did Eusebius vary in this manner? One writer (Dr. Vedder) bluntly says: "The clearest case of this kind is Eusebius who quotes the Great Commission without the clause on baptism." So he does, but he also quotes it with the clause on baptism. Conybeare and Lake argue that the baptismal clause was interpolated for dogmatic reasons and was not in the original text which Eusebius had and usually quoted. At the most, then, Eusebius had two sets of documents, one without the baptismal clause. That, in the abstract,

is possible, but in the face of the unanimous testimony of Greek manuscripts, versions, fathers, it must be the only alternative before it gains much force. There is another alternative. The Christian writers quoted freely and only now and then with precision. This is seen in Justin Martyr, for instance. In *Apology* i. 61 the "Threefold Name" occurs in connexion with baptism, but in *Trypho* 39 we have "some made disciples in the name of Christ." In the *Didaché* (7) we have the command in full, but in section 9 we find: "But they that have been baptized into the name of the Lord." In the second instance Justin Martyr and the *Didaché* are not quoting, but are simply referring in an abbreviated way to the command. May not Eusebius be doing the same thing? Dr. Samuel Lee (used to good purpose by John Humpstone in *The Watchman-Examiner* for January 31, 1918) in his preliminary dissertation to his translation of the *Theophania* of Eusebius (p. 44) quotes from the Epistle to Caesarea: "Each one of these we believe to be and exist: the Father, truly the Father: and the Son, truly the Son; and the Holy Ghost, truly the Holy Ghost, even as our Lord, sending forth His disciples to preach, said: 'Go (and) make disciples of all nations baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost.'" Here Eusebius quotes the Lord's command to baptize precisely as we have it in Matthew xxviii. 19, and we can readily see why he quotes it because the passage deals with the Trinity. But in the *Theophania* there is another passage that throws light on the habit of Eusebius: "But He who was their Lord solved by one additional word the aggregate of the things which they doubted, and pledged them by saying, *Ye shall conquer in My name.* For it was not that He commanded them simply to go and make disciples of all nations: but with this excellent addition which he delivered, viz., *In*

My Name." It is evident that Eusebius here is concerned simply with " in the name of the Son," and not, as above, with the name of all the Persons of the Trinity. He used all or part of the passage as occasion demands, very much as preachers do to-day. Plummer sums up the matter thus : " Eusebius quotes the verse, with the command to baptize into the name of the Trinity, when it suits his purpose ; when he requires the rest of the verse, but not the command, he omits the latter." There the matter may be left. Allen (*Int. Crit. Com. on Matthew*) regards the testimony from Eusebius as " indecisive." That is surely putting it mildly. But, even so, it makes it out of the question to employ Eusebius as a strong enough lever to overturn the absolutely overwhelming evidence for the genuineness of the passage in Matthew xxviii. 19.

3. *But Did Jesus Say It after All?*

It is objected further that the passage is under suspicion, even if Matthew wrote it, since it stands alone in the New Testament. Everywhere else in the New Testament baptism is in the name of Jesus. This point seems to have some force when thus presented, and certainly it must be considered. It is argued that the text of Matthew reflects the atmosphere of a later age and simply must have been interpolated on doctrinal grounds, whatever may be true about the usage of Eusebius. It must be remembered that Synoptic Criticism shows that our Greek Matthew must belong to the first century A.D. Ignatius (*Smyrn.*, i.) has an unmistakable reference to Matthew iii. 15 (A.D. 110–115). The *Didaché* (7), as we have seen, quotes Matthew xxviii. 19, or, at least, the same logion of Jesus. Clement of Rome (A.D. 94–6) shows marked similarities with Matthew. McNeile (*Commentary on Matthew*, p. xxvi.) thinks that Matthew and Luke are " quite independent, and neither

shows distinct signs of priority." It is possible, though not certain, that Luke knew Matthew (Robinson Smith, *Hibbert Journal*, April, 1912). Like Luke, Matthew used both the Logia (Q) and Mark. But Matthew's Gospel seems difficult to place much later than the destruction of Jerusalem (A.D. 70) according to Allen (p. lxxiv.) and Plummer (p. xxxii.). McNeile (p. xxviii.) prefers A.D. 80. The point is not material to our argument. It is clear that Matthew xxviii. 19 comes within the memory of the living tradition of the Sayings of Jesus. We cannot affirm that it was in Q or in Mark. We should know better if we had the real ending of Mark. Allen thinks it quite possible that "the phrase may already have stood in the lost ending of Mark" (p. 306). At any rate "this command is implied in the appendix to Mark" (Plummer, p. 431). Plummer considers it a "reasonable inference" since Mark begins his Gospel with the promise that Jesus would baptize with the Holy Spirit.

The fact that the record in Acts always has baptism in the name of Jesus rather than in the name of the Trinity has no weight unless one takes the view that Jesus meant His command in Matthew xxviii. 19 to be a baptismal formula. Of that we shall speak presently. If it is not meant as a formula, we still have to face the question whether it is in harmony with the standpoint of Jesus and whether it does not represent a later theological and ecclesiastical outlook. Plummer frankly admits the abstract possibility "that, although the Evangelist wrote these words, yet they do not represent anything that our Lord actually uttered; he may be putting into Christ's mouth the baptismal formula, and which he was sure must have Christ's authority" (p. 432). This argument proceeds on the basis of the "formula" idea. Plummer pointedly replies that there is too much Trinitarian doctrine in the

New Testament not to believe that Christ did say something like this. Paul, for instance, has reference to "the Threefold Name" in 1 Corinthians xii. 4–6; 2 Corinthians xiii. 14; Ephesians iv. 4–6. We see it plainly in 1 Peter i. 2. On this passage Hort says: "How such an idea could arise in the mind of any apostle without sanction from a Word of the Lord, it is difficult to imagine, and this consideration is a sufficient answer to the doubts which have been raised whether Matthew xxviii. 19 may not have been added or recast by a later generation."

As a matter of fact, we have the basis for the doctrine of the Trinity in Mark xiii. 32 in the antithesis between "the Father" and "the Son." It appears also in Q in the like antithesis there (Matt. xi. 25–27; Luke x. 21 f.). There are numerous references to the Holy Spirit in Q and Mark. We cannot rule out Matthew xxviii. 19 on the grounds of the Trinitarian teaching, for we find that in Mark and Q, our oldest documents for the life and teaching of Jesus.

McNeile (p. 437) is not certain that Jesus said these words at the point where Matthew has placed them, though convinced that they belong to Matthew's Gospel: "It is probable, not that Matthew's text is unsound, but that the whole clause is due to him, and that the Lord did not *at this point* command the rite of baptism." McNeile, however, adds: "But that He commanded it before His death is in any case extremely probable, since it but accounts for the early and universal use of the rite in the Church." In conclusion McNeile says: "The validity of the rite is far from being annulled if the present passage was not an utterance of the risen Christ." It must be acknowledged that McNeile is hyper-sensitive on this delicate point. He is so anxious to concede every point in all fairness that, though Matthew xxviii. 19 is genuine, we still must concede

the possibility that Matthew may have made up the logion or an interpretation of a true word of the Lord. But let the point be granted. We still have to account for the sudden resumption of baptism on such a scale as at Pentecost and with such uniformity thereafter. That situation calls for a command from the Lord Jesus before His Ascension. Matthew xxviii. 19 fits the historical situation in Acts ii. Surely this neat adjustment does not throw suspicion on the passage from the standpoint of historical criticism. Rackham (on Acts ii. 41) thinks that the first edition of Matthew's Gospel (about A.D. 60–70) used the language of that time in reporting the words of Jesus in Matthew xxviii. 19 instead of the original command to baptize in Christ's name. But the constant allusions to the Trinity in the Epistles demand some such command as this to explain them (Bindley, THE EXPOSITOR, October, 1918, p. 43).

4. *But is it a Baptismal Formula?*

Is it necessary to believe that, if the words are a genuine logion of Jesus, He meant them as an "exact form of words to be used in baptism"? It is clear that Jesus "would not prescribe a set form of words for this purpose" (Plummer, p. 433). All modern scholars practically agree that Jesus was unlikely to do such a thing. If the language of Matthew xxviii. 19 is beyond doubt a ritualistic formula, then some doubt may exist as to whether this is after all the teaching of our Lord. Lindsay (*Int. Stand. Bible Encycl.*) calls Matthew xxviii. 19 "the Formula of Christian baptism." It is true that Tertullian (*De Bapt.* 13) expressly asserts that in Matthew xxviii. 19 the "law of baptism has been imposed and the formula prescribed." It is trine immersion: "And it is not once only, but thrice, that we are immersed into the Three Persons, at each several men-

tion of Their Names" (*Adv. Praxean.*). There is no doubt that the words of Jesus in Matthew xxviii. 19 came to be used as a formula and gave rise to trine immersion. But the problem is, not later ecclesiastical custom, but the point of our Lord. Did He mean His command to be a set and necessary formula?

It is submitted that this is by no means a necessary interpretation of the language. The fact that the Acts uses only the name of Jesus in connexion with baptism shows that no such formula was considered necessary. Peter urges at Pentecost that the new believers "be baptized in the name of Jesus Christ" (Acts ii. 38). Cornelius and the rest were ordered by Peter to "be baptized in the name of the Lord Jesus" (Acts x. 48). The mistaken disciples of the Baptist at Ephesus were "baptized into the name of the Lord Jesus" (Acts xix. 5). Paul spoke of being "baptized into (unto) Christ" (Rom. vi. 3, etc.). Plummer pointedly says: "If our Lord had really given directions that the Trinitarian formula was to be employed by the Apostles, the formula given in Acts would never have come into use" (p. 433). But do we have a "formula" in Acts? The language varies too much to be a "formula." The essential thing was to baptize in the name of Jesus Christ in order to distinguish Christian baptism from Jewish proselyte baptism. We have seen that the *Didaché* and Justin Martyr and Eusebius all have the short form and the long form. They undoubtedly both existed. By and by the full form was insisted upon as necessary. Cyprian (Ep. lxxiii. 18) argues against the practice of baptizing "in the Name of Jesus Christ." The Apostolical Canons (50) forbid a presbyter baptizing "into the death of Christ" with "only one immersion which is administered into the death of the Lord." Trine immersion proves the use of the Trinitarian formula. But we do not know that it was

so practised at the very beginning. Maclear (*Hastings' Dictionary of the Apostolic Church*) argues that, since "it was our Lord's habit not to make regulations but to establish principles," we may conclude that in Matthew xxviii. 19 "He did not here prescribe a formula, but unfolded the spiritual meaning of the rite." This interpretation coincides best with our Lord's teaching and with the apostolic practice of freedom, while it explains also the later development of the ritualistic formula from the word of the Master.

5. *Shall we Say "In" or "Into"?*

Allen (p. 396) is clear that a distinction is to be drawn between "in the Name of Jesus Christ" (Acts ii. 38; x. 48) and "into the Name of the Lord Jesus" (Acts xix. 5). The one symbolises the fact that one has become a disciple of Jesus, the other lays stress on the result of the ceremony. Plummer (p. 433) thinks that "baptizing into the Name of the Trinity may mean immersing into the infinite ocean of the Divine Perfection." Both prepositions (ἐν and εἰς) are thus justified, he holds, but they convey different ideas. He here follows Heitmüller (*Im Namen Jesu*). But, in view of the practical identity of the two prepositions (see Robertson's *Grammar of the Greek New Testament*, p. 592), it is doubtful if a real difference can be insisted upon in Acts. The papyri and the inscriptions give numerous instances of εἰς τὸ ὄνομα where money is placed to the credit of one. The instances in the New Testament are many where one cannot render εἰς by "into" as in Matthew xii. 41: "They repented *at* the preaching of Jonah." And in Matthew x. 41 we have the very idiom εἰς ὄνομα: "He that receives a prophet *in* the name of a prophet," "*in* the name of a righteous man," "*in* the name of a disciple." It is probably an over-refinement, therefore, to contend for "into the Name of" in Matthew xxix. 19. The baptism is commanded by Jesus and is to be performed on the

authority of the Trinity. The Name of Jesus alone was enough, for He stood for the Trinity. But the act of baptism rightly symbolises one's relation to the Trinity, and hence each Name is given by our Lord. In the papyri "Name" (*ὄνομα*) often is used for the person or the authority of the person. It occurs frequently in the Septuagint in this sense. See Acts i. 15: "The number of the names (persons) together were about one hundred and twenty."

We are driven, therefore, by every line of argument to adhere to the Lord's command to baptize as a genuine part of Matthew's Gospel and a true Saying of Jesus. Certainly there is nothing that modern scholarship has brought to light that justifies our setting aside this Magna Charta of the Christian propaganda. The Lord's Command to baptize stands as an integral part of the great Commission. Men differ in their interpretation of it. The spirit of the teaching of Jesus inclines one to take it as a symbol of the new life already begun, not the means by which the change is wrought. In other words we do not have a sacramentarian injunction, but a symbolic picture of the death to sin and the resurrection to life as Paul expounds it in Romans vi. 4. But baptism belongs to the program of Jesus in the evangelisation of the nations.

A. T. Robertson.

ANOTHER CHAPTER OF TESTIMONY ABOUT THE PASSION JOURNEY OF JESUS.

ANALYSIS OF XI. 1–XIII. 21 (COLUMN B. ANALYTICAL TABLE. *Vide* EXPOSITOR, *Jan.*).

THE part of the 'Journey Narrative' in Luke's Gospel, which begins with chapter xi. is the part which contains the worst perplexities for the reader who wishes to trace out the road to Jerusalem which Jesus, according to ix. 51, has now commenced to travel. Much of the material which now confronts us belongs so obviously to the early days in Galilee; some of it even, it would seem, to the last days in Jerusalem. Can we, without departing from the belief that Luke has intended this whole section of his Gospel as a record of the passionate pilgrimage, find any clue to these perplexities?

A general survey of the sub-division now before us reveals the fact that Luke is for the most part dependent here, not on personal but on documentary information; and that probably his main source was "Q" (the Logia), as a comparison with Matthew suggests: Thus:—

Luke xi. 1–4	xi. 9–13	xi. 14–26, (xii. 10)	xi. 29–32
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Matt. vi. 9–13	vii. 7–11	ix. 32–34 xii. 22–32, 43 ff.	xii. 39–42
Luke xi. 33–36 [cf. viii. 16–18, xii. 2]			xi. 37–41, (42–52)
‖			
Matt. v. 15, vi. 22 [cf. Mark iv. 21–23], x. 26–27			xv. 1–20, (xxiii. 1–35
Luke (xii. 1)	xii. 2–9, 11 f.	(xii. 22–34)	xii. 38–46
‖			
Matt. xvi. 6, 11 f.	x. 16–33, 40–42	vi. 19–34	xxiv. 42–51
Luke xii. 51–53	xii. 54–57	xii. 58–59	xiii. 18–21
‖			
Matt. x. 34–37	xvi. 1–4	v. 25–26	xiii. 31–33

What remains as peculiar to Luke is xi. 5–8 ('the midnight borrower'), xi. 27 f. (a woman's admiration), xi. 53

(a summarising and transitional verse); and—in the second half of the sub-division—xii. 13–21 ('Divide the inheritance!' and the Rich Fool), xii. 35–37 ('the girt loin and the lit lamp'; 'the master serving the servants'), xii. 47 f. ('stripes few or many'), xii. 49 f. ('fire,' 'baptism'), and xiii. 1–17 (massacre of Galileans, fallen tower, 'fruitless fig-tree,' and woman healed).

(1) *Editorial Accretions and Intrusions.* If we take the transition verse xi. 53 as a half-way house, and compare the two halves thus obtained, certain significant results emerge.

(*a*) With the exception of the slightly displaced xi. 24 ff. ('the empty house'), and xi. 33–36 (homeless Sayings about Light),—throughout the first half Luke adheres strictly to the Matthean order; from which one may infer a very close dependence on Q. But in the second half not only is Luke much richer in original matter, but in the Sayings which he shares with Matthew he maintains a quite independent order,—an order, in all probability, therefore, dictated by an influence other than Q.

(*b*) Judging by the evidence of the other synoptists, all the material in the first half, with the exception of the Woes (xi. 42–52), belongs to the early Galilean ministry. Whereas in the second half, as we shall see, there is perhaps only one pericope (xii. 22–34) for which a place in the days before the journey should be claimed.

(*c*) With the exception of the Prayer pericope at the beginning, the *first half is all concerned with the conflicts between Jesus and the Pharisees and scribes.* The incident of the woman's admiration, and the sayings about Light—sententious words which seem to have been often on the lips of Jesus—are no exception. They too belong to the days of conflict. This fact—that they are conflict sayings—covers, and no doubt explains, the position of the drastically antedated Woes;—though Luke may be chronologically right

about some of them : Matthew xxiii. is not a single utterance, but a collection of Sayings.

The hand of the editor rather than of the historian is surely evident in all this. Some light on the placing of the Prayer pericope at the beginning (xi. 1–13) may emerge later. That apart, Luke is here grouping the 'Controversy' sayings on the principle of internal affinity, and on the same principle associating with them the Woes which Matthew has placed much later. And we may, not unreasonably, regard the passage, not as a piece of first-hand testimony about the journey, but as a long interpolation, culled from a documentary source, illustrating the collisions that led to the journey. Yet probably here too Luke's general aim is historical. Acting on information that these conflicts reached a climax in the period immediately preceding the journey, he has found a place for them in the short interval between the rebuff in Samaria, and the final setting out by way of the Peraea.

But before coming to a final conclusion, let us proceed to an examination of the second half of our sub-division, with a view to discovering whether there are editorial insertions.

The word about the unforgivable sin (xii. 10) belongs, as Mark-Matthew make clear, to the conflict about "a sign." Its presence here may be an example of Luke's humanitarianism ; he would fain soften the force of xii. 9.

The words on Worldly Care and Earthly Treasure (xii. 22–34) are no doubt entirely appropriate after the parable of the Rich Fool. And Matthew's placing of them in the Sermon on the Mount is no sure clue to their historical connexion. But a closer examination disposes one to the view that they are an editorial addition here. Their whole tone claims for them a place in the earlier sunnier days in Galilee, and not among the more intense and sombre utterances of this time. From this point of view they are not

congruent with what immediately precedes. Further, the formula with which they are introduced,—'And He said to His disciples'—shows that Luke himself is conscious that the venue of the talk has here changed. We shall propose another reason for considering them an editorial addition presently.

Another passage which might be challenged as a chronological misplacement is xii. 54–57. It has kinship with Matthew xvi. 3, embedded in a different context. But we find that this verse in Matthew is feebly attested. "The majority of the uncials with the Old Syriac and Origen rightly omit it as irrelevant to the original context" (Moffatt: New Transl., *loc. cit.* note). Luke's placing is thus not really contested. Moreover the words have in them the note of the Passion Journey. When the whole context is clearly before us their significance will be more apparent.

xii. 58 f. ('on the road to the Law-Court') is found in the Sermon on the Mount (Matt. v. 25 f.). But it is in Matthew, not Luke, that the hand of the editor is apparent. There is nothing very convincing about the view that they are a shorthand version of the parable in Matthew xviii. 23–34. Here in Luke they have the Apocalyptic ring of these days of tragic decision in the career of Jesus.

We defer consideration of the parables of the Mustard Seed and the Leaven (xiii. 18–21) till later. For it seems to us that they occur in another eye-witness's testimony about the Journey.

But there are two passages still to be considered. One (xii. 51–53) corresponds to Matthew x. 34–39. Again, however, it is Matthew's placing which is doubtful. It occurs in his version of the address at the sending out of the Twelve. But much of the latter portion of Matthew's version of this address is anachronistic. At the time of the sending of the Twelve, active persecution of Jesus and rejection from

the Synagogues had scarcely begun. Moreover there was no violent severance of family ties involved in the mission of the Twelve. And in the word, 'Ye shall not have gone over the cities of Israel until the Son of Man be come' (Matt. x. 23) there is surely the apocalyptic note characteristic of the time when the great journey was resolved on, and begun (cf. Matt. xvi. 28). It may be urged against this that Luke does not repeat the word here, and that it is not appropriate to the sending of the Seventy or to the wider semi-Gentile aspect of the campaign which Jesus has now in view. But this wider aspect is more apparent than real. While His sympathies were not bounded by feelings of race and His plan of campaign was geographically wide, He had, nevertheless, on the coasts of Tyre resolved to confine His last effort to 'the lost sheep of the house of Israel.' And if Samaria came within this circle, so also did the Peraea which was part of the province of Judaea. The great campaign was primarily an attempt to win all Israel for the Kingdom.

This sends us back to the commencement of this second half of our sub-division (xii. 2–9, 11–12). In searching through the rest of it we have reserved this passage purposely until now. It is a briefer record of the latter part of Matthew's version of the Missionary Address to the Twelve. And this, as we have just stated, is full of anachronisms, in Matthew.[1] Nevertheless, they undoubtedly are words spoken at a Sending Forth. And not till the Sending of the Seventy were all the conditions present which make the words historically congruent. Now when Luke gave us his first chapter of special testimony about the journey to Jerusalem (ix. 51–x. 42) we found that the central feature of that eye-witness's story was the sending of the pioneer

[1] See additional note, at the end of this discussion, on the Matthean Missionary Address to the Twelve.

messengers (ix. 52, 57—x. 24). Is it possible that here, at the point in Luke's Gospel which we are now considering, Luke is commencing another chapter of special testimony about the journey; introducing us to another eye-witness who, standing as it were over against the first eye-witness's story, and noting its special interest in the Mission of the Seventy, begins his story by recalling some more of the words which fell from Jesus' lips about that time?

(2) *The Second Eye-witness's Story.* In answer to the question which we have just propounded, we call attention first of all to the adjacent verses xi. 53 and xii. 1. We have already noted that xi. 53 is a summarising or transitional verse. xii. 1 which follows is Jesus' warning to the disciples to beware of the leaven of the Pharisees. Now Mark (viii. 14–17) and Matthew (xvi. 6–12) assign a very definite place to this warning. It was spoken at the critical turning-point of the ministry in Galilee, when Jesus became conscious that the hostile influence of the Pharisees was beginning to win its corrosive way into the popular judgment about Him. It was spoken on the eve of the journey to Caesarea Philippi, to pray, to reflect, to decide. His decision was—the journey to Jerusalem. And the best attested reading of xi. 53 gives us what we are looking for here. This verse indicates a climax in the bitterness of the controversy with the religious leaders. It sets in swift outline the fierceness of their subsequent persecution. (Cf. Matt. xix. 3: 'The Pharisees tempted Him' immediately after the announcement of the Peraean journey, xix. 1). And it opens with the words: 'Now when He had set out from thence.' Is it not Luke's hint that we are passing into the journey narrative once more? True, it is vague: the place whence is not indicated. But Luke, who has already given us part of the 'journey' narrative (xi. 51–x. 42) has little choice but to be vague at this point. Still, it comes exactly where we might

hope to find such a suggestion of movement,—after the long interpolation of 'Conflict' Pericopae. Now this, as we have observed, is no part of Luke's special testimony. Its source is almost entirely documentary, and shared in common with Matthew. The only feature peculiar to Luke is the incident of the woman's admiration (xi. 27 f.). And while we do not doubt the authenticity of the incident (Luke may have got it from some of his women informants), the suggestion that Luke is deliberately substituting it here for the episode of Jesus' mother's and His brethren's suspicion concerning Him during the days of the conflict (Mark iii. 21, 31–35) is too obvious to be evaded.[1] The whole interpolation, indeed,—interrupting as it does the 'journey' story—looks like an after-thought of the Evangelist.

In short, we now venture to suggest that in the original draft—the first edition—of his Gospel, it found no place at all. For note how it ends. He gives the discourse against the Pharisees and lawyers, recorded in Matthew xxiii., down to the quotation about the blood of Zecharias the son of Barachias (Matt. xxiii. 35), and deliberately stops short of the great word of yearning over Jerusalem. Why? Is it not because he had already recorded this word in another place? And observe where that place is. It is at a *subsequent* point in his Gospel (xiii. 34). The most natural explanation is—not that he knew he was going to quote it there: it is not any more appropriate there than it would be here—but that he remembered he had used it in an earlier edition of his Gospel, and avoided repeating it when he made this long interpolation. Luke, as a rule, is very careful to avoid even the appearance of "doublets" in his Gospel; but does it not heighten the impression that this 'Conflict' passage is a later insertion to note that in it he has not been

[1] The carefully edited version of the story placed elsewhere by Luke (viii. 19–21) would seem to bear this out.

completely successful in avoiding repetition? xi. 33 repeats viii. 16. Moreover this conjecture would explain the apparent dislocation of verse xii. 10. This isolated boulder, carried thither by a theologising motive,—namely, to mitigate the harsh finality of xii. 9,—and placed there in his first edition, could not be repeated in its rightful place among the 'conflict' sayings of the long interpolation. There is a certain awkwardness too about the interpolation. Luke may have had his information extended and readjusted when he renewed his intercourse with the Ephesian circle after his return from Rome to the East in later years. But to have written the story of the Conflicts in true historical perspective would have meant re-writing the earlier part of his Gospel and to some extent altering its ground-plan. So he inserted a summary outline here. If this conjecture is sound, it follows that in the first edition of Luke's Gospel, the second eye-witness's story of the Road followed immediately upon the first, or rather with only the short Prayer Pericope between.

But further, what now follows differs markedly in character, as we have seen, from this long interpolation. (*a*) It is very much richer in original matter. (*b*) And even the matter which it shares in common with Matthew follows an independent order of its own. (*c*) Not only so, but we have found, in addition to the 'travelled boulder' xii. 10, only one passage in these "Q" Sayings here which can be said to betray the editorial hand,—the passage about Worldly Care and Earthly Treasure (Luke xii. 22–34). And, in further support of the view that it is an editorial intrusion, we venture now to add that it too is of the nature of an after-thought on the part of Luke,—an attempt to make good an important omission in the first edition. For it does not contain one of the great words of that discourse as it is recorded by Matthew in the Sermon on the Mount, namely

Matthew vi. 24. The reason, it seems to us, is precisely similar to that for which he omitted the soliloquy on Jerusalem from the 'Conflicts' interpolation: he had quoted it already, in his first edition, at another point in his Gospel, and that, too, a point much subsequent to this (xvi. 13).[1] (*d*) In all the other matter which Luke has in common with Matthew here, he follows an order that is not only independent, but also, as we have indicated, superior to Matthew's in chronological probability. Are we not entitled to infer from all this that Luke has now behind him here a thoroughly trustworthy first-hand testimony?

When we look at the passage, purged of the presumed editorial accretions and intrusions, the impression of actuality and authenticity grows so strong as to be almost overwhelming. With xi. 53–xii. 1 Luke is once more bringing us into contact with the excitement of the preparations for the last campaign towards Jerusalem and the last Farewell to Galilee. And it is a very impressive and living picture that starts into view. First, as if catching up the central fact of the previous eye-witness's testimony, there are further details of words spoken at the time of the great sending forth (xii. 2–9, 11–12),—words full of the sterner note of hardships and dangers which are looming on the horizon. Then comes the interrupting episode of the man who wanted Jesus to interfere in a family property dispute. It is brushed aside by Jesus with the impatience of One girding Himself for a life-and-death adventure; and crowned with the solemn story of the rich fool who was suddenly summoned into the Unseen World which he had been leaving tragically out of account (xii. 13–21). It is followed by what we may call His Farewell Discourse to Galilean adherents,—parables

[1] Perhaps his quotation of some words from this same discourse (Matt. vi. 22 f.) in the preceding 'Conflicts' interpolation (Luke xi. 33–36) has helped to bring his previous omission of it to his notice.

about the Son of Man's Return, which take on a new and vivid note of actuality when thus set chronologically on the eve of His departure on the fateful journey. It is an urgent call to watch, be on the look out! And surely the priceless details, which we owe to Luke alone,—the words of the girt loin and the lit lamp, of the Master who will gird Himself to serve the faithful servants, and of the tenderly careful justice that will discriminate in the matter of stripes between the ignorantly, and the deliberately, neglectful—are the clear echo of first-hand personal testimony here (xii. 35–48). It is followed by the intense expressions of burning and eager self-consecration : " I am come to throw fire on the earth, and how I would it were already burning ! " . . ." I have a baptism to be baptized with and how am I straitened till it be accomplished ! "—words in which we hear the authentic passion-note beyond a doubt (xii. 49–50). Then comes the emphatic and searching address, reminding those who would follow Him to the bitter end that this was a call which meant the clean cut of the sword of separation through all earthly ties (xii. 51–53). To this Luke adds the word about the signs of the times, which requires to be set against the background of the setting out before it yields its full import (xii. 54–57). And he ends this record of discourses of our Lord with what appears to be a picture of Life as a pilgrimage along a road to a Court of Justice, with its urgent summons to the ending of all mutual strife while we are still in the way (xii. 58–59).

There is a pause in the narrative here, and with it we too may pause. But, looking back, are we not driven to admit that Luke is here being guided by no caprice of his own memory or imagination, but by an eye-witness's authentic information personally conveyed ? And to admit also that Luke is here again making good his claim to write out *in their order* the things most surely believed among us concerning our Lord ?

(3) *The Source.* It may perhaps be thought fanciful to enquire who was Luke's special informant here ; but there are one or two suggestive features in the matter peculiar to Luke's Gospel in this section which make it almost impossible to resist the temptation. Such an enquiry may do nothing to strengthen the conclusions already reached ; but neither —if our conjecture prove to be groundless—will it in any way invalidate them.

It is, of course, the original matter in Luke that alone can help us here ; and we have just had the main body of it under review. We have purposely left the Sayings and incidents of xiii. 1–17 out of account meantime,—under the strong impression that they belong to yet another eye-witness's testimony. Their introduction (xiii. 1) suggests that ; and the dominant interest running through what follows is certainly different. But that is another story. It is better to make sure that we are forcing no alien data to serve us, if our inference is to commend itself as having any degree of probability. There remain the two original features before and in the ' Conflicts ' passage : xi. 5–8 (the parable of the midnight borrower), and xi. 27 f. (a woman's admiration). The latter cannot be reckoned within the scope of our present enquiry. Occurring in the ' Conflicts ' passage, it does not belong to the testimony we are now considering. It may have come from women disciples whom Luke perhaps had fellowship with in the Ephesian circles in his later years. But what of the prayer parable ? Here also it would be rash to dogmatise. Perhaps it is part of the first chapter of evidence about the Journey. The spiritual gifts and insights vouchsafed by God to the prayer of faith may have been the subject of Jesus' conversation with Mary in Bethany, and it may have been part of the tradition remembered by the tellers of that beautiful story. But the presence of the Lord's prayer, and the suggestion that all this

pericope was teaching given by our Lord to His disciples, together make this unlikely. It may, on the other hand, be an editorial intrusion. But its complete isolation, as regards subject-matter, within its context—even when the 'Conflicts' passage is omitted—makes that also unlikely. There is the remote possibility that, as Jesus probably taught His disciples to pray on the occasion of the Sending of the Twelve, Luke wished to embody a similar instruction about the time of the Sending of the Seventy. But this is far-fetched, and the pericope is awkwardly placed, if that is its purport. Perhaps, then, the original parable at least (the rest may be editorial addition) *is* part of the special testimony of the second eye-witness. But since it was an isolated piece of information, having no direct connexion with the 'journey' story related by this witness, belonging in fact to an earlier period of the Galilean ministry, Luke marked this interval by separating it from that testimony by the long 'Conflicts' interpolation when he revised his Gospel.

We cannot, however, build on such vague conjecture. We find surer starting ground in the central group of original incident and sayings.. (xi. 53—xii. 9, xii. 11–21, xii. 35–59.) And in addition to what has already been said regarding the unity of the story, we would point out now that there is a homogeneity about it,—as if it bore the impress of a single mind with a dominant religious outlook controlling the reminiscences,—human life seen *sub quadam specie eternitatis* and in the light of an eager expectancy of our Lord's imminent Return. Here too crops out a marked feature of Luke's Gospel,—its interest in questions relating to property, wealth, the life of poverty, and the nobility of service. It would lead us to expect among Luke's informants wealthy followers of Jesus,—men like Barnabas the Cypriote who 'having land sold it and laid the

money at the Apostles' feet' ; men who had made great sacrifices for the Kingdom's sake. Barnabas was probably not a Christian till after Pentecost. He may—for he is styled an 'Apostle'—have both seen and heard the Lord in the days of His flesh. The theory that he was the rich young ruler who was bidden sell all and follow has something extraordinarily attractive about it. But that story belongs to near the end of the journey. We are therefore scarcely entitled to think of Barnabas as a possible source of the testimony we are now considering. But was there not another Cypriote, a man of means, able to give hospitality to a considerable company, whom Luke made the acquaintance of on the way up with Paul to Jerusalem (Acts xxi. 16), —Mnason whom Luke significantly calls an ἀρχαῖος μαθήτης —a disciple of the early (or beginning) days ? These words, according to the better interpretation of them, mean that Mnason had begun to follow Jesus in the days of His flesh. The Gospels are full of what Jesus "began" to do. Luke's Gospel is, in his own words, the 'treatise about what Jesus *began* both to do and to teach' (Acts i. 1) ; the book of the Acts is the story of what Jesus *continued* to do in the power of the Spirit. And the title μαθήτης is surely more appropriate to one who had 'learned of Jesus' when He taught on earth than to a Pentecostal convert. Moreover Luke never adds an epithet to the names he mentions, unless it has some special significance for him. Here it seems almost a signal to us that Luke had listened to this quondam host of his entertaining his guests with an account of his own experience in contact with Jesus.

Harnack rejects the longer Western text of Acts xxi. 16, on the ground that Luke would hardly have gone out of his way to name with such specific detail Paul's host for a single night at the halting-place on the road from the coast to Jerusalem. Mnason was Paul's Jerusalem host, he thinks,

and is mentioned for his courage in receiving the maligned and suspected Apostle. Paul was not so friendless in the holy city as that would imply. But whether Mnason was the Jerusalem host or no, it seems a more satisfactory explanation of Luke's description of him to say that it betrays the author's consciousness of the debt he owes this man for some of the details of his Gospel narrative. This ἀρχαίος μαθήτης (Acts xxi. 16) is surely one of 'the eye-witnesses ἀπ' ἀρχῆς' (Luke i. 2).

May it not have been he who remembered the interruption from the crowd which turned out to be a request about a sordid property squabble? May not that parable of the rich fool blinding his eyes to the fact of Eternity have been preserved to us because it had made so deep an impression on the mind of this man of means? May it not be he who, an old man now, his loins girt and his lamp lit, repeats with pathetic eagerness the parables of the Son of Man's Return which Jesus told as He took a last farewell of sad-eyed followers in Galilee? May it not be he who, bustling about to serve his guests, makes light of it by recalling the Master's own promise that He would gird Himself and serve the servants whom He found faithful when He returned? Was not Mnason entertaining men among whom was one, Paul, on his way up to Jerusalem under an impulsion strangely like that which governed the spirit of the Master at that very time? May it not have been he who, hearing of the prediction that bonds and imprisonment awaited Paul, remembered the Lord's description of life as a road leading to a Grand Assize (where all would one day stand, where Paul's enemies would at last stand), where some are condemned to few stripes, some to many, some to imprisonment till the last farthing had been paid? And as he listened to Paul passionately disregarding the restraining voices of kind hearts, may it not have been he to whose mind there came

floating back the sublime words of the Master in a like situation : " I am come to throw fire on the earth ! Would it were already burning ! " . . . " I have a baptism to be baptized with ! How am I straitened till it be accomplished ! "

The longer Western Text of Acts xxi. 16 would have us to understand that Mnason lived at a village which made a suitable half-way house between Caesarea and Jerusalem. Probably it was nearer Jerusalem, for apparently Paul and his friends arrived next day in the city early enough to get a welcome from ' the brethren.' It may have been a long day's journey from Caesarea to Mnason's house, and no messenger had been sent on before. May it not be Mnason who, in the courtesies of introduction, recalls with a smile Jesus' parable about the friend who had to borrow three loaves at midnight to tide over the unexpected visit of a late-arriving guest ? It is practically certain that Luke kept a diary or journal, and if, as seems likely, he was in the habit of making notes, at the time, of all that he could gather about the Sacred Story, then notes of Mnason's reminiscences would be down on his parchments *immediately after* the reminiscences he had gleaned in Philip the evangelist's house in Caesarea in the preceding days. Perchance the parable of the midnight borrower stood next the lovely story of the home in Bethany. And the rest followed as we have them before us now.

Additional Note on Matthew's Version of the Address to the Twelve.

It is trespassing somewhat beyond the bounds of the subject, but a brief analysis of Matthew x. has a certain relevance to the discussion on pp. 131, 132 (supra). It corroborates the view there taken, to remember that a characteristic of Matthew is his habit of grouping quite distinct sets of Sayings under a particular incident which was the occasion of only one set. E.g., The Sermon on the Mount, the Parable Discourse of chapter xiii., the Parable Collection at xxi. 28–xxii. 14, the ' Woes ' Discourse (chap. xxiii.), the Parable

Collection at xxiv. 43–xxv. Chapter x. is no exception. And since 'Matthew' records no Mission of Seventy, it is natural to expect that, if any of the great words of that stirring time had been found by him in his sources, they would be attached in his Gospel to Sayings of the earlier kindred occasion. When chapter x. is examined in this light, and with the aid of Luke's special source, the difficulties vanish. Thus x. 5–15 is the substance of the Address to the Twelve (cf. Luke ix. 2–5; x. 4–9). x. 16 brings us into the atmosphere of the sending of the Seventy (Luke x. 3). x. 17–22 corresponds to Luke xii. 11 f. And Matthew's longer version here, when closely examined, discloses the fact that it is inflated by a fragment of the so-called 'Little Apocalypse' (cf. Matt. xxiv. 7, 9, 10–13). x. 23–33 is part of the address to the Seventy (Luke x. 10 f.; xii. 2–9). x. 34–39 is the 'Sword of Division' address, which, if we now accept Luke's guidance, was chronologically adjacent to the sending of the Seventy—followed it immediately perhaps (Luke xii. 51–53). Verses 38–39 are a doublet in Matthew. They belong chronologically to the address to the disciples at Caesarea Philippi (Matt. xvi. 24 f.). x. 40–42 is another fragment of Missionary Address, and may belong to either of the missionary occasions. Luke suggests the second (x. 16; cf. Mark ix. 41), where we seem to be in the neighbourhood of the second occasion. If these words were accompanied by the parable in Matthew xxv. 31–46, to which they have close affinity, then it was probably on the second occasion they were spoken—in the more Apocalyptic atmosphere of the closing period.

J. A. Robertson.

PHILO'S RELATION TO THE OLD TESTAMENT.

No more instructive summary could be given of Philo's general attitude towards the Old Testament than that which appears in his own remarkable statement of Moses' various functions as leader of Israel. "We have already argued," he says, "that the perfectly-equipped leader must have four functions assigned to him, the kingly, the legislative, the priestly, and the prophetic, that as legis-

lator he may enjoin what ought to be done and forbid what ought not, that as priest he may deal not only with human but also with Divine matters, that as prophet he may reveal what cannot be grasped by reason. As I have discussed the first three of these, and proved that Moses excelled as king and legislator and high-priest, I come finally to show that he was also the most notable of prophets. I thus recognise that all that stands written in the sacred books are Divine oracles, declared through him, and I will go on to details, after making this observation: of these sacred utterances some were spoken by God in person, using His marvellous prophet as interpreter, some were revealed as the result of question and answer, and some were announced by Moses in person, in a state of inspiration and possession" (*De Vita Mos.* II. (III.) 187 f.).

Various features here are significant. Moses is the supreme figure in the history of the chosen people. He has been used as the special medium of the Divine revelation to Israel. What he has written in the sacred books possesses Divine authority. The statement makes clear that for Philo the Pentateuch is the kernel of the Old Testament, and that it is in the most literal sense inspired. We shall not discuss at this stage Philo's conception of inspiration. But in order to realise its scope, it must be observed that he assigns the same infallibility to the Septuagint translation as that which belongs to the original. He accepts the Jewish legend as to the miraculous agreement of all the translators, working separately, in their renderings, and observes that these men must be called "not translators but hierophants and prophets, inasmuch as it was granted to them by unalloyed reasonings to coincide with the wholly pure spirit of Moses" (*op. cit.* II. 40). We may note in passing that it is the translation of the laws which is especially before his mind (*op. cit.* II. 36).

Philo's chief aim in all his works, it need scarcely be said, is to demonstrate the universal validity of Jewish religion as enshrined in the Old Testament, and, *par excellence*, in the Pentateuch. Probably he devotes himself to this task for his own sake, for that of his co-religionists, and to win the attention of his Hellenistic contemporaries. In his own case the extraordinary fascination of Greek philosophy for his mind perhaps compelled him to adjust the powerful claims of reason to the authority of what he regarded as a Divine revelation. A similar adjustment would be needful for many of his fellow-countrymen who had passed through experiences like his own. And it was natural for him to appeal along these lines to fair-minded Pagans, in whose rich heritage of wisdom he shared, but who, he felt, had lessons of incalculable value to learn from the Divinely-taught philosophy of Moses.

But the work was beset by difficulties. Although he never challenged the assumption of verbal inspiration, he could no longer approach the sacred text with the artlessness of unquestioning submission. Thus, when he reads in Genesis ii. 8 that "God planted a garden in Eden," he remarks: "To suppose that vines and olive-trees or apple-trees . . . were planted by God is utter and incurable stupidity. . . . We must therefore have recourse to allegory, the favourite method of men of vision" (*De Plant.* 32 ff.). There can be little question that Philo stood in a long succession of allegorical interpreters of the Old Testament. The practice had been reduced to a kind of science.[1] This he assumes. "Do not be surprised," he says, quite incidentally, "if, according to the rules (κανόνας) of allegory, the sun is identified [in Gen. xxviii. 11] with the

[1] At the same time, Siegfried's list of allegorical canons (*Philo von Alexandria als Ausleger d. A.T.*, pp. 168–197) assumes a rigidity of practice for which we have not adequate evidence.

Father and Governor of the universe" (*De Somn.* I. 73). Numerous references of the same character occur in his writings. A large variety of competing interpretations is current and familiar to Philo. In discussing, e.g., the phrase used of Abraham (Gen. xv. 15): "Thou shalt depart to *thy fathers*," he mentions three differing explanations of "thy fathers": "Some say, the sun and moon and the other stars. . . . Some think of the archetypal Ideas. . . . Some have conjectured that the four elements are meant, of which the universe is composed" (*Quis Rer. Div. H.* 280 ff.). Occasionally he speaks of his predecessors in this art as φυσικοὶ ἄνδρες (e.g., *De Abr.* 99: *De Vita Mos.* II. (III.) 103), sometimes, as in the quotation above, as ὁρατικοί. Apparently, therefore, he was in possession of an elaborately articulated system of allegorical exegesis, although he does not hesitate again and again to suggest interpretations of his own (see esp. the remarkable passage, *De Cherub.* 27 ff.). Hence we need not be surprised to come upon the statement: "Practically everything, or at least most things, in our legislation must be taken allegorically" (*De Joseph.* 28). Philo consistently acts upon this principle, and his theory of allegory is worthy of a brief notice. It is essentially esoteric in character, and this presupposes a certain initiation, if its application is to be grasped. In introducing a complicated allegorical explanation of the sacrifice of Isaac which Abraham was ready to carry out, he says: "The story as a matter of fact does not rest upon the literal and obvious version, so that to the average reader its nature seems rather obscure, but those who have an understanding for the invisible things of the mind rather than for the perceptions of the senses and who possess the power of vision recognise it" (*De Abr.* 200). That is the reason why once and again he appeals to his readers in the language of the Mysteries,

e.g., *Leg. All.* III. 209 : "Open your ears, O ye initiates, and receive the mystic ritual."

Plainly, his method enables Philo to remove innumerable stumblingblocks from the sacred narratives : e.g., to take literally the statement of Genesis xi. 5 that "the Lord came down to view the city and the tower" is "monstrous impiety." For "who is not aware that one who comes down must leave one part of space and occupy another. But the whole universe is filled by God" (*De Confus. Ling.* 135 f.). The startling character of the phrase can only be explained, as in other cases, by the legislator's need of using human speech about a God who is not anthropomorphic, to assist men's spiritual education (*op. cit.* 134 f.). The real explanation lies beneath the surface. An obstacle of a less serious type is found in Jacob's command to Joseph to visit his brethren in Sychem (Gen. xxxvii. 13). "How could any one in his senses accept such a situation ? Is it likely that a man with such kingly resources as Jacob should have such a scarcity of slaves or servants that he must send his son abroad" on errands of this kind ? (*Quod det. pot. insid.* 13). Here also trained insight is necessary. Yet Philo's practice is by no means uniform. Thus, to a very large extent, he treats the story of Abraham's obedience in the sacrifice of Isaac as a historical narrative and gives an elaborate exposition of it on that basis (*De Abr.* 167–199). The early life of Joseph is similarly handled as actual history (*De Joseph.* 1–27), although its allegorical exegesis follows. Indeed, in *De Migr. Abr.* 89, he goes the length of saying : "There are some who, regarding the literal laws as symbols of ideal realities, were excessively scrupulous in some points, while in others they were lazily negligent. For my own part I must blame such people for their laxity. For both elements demand attention, the most diligent search for hidden meanings, and the

preservation of those on the surface which could not be challenged." The literal sense he compares in this passage to the body, the symbolic to the soul (*op. cit.* 93). The comparison explains the well-known statement of Clement of Alexandria regarding the Fourth Gospel (Eus. *H.E.* VI. 14): "John, last of all, having perceived that the bodily things had been set forth in the Gospels, being urged by his friends, inspired by the Spirit, produced a spiritual Gospel"; and indirectly supplies the clue to much that is enigmatic and baffling throughout that book. In agreement with this frequently close adherence to the literal narrative is the emphasis Philo lays on minute verbal points. He finds, e.g., in Exodus xxi. 12 the law: "If a man strike another and he die, he must certainly be put to death" (*θανάτῳ θανατοῦσθαι*). "Being clearly aware," he proceeds, "that he [Moses] never uses a superfluous word . . . I was puzzled by his saying of the voluntary slayer not only *θανατοῦσθαι* but *θανάτῳ θανατοῦσθαι* . . . But when I consulted that wise woman whose name is Enquiry, I was relieved from my search: for she taught me that some living people are really dead, while some who have died are truly alive" (*De Fuga*, 54 f.). Similarly, in the opening paragraphs of *De Agricult.* he urges the minute accuracy of Moses in his use of terms, and presses the distinction between *γεωργία*, husbandry, and *γῆς ἐργασία*, the working of land.[1]

Yet there are other features of his usage which seem directly to conflict with this microscopic attention to detail. An extraordinary example is his manner of quoting from

[1] In the light of these and many parallel phenomena, it seems by no means legitimate to draw the sharp distinction which Bousset does between the Palestinian Rabbinic exegesis and that of Alexandria, and to say that the one is of the letter, while the other is of the spirit (*Die Religion d. Judentums*,[2] p. 185). The Rabbinic scrupulousness about verbal minutiæ has unquestionably influenced Philo.

the LXX. We have seen that he held the translation to be verbally inspired. Nevertheless he handles the infallible text with the utmost freedom. Often, in citing a passage, he gives part of it in his own words: e.g., in Genesis xv. 6, for the clause, "it was counted to him for righteousness," he substitutes, "he was considered righteous." More daringly still, he sometimes without warning replaces the very words he is supposed to be interpreting by his own allegorical explanation: e.g., in Numbers v. 2: "Let them send away *out of the camp* every leper," he substitutes for τῆς παρεμβολῆς the phrase, τῆς ἁγίου ψυχῆς, "the consecrated soul." Repeatedly he exchanges a less for a more familiar word, and often omits unimportant expressions altogether.[1] Equally remarkable in view of his standpoint are such statements as that which he makes regarding the creation of Eve. In expounding Genesis ii. 21: "And he took a rib, etc.," he remarks: "The literal narrative in this case is mythical, for could anybody accept the story that woman was made out of the rib of a man?" (*Leg. Alleg.* II. 19). So also, in speaking of Moses' fiery serpents, which call up the story of the serpent's deception of Eve, he describes them as prodigies, and adds: "but in explanations based on the hidden sense, the mythical element disappears, and the truth is made evident" (*De Agricult.* 96 f.). Here is a definite recognition of myth in the patriarchal narratives.

How are we to relate these features of his attitude towards the text to his doctrine of verbal inspiration? As a matter of fact, they are wholly irreconcileable. Without realising what had happened, Philo, by his adoption of the allegorical method, had emptied his basal doctrine of all genuine value. By continuing to emphasise verbal details, he presented,

[1] These instances are taken from Bishop Ryle's most useful discussion, *Philo and Holy Scripture*, pp. xxxv.–xxxviii.

indeed, the appearance of loyalty to his fundamental assumption, and probably he concealed from himself the implications of his normative system. Hence, whatever language he might still use, in reality he accepted as much of the literal text as suited his scheme of thought, and had no hesitation in explaining away what proved incompatible with that.

A comparison with St. Paul's standpoint at once presses itself on our attention. For the same kind of difficulty confronts him in a parallel situation. Very rarely, indeed, does the Apostle have recourse to the allegorical method, which was evidently familiar to him. The most notable instance is, of course, the allegory of the two Covenants under the names of Sarah and her handmaid, Hagar (Gal. iv. 21–31), the mistress symbolising the heavenly Jerusalem, the free community of Christians, the slave representing the earthly centre of Judaism, which remains in the bondage of legalism. Philo more than once allegorises the same story, but, as we should expect, on totally different lines (*De Congress. Erud. Grat.*, esp. 11–24). Thus for him, Sarah stands for complete virtue, with whom Abraham, the "learner," cannot at first be fruitfully united. He must first wed Hagar, i.e., preliminary instruction. Later on, his marriage with virtue will bring forth fruit. A precisely similar use of the story is made by him in *Quaestt. in Gen.* III. pp. 190–1. So far as historical sense is concerned, there is little difference between the two writers. To say, as Lightfoot does (*Galatians*, p. 199), that "Philo is, as usual, wholly unhistorical," while "with St. Paul, on the other hand, Hagar's career is an allegory, because it is a history," is to ignore the fact that Hagar's "history" has no connexion of any kind with existing Judaism, and Paul's use of it is as arbitrary, on its own lines, as Philo's. A remarkably close correspondence of standpoint is exhibited

by a comparison of Paul's position in 1 Corinthians ix. 9–10 with that of Philo in *De Sacrific.* 260. The Apostle, in defending the right of missionaries to be supported by the communities in which they labour, not only refers to the words of Jesus (Luke x. 7) but also quotes the precept of Deuteronomy xxv. 4: "Thou shalt not muzzle the ox that treads the corn," and applies it by asking: "Does God care about oxen? Or does he speak thus with us exclusively in view? Of course it was written on our account." Similarly Philo, in discussing the regulations regarding sacrificial animals, proceeds: "You will discover that all this minuteness in reference to the animal shadows forth by means of symbols the improvement of your character. For the law does not exist for irrational creatures, but for those possessing mind and reason, so that its concern is not for sacrificial animals, to provide that they be without blemish, but for those who offer the sacrifices, that they be not disquieted by reason of any passion." Philo also misses the significance of one of those humane laws which characterise the Old Testament code. In Exodus xxii. 26 f. it is said: "If thou take thy neighbour's upper garment as a pledge, thou shalt give it back to him before sunset: for it is his only covering. . . . In what shall he sleep? If he cry to me, I will listen to him, for I am merciful." Philo's comment runs thus: "Is it not meet, if not to reproach, at least to suggest to, those who suppose that the legislator has all this concern about a piece of clothing, What do you mean, my friend, does the Creator and Ruler of the universe call himself merciful in connexion with so trifling a matter as the failure of a creditor to return his upper garment to a debtor?" (*De Somn.* I. 92 f.). Strangely enough, Philo expresses his delight in the injunction about oxen which Paul explains symbolically, and speaks of it as "that tender and gracious ordinance" (*De Virtut.* 145 f.).

The Apostle, however, is extraordinarily sparing in turning history into symbolism. In his treatment of the Old Testament he often approaches a philosophy of history, as in Galatians iii. 17 ff. But in his doctrine of verbal inspiration he is confronted by the same kind of problem as Philo. For Paul also regards the text of the Old Testament as the literal utterance of God. Like Philo, nevertheless, he does not hesitate, when quoting from the LXX, to omit or supply words for the advantage of his argument: and often, like him, his quotations have the inaccuracy which comes from trusting to memory. But his crucial difficulty arises from his attitude towards the Law. *A priori*, the Law, as the revelation of the Divine will, is "holy and righteous and good." It presents an unassailable moral standard. Why, then, has it not satisfied Paul's religious aspirations? At one stage in his career, represented by such passages as Galatians iii. 19, Romans vii. 13, and Romans v. 20, he adopts as a working hypothesis the idea that the function of the Law in the purpose of God was to intensify the consciousness of sin, to make the conscience more sensitive to all breaches of the Divine order, and thus to humble man as a sinner in presence of the All-holy. But he could not rest there. And in the light of his Christian experience he feels after a further explanation. Already in Romans viii. 2 f. he speaks of the Law as baffled by the influence of sinful flesh, human nature as Paul knows it in ordinary experience. Sin, therefore, is to blame for the Law's failure. Yet the admission that human sin so completely foiled what was a Divine method that a new way of salvation had to be brought in makes clear that Paul was occupying ground which he could not permanently hold. Even in "Galatians," under the pressure of controversy with Judaising Christians, he had ventured to detract from the dignity of the Law as contrasted with the revelation of grace in

Jesus Christ (iii. 19). In the same context, the necessity of a human medium for the legal dispensation, even Moses, constituted for Paul's mind, in diametrical opposition, we may note in passing, to Philo's standpoint, a ground of disparagement. In Galatians iv. 4 and iv. 8–13 he had gone the length of comparing Jewish legalism with Pagan ritualism. But in "Colossians," one of his latest Epistles, he takes a more daring step. His growing appreciation of Christ more completely overshadows everything in religion that appears to compete with Him for men's allegiance. And so in Colossians ii. 14 he sternly sweeps away the entire principle of Legalism as something inherently valueless, something whose existence is incompatible with the forgiveness of sin. Thus, as in Philo's case, Paul is driven by the inexorable logic of experience, probably without any formal recognition of what was happening, far away from his original position. He still finds in the Old Testament the revelation of God's will and purpose, but he finds it in such elements as the Divine grace towards Abraham, and the faith of Abraham which responded to it. The later legal aspect of religion stood on a lower plane. It was an "interpolation" (Gal. iii. 19) in the true development.

Before leaving the subject of Philo's relation to the Old Testament *as history*, let us note one or two directions in which his position sheds some light on the Fourth Gospel. It is necessary, on the whole, to distinguish between Philo's allegorising and that symbolic element in the Fourth Gospel which comes the more fully to light, the more exhaustively its material is investigated. The Evangelist's descriptions of the typical miracles which he selects as "signs," his deliberate association of these with elaborate discussions which aim at a spiritual interpretation of them, his predilection for mysterious sayings which admit of divergent

explanations (e.g., ii. 19–21, iii. 14–15, iii. 29, iv. 18, iv. 35, vi. 53 f., vii. 38, xii. 24, xiii. 8–10), his use of expressions which have a twofold meaning (i. 30, iii. 3, 8, iii. 14, iv. 10, v. 25, xi. 11, xii. 32, etc.), his symbolic explanations of localities (ix. 7), the inner allusiveness of such passages as i. 46–51, iv. 15–26, etc., his reticence regarding "the disciple whom Jesus loved"—all these phenomena and others of the same kind impart a certain esoteric flavour to the Gospel throughout. That forms an essential element in the author's symbolism. And it involves an elusiveness which marks the contrast with Philo. For in strict allegory, as Mr. J. M. Thompson points out, "a particular stands for a particular," whereas "in symbolism proper it stands for something more general than itself." [1] But, of course, the vaguer method often passes into the more detailed correspondence, and *vice versa*. Hence, various points for comparison are obvious. Beside Philo's constant emphasis on the significance of numbers, e.g., on the number 4 (*De Opif. M.* 45–52), on 7 (*Ibid.* 89–106), on 10 (*De Decal.* 18–31), may be placed, with some reservation, the six water-pots at Cana, the five husbands of the Samaritan woman, and the five porches at Bethesda. What may be called the "esoteric" element in the vocabulary of the Fourth Gospel, embracing such terms as ὥρα, ἄνωθεν, ὑψωθῆναι, νύμφιος, ὕδωρ ζῶν, οἱ νεκροί, κ.τ.λ., has parallels in Philo's mystic use of τόπος (*De Somn.* II. 61–68), ἄφεσις (*De Migr. Abr.* 32), and πηγή (*De Fuga*, 177 f.). Only, Philo expounds the meaning of these words, while the Evangelist seems to count upon an understanding of his terms in the circle for which he writes. Specially noteworthy in Philo is his elaborate symbolism of names. Names and their component parts, he says (*De Mutat. Nom.* 65), are really "distinctive marks of capacities" (χαρακτῆρες δυνάμεων), and,

[1] *Proceedings of Oxford Society of Historical Theology*, Dec. 4, 1913, p. 25.

on this principle, such proper names as Egypt, Joseph, Leah, Rachel, etc., designate certain definite qualities or characters. The interpretation of Siloam by the Evangelist suggests an allied standpoint, and possibly, if we had a clue to the usage of his circle, the same might be said of such names as Nathaniel and Nicodemus. Curiously enough, Philo shows the same kind of reticence about Jacob's son, Judah, whom he usually describes as "the fourth in age" (e.g., *De Joseph.* 15, 189) without mentioning him by name, as the Fourth Evangelist with regard to "the disciple whom Jesus loved."

We enter a less obscure region when we try to estimate the discourses of the Fourth Gospel in the light of Philo's practice. Indeed the latter gives us a most arresting clue to the attitude of ancient thinkers towards that which they reckoned to be history. We know that for him the Pentateuch was inspired in every detail. Yet in narrating, e.g., God's instructions to Moses to warn Pharaoh, as reported in Exodus iv. 11 f., he expounds the discourse on lines of his own, simply making the original his starting-point (*De Vita M.* I. 84). Even more noteworthy is his re-casting and elaboration of Moses' injunctions to the spies before they left on their errand (*Ibid.* 222–226). Taking Numbers xiii. 17–20 as his basis, he constructs upon it a composition which embodies some of its leading ideas, but supplements them in every direction.[1] This process illustrates the usage of the Fourth Evangelist, for whom some saying or thought of Jesus forms the text of a carefully articulated discourse. It appears to him in no sense arbitrary to draw out on these lines the significance of a message which he regarded as wholly Divine.

We have still to deal with Philo's relation to the Law,

[1] Perhaps Philo was here indebted to the tradition of the πρεσβύτεροι: see *Vita M.* I. 4, referred to by Schürer, *H.J.P.*, Div. II. vol. iii. p. 365.

as such, a subject which can only be sketched in outline. The main task he prescribed for himself was to expand the Pentateuch in its most universal bearings. For he regards Moses as the incomparable legislator for humanity. "His laws alone, stable, unshaken, undisturbed, bearing the impress of the seal of Nature herself, remain firm from the day when they were written until now, and, we trust, will abide for all time coming, endowed with immortality, as long as sun and moon and the entire heavens and universe endure" (*De Vita M.* II. 14). For this reason their scope reaches far beyond national limits. And Philo's aim is to show that they enshrine all that is of value in Pagan philosophy. His method, of course, supplies the instrument for that purpose. But over and above the results reached by the use of allegory, Philo deliberately emphasises the complete harmony of the Mosaic Law with the Law of Nature. He was deeply imbued with that Stoic doctrine, and at the very opening of his great allegorical commentary on the Pentateuch he strikes this note: "This beginning (i.e., this book of Genesis) is . . . worthy of the highest admiration, as it contains a description of the creation of the world, to show that the world is in harmony with the law, as the law is with the world, and that the man who obeys the law is for that reason a citizen of the world, since he guides his activities according to the will of nature (*πρὸς τὸ βούλημα τῆς φύσεως*), by which the entire universe is directed" (*De Opif. Mund.* 3). Here is the famous Stoic maxim, "to live in harmony with Nature," set in the forefront of his enterprise. We are not therefore surprised to find in his more detailed account of the Mosaic legislation that Moses "began with the creation of the universe, in order to set forth his most necessary doctrines, first, that the Father and Creator of the world is the same as the real legislator, and, second, that he who is willing to

live by these laws will gladly strive after harmony with Nature, and will live in accordance with the ordinances of the universe, bringing his words into agreement with his deeds, and his deeds with his words" (*De Vita Mos.* II. 48).[1] But a position like this has far-reaching implications. Hence Drummond is probably justified in saying that for Philo "the Pentateuch was simply the Divine Logos resolved into Logoi, statements of philosophical truth, and precepts of the moral code" (*Philo Judæus*, II. p. 308).

When such a point is reached, we are prepared for the conception of Conscience, the legislative Reason within us, which is one of Philo's most remarkable contributions to the content of ancient ethics. Also, we are in no way surprised to find that Philo transfers the emphasis from the ritual of the Law to the condition of the soul before God. "Let me tell you, my friend," he declares, "that God feels no joy when we bring him hecatombs, for all things are his possession. . . . But he delights in pious dispositions and in men who practise holiness, and from them he gladly receives sacrificial cakes and grains of barley and the most frugal offerings as of highest worth. . . . And even though they bring nothing else, in bringing themselves, the most perfect completion of noble character, they present the best sacrifice, honouring God their Benefactor and Saviour with hymns and thanksgivings" (*De Spec. Leg.* I. 271 f.). But, as Bréhier points out, "this inward morality is not purely and simply morality, it is morality accompanied by the consciousness of its superhuman, Divine origin"

[1] Bréhier points out an interesting affinity in this connexion between Philo and Cicero (*De Republica* and *De Legibus*): "They show a similar anxiety to champion their respective laws by placing them under the ægis of Natural Law" (*Les Idées Philosophiques et Religieuses de Philon*, p. 12). He does not mention that these works of Cicero have as their main source the Stoic teacher Panætius (see Schmekel, *Die Mittlere Stoa*, pp. 47–63, 67–85). Philo constantly reveals the influence of Posidonius, the pupil of Panætius.

(*op. cit.* p. 228). Plainly, such a process throws the door wide open for that universal validity of the Law, so dear to the mind of Philo. He appears to be conscious of occupying a unique position. "We instruct in the Divine mysteries those initiates who are worthy of the most sacred ritual: these are the people who, without arrogance, practise true and genuinely unadorned piety, but we shall never be hierophants for those in the grasp of an incurable disease, the stupidity of set phrases, the paltry trifling with names, the clap-trap of appointed customs" (*De Cherub.* 42). The statement quoted earlier from *De Migr. Abr.* 89 as emphasising adherence to the strict letter of the law, though apparently a direct contradiction of this, is really modified by what immediately follows it. "As it is," he says, "like people living alone in isolation or bodiless souls, having no communication with city or village or family or any human company, they look down upon the opinion of the multitude, and search for bare truth in itself: and yet the sacred word teaches them to pay respect to estimable public opinion and to abolish none of those usages established by inspired men who surpassed any of our time. . . . It is the part of the mature soul to share both in being and in seeming to be: it must aim not only at gaining esteem in the men's quarters, but also at being praised at the hearth where the women sit" (*Ibid.* 90, 96). Thus, one element, at least, in Philo's concern for observance of the *letter* of the law springs from the fear of wounding the consciences of others, although in certain moods he can speak of such "weak" brethren in a tone of disparagement.

It is worth observing how, along a very divergent line of development, Philo arrives at a position regarding the Law, which approximates to that of Paul. His religious instinct, as well as the spiritual atmosphere in which he moves, leads him away from the region of ceremonial into

that of obedience to the Divine will, whose appeal he hears within. The Christian Apostle, with surer spiritual vision, discovers through his crucial experience of Christ, a Divine Love which seeks him out and to which his soul can make answer with adoring gratitude. This heart-felt devotion takes the place of legal obedience. But each, in his own manner, has come to realise the accomplishment of Jeremiah's epoch-making utterance: "I will put my law in their inward parts and write it in their hearts" (xxxi. 33).

This quotation suggests a reference to Philo's attitude towards the Prophets. We have already seen that for him Moses stands supreme above all the rest. And that is borne out by the solitary level on which he places the Pentateuch. Indeed, if we were content to apply the rough and ready test of quotation, this subject might be dismissed without more ado. For in Dr. Ryle's classification of the material, six pages of extracts represent the Old Testament prophets as against two hundred and eighty-eight for the Pentateuch. Windisch goes the length of saying that Philo was scarcely influenced by them at all (*Die Frömmigkeit Philos*, p. 93). We are rather inclined to apply to them what Windisch himself says, in the same connexion, of the Psalms, that they affected Philo more powerfully than he acknowledges (*op. cit.*, p. 94). It is true and surprising that he has not attempted to allegorise the prophetic writings, when we remember how current this practice was among the Fathers of the early Church.[1] Possibly one reason may have been that his interest did not lie in history, not even in the historical experiences of his own nation. And it would have been difficult to offer any kind of exposition of these glowing utterances, apart from an earnest participation in the Hope which pervaded them, or at least in the expectation of those great eschatological

[1] See, e.g., Hatch, *Influence of Greek Ideas on Christianity*, pp. 72, 73.

events which loomed before their minds. We know that Paul, as a Christian, re-discovered the prophets, as Jesus had done, and carried forward their lofty spiritual intuitions into the life and thought of the new community. Philo, in his own special environment, and on the path of his own religious development, at least reflects some of the most vital of the prophetic achievements. The primacy which he assigns to the inward worship of the spirit over all sacrificial rites places us at the heart of the religion of the prophets. It is quite possible, as Bréhier suggests (*op. cit.*, p 227), that his distance from Jerusalem and its Temple, and his association of worship with the Synagogue, in part account for this affinity. To us it appears that the clue lies deeper. We are not inclined even to lay strong emphasis on his familiarity with an idealistic type of philosophy which discountenanced anthropomorphism. Must not his receptiveness towards the spiritual have been one of the main factors in creating his philosophic interest? Is it not rather his view of God, and of the grace of God, and of God's interest in man, which reminds us over and again of Hosea and Isaiah? And does not this go back to a personal religious experience, similar in kind to that in which the prophets became profoundly aware of God?

H. A. A. Kennedy.

GOD THE INEVITABLE: A STUDY OF PSALM CXXXIX.

"Thou hast beset me behind and before, and laid Thine hand upon me."—Verse 5.

Psalm cxxxix. is a chapter from the autobiography of a great soul. In the common text it is headed by the name of *David*, on the conjecture of the Jewish editors; while some copies of the Greek Bible associated it also with "Zechariah" and the times of the Dispersion. Both in style and sentiment the composition bears traces of a late age in Hebrew literature. David was the precentor of the sacred choir who in long succession gave utterance to the experiences and aspirations of the saints of Israel, and the entire Psalter passed traditionally under his name, so that any anonymous piece of special interest was apt to be credited to David's authorship and associated with some occasion in his life. The particular writer and the precise circumstances of the song we are not concerned to know; for this Psalm belongs peculiarly to the poetry of the inward life; it issued from the depth of the human spirit and speaks to man universally. It is a passage from the autobiography of Humanity. Every thoughtful religious man recognises himself in the "me" of the opening verse.

Here is a man who has found God—or rather, whom God has found! Looking out from the windows of his soul one day, he is startled to meet the eye of That Other looking in; he stands confronted, apprehended, by the Great Unseen. He finds himself scrutinised by the all-penetrating,

all-surrounding Intelligence and Will whom we name *God*. "O Jehovah," he exclaims, "Thou hast searched me, and known me!" The man *knows that he is known*, as one can be known only to Omniscience: all within him, all about him, is laid open to the searching, interested gaze of his Maker. This awaking of consciousness to the sense of the omniscient God is the supreme moment for every one in whom it takes place; the whole of this marvellous song bears witness to its transforming effect upon mind and character.

And we observe that the God revealed in the individual conscience is at the same moment perceived filling the universe around him. For Man and Nature, the within and the without, the world and I, form a single realm and have one substratum. The God who holds my soul in life, by that same token holds in subsistence the universal frame of things. North, south, east, or west—whichever way I turn my eyes—there is God! The whole horizon flames with His glory, is instinct with His presence. At every outlook that piercing gaze meets me; along every avenue His vitalising breath is borne in upon me. "Whither," cries the poet, "should I go from Thy Spirit? whither flee to escape Thy presence? If I ascend into heaven, Thou art there: if I make my bed in Sheol, behold Thou art there! If I take the wings of the dawn and lodge in the farthest reaches of the sea, even there shall Thy hand lead me and Thy right hand hold me!" In no direction, by no distance, can I get away from Him. No realm of nature the most remote, no region of thought the most retired or abstruse, no created thing will furnish harbourage to the man who would shun the company of his Maker or evade His grasp. The old historian proudly declared the world for the enemies of Rome "one vast and dreary prison." That is true in a sense infinitely grander, and infinitely kinder, for the oppos-

ers of God ; the entire universe, as the Psalmist apprehends it, is a cage for the man who would get beyond Jehovah's authority ; its laws of Nature are the iron bars against which the rebel beats and breaks himself helplessly. God is the Inevitable, the Besetter and Besieger of the human soul, with His sentinels stationed at the farthest outpost stars, His ambush laid close to the doors of the heart.

" Thou hast beset me behind and before " : the sentence of verse 5 is the sum of the Psalm. It registers a great discovery, for the man himself and for his race. The axiom is not to be narrowed to any single plane of meaning. But we may polarise it for ourselves and construe the antithesis, as to be sure the author mainly does, in terms of *time*, which is the ground-form of finite experience. Time's two tenses of the *has been* and the *is to be* supply the measure of existence to creation ; the life of men in their thinking and their acting—of individuals and of communities—is all strung upon this thread. " Behind " is the past ; " before " is the future ; God is in both, and at every point. We look backward or forward—to infancy or age, to the world's embryonic beginnings or to its culminating glories—in both directions alike He is there ! We stand at this fleeting moment between the two immensities, and behold God filling both, from either side He pours in to flood the present with Himself—" He who is, and was, and is coming."

1. As we look back, till sight fades, into the days of the past, shall we not acknowledge that God has been in them all ? His being gives them unity. Through the yesterdays of our brief earthly span, through the centuries of our national history, through the millenniums of human progress and the march of revelation, through the vast and inconceivable stretches of prehuman development and the upbuilding of the material universe, God has incessantly wrought ; His purpose of the ages has operated continu-

ously in all that is behind us and is summed up in the present instant of time. "Before the mountains were brought forth, or ever the earth and the world were framed," the Framer and Father was there,—"of whom, and through whom, and unto whom are all things."

Upon ourselves, once realising His existence, we look as the offspring of God, the children of His creating love and power. God's present interest in us and perfect acquaintance with us spring from His concern in our making. From our unconscious and crude beginnings, the Almighty One has "beset" us "behind." In what a mysterious, vital, and tender relationship the name of "Father" disclosed by Jesus Christ, sets the Most High toward our individual past. Though it was not given him explicitly to use that title, the poet anticipates its substance. He reflects in verses 13 to 16, with the holy awe which marks a pure religious mind, upon his nativity and physical origin; in these he sees God intimately and delicately working. "Thou," he cries, "hast framed my innermost self; Thou hast woven me in my mother's womb: I will give thanks to Thee, for I am fearfully and wonderfully made."

In the compounding of the elements of life to make his person this inspired man recognises a Divine forethought and skill of the most marvellous kind. He surveys himself an astonishing creation of God, a commixture exactly measured and adjusted, with antecedents that go back to the roots of creation. His body therefore he regards with an awful reverence: "Wonderful are Thy works," he concludes from this deep glance into himself, "and that my soul knoweth right well. My frame was not hidden from Thee when I was made in secret and curiously wrought in the depths of the earth"—this surely looks farther back than the "mother's womb." "Thine eyes did see mine

unperfect substance; and in Thy book," as if sketched in the architect's plan, "were all my members written, with the days that were fashioned when as yet there was none of them,"—the outline of the man's history wrapped up in the prenatal embryo. So God has beset the man from his birth and begetting, like the potter with the vessel he fashions, choosing and mixing his clay, setting the wheel a-spinning, and with deft touches of his hand fixing each line and turn of its shape.

And Providence has seconded creation; it is in truth a continuous creation, and what we call providence for the present sphere serves as creation for the next. With the Psalmist Providence leads back to Creation in the sequence of his thought, since the former governs immediately God's present dealings with him; hence the order of verses 1–12. Never has the Eternal Father forsaken the work of His hands, never for one moment does He let His cherished creature alone or cease His work upon it. God's assiduous care, which misses nothing, has attended me, sleeping or waking, through the bygone days, whether I was conscious of it or no. "Thou knowest my downsitting, and mine uprising; Thou understandest my thought afar off": when I come home spent with the day's toil or journeying, when I rise on the morrow fresh for some new endeavour, He takes notice of it all, exercising a fatherly oversight of my nightly rest and daily labour, anticipating my wants and reading my unspoken thoughts with more than a mother's insight. So minute and vigilant is the environing Providence, that Jesus tells us: "The very hairs of your head are all numbered"; so sympathetic, that another Psalmist can appeal to God: "Store Thou up my tears in Thy bottle, record them in Thy book!"

Science makes this conception of the Divine enfolding of man's life the more intelligible, as it discloses the exist-

ence of a medium, to which it gives the name of *æther*, penetrating and enwrapping the objects about us and forming the tissue of the material universe, a substance perfectly continuous and elastic and vastly finer than the atmosphere, wherein the more powerful forces of nature are lodged and its deeper operations carried on. Through this assumption, the truth of which would seem to be demonstrated, the motions of the world of matter and the processes of organic life are traced to the infinitely subtle and infinitely little, where God hides His working and "His ways are past finding out."

But the Divine Providence, while it is protecting and nourishing to mankind, is at the same time disciplinary and educative. God is a Father supremely concerned about the behaviour of His children. This is what our poet is thinking of when he writes: "Thou siftest (winnowest) my path and my couch; and art acquainted with all my ways." Every step in my course is minutely scanned, every movement duly marked and appraised. Up and down, to and fro, we are tossed in the sieve of life, that coarseness and levity, self-will and mistrust, may be shaken out of us and the good grain of sound wisdom may remain. The same experience our Lord describes by one of His matchless figures, when He says, "I am the true Vine, and My Father is the vine-dresser. Every branch in Me that beareth fruit He pruneth it, that it may bear more fruit." The winnower's van, the gardener's knife—these are parables of what the Great Unknown is doing with us, with men and nations, in the sterner providences of our lot. Glimpses and hints of the process we get now and then—no more at present; for the essence of the discipline lies in that we walk by faith—enough, if we observe them, to assure us of God's persistent design to wean us from our sin and win us altogether for Himself.

God has been the director of our past: is He not also our protector *from* the past? This is implicit in the Psalmist's language, if it was not actually in his thought. The words of genius, some one has said, always mean more than the utterer himself intended. God "besets" us "behind" most wondrously when His mercy comes in between us and our misdoings and He, the unforgetting, "remembers not against us former iniquity," when He shields us from the furies which dog transgression and severs us from our former selves. It is our temptation sometimes to affect to do this on our own account: we pass the sponge over the slate and wipe out the unpaid debt—the past, to be sure, is past and done with! We come to a turn in the lane of life, we make a new start, imagining that bygone mistakes and follies may be dismissed; "out of sight is out of mind." Alas, such acts of indemnity are not at our own vote, nor are they to be passed absolutely for one another. The old sins, unforgiven, are still with you; their nemesis haunts you; they will track you down like sleuth-hounds and spring upon you at the least-expected moment. The spoken word, the deed once done, has passed beyond your power; it has gone into God's eternity, and He alone may deal with it.

And when, through Christ's intervention (as we now understand), the Almighty does abolish a man's transgressions and wipes them out, then in truth he is redeemed from iniquity and "created anew in Christ Jesus"; he is a saved man. However difficult the psychology and philosophy of it all may be, the facts of the Christian salvation and the ethical renewal it brings about are unmistakable; they are countless in number and immense in magnitude. They are marvellous beyond all miracle, and belong to Him "who only doeth wondrous things." Even for God this was a hard thing to accomplish—it is hard for a thinking

man to believe—the forgiveness of sins, which makes them as though they had never been ; it cost the Almighty Father the blood of His own Son ! But the thing *is* done ! "The blood of Jesus, God's Son, cleanseth us from all sin." The offence of His people is "cast as a stone into the depths of the sea,"—drowned in the oblivion of eternity. God's fatherly love comes close to our hearts in the act of pardoning grace, and shuts us in from pursuing fears and vengeance, even as Israel crossing the Red Sea was sheltered by the pillar of cloud and fire from the angry hosts of Egypt. God puts Himself, in His uttermost grace, between me and the self of yesterday.

2. Enough of the past : what of the future ? Can God help us there ? has He "beset" us "before" as well as "behind" ?

If the certainty, the fixedness of the past is sometimes our terror, the uncertainty of the future fills us equally with dread, when we regard it apart from God. Who knows what a day may bring forth ? How many of us dreamed a week before the outbreak of the late frightful war of what was in store for their country and for Europe ? On what a precarious tenure do we hold our dearest possessions, and our earthly existence itself ! Ever and anon some lightning-stroke falls upon a life near to our own ; and we have no assurance that ours will not be the next to be smitten. Should a long and full stretch of years be allowed us, our perils and temptations multiply the more : who is to warn us of the pitfalls and ambuscades lying unforeseen along the path ? We choose our way so far as we can see, and make for the proximate destination, never quite sure that we shall reach the point aimed at, and not knowing what, if we do reach it, will befall us there. *Is there any one that knows ?*

Yes, there is One, One only, who has been in that hidden

land, whose thought has traversed the course which stretches, covered with mist, into the vast unknown before us each. To God the future lies open no less than the past. His eye has measured the track of the coming years—the "days that were fashioned" in His forecasting thought, "when as yet there was none of them"; and He has noted with fatherly forethought every turn and winding in the road we are to travel.

And foresight, joined to Almightiness, means foreordering; prevision guarantees provision—not a predetermining of the course of events which would annihilate finite wills and make them an illusion, but an overruling Providence which fits them all into its plans. God is ahead of us, however fast the times move; He is never out of date, never behind the age, but in front of it always. He awaits us at each crisis and emergency with new secrets to unfold, new gifts to bestow, new tasks to appoint. He has "prepared lovingkindness and truth," as another Psalm puts it, "that they may preserve" His children. Our human preparings, how shortsighted and unreliable they frequently prove; our prescience is daily mocked! Fathers lay up store for their children with pathetic affection and consuming toil; fain would they "beset" them "before," and put them in safety from care and want: the treasures they have gathered "make to themselves wings and fly away," or remain to prove a curse to the spendthrift inheritor. The rich man says to himself, with his harvests safely housed, "Soul, thou hast much goods laid up for many years: eat, drink, and be merry"; but a stern voice breaks in, "This night shall thy soul be required of thee!" So we play at Providence—doing the best we know, how blunderingly. But the heavenly Father is never at fault in His judgment, never at a loss in His resources. At every time of need, however sudden or extreme, walking by faith we

find Him ready with help to match necessity, with strength according to our day. The way of our future is a way fenced and fortified beforehand ; it is paved and overarched by the promises of God.

Here is our comfort and security. How could we face the future if we must suppose that chance or a blind fate governed our destiny ? how dare to wind the ties of life about our heart and charge ourselves with its responsibilities, if we did not know, or at least surmise, that a kind and wise forethought was consulting behind the scenes for human good ? What the result of my life's work may be, what is to become of my children, of my Church, my country, my race, in the next twenty or thirty years, I cannot tell, I shall not live to see ; but *He knows*, the All-wise and All-loving, and I am content : " my times are in Thy hand." Sure of this, I walk on unafraid.

When the Almighty long ago " brought Abraham forth abroad " and bade him " look toward heaven and tell the stars," He pointed to the stability of Nature, and its boundless and splendid profusion, as the pledge of His fidelity to man. The grand powers above us and about us are working upon a single design, to effect a purpose in which the minutest circumstance no less than the largest factor has its place and use. All is charged with the providence of God ; all is moving with one motion, from everlasting to everlasting, toward the hidden mark, the Divine goal of the ages. He who can tell the stars, can measure the scope and trace the method of God's covenant-relations with mankind. The sovereign Mind and Will that has " built all things," constitutes Himself your personal guide and the provider of your immortal future. " Fear not, Abram," He says to the father of believers, " I am thy shield, and thy exceeding great reward." " Certainly I will be with thee " : such is God's assurance to the pilgrim soul ; that promise guarantees the future.

Those who have known God's past faithfulness, who have "tasted and seen how good Jehovah is," can augur what is coming; they judge of what is "before" from what is "behind." For God, if He be God, is the Rock of ages, —"yesterday and to-day the same, and for ever." Nay, the future for His children is bound to be better than the past. Evolution, and not a mechanical continuance or revolving of the wheel of nature, is the law of His kingdom, which grows from the mustard-seed to the tree of spreading branches, from the small to the great and the lowly to the lofty. God is marching on in the might of the eternal purpose to the realisation of His glorious designs for redeemed mankind; under that banner, led by the Captain of our salvation, we safely advance. Here is our security for the salvation of humanity, and for the life and immortality proffered to us each in the Gospel. It lies in the existence of a Mind infinitely wise and good and sovereign, in whom is found the source and the goal of the finite Universe, whose character and His purpose toward men shine forth in Jesus Christ. Yonder in the past He has spoken, He has wrought and suffered for mankind—we look backward to Bethlehem and Calvary; yonder in the future we look forward to "the grace that is to be brought to us at the revelation of Jesus Christ." He is the Alpha of the life of faith—and its Omega.

3. But the saying in which the Psalm centres, converges to a practical point; we must follow its teaching a step further, or we have considered it to small purpose. To contemplate the Unseen Wisdom guiding our past, and providing our future, is not sufficient. Too easily do we lose ourselves in vain regrets and idle hopes, in brooding over vanished scenes or dreaming of brighter days to come. We have our being in the present. Life is not a memory, nor a speculation; it is an actuality. Its decisions are

made always to-day, not yesterday and not to-morrow: wherefore it is written, "Behold, *now* is the accepted time; behold, *now* is the day of salvation." God is no distant transcendent Majesty, to be pushed away and kept afar off—to be dismissed with the fancies of childhood, relegated to the pages of an old Bible and the myths of an earlier world; nor to be postponed to some more convenient season, when the stress of business is over, when the flush of youth has faded and its hot desires are spent, reserved for the evening pause of life and its sequestered walks, for the time when the pensive shadows fall and the cool winds blow from the unseen shores. He is a God nigh at hand—right down here, mingling in the thick and throng of noon-day life, with His holy eyes searching and His quickening breath fanning us. At the height of his activities, He accosts the living, thinking man, and claims from him instant attention and obedience. "For in Him we live and move and do exist"—all our deepest poets say that: when life is fullest and its tide swells highest, then God is most surely with us. The energy of thought and will that stirs in you at this moment, comes of the constant inflow of His animating Spirit.

This is what the man had found out and felt who wrote the 139th Psalm. He is facing the facts about God. Like Jacob at Penuel, he has come to hand-grips with his Maker. Religion is for him no longer a sabbath performance, a social convenience and convention; it is an overwhelming personal reality. God has *cornered* this man, and is looking right down into his eyes, to demand a prompt and straight answer. There is no escape for him, and no wish any longer to escape. The decisive hour of life has come. That God who has pursued him through the past and stands athwart his future, who has besieged him and compassed him about from every side, now closes in upon him and seizes him with insistent grasp. By this confession he yields himself a

prisoner: "Thou," he cries, "hast laid Thine hand upon me!" He acknowledges in God the Owner of his being—the Lord of the Universe, now at last the admitted Lord of the wayward, stubborn, self-engrossed, self-idolising human heart. The soul surrenders to its Maker's love. Such is the story that appears to lie behind this song.

There are two things men are constantly and childishly trying to avoid—God and themselves. This is the secret of our modern restlessness. Men are rushing about, hurrying this way and that, to divert an uneasy conscience, to "hide from the presence of the Lord." We are like Adam in the Garden after his sin, skulking from his Maker behind the trees—playing at hide and seek with Omnipresence: a poor game is that! Anything to get away from God! Sometimes one may watch men spending half a lifetime in dodging religious conviction; and the hunted, harassed look grows upon them. How useless, how pitiable—"the pot-sherds of the earth," as the Second Isaiah puts it, "striving with their Maker!"

Procrastination improves nothing, but makes matters continually worse. Aye, and unbelief alters nothing. The Psalmist in his time would seem to have tried, or at any rate considered, that expedient: "If I say, Surely the darkness shall cover me and the light about me shall be night," it is no use my saying so: "Even the darkness hideth not from Thee, but the night shineth as the day. The darkness and the light are both alike to Thee."—I shut my eyes and say, "How dark!" The sun pursues his beneficent course none the less and pours his beams upon me, while I stumble at noon-day. My blindness hurts me lamentably; it does not extinguish *Him*, nor shut me out from His observation. God is light, and God is here—patiently waiting for me to open my eyes and look up; His pitying

glance, His outreached hand, meet my repentant, wondering gaze. One can never for an instant get away from God, not in all the cloud of one's perplexed reasonings, not in the inmost seclusion of the distrustful heart. I turn my back upon Him—I am moving toward Him all the same, fleeing from His mercies to rush upon His judgments!

God has pursued you through the past; He awaits you in the future; and He arrests you in the present hour. It is vain to struggle, to turn this way and that: how should we escape the God who has planted His law in our conscience and stamped His image on our brow?

> "Yield to His love's resistless power,
> And fight against your God no more."

For you are sure to be beaten! This is the moral of the old-world song: nothing is truer to the life of to-day.

G. G. Findlay.

A THIRD CHAPTER OF TESTIMONY CONCERNING THE ROAD TO JERUSALEM.

(Luke xiii. 1–xiii. 22–xiv. 35.)

"On He went teaching from one town and village to another as He made His way to Jerusalem" (xiii. 22). It is thus that Luke, as he relates the story of Jesus' last great campaign-journey to Jerusalem, refers pointedly and explicitly to the fact for the first time since he announced—a long way back (ix. 51)—that the journey had begun. No need therefore to demonstrate by indirect reasoning that this is part of the record of the Road. But we may also, without hesitation, infer from the words that Luke is conscious he is offering us here a very definite and thoroughly accredited piece of special testimony, and that when he received the facts it was avowedly as incidents of the road they were told

to him. A mere glance, backward as well as forward, affords preliminary confirmation of this. For some way on both sides of this road-mark the facts are nearly all new. No other Gospel has preserved them. The only problem is to determine, if possible, where the story begins and ends. Is this definite announcement the beginning of the story, or does it speak out of the heart of it ?

Permit us, first, to glance back over all the way we have so far travelled, in order to pick up and link together the scattered hints of time, place, and movement. If we are right in our view of the Second Eye-witness's testimony, xi. 53 has a hint—vague, as it unavoidably had to be,—that for a second time we are passing into the record of the Road, and that the narrative which follows, intense, swift, and vivid when purged of editorial additions, is meant to stand in chronological proximity, or sequence, to the story, told by the previous informant, of the Sending of the Seventy. But now, between this second time-mark (xi. 53) and the guide-post (xiii. 22) to which we have just pointed, there is yet another indication—xiii. 1 : " There were present *at that time* some who told Him, etc." At what time ? Unless our view of what immediately precedes is correct, Luke has left us quite at sea, without star or compass. The time when some one interrupted from the crowd (xii. 13) is no help to us. And to wander away back into the " Conflicts " passage (xi. 14–52) is hopeless. But if xi. 53 means " when He had set out from Galilee," and the story which follows is a temporal unity,—told perhaps by another of the Seventy and embracing, therefore, at most but a day or two—we get quite a satisfactory indication of time sequence. (*a*) ix. 51 —the first attempt towards Jerusalem, followed by the rebuff in Samaria : back presumably in lower Galilee : the sending of the Seventy (with the rest of that informant's story added). (*b*) xi. 53—the final departure from Galilee

(prefaced by the "Conflicts" passage): a further report of words to the Seventy: the interruption from the crowd: the Farewell Parables to Galilean followers, with their call to watch for the returning Son of Man: the passionate cry of a heart aflame facing a baptism of blood: and the solemn announcement of the severance of family ties which was now inevitable for those who would further accompany Him. (*c*) Then xiii. 1: "*at that time*," i.e. the whole time indicated by (*b*)—followed by notes of the "repentance" preaching which characterised His utterances as He now "passed on through cities and villages teaching and journeying towards Jerusalem." Are we right in thus making xiii. 22 not the introductory formula to a new story but a mark of time and movement in the heart of it, and in suggesting that this fresh chapter of evidence begins at xiii. 1 and extends to the next demonstrable break in Luke's record—xiv. 35?

(1) *Unity of the Testimony.* It has already been suggested that xiii. 22 is not phrased as we should expect an introductory sentence to be. It is not cast in the same mould as ix. 51 and xvii. 11—its companion guide-posts. It merely suggests, rather, the resumption of the journey after the episode in the synagogue (xiii. 10). It is linked with it by an unobtrusive καὶ; whereas the "now at that time" of xiii. 1 looks much more like the formal greeting of a new section courteously introducing itself.

Further, there are one or two general characteristics of the whole passage (xiii. 1–xiv. 35) which lend support to the view that it is a unity and comes from a single source. For one thing, we seem to feel the road much more securely beneath our feet throughout this section. The last story was rather the story of the leave-taking. Here the journey is fairly resumed. Not only does "that time" indicate, as we have suggested, the time of the final setting out from Galilee, but the retailing of the report of the massacre in

Jerusalem seems prompted by a misgiving on the part of some persons friendly disposed to the Prophet as to the consequences that might ensue if He carried out His present intention to go up as a religious reformer to the Capital. He has said Farewell, and turned His back on the happy past. His eyes have now the forward look. And all through this section from its opening words, the Holy City stands out clearly as His goal (xiii. 4, xiii. 22, xiii. 33). It may be because the informant was impressed with this, and quoted in corroboration the words which so movingly express His deep desire to win the City of the Sacred Shrine that they find a place (xiii. 34) which does not easily commend itself as their true chronological context.

Then not only do we feel the swing of movement along the road, but features by the way, definite halting-points take concrete shape before our eyes. We are present for a little in one of the synagogues (xiii. 10). We pass through one town and village after another (xiii. 22). We seem to come within hail of Herod's royal seat (xiii. 31 f.), but Jesus mocks at the risk; His eyes are on the road ahead—and the goal (xiii. 33). We enter the house of a ruler who belonged to the Pharisees (xiv. 1). Then afterwards we find ourselves on the road again (xiv. 25). As in the previous eye-witness's testimony (xii. 1, 13, 54) we are conscious of the crowds here too (xiii. 14, 17, 24, xiv. 25); but there is a heightened circumstantiality here in the way varieties of groups and individuals detach themselves from the crowd and occupy for a moment the foreground of the scene,—some travellers just back from Jerusalem (xiii. 1), a clique of shame-faced antagonists in a synogogue (xiii. 17), a company of friendly Pharisees (xiii. 31), a set of watchful eyes at a party (xiv. 1), a roomful of guests jealous about precedence (xiv. 7), a 'daughter of Abraham'—a sufferer bent and bound for eighteen years (xiii. 11 f.), a synagogue president with a good touch

of asperity in his tongue (xiii. 14), a theological hair-splitter (xiii. 23), a ruler who belonged to the Pharisees (xiv. 1), a man suffering from dropsy (xiv. 2), a man of glib piety (xiv. 15) but no deep seriousness of soul.

Then in addition to the echoes of contemporary happenings (xiii. 1, 4) and of prominent personalities of the day (xiii. 1, 32), surely we can see reflections and observations of the road finding their way into Jesus' talk. Of course such sights as two men discussing the felling of a fruitless fig-tree in a vineyard (xiii. 6 f.), or one man sowing mustard in a garden (xiii. 19); one man taking his ass to water (xiii. 15) or another dragging his ox out of a ditch (xiv. 5), on the Sabbath; a hen covering her brood with her wings (xiii. 34) or a house half-built and derelict (xiv. 28), have nothing about them to mark them as wayside scenes belonging specially to this time. But—if we might expand Luke's brief report by the aid of Matthew's fuller version of words belonging to this time (Luke xiii. 24 = Matthew vii. 13 f.)—do we not hear of a broad highway that leads to a city of corruption, and of a gate that opens on a narrow path but a safe one? Do we not see a Preacher preaching "in our streets" (xiii. 26), and hear of messengers searching through "streets and lanes of the town" (xiv. 21), along "roads and hedges" (xiv. 23) of the countryside for guests for the Kingdom feast? And of banquets to the passing visitor (xiii. 26), and some folk knocking at a door in the street and a stern face at the window and a hand waving them away (xiii. 25, 27)? Is there no glimpse of the campaign-journey whose cost He had counted reflected once in Jesus' mind? And do we not once feel the crunching of dead and useless salt beneath our feet on the road (Luke xiv. 35 = Matt. v. 13)?

Now this circumstantiality and actuality characterise every part of the section of the Gospel under review. Do

they not point to a single source for the whole of it,—the realistic touch of an observant and retentive mind?

But there is a further general feature of the whole section which seems to us an even more convincing indication of singleness of source. It is the pre-occupation of the narrator with one dominating theme to which he returns again and again—repentance and the need for earnest struggle to win an entrance to the Kingdom. We shall have to look at this in closer detail later. Let us meantime consider two things which might be urged against the validity of this as an argument for a common source. One is that repentance, and that too in its sterner aspects, was the prevailing theme of all Jesus' preaching at this time; and that it is due to Him and not to the teller of the story that it receives such prominence here. It is true that Jesus had become the intense and urgent preacher of repentance. But that one man's account of it could differ markedly from another's may be seen at once if we compare this testimony with that which immediately precedes it. In the previous testimony it appears refracted through the mind of one absorbed in the imminence of the Unseen World and in watching for the Messianic Advent. Here, it is the commotion and struggle of the new life's earthly beginning that is emphasized in the thought of the teller of the tale. There, the Kingdom is to come suddenly in supernatural glory from above; here, it is sometimes regarded as a gradual growth within human life, from small to great. There, the Master returns suddenly to a house He has left in charge of servants. Here, the Master is within the house and men are suppliants for entrance outside. There, the spiritual life is a waiting in faithfulness, not in negligence. Here, it is an earnest pressing along a road and in through gates and doors. There, gentler and more merciful aspects of the After Life are recollected as in mellow reflection: here, it is only the irrevocableness of

lost opportunity, the possibility of being left outside the fast-closed door. There, in short, the bit of the journey recalled is the experience of one who had already been some time a follower. Here the reminiscence of the journey seems to be the recollection of the experience of one who was standing at the beginning of the new life when Jesus passed his way.[1]

The second argument which may be urged against using this characteristic of the story in proof that it comes from a single source is that the kinship of theme observable in much of it may be due to the hand of Luke the editor grouping things on the principle of internal affinity. This may indeed be the reason for the position of the parables in chapter xv. But as to the rest—this argument cannot be made good. The long story of the healing of the bent woman, the parables of the Mustard Seed and the Leaven, the report of Herod's designs, and the earlier part of the table talk in the Pharisee's house interrupt the supposed sequence according to kinship of theme. Luke is certainly not collecting and arranging Sayings of Jesus here. He is repeating a tale as it had been told to him.

(2) *Editorial Intrusions.* But here another question arises. Are we justified in using all that the passage (xiii. 1–xiv. 35) contains to support our conclusions ? Are there no editorial intrusions ? We have already suggested a reason for the placing of the Apostrophe to Jerusalem (xiii. 34 f.) here. We reserve a fuller note on the difficulties it presents for an Appendix to this part of our analysis.

The parables of the Mustard Seed and the Leaven (xiii. 18–21 = Matt. xiii. 31–33), though differing entirely in their

[1] A striking illustration of the contrast is afforded by comparing xii. 35 f. with xiii. 25. Both are echoes of the parable of the Ten Virgins, which only Matt. fully records, but which is obviously one of the Parousia Parables spoken by Jesus about this time. The contrast between the remembered fragments betrays the differing interests of the two informants.

setting from Matthew's, may not be challenged on that account. There is no historical clue to their true position in Matthew's Parable-pericope. Question may be raised, however, as to whether they are congruent with the apparently more Apocalyptical outlook of Jesus in this period. One must not mistake appearance for reality in deciding such a question. Jesus' outlook never becomes exclusively, or even mainly, apocalyptical. The profound reality which gripped and governed His life was spiritual and inward, and remained so to the end. Luke xvii. 21-25, which undoubtedly belongs to the journey period, is proof of that. And these parables may well have been spoken at this time by the clear-souled Jesus, whose high vision of the Kingdom never fundamentally changed, in order to correct exaggerated impressions that had been created in duller minds by the arresting parables of the Return (xii. 35–48). There is certainly no obvious editorial motive for their presence here ; they interrupt, rather, any supposed sequence in theme. For that very reason we should judge that it is Luke the historian, compelled by his information, who is placing the parables here. Indeed, he gives us the impression that he knows that the place where they were spoken was in the synagogue where Jesus had just wrought the cure (xiii. 10). They are the only parables we ever read of as having been spoken in a synagogue.

Again, Luke doubtless gives the right context for the " Strait Gate " discourse, which occurs in Matthew as part of the Sermon on the Mount (Luke xiii. 23–30 = Matt. vii. 13–23). It has all the marks of the strenuous and intense level of spirit at which Jesus was now living ; as well as the obvious traces of the road, already referred to.

Again, the parable of the invited guests (Luke xiv. 15–24) seems to have the genuine marks of authenticity about its setting. The scene is too vivid, the guest's pious ejaculation

which called it forth too real, for this to be an invented occasion. In Matthew this parable is clearly an intrusion between xxi. 46 and xxii. 15; and there are other marks of its having been taken from an older document, and of editorial handling in Matthew's Gospel.

Luke xiv. 25–27 is perhaps doubtful—in part at least. The actual form of the words shows close kinship with the Address to disciples at Caesarea Philippi (Luke ix. 23). It is one of the very few "doublets" in Luke. And the reason may simply be that he could not gainsay the testimony of the Petrine tradition in the one case (cf. Mark viii. 34), and of his own informant in this other. Jesus must certainly have repeated His supreme thoughts sometimes. And some such sentiment is necessary as a preface to xiv. 28 ff. here.[1]

Luke xiv. 34 f. (= Matt. v. 13, Mark ix. (49), 50) sounds also like a sententious saying frequently on Jesus' lips. But of course Matthew's placing does not determine its context; and its position in Mark seems to corroborate Luke's setting here. It is entirely in keeping with the soul-shattering nature of Jesus' thought at this time.

There is nothing, therefore, unless it be the Apostrophe on Jerusalem, that we feel obliged to remove.

(2) *The Third Witness's Story.* We have already gone into so much of the detail that it is unnecessary to do more than summarise the story now. Once again we can affirm that Luke is carrying out his intention to set down in order—and that, mainly chronological order—"the things most surely believed among us" concerning our Lord. There is a great deal that is peculiar to Luke here,—news of the massacre of Galileans by Pilate, news of the falling of the

[1] There is ground, indeed, for thinking that Mark's placing of the words may be topical rather than chronological. At Caesarea Philippi Jesus was in seclusion with His disciples. Yet in Mark viii. 34 we have 'the crowd.' Here again, therefore, Luke, following the authority of his special witness, may be giving the words their true historical context.

tower of Siloam, the parable of the fruitless fig-tree, the woman healed in the synagogue, Herod's designs against Jesus, the feast in the Pharisee's house, the dropsical man healed there, the sayings about the chief seats and the right guests to entertain, the " counting the cost " parables of the unfinished tower and the ill-planned campaign. And even that which is shared in common with the other Gospels,—the parables of the Mustard Seed and the Leaven, the " Strait Gate " discourse, (the soliloquy on Jerusalem), the parable of the invited guests, and one or two words like that about " the Salt,"—in the main fit far better into the historical context here, and have in them elements at once original and self-authenticating.

Moreover, we have some hint of locality in this strand of Luke's narrative. After the rejection by Samaria—not before several attempts: from the inhospitable village " they went to the next " (ix. 51–56)—Jesus returned, we conjecture, to Galilee. Not perhaps as far North as Capernaum, but near enough to be in touch with the throng of His early followers and hearers. And then He sets out Southwards, down the West shore of the Lake. For here comes in the hint of locality: some Pharisees come to warn Him of Herod's scheming to lay hold on this troubler of the peace,—this ghost of John the Baptizer! " Get away *from here* and continue your journey! " they urge. And this almost certainly means that Jesus was now in close proximity to Tiberias, the royal city. And the feast which follows seems to have been of the nature of a " Godspeed " to the Reformer-Prophet passing on His way. For He is on the road immediately after, passionately bidding the crowds that follow " count the cost! "

(4) *The Source.* All this whets our curiosity to know who Luke's informant was? Who told him this absorbing story, containing so much that is original yet obviously authen-

tic ? We have here a rich field to search in. Have we found any clue ?

(*a*) One noticeable general feature has already been referred to—the *emphasis on* the *repentance*-note in Jesus' preaching at this time. And, while there are still, as in the earliest preaching, the essentials of the gracious and winsome message—the patience, the considerateness, the hopefulness of the Divine Heart about men (xiii. 8),—there is much greater prominence given to the sterner side,—the inescapable necessity of repentance (xiii. 3, 5), the ultimate fate of the impenitent (xiii. 3, 5, 7, 9), the need for sincerity amounting, it may be, to agony in repentance (xiii. 24 " agonise to enter "), the futility of trivial claims to a place in the Kingdom (xiii. 25, 26), the terrible closed door that awaits false penitents (xiii. 25), the tragedy of putting off the gracious invitation with light excuses (xiv. 18 ff.), and the necessity of sternly counting the cost of all that is involved in true following, before attempting it (xiv. 28 ff.). To find in all this the hand of Luke the editor is a much less satisfying view than to find in it the impressions of one informant whose mind had been absorbed at the time by the question of repentance, and deeply stirred by the stern and solemn notes of it,—one who is probably telling the story of his own conviction of conscience, his own wrestling under this preaching,—an experience which cost him a tremendous expenditure of spirit, agony of soul.

(*b*) An unmistakable and very significant feature of the story is that *the Pharisees appear here in a favourable light.* A group of them show a friendly disposition to Jesus. They warn Him of Herod's evil intentions and urge Him to flee from the neighbourhood. One of them entertains Him. They are not expressly mentioned as the opponents in the incidents of Sabbath cures. In the Synagogue it is " the ruler " who objects, not rebuking Jesus, however, but the

people, for coming to be healed on the Sabbath. And it is not the Pharisees as a class, but "all His adversaries" who are shamed by Jesus' reply. And at that friendly feast given by a ruler who was of the sect of the Pharisees, the people who watched His meeting with the dropsical man are a vague "they." Moreover when Jesus challenged them to oppose the healing of the dropsical man, we hear nothing of the usual censorious murmuring. We are told that "they held their peace" . . . "they could not answer." Again it is not suggested that it was Pharisees who shewed keenness about social precedence at table. Neither the theological conundrum-monger, nor the man of glib piety are stigmatised as Pharisees. There is surely the strong presumption here that the informant was either a Pharisee, or one who had a certain sympathy with the Pharisaic point of view, and was anxious to shew they were not all hostile to Jesus.

(*c*) We may here suggest also that since the Seventy were presumably by this time on the way, none of the men among whom we might naturally look to find properly qualified eye-witnesses were on the scene. Our witness here is in all probability *a man the beginning of whose deep interest and attachment to Christ dates from this very time*, yet one *who afterwards became a man of standing in the early Church*, one able to give valuable, coherent, and trustworthy testimony, a man of more than average attainments, an intelligent observer with a retentive memory.

(*d*) To draw the evidence closer, we note that *the locality of the story* is apparently *somewhere in the neighbourhood of Tiberias*. More particularly still, there is here to be noted a feature which crops out more than once in Luke's Gospel. Luke has some special information to give about Herod the Tetrarch,—information which looks like that of a man conversant with the inner life of the Palace. It is Luke alone

who reports Herod's evil designs here. It is Luke alone who reports the appearance of Jesus before Herod during the trial. Not only so, but the informant is cognisant of the king's feelings and wishes more than once (Luke ix. 7: "Herod was perplexed"; ix. 9: "He desired to see Jesus"; xxiii. 8: "Herod was exceeding glad (relieved) when he saw Jesus"; xxiii. 11: "Herod set Jesus at naught . . . mocked"; "Herod had been at enmity with Pilate—and now made friends"; as well as the expression here—"Herod *intends* (θέλει) to kill you"—xiii. 31.)

Was there, perchance, such a man who had been following, with growing attraction, the movements of the new Prophet? Does not Luke's "There were present at that time *some*" look like a half-introduction to the circle from within which he got the information he is about to record (xiii. 1)—a circle that had constant comings and goings between Jerusalem and Galilee and knew all the news of the capital, a circle sufficiently concerned about His welfare to try to dissuade Him from going up?[1] And was this informant one who had special means of knowing the wicked designs of Herod, and was on sufficiently intimate terms with Pharisees as to use some, like-minded with himself, as the medium through which to convey this information to Jesus? Was there such a man likely to be invited to a feast in the house of a ruler who belonged to the sect of the Pharisees? An informant who can report the stray remark of a guest at the table was surely there. Nay, was he possibly even the host himself,—for part of Jesus' conversation was directed, we are pointedly told, to the host? This seems the more likely when we remember the nature of the advice to the host.

[1] The precision of the phrase with which xiii 31 commences ("The same hour") helps to convince us that the story of the friendly Pharisees' warning comes from the same source as the preceding paragraph. And the latter is prefaced by the definite road-mark (xiii. 22), which in turn forms a link between this and the earlier part of the chapter.

The genial Jesus would not be guilty of utterance, audible by all at the table, calculated to embarrass His fellow-guests; it must have been more or less privately spoken. And does not the fact that this man watched Jesus taking special note of the struggle for precedence, and that he stored up Jesus' opinions about that as well as His advice to entertain the poor as guests rather than the socially important, suggest some one familiar with court etiquette, trained in it perhaps, and finding a refreshing contrast to that artificial life in this Prophet-reformer's views; one to whom, therefore, becoming a follower of Jesus meant giving up some high social status and privilege,—who had to count the cost and yet had been compelled by an awakened conscience at length to make the great sacrifice?

Can we, among all Luke's possible informants, find one who answers to this unusual combination of requirements? We turn to the book of "Acts" again; and there we are told by Luke that there were in the Church at Antioch certain prophets and teachers (xiii. 1). And to the last but one of the names he mentions, he adds a special and deeply interesting bit of information. "Manaen," he calls him, "who had been brought up with Herod the Tetrarch." Luke seldom adds a qualifying phrase to a name, and never, we may take it, without a reason. Luke had been a citizen of Antioch, it would seem,—for a time at least. But, even apart from that, Luke must have had many comings and goings between the prison at Caesarea and Paul's friends in his old congregation, the Church that had sent him out as a missionary. And Luke had grown sufficiently intimate with Manaen to get from his own lips the story of his early life in the royal palace at Tiberias.

In one important direction the conditions we have seen to be essential in Luke's witness here are fulfilled in Manaen. That a foster-brother of Herod had become a great Christian,

a teacher or prophet (Acts xiii. 1), a leader in the mother-church of Gentile Christianity, who had had a full experience of what it meant to become a Christian and could expound the way of faith to others, is clear and evident. But what connexion could the foster-brother of the king possibly have had with Pharisees? This man was closely associated for a time with Paul, was doubtless influenced by, and had in turn influenced Paul's drastic view of Christianity. But though this part of Luke's Gospel is often pointed to as reflecting Pauline thought, it could not have been from Paul that this man had learned to regard Pharisaism in a friendly light. Had Manaen any early personal association with Pharisees?

Tradition comes to our aid in a surprisingly complete way. About forty years or so before Christ, when Herod the Great, father of the Tetrarch, was a young boy, he was met one day—so Josephus the historian informs us (*Ant.* XV. x. 5)—by a holy man, white-robed, long-haired and bearded. The religious ascetic greeted the young Herod and predicted that he should one day become king of the Jews. More than a dozen years passed, and the princeling, grown to manhood, actually had the prophecy fulfilled in him. It had evidently made a deep impression on the mind of the ambitious boy. He had never forgotten it. And, now on the throne, he sent for the holy man, and made him his friend. Josephus tells us that the name of this Essene (i.e., Jewish monk, or Super-Pharisee) was Manaen (Heb. Menahem). It is probably this man to whom the Talmud refers when it says that Menahem, a leading Rabbi, entered the household service of the king—as a kind of court-chaplain perhaps. Since the Essenes were strict Sabbatarians and attenders of Synagogue, may not this fact have some bearing on the mysterious party called "Herodians," who, according to the Gospels, came to be associated with the Pharisees in their antagonism to Jesus over the Sabbath question? (cf. Mark iii.6; viii. 15; xii. 13; Matt. xxii.16).

Some years later a son was born to Herod the Great, Herod Antipas, who became the Tetrarch. And the king had him reared by a mother whose infant son's name was Manaen. Does it not seem almost certain that Herod the Great must have consulted his aged friend Manaen, the Essene, or sought to do a kindness to some relative of his religious mentor? The name is not a common name. And so it came to pass that a youth Manaen, named after his notable grand-uncle (for the stricter Essenes abjured the marriage bond), or after his grandfather (for Menahem had violated the stricter Essenic regime in entering the court-service), became the foster-brother of Herod the Tetrarch. Such a youth would in all likelihood be brought up according to the rigid tenets of his Jewish faith—in Pharisee circles, if not actually an Essene. And note once again the phrase in the Gospel, "a ruler belonging to the sect of the Pharisees" (xiv. 1). Godet interprets this to mean a Sanhedrist, and would therefore locate the incident of the feast in this man's house, in Jerusalem. But this involves a violent chronological misplacement in Luke's narrative, without any other hint that it is so, not to speak of explanation why. It is too violent a disregarding of Luke's claim to be an orderly historian. But the phrase finds a good explanation in the view that this man belonging to Pharisee circles was a man of political influence, status, authority in Herod's court. It is thus found possible to satisfy every one of the most unusual combination of qualifications required in Luke's informant for this part of the journey narrative.

This man would at least be acquainted with the high code of the Essenes—their three supreme principles of life: the love of God, the love of virtue, and the love of man. He knew how they loved peace, sought silence, and refrained from oaths—save only their religious vows. They were an ancient Society of Friends. He knew their rule of chastity.

He was aware that they followed a life of voluntary poverty, a community, a co-operative brotherhood, living apart by themselves; equalitarians—socialists before their time!—condemning the relationship of master and slave; experts in the healing agencies of the day, exercising a practical benevolence towards the sick, diseased, and poor. He had the memory of his own strict ancestry and upbringing behind him. The Essenes were great gardeners, and such illustrations as those of a man sowing mustard seed "in his own garden" (a realistic touch in Luke's version, xiii. 19), and of the considerate gardener pleading for the fig-tree that bore nothing but leaves (xiii. 6) may have linked themselves with early memories.

And here he was, the foster-brother of the king, a royal favourite at Antipas' court. There was an imposing outward show of religion there. But he knew that it was dictated in part by policy, in part by superstitious fear. He had seen the development of the wild side of his royal foster-brother's character—his craft, his lust, his cruelty, his caprice, his effeminacy ("that vixen"), his vanity, his moral cowardice. He knew the licence of the court, the scandal of Herod's relations with Salome and Herodias. And yet the luxury, the "soft-raiment," the social prestige held him there fast bound in glittering chains. Even before Jesus came into his life he could say, *Video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor.* But now, in the white light of this Holy Life, the contradiction, the discord, the sham, the hollow unreality of the unsavoury dream stood out in intolerable relief. Strict legalism, rites and ceremonies, were no substitute for love and purity. To help and heal was a holier duty than to keep the Sabbath. To befriend the poor a nobler thing than the chief seats at feasts. His soul was now like that ferment which Jesus had pictured, that hidden unrest, bubbling amid the meal. Nay, this insistent

Preacher of repentance had driven him at last to the choice between living on under the agonies of an awakened conscience and making the great sacrifice—cutting himself forever free from it all. And into this inward tension came the whispers of Herod's scheming to lay hold on Jesus and do with Him, perchance, as he had done with the hairy-mantled prophet of the desert, John. To be accessory after another such crime was not to be borne. Manaen's decision was made, the die was cast. His soul was at rest.

Oh, it was not any hope that this was the national Messiah that had won him. He had long ago, like many of the Essenes, thrown these hopes away. There was no room for that sort of thing in the breast of a courtier of Herod. It was a spiritual kingdom to which he had in penitence been introduced. This new movement, as he looked down on it from amid the splendours of place and power in the retinue of an earthly king, had seemed an insignificant thing. But this disturbing Preacher with the lowly heart and the frank and open eyes had admitted that : He said the Kingdom of God was like a mustard seed. And now,—as Manaen told his story over and over in Antioch,—he could say he had lived to see it becoming a mighty tree.

Yes, all the facts and the likely inferences about this story of Manaen fit so completely and exactly into the conditions here that we can scarcely avoid the conclusion—it is the truth. Another chapter of the story of the road to Jerusalem stands out before us in clear and living outline. It is the story of a would-be saviour of Jesus, who himself was saved.

Appended Note to Analysis of the Third Testimony about 'the Journey.'

The *Lament over Jerusalem* (xiii. 34 f.) is a puzzling feature in this block of information. It is not to be confused with the words spoken on Olivet. It is no misplaced fragment of xix. 41–44. Its parallel in Matthew is xxiii. 34–37, at the close of the Woes against

the Pharisees spoken in the temple-precincts. That there was such an address is probable, but one can be practically certain that Matthew, as frequently throughout his Gospel, has coupled kindred logia from different occasions along with it. So that in spite of its appropriate local setting we may not accept off-hand the occasion which Matthew gives for this Lament as correct. Indeed the last verse seems to indicate that Jesus is about to retire for a time from the city, and not appear there again until He comes to make a Messianic entry, His followers crying, "Blessed is He that cometh in the name of the Lord." This is a more natural interpretation than to regard them as a prediction of the Second Advent. That being so, they are placed too late in Matthew. The triumphal entry is over.

Still the isolated and unattached position of the Logion in Luke is perplexing. The moment before He is in the neighbourhood of Tiberias. *Now*, He is not only apostrophising the holy city, but speaking as if He were present in it ("thou shalt not *see* me"). It does not seem as if Luke could have got this word from his informant here. But if it be the hand of Luke the editor, it is not affinity of subject-matter that is the reason for its insertion. It is a purely mnemonical conjunction, the word 'Jerusalem' in the previous verse giving the cue for what follows. It might, on this ground, be explained as a later interpolation in a passage of the Gospel which was given to catechumens to be learned by heart. But this explanation carries no conviction: it does not satisfy. It is too awkward an insertion if that were all the connexion. Besides Luke quotes the rest of the pericope, as it is given in Matthew, elsewhere in the Gospel (xi. 49-51), and deliberately leaves this saying out, as if he knew that he had it elsewhere in his notes of special information, or had already given it a place with those notes in an earlier edition of his Gospel. May it not, after all, be from Luke's informant, who, having just told of our Lord's confidence that He would not be prevented from reaching Jerusalem, went on to speak of His longing to win the capital, the holy city, and quoted these brooding words of His, spoken on another occasion?

But across this there cuts another theory about the words, which we must now glance at. The pericope in Matthew begins, "Behold I send unto you prophets and wise men and scribes," and after telling of "the blood of Zacharias the son of Barachias whom ye slew between the temple and the altar," adds, "Verily I say unto you all these things shall come upon this generation." Then come the words we are considering. Now Luke, when he quotes the first part of this pericope introduces it with the formula, "Therefore also said the Wisdom of God" (xi. 49). It might be that Luke is relying on a different text of Q from that which the writer of the

first Gospel had before him. But another solution has been suggested (cf. Harnack, *Sayings of Jesus*, p. 103), namely, that Jesus is here quoting an authority which He regards as inspired (an apocryphal book called "The Wisdom of God"). It might of course be from one of the lost Gospels which sometimes called Jesus "the Wisdom of God," that Luke is quoting. But the most likely of these—"the Gospel to the Hebrews"—it certainly is *not*, for in that Gospel, according to Jerome, Zacharias is called *filium Joiadae*. Harnack's suggestion is that the whole pericope is a quotation from "The Wisdom of God," *including* the brooding soliloquy, and that they come from Jesus' lips, if they come from Him at all, only as a quotation. But the explanation is not so simple as it seems.

(1) What does this theory imply? That our Lord should quote from such a book means that He not only regarded it as inspired but as well known, enjoying a wide circulation and authority; yet it is a book which but for this one reference is never elsewhere quoted or even referred to in the extant literature of the period, and is now wholly lost. A somewhat doubtful combination of assumptions. (2) It is significant that Matthew seems to regard the whole passage as a word of Jesus, and omits all reference to "the Wisdom of God." And Luke corroborates him so far as the Lament is concerned, for he omits it in the place where he records the presumed quotation (xi. 49–51), and he records it here (xiii. 34 f.) as an accepted and authentic word of Jesus. (3) It looks as if the theory, that the *whole* passage in Matthew is a quotation, is put forward to get rid of the difficulty involved in the words "how often." On the lips of Jesus the words imply that He had frequently preached in Jerusalem, but the Synoptists record only the one visit during His ministry—the last. This is a drastic cutting, not a loosing of the knot. But examine the whole passage in Matthew again. Even if the first part be a quotation, surely verse 36 marks Christ's own comment on the words He has just quoted—a comment introduced by His familiar "Verily I say unto you." Is it likely that in verse 37 He resumes the interrupted quotation? Surely not, unless He does it in a kind of chanted soliloquy in which He makes the spirit and thought of them His own. But even this interpretation is laboured and strained; still more so is the viewing of the whole passage as quotation. At the most, it seems to us, only Matthew xxiii. 34–35 can be regarded as quotation. The intense feeling of verse 37, the original and beautiful simile, the fact that it retraverses musingly the facts in verses 34 35 ("thou that killest the prophets and stonest them that are sent unto you"), the turn of the phrase "them that are *sent*," and verse 39—these things all cry out to claim Jesus as their author. The

change of note from the harsh denunciation and doom of 34–35 to the lingering compassionate longing of 37 is very striking. Does not the change from prediction to memory of accomplished fact —Jerusalem's established reputation as a prophet-destroyer—also indicate the return to authentic utterance of Jesus? And as for that 'how often,' the Synoptists have more than one word that suggests frequent visits to the holy city (cf. the most strongly attested reading of Luke iv. 44: "And He preached in the Synagogues of *Judæa* [not Gal.]"). Perhaps here also there is a hint that He paid a short prospecting visit after the sending of the Seventy. Perhaps He did journey 'to-day and to-morrow and the next day.' At least it is most natural to place the occasion of this Apostrophe in some visit prior to the Messianic entry. Only so does xiii. 35 have meaning.

J. A. Robertson.

AN ALLUSION TO THE DESTRUCTION OF JERUSALEM IN THE FOURTH GOSPEL.

The view that the Fourth Gospel was written before 70 A.D. is maintained by Lampe in his monumental commentary on the gospel. He mentions only two writers who held this opinion before himself—Samuel Basnage and William Whiston. Lampe decides in favour of a Neronic date for the composition of the Fourth Gospel on the ground of three arguments, viz.: the attestation of the work in xxi. 24; the use of the present ἔστιν in v. 2; and what he calls a "consensus of many glosses and versions." To the second of these, which alone merits consideration, we shall return later. He states his conclusion in these words: "Putem ergo non contemnendas adesse rationes, quae ante excidium Hierosolymitanum Evangelium nostrum sub extremis forte Neronis temporibus conscriptum esse persuadent."[1] After the publication of Lampe's work a few writers adopted the same or a similar view; but the majority of critics, for entirely sound reasons, have always been against assigning the gospel to an early date.

[1] Cf. Lampe, *Commentarius analytico-exegeticus . . . Evangelii secundum Joannem* (Amsterdam, 1724–26), i. p. 157 f.

In recent times, however, several scholars have attempted to prove that it was written before 70 A.D.[1] Wuttig, in discussing the use of the present tense in v. 2, quotes with approval Lampe's opinion that the Holy City was standing when John wrote these words.[2] He also declares not only that there is no reminiscence of the destruction of Jerusalem and the events connected with it in the Fourth Gospel, but also that this catastrophe does not figure in the evangelist's view of the future.[3] For these and other reasons Wuttig assigns the gospel (chapters i.-xx.) to the years 61–63 and the appendix (chapter xxi.) to the year 64 or later.[4] Küppers bases his argument on what he believes to be the true relation of the synoptic gospels to the Johannine gospel, and concludes that the latter was written in Palestine soon after the year 44.[5] Gebhardt acknowledges his indebtedness to Wuttig's work, which he thinks has not received the attention it deserves. Partly on the ground that the gospel contains no reference to the fall of Jerusalem,[6] though he issues a *caveat* against too great reliance upon the *argumentum e silentio*, he puts the composition of the book (chapters i.–xx.) in the years 60–66. The appendix (chapter xxi.) he regards as dating from the year 67 at the earliest.[7] Gebhardt differs from Wuttig chiefly in holding that the Fourth Gospel was written in Asia Minor, probably at Ephesus, and not in Palestine.

Does the use of ἔστιν in v. 2 imply that Jerusalem was standing when this verse was written? It is idle to say that the pool and its porches were spared by the Romans because

[1] E.g. O. Wuttig, *Das Johannische Evangelium und seine Abfassungszeit* (Leipzig, 1897); W. Küppers, *Neue Untersuchungen über den Quellenwert der vier Evangelien* (Gr. Lichterfelde—Berlin, 1902); H. Gebhardt, *Die Abfassungszeit des Johannesevangeliums* (Leipzig, 1906).

[2] Cf. Wuttig, *op. cit.*, pp. 28ff. Cf. also Bengel *ad loc.*: "Scripsit Johannes ante vastationem urbis."

[3] Cf. Wuttig, *op. cit.*, pp. 27 and 37.

[4] Cf. *ibid.*, p. 38.

[5] Küppers, *op. cit.*, pp. 43 and 122.

[6] Cf. Gebhardt, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

[7] Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 21 and 36.

they served a beneficent purpose (Ewald), or that the evangelist probably regarded the pool as "one of the permanent features of the city" (Dods). The truth is that the present tense is used here in essentially the same way as it is employed by Jewish and Christian writers in describing the Jewish cultus, even though Jerusalem and the temple were no longer in existence.[1] Therefore the use of ἔστιν in v. 2 has no significance whatever for determining the date of the gospel.[2]

Does the Fourth Gospel contain an allusion to the destruction of Jerusalem? Wuttig and Gebhardt maintain not only that there is no mention of this event in the book, but also that the absence of such a reference is a valid argument in favour of their view concerning the date of the work.[3] They assume that the fall of Jerusalem was as significant for early Christianity as it was for Judaism. If this were true, the capture and razing of the city would be frequently referred to in the books of the New Testament and in other early Christian writings. For Judaism the destruction of Jerusalem was an event of the utmost significance—a calamity comparable only with the capture of the city by Nebuchadnezzar in 586 B.C. It put an end to the Jews' national life as well as to the elaborate worship maintained in the temple; and it also determined the character of Judaism for the future by making Pharisaism permanently supreme. But for early Christianity the fall of the Jewish metropolis had no such significance. The reason for this was that before the year 70 Christianity

[1] Cf. Heb. vii. 8, 20, viii. 3–5, ix. 6–9, 13, xiii. 10; Josephus, *Ant.* iii. 9–10; *Contra Apion.*, i. 7, ii. 6, 8 and 23; Clem. Rom. xl. 4–xli. 3; Barnabas vii. 8 and 11; Justin, *Dial.* 117; *Ep. ad Diog.* 3.

[2] It should be noted that the imperfect tense is used in the following places: iv. 5, xi. 18, xviii. 1.

[3] Other scholars find no reference to the destruction of Jerusalem in the Johannine gospel, but deny that the absence of such an allusion is evidence of an early date.

had already become a separate religion in theory and in fact. Hence it was possible for Christians to take a detached view and to regard the catastrophe as a judgment of God upon the Jews for their rejection of Christ. It is not surprising, therefore, that the destruction of Jerusalem does not occupy a prominent place in early Christian literature.

There are, however, several allusions to this event in the New Testament, and the present writer believes that there is one in the Fourth Gospel. It is found in Jesus' colloquy with the woman of Samaria. She recognises that He is a prophet; and then, pointing to Mount Gerizim, the seat of her ancestors' worship, she says: "Our fathers worshipped in this mountain; and ye say that in Jerusalem is the place where men ought to worship." [1] Jesus replies: "Believe me, woman, the hour cometh when neither in this mountain nor in Jerusalem shall ye worship the Father." [2] This is clearly a prophecy after the event. The Samaritan temple on Mount Gerizim was destroyed by John Hyrcanus I., and a like fate befell Jerusalem and its temple at the hands of Titus. To the author of the gospel both events are in the past, and both teach the same lesson concerning the worship of God. The hour has already come when the true worshippers, as distinguished from those who in former times held that men must worship only in certain places, worship the Father in spirit and in truth.[3] This allusion to the destruction of Jerusalem, couched in the form of a prophecy and put into the mouth of Jesus, is conclusive proof that the Fourth Gospel was written after 70 A.D. Other evidence, which need not be mentioned here, brings the date down at least a generation later.

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[1] John iv. 20.

[2] John iv. 21. This verse is an essential part of the narrative, and cannot be regarded as the work of a later editor.

[3] Cf. John iv. 23.

PHILO ON MAN'S YEARNING FOR GOD.

The earnest longing of men for God is recognised by Philo from various standpoints. Sometimes it is viewed under a more abstract aspect, rather as the satisfaction of the intellect than of the whole nature. "There is nothing better," he says, "than to search after the true God, even if the finding of him should escape human capacity, seeing that even eagerness of desire to understand him in itself produces unspeakable pleasures and delights" (*De Spec. Leg.* I. 36). Similarly, in *De Confus. Ling.* 97 : "It befits those who would company with knowledge to strive after a vision of the Existent, and if they cannot attain this, at least of his image, the most sacred Logos, and next in order of that most perfect of his works, this universe of ours." But in other passages we find a far more personal note. "To what soul," he asks, "was it given to put evil out of sight, save to that to which God was revealed, the soul which he deemed worthy of his unspeakable mysteries? For he says, Shall I hide from Abraham my servant the things I do? True, O Saviour, for thine own works thou dost show to the soul that yearns for goodness, and hidest none of them from her. For this reason she is able to flee from evil . . . and unceasingly to extirpate hurtful passions" (*Leg. Alleg.* III. 27). Again, commenting on God's word (Gen. xlvi. 4), "I will go down with thee," he expands as follows : "This I do because of my pity for thy rational nature, so that by my guidance thou mayest be brought up out of the Hades of passion to the Olympian abode of virtue, for to all suppliant souls I have made known the way that leads to heaven, preparing for them a thoroughfare that they might not grow weary of their journey" (*De Post. Cain.* 31). Let us enquire what he means by "the Hades of passion," and how souls are to flee from evil.

(*a*) *The Meaning of Sin.*

Philo's conception of sin is indissolubly associated with his view of men's bodily nature. Here, as in the case of all his positions, we must not be influenced by isolated passages, but by the trend of his thought as a whole. Thus, a statement like *Leg. Alleg.* III. 71 : "The body is evil by nature and plots against the soul" is a bare summary, which in no way exhibits the processes of Philo's reflection. Nor do we get upon the right track, either by pointing decisively to his theory of the descent of souls into human bodies or by emphasising the frequent descriptions of the Fall of man in Paradise. The former appears to us a side-issue for Philo. In the latter he probably uses the figure of Adam as a sort of inclusive personification of humanity, much as Paul did in Romans v. 12 ff. Philo really starts from his experience of human nature in himself and from his observation of his fellow-men, the precise standpoint of Paul in all that he affirms regarding "the flesh." Of course Philo, from the texture of his mind, is compelled to theorise on the subject. But that is subsequent to his acquaintance with the conflicts of the moral life. The personal note, so poignant in some of his utterances, gives the real key to his starting-point : e.g., *Leg. Alleg.* III. 211 : "There is another kind of groaning found in those who repent and are distressed because of their past waywardness, who exclaim, Wretched men that we are, who have for so long been stricken, without knowing it, by the disease of senselessness, folly, and wrong pursuits." A comparison is obvious with Paul's famous ejaculation (Rom. vii. 24) : "Wretched man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death ?"

Bearing in mind, then, the point from which he starts, we must further note that there are certain presuppositions about which he never argues. The body is,

for Philo as for Paul, a clog upon the higher nature. He would have identified himself whole-heartedly with the Apostle's self-revelation: "I beat my body black and blue and make it my slave" (1 Cor. ix. 27). This is not because its material is evil, but because it is bound up indissolubly with the life of sense. That life is largely at the mercy of pleasure (ἡδονή), an irrational and seductive passion. Pleasure is the serpent, "an abominable thing in itself" (*Leg. Alleg.* III. 68), which "beguiles and leads astray the reason" (*Ibid.* 64). The "love of pleasure" is "ungodly" (*Ibid.* III. 211). So that when Philo speaks of sinning as "innate in every man who has come into being" (*De Vita Mos.* II. (III.) 147), when he describes as "without limit" "the things that stain the soul" (*De Mut. Nom.* 49), he has above all else in view the appeal of passion to the nature. "Passion," he declares, "is the fountain of sins" (*Quod Deus sit immut.* 72). But there is nothing mechanical in the working of this appeal. The allurements of passion present themselves before the will. Philo assumes man's power of choice. "Moses," he observes, "does not follow the opinion of some impious men who say that God is the cause of evils, but he attributes them to our own hands, meaning by that our own efforts and the voluntary turning of the mind toward the worse" (*Quod det. pot.* 122). Involuntary sin occupies a position between right and wrong (*Quaest. in Gen.* iv. § 64). Accordingly he can allege that "mind and reason are, as it were, the home of vice and virtue, in which it is their nature to dwell" (*De Op. M.* 73). Man deliberately subordinates the higher rational life of the soul to the sway of irrational desire, instead of following the belief of Moses that we "ought to cut out and root up passion from the soul" (*Leg. Alleg.* III. 129).

What is the bearing of this upon God? It is true, as Windisch (*Die Frömmigkeit Philos*, p. 98) observes, that

in Philo guilt before God is overshadowed by the sense of man's nothingness as a creature in the Divine presence. Yet there are hints of something more positive. "God was justly angry at them," he says, speaking of the generation described in Genesis vi., "seeing that that living creature which seemed to be the noblest and had been judged worthy of kinship with himself, because of sharing with him in reason, eagerly followed evil and every kind of evil, when it ought to have practised goodness" (*De Abr.* 41). Man, that is to say, knew the ideal and deliberately ignored it. God entrusted to him the gifts of soul, speech, and the sense-life. But by far the majority of men, under the influence of self-love (φιλαυτία), appropriated these for themselves. They had their just reward in souls defiled by irrational passions and held in the grasp of innumerable vices: in speech whetted against the truth, hurtful to those who heard it, disgraceful to those who uttered it: in a sense-life insatiable, heedless of all controlling influences (*Quis Rer. Div. H.* 106 ff.). This self-love, which prompts to the abuse of men's God-given powers, reveals itself flagrantly in the form of τῦφος, overweening vanity, which is again and again emphasi ed by Philo. He asserts that "τῦφος is the artificer of many other evils, of false pretension, of arrogance, of inequality. . . . By reason of τῦφος even Divine things are utterly scorned" (*De Decal.* 5 ff.). This entire attitude means defiance of God.

The only fitting punishment for the human race was "that it should be extirpated on account of its ingratitude towards God, its benefactor and Saviour. But God, in his mercy, took pity upon men, and moderated their penalty" (*De Op. M.* 169). Necessarily, however, the Divine grace presupposes minds and hearts which through repentance and humility can respond to its workings.

Theoretically Philo may be at times disposed to associate wrong action with man's constitution as a transient being, just as there are passages in St. Paul which appear, on the surface, to connect sin with man's physical heritage. But in reality, for both, sin means an assent of the will to the lower, selfish impulses, in opposition to those which point God-wards. The actual human experience which they know presents the spectacle of a practical rather than a theoretical dualism. Wrong-doing in the strict sense is not involuntary, the result of ignorance. It is the turning-away from God in favour of self, which Philo calls τροπή. The situation is that of a being akin to God, participating in the Divine Logos or Thought, and yet exposed to the assaults of pleasurable cravings, with which his reason identifies itself and makes them the ends of living. Men's inner life, that is to say, is "mingled of opposing qualities, right and wrong, base and honourable, good and evil" (*Quaest. in Gen.* iv. 203). Philo quotes with approval the saying of Epicharmus: "Whosoever yields but slightly to evil is a very good man: for no one is guiltless, no one is exempt from reproach." Hence the main task, if any spiritual progress is to be made, must be the attainment of self-knowledge. "Hither, you who are stuffed full of vanity and indiscipline and braggart boasting, you pretenders to wisdom, who claim not only to know clearly everything that is, but also, in your hardihood, venture to declare their causes, as if you had been present at the creation of the world. . . . Let alone these other concerns once for all: know yourselves, and declare plainly of what nature you are" (*De Migr. Abr.* 136 f.).

(*b*) *Conscience.*

At this point in his reflection Philo enunciates with spiritual insight and power a truth of the inner life which

up till now had been but dimly foreshadowed, the existence of the moral consciousness, a criterion of action placed at men's disposal, with boundless possibilities for the building up of human character in accordance with the Divine purpose. He has, indeed, no formal discussion of Conscience and its functions, but his frequent references to its commanding position within the soul reveal its importance for his thought. Here, as invariably, his utterances are found to fluctuate, but their general drift is easy to grasp.

There are several important passages in which his view of Conscience closely approaches Paul's conception of νοῦς, the higher element in human nature which approves of the good (e.g. Rom. vii. 23, 25). This Paul occasionally designates ὁ ἔσω ἄνθρωπος, "the man within." It assents to the Divine order (Rom. vii. 22): it is renewed in the Christian (2 Cor. iv. 16): it is the recipient of the power of the Spirit (Eph. iii. 16). In other words, it is the connecting link between the "natural" and the "supernatural." Now, in *De Agricult.* 9, Philo asks: "What can be the man in each of us but the νοῦς which is wont to reap the benefits of those things which have been sown and planted?" A further stage in the working out of the idea appears in *De Fuga*, 131: "Those are the utterances of the genuine man, who is (reading with Cohn ὅς εστι) the testing power (ἔλεγχος) of the soul, who, when he sees the soul in perplexity making inquiry and search, takes care that she may not go astray and miss the right path." It should be noted that ἔλεγχος is for Philo an almost technical description of the function of Conscience. The full-fledged conception is found in *Quod det. pot.* 22 f.: "If the vision of their soul had not been defective, they would have recognised that the precise and characteristic name of the genuine man is just "man" (ἄνθρωπος), the proper designation of the well-knit and rational under-

standing (διανοίας). This man who dwells in the soul of each is found to be, on the one hand, ruler and king, on the other, judge and umpire in the contests of life, and at times taking the place of witness or accuser, he tests us invisibly within, not allowing us to open our mouth, but laying hold of and bridling with the reins of conscience the stubborn and rebellious course of the tongue, and thus brings it to a halt." Here Philo assigns to the rational understanding the function of moral judgment, regarding it no doubt in its unsullied character as the commanding element in the inner world of the soul. Hence it is not a mere accommodation to popular usage, as Bréhier supposes (*op. cit.*, p. 302), when, in *De Decal.* 87, Philo describes as *innate* (συμπεφυκώς) to every soul the "testing power" (ὁ ἔλεγχος) that dwells with us, that is always true to its character of hating evil and loving good, that, as accuser, blames, accuses, frowns upon us, and again as judge, teaches, warns, exhorts us to change our ways. That is surely one permanent aspect of the situation. It entirely accords with the well-known statement of *De Op. M.* 146: "Every man, so far as his understanding (διάνοια) is concerned, is intimately related to the Divine Logos, an impress or particle or effulgence of the blessed nature, while as regards his bodily status he is closely akin to the whole cosmos." This is what Paul means when he speaks of man as the "image" and "reflection" of God (1 Cor. xi. 7). Were this not true, man would be in the position of the irrational creatures, having no spiritual affinity to the Divine, finally excluded from fellowship with God.

But Philo recognises, like Paul, the irrational tendency in human nature to follow the worse, although it knows the better. Therefore man's mind has to be reinforced in its moral aspirations by the Divine energy itself. And so, repeatedly, Philo identifies Conscience with the Logos.

Perhaps the most notable passage is *Quod Deus sit immut.* 134 ff. : "So long as the Divine Logos has not come into our soul as into its abode, the deeds of the soul are blameless : for its guardian or father or teacher or whatever we ought to call that Priest by whom alone it can be warned and controlled remains far away from it : and those who sin through ignorance, without knowledge of what things they ought to do, receive pardon. For they do not even apprehend their actions as sins. Indeed they even suppose that they are acting rightly in cases where they commit great errors. But when the Priest who genuinely tests us enters into us like a perfectly pure ray of light, then we recognise the unrighteous designs harboured in our soul and our culpable . . . deeds. All these the consecrated testing Power, having shown their defilement, bids us pack away and strip off, that he may behold the house of the soul clean, and if any diseases have arisen in it, may heal them." And later, in the same context, having compared the Logos to a prophet on the basis of 1 Kings xvii. 18, he continues : "For this inspired being, in the grasp of an Olympian love, and goaded by the irresistible stings of his Divine frenzy, entering into the soul, creates there the remembrance of her old wrong-doings and sins, not that she may again yield to them, but that with loud lamentations and weeping she may come back from her former wandering, hating its issue, and may follow the promptings of the Logos-prophet, who is the interpreter of God."

Here the clearest emphasis is laid upon Conscience as the Divine agent in the soul, so illuminating its actions that their real character cannot escape detection. Philo never enquires whether this is a gradual process, accompanying or constituting the moral growth of the individual, or a sudden experience, which might be compared to Paul's remarkable account (Rom. vii. 7 ff.) of his awakening to the real meaning

of sin. The opening sentences of the passage inevitably remind us, up to a certain point, of what the Apostle says about sin not being reckoned to a man so long as no moral standard like the law confronts him. But for Philo the activity of conscience is wholly and permanently salutary, while by Paul the religion of law comes to be regarded merely as a makeshift.

Bréhier (*op. cit.*, p. 301) observes that the function ascribed by the Stoics to the Wise Man as a consultant on the subject of moral health and progress is by Philo entrusted to conscience. This marks a real epoch in the history of ethics. The Greek schools had been chiefly concerned with the question of the highest good for man. When, in their later phases, they came to discuss the source of moral obligation, the Stoics, who led the way, found the authoritative norm in reason. That doctrine is, as we have seen, recognised by Philo, but in a very real sense he transforms it on lines akin to, although not immediately derived from, Old Testament religion. For we may at least say that Jeremiah's great conception of the Divine law or teaching written in men's hearts approximates to Philo's position. Essentially, for Philo, Conscience involves the impact of God upon the soul. It is the assessor in the realm of the inner life (*De Jos.* 47 f.). It is an angel who, while it questions the soul in order to reveal to it the truth, has full knowledge of the situation (*De Fuga*, 203 f.). It is identified with the vision of the good which often hovers suddenly over the most worthless, but which they are unable to grasp or to retain. And this vision is nothing else than a visitation of the Spirit of God (*De Gig.* 210 f.). This last passage brings out clearly what is suggested by Philo's entire conception of conscience, its remarkable affinity to the idea of the " advocate " (παράκλητος) in such places as John xvi. 8 : " When he has come, he will convict (ἐλέγξει)

the world as regards sin and righteousness and judgment: and xiv. 17: "He will give you another advocate to be with you for ever, the spirit of truth." There is a remarkable passage in Philo which gives an almost startling corroboration of this. When dealing (*De Spec. Leg.* I. 235 ff.) with legal enactments bearing on the case of those who have defrauded their neighbour, and afterwards confessed their sin, he says: "After making atonement to the person he has wronged, Moses enjoins that he should go to the holy place, to ask for remission of his sins, bringing with him an irreproachable advocate (παράκλητος) the power which has searched his soul,[1] which delivered him from a hopeless calamity, ridding him of a mortal disease and transforming him into a condition of perfect health."

We have seen that the main function of Conscience in Philo is ἔλεγχος, testing or convicting. And for him its witness is incorruptible and absolutely true (*De Post. Cain.* 59). Its activity points at least in the direction of Paul's great doctrine of the Spirit as the Divine life in the Christian, although, of course, that presupposes a background of experience which Philo would scarcely have understood. Indeed Philo seems to identify conscience with God Himself. "If the understanding, supposing that it can do wrong without the knowledge of the Deity, as if he were not able to see everything, commits sin stealthily and in secret places, and afterwards, whether of itself or at the suggestion of some one, perceives that it is impossible for anything to be concealed from God, and thus unfolds itself and all its habits, and bringing them forth as to the sunlight shows them to the Overseer of all things, asserting its penitence for these wrong opinions which formerly it cherished through lack of knowledge . . . it is purified and benefited and assuages the just wrath of that testing,

[1] τὸν κατὰ ψυχὴν ἔλεγχον.

punitive Power which stands over it" (*De Somn.* I. 91).

Reviewing, then, all the evidence we have examined, it may be truly affirmed that Philo regards Conscience as a real factor in awakening man's aspirations after God. An indispensable condition, therefore, of reaching God is the lowliness of the man who is able justly to estimate himself as in the Divine presence. "I have learnt to measure my own nothingness and to admire the exceeding excellence of thy benefits. And when I perceive myself to be but "dust and ashes" and whatever can be more despicable, then I have the courage to meet thee, having become humble, cast down to the ground" (*Quis Rer. Div. H.* 29).

(*c*) *Repentance.*

If Conscience stimulates the soul to moral progress, the fundamental step in such progress is Repentance. Philo definitely associates this change of mental and moral direction with the action of conscience. When discussing, on the basis of Leviticus vi. 2 ff., the case of a man who has sworn falsely regarding a wrong he has done his neighbour, he remarks that the man, having imagined that he has escaped the charge brought against him, "becomes his own accuser, being convicted inwardly by conscience, and reproaches himself for his falsehood, and making open confession of his wrong-doing asks pardon." In such a case he is bidden to prove the genuineness of his repentance not by word but by deeds. And Philo points out that the sin-offering he has to present is the same in kind as the peace-offering (*τοῦ σωτηρίου θυσία*), "for in a sense the man who repents is saved, turning aside from that disease of the soul which is more serious than bodily passions" (*De Spec. Leg.* I. 235 ff.). This instance shows his view of the direct effect of conscience upon the will in the matter of repentance. Probably that remains a pre-supposition.

But his delicate moral observation plays on the subject from varying standpoints, which suggests that he is influenced not by theory but by practical experience.

The main root of Repentance is the discovery of the soul that it has been turning aside from God after lower aims, such as pleasure. At this discovery, "the man, beholding God, laments over his own desertion . . . and his soul cries out, imploring the Almighty to save him from further deviation and to accomplish his perfecting" (*Leg. All.* III. 211 ff.). Repentance therefore begins in grief of spirit. "Those who genuinely repent are afflicted by reason of their former course of life, and in their grief at its wretchedness they weep, they groan, they sigh" (*Qu. in Exod.* I. 15). Sometimes the emphasis is laid on the causality of the Divine Mercy, which is no doubt assumed by Philo in all the operations of conscience. "He resolved on confession and pardon at an earlier time: now . . . he appoints repentance, not scoffing at nor reproaching in any way those who are thought to have sinned, making possible the ascent of the soul from vice to goodness" (*Qu. in Gen.* I. 82). Whatever be the immediate stimulus, a primary stage in the process of repenting consists in confession of sins. "If . . . in shame they turn with their whole soul, reproaching themselves for their waywardness, declaring and confessing all their sins, in the first place with purified mind before conscience . . . and then with their lips . . . they shall obtain the favour of the gracious God, the Saviour, who has imparted to the race of men his choice and chiefest gift, intimate kinship with his own Logos" (*De Exsecr.* 163). But besides the negative element of penitence, repentance involves the positive longing for goodness. "Following upon the victory gained by hope, there is a second contest in which the repenting soul is the competitor, for though it has not participated in the unchang-

ing nature . . . which always remains the same, yet suddenly possessed by a passion . . . for the nobler, it hastens to abandon its habitual greed and wrong-doing, and to make its abode with self-control and righteousness and the other virtues" (*De Praem. et Poen.* 15).

In the passage just quoted Repentance is made to follow Hope. This is a favourite position of Philo's. Hope he regards as the supreme characteristic of the human soul (*De Abr.* 8), in the sense of the expectation of good things. Its precise relation to repentance is described in a passage where Philo groups them both with complete attainment (τελειότης). But to understand the significance of this, we must turn to an earlier statement. "It must be noted," he says, "that repentance is ranked second to complete attainment, as a change from sickness to health ranks second to a perfectly sound body. Thus uninterrupted completeness in virtue stands closest to Divine power, while the improvement that has gone on for some time is the special blessing of a well-ordered soul, refusing to continue among childish things, but with full-grown and manly bent, seeking a condition of poise and following the vision of the good" (*De Abr.* 26). In the light of these words we can appreciate the later utterance: "The perfect man is complete from the beginning: he who has repented is half-made, having devoted the former period of his life to evil, and the later to virtue, to which he . . . transformed his abode: while he that hopes . . . is defective, aiming always at the good, but having not yet been able to reach it, resembling sailors who, though eager to put in to port, are still at sea, unable to get to anchorage" (*Ibid.* 47). Probably, as in the case of the Wise Man of the Stoics, the position of the τέλειος is for Philo an ideal rather than an attainment. For in another important passage where again he assigns to Repentance the second rank, he remarks:

"To commit no sin at all is peculiar to God, possibly also to a Divine man, but to turn from sin to a blameless life is the part of a discerning man who recognises what is wholly profitable" (*De Virtut.* 177). In drawing an ingenious distinction between the first and the second return of the dove to Noah, he uses the legend to emphasise the *gradual* process of repentance. "To find repentance is not easy, but an excessively difficult and toilsome business": and he proceeds to illustrate by the olive-leaf and the dry twig (LXX of Gen. viii. 11) in the dove's mouth the stages in the process (*Qu. in Gen.* II. 42 f.). We do not touch on an interesting feature of his longest discussion of repentance (*De Virtut.* 175 ff.), in which he deals primarily with the turning of idol-worshippers to the one God, and shows that this involves the exchange of folly for insight and of wrong-doing for righteousness. The final result of Repentance, which unifies the life of the soul, is that its subject becomes at one and the same time beloved of God and a lover of Him.

(*d*) *Faith.*

If we were attempting to discuss the genetic development of the Christian soul on New Testament lines, it would be natural, after estimating the significance of Repentance, to deal with the fundamental religious relationship of Faith. In a sense, this is also legitimate for the student of Philo. But that sense must be made clear. Repentance, as we have seen, means that conscience has been at work, unveiling to the soul its own unworthiness, and urging it on to a nobler course. Faith, in Philo, seems to presuppose this background. Whatever else it may be, it is at least "an amelioration of the soul at all points," but "of the soul resting and established on the Cause of all things, who is able for anything but who wills the best" (*De Abr.* 268). The latter

part of the description compresses much of Philo's doctrine of Faith.

It is important to notice that he is largely guided in his conception by the Old Testament report of Abraham's faith, and especially by Genesis xv. 6: "Abraham believed (ἐπίστευσε) God and it was counted to him for righteousness," a passage which is equally prominent in Paul, and seems to have taken an outstanding place in Synagogue theology (see e.g., *Mechilta*, ed. Winter u. Wünsche, p. 110). That fact, which has numerous parallels throughout his works, reminds us that some of his observations on Faith are not necessarily typical of his thought but due rather to the details which happen to make up some passage in the story of Abraham.[1] But in the main his own view accords with the Old Testament account of the patriarch's faith. And his description of it is most significant for his entire outlook. "He first is said to have believed God, since he was the first to possess an unwavering and stable notion (ὑπόληψιν) that the sole Cause is the highest and that his providence is over the universe and all that belongs to it. So having come to possess faith, the most stable of the virtues, he entered into possession of all the others along with that" (*De Virtut.* 216). This, although expressed in different terminology, is in remarkable agreement with Paul's interpretation of the same story, that Abraham staked everything on his conviction of the grace and truth and power of God (Rom. iv. 16 ff., Gal. iii. 7 ff., 18). In both cases there is far more than the mere unfaltering expectation of good things to come. The very foundation of religion is implied in this relation of absolute trust in

[1] This consideration takes away from the force of Dr. Bigg's remark (*Christian Platonists of Alexandria*, p. 26) that in *Quis Rer. Div. H.* § 21 Philo associates Faith with a lower stage of spiritual life. Philo attempts to do full justice to all the details of the special passage he is expounding (Gen xv. 8).

the unseen God. The same may be said of the writer to the Hebrews who stands in line with Philo at so many points. For him faith is "the assurance of the things hoped for, the proof (or, conviction, ἔλεγχος) of the things not seen" (xi. 1). It means the realisation in this present of that invisible realm in which God can be fully known, or rather, the realisation of the unseen God Himself. "For Moses . . . endured as seeing him who is invisible" (xi. 27). The assurance of God is primary for the writer to the Hebrews as for Philo. All fulfilment of hopes and expectations is for both bound up with that. Indeed, the New Testament teacher uses language which might have been Philo's own, when he declares: "He that draws near to God must believe that he exists, and that he rewards those who earnestly seek him" (xi. 6). This conviction transforms life from illusion into reality.

In emphasising the profoundly religious significance of faith in Philo, as contrasted with a more superficial aspect of it, namely, belief in the fulfilment of God's promises before there is any sign of this happening, Bréhier (*op. cit.*, p. 222 f.) suggests that the deeper view is due to the influence of Stoic mysticism.[1] And he attempts to find a confirmation of this in such statements as *Quis Rer. D. H.* 101: "That it would come to pass, he of course firmly grasped in accordance with the Divine promises," where he associates the "firm grasp" with the Stoic idea of faith as "powerful apprehension." It is possible that some of his terms may have been suggested by Stoic usage although they are such as might naturally present themselves. But Bréhier's own admission (*loc. cit.*) that, in distinction from the Stoics, who use the conception in reference to all true representations, Philo never applies the idea of faith except to God, makes it far more probable that he speaks funda-

[1] So also W. H. P. Hatch, *The Pauline Idea of Faith*, p. 47.

mentally on the ground of his own religious experience.

When we try to analyse Philo's view of Faith more clearly, we are at once impressed by its intellectual side. That has come out above in the important passage where he describes it as a stable ὑπόληψις, and is corroborated by the quotations from Hebrews which have so markedly Philonic a colour. "To clear away each of these [earthly influences] and to distrust the world of becoming which is of itself wholly unworthy of confidence, and to have faith in God alone, who alone is in truth trustworthy, requires a large and Olympian understanding, one which is no longer enticed by our worldly interests" (*Quis Rer. Div. H.* 93). Hence Schlatter is so far justified in saying that for Philo, Faith is "the fruit of knowledge and the incompleteness of the latter is directly transferred to it" (*Der Glaube im N.T.*, p. 92). But obviously all Faith has its roots in the understanding. The question is whether it gets beyond this intellectual starting-point. And it is not difficult to answer that question in Philo's case.

In one of his numerous comments on Genesis xv. 6 he asks: "In what else can we put our faith [save in God]? Can we put it in leadership or reputations and distinctions or in abundance of riches and high birth or in health and quick sensibility or in vigour and bodily beauty?" After estimating these at their proper worth, which at best is utterly transient, he concludes: "Faith towards God alone is a true and stable good, a consolation of life, a fulfilment of bright hopes, a famine of evils and a full crop of blessings. . . . For, as those who walk by a slippery path stumble and fall, while they who tread the dry high-road go forward without tripping, so those who engross their soul with bodily and external interests accustom it to nothing but falls . . . while they who through the contemplation of virtue hasten towards God follow a straight

course. . . . So that one may truly say that he who has put his faith in the former objects refuses to trust God, while he who refuses to trust them has put his faith in God" (*De Abr.* 263, 268 f.). It is plain that by genuine Faith Philo means that liberation of the soul from the dominion of earthly good which has as its obverse side the great venture of casting one's self upon God. This he describes as a straining, testing experience. Referring to Genesis xv. 6 as a eulogy of the trusting soul, he meets a possible objection: "Perhaps some one might say, Do you judge this worthy of praise? Who would refuse to heed the word and promise of God, even if he were the most lawless and impious of men? Our reply would be: Dear friend, don't without careful inquiry deprive the wise man of the eulogy which is his due, or ascribe to the worthless the most perfect of virtues, faith, or find fault with our discernment in such matters. For if you choose to make a profounder search and not merely a superficial one, you will clearly discover that it is not easy to put faith in God alone without dragging in something else, on account of the close kinship which binds us to mortal things, a kinship which persuades us to confide in money and fame and power and friends and vigour of body and many similar things. . . . To fix our moorings firmly . . . in the Existent alone is a surprising thing among men, who do not possess unadulterated good, but not strange when truth is in control, rather the pure product of righteousness" (*Quis Rer. Div. H.* 90 ff.). Here he deliberately excludes everything but the immediate relation of the soul to God. God fills the entire spiritual horizon: and there is no other. This is truly the paradox of religious experience: to distrust and detach one's self from all the forces that press in upon human life, as deceptive and unreal, and to hazard everything upon the Invisible, which cannot

be apprehended by the ordinary process of knowledge. This implies a tremendous act and bent of will. Philo is true to his Old Testament lineage. There is nothing to correspond to it in his Greek masters. Knowledge could not achieve such a result. And the issue is a glad fearlessness of bearing (*παρρησία*). Philo delights to dwell upon this. "The noble man"—he is describing Moses and his attitude towards God—"can behave with such glad fearlessness as not merely to speak and shout, but he will actually dare as the result of pure trust and genuine feeling to cry out" (*Quis Rer. Div. H.* 19). But such an attitude, the high product of faith, is devoid of presumption. It never crosses the boundary which separates confidence in God from self-confidence. "What am I"—Philo represents Abraham as saying—"that thou shouldest impart to me of thy speech? Am not I an exile from my country? . . . Am not I an alien from my father's house? . . . But thou, O Lord, art to me my country, thou art my kinsfolk, . . . thou art my reward, my glad fearlessness . . . Why then should not I dare to utter my thoughts? . . . Yet I who speak of daring confess my awe and terror. . . . Without ceasing, therefore, I find delight in this blending, which has moved me neither to speak boldly without godly fear, nor to tremble before God without glad fearlessness" (*Ibid.* 26 ff.). Philo's descriptions of *παρρησία* at once recall the prominence of the idea in *Hebrews* and 1 *John*. In the former it belongs distinctly, as in Philo, to the sphere of faith. Indeed chapter iii. 6 might have come from the older author: "whose house are we, if we keep our glad fearlessness and our exultant hope stable unto the end." But not less remarkable is the Johannine usage. True, it is based on love rather than faith, but it would be hard to distinguish in 1 John between the two. At any rate, for the writer, love is that which unites with

God, the very function which faith discharges according to Philo.

This reference to the New Testament suggests a further one, which will serve to bring out an additional element in Philo's conception of Faith. We have mentioned points in which St. Paul and Philo coincide. And our last paragraph emphasises another, faith's office of linking the soul to God. From the nature of the case, Paul's conception is far more concrete and personal, for its medium is the living person of the living Lord. But, besides, for Paul, faith marks especially the initiation of the Christian career. Undoubtedly he presupposes faith at every stage, as so crucial a passage as Galatians ii. 20 demonstrates. But above all, in Paul's view, faith is that movement of the whole being, which, in response to the revelation of the Divine love in Jesus Christ, crucified and risen, carries it into union with the living Lord, so that henceforth it shares His attitude to sin and to God.

Some of the passages already cited hint that at times Faith is viewed by Philo not so much in relation to the beginning of a higher life as to its consummation: not so much as a starting-point, but rather as a goal. Commenting on the expression, "which I *will* show you" (Gen. xii. 1), he observes that here God "has carefully defined beforehand for his promise not the present but the future, as a testimony to the faith which the soul placed in God, not showing forth its gratitude as the result of something accomplished for it, but as springing from its expectation of what was to come. In depending on and clinging to a bright hope, and regarding as indubitably present that which was not present on account of the stedfastness of him who had made the promise, it has *won as its prize*, faith, a perfect good" (*De Migr. Abr.* 43 f.). This accords with his statement, quoted above, as to the difficulty of attaining to faith.

But Philo's attitude is most clearly disclosed in several estimates of Abraham, the typical believer. "He who was the first to forsake empty pride for truth, who used for his perfecting the virtue which could teach[1] him, wins faith towards God as his prize. . . . He to whom it has been granted to despise and overstep all that is corporeal and all that is not, and to rest and establish himself on God alone with stedfast reason and unwavering . . . faith, he is truly fortunate and thrice-blessed. We must also enquire into the fact that each of the three [patriarchs] had the prize most befitting him assigned. For to him who was perfected by instruction [Abraham] faith was awarded, since the learner must believe his teacher in the lessons he has given: for it is difficult, nay, impossible to train one who refuses to trust you" (*De Praem. et Poen.* 27, 30, 49). In these passages, emphasis is certainly laid upon faith as the climax of a period of spiritual discipline. But perhaps faith must always be viewed under these two aspects: as the clue to spiritual progress as well as its crown. That is implied in the famous words of Hebrews xii. 1 f.: "Let us by endurance run the race set before us, looking away to Jesus, the leader and the perfecter of our faith." And no less so in Paul's ardent aspiration (Phil. iii. 8 f.): "Nay, I count all things as loss compared to the surpassing worth of knowing Christ Jesus my Lord . . . that I may win Christ and be found at the end in him." Faith and still more Faith is the goal of Paul's striving to the close. It is the supreme issue for all believers.

H. A. A. Kennedy.

[1] Reading διδασκαλικῇ, with Mangey.

SOME SUGGESTIONS ON THE TEXT AND INTERPRETATION OF MATTHEW XVI. 18–19.

An exquisite feminine mind of to-day has shown that there are experiences which can make us "know all our hopelessness all through." Her words could be the just expression of a scholar's feelings as he looks over the recognised sixteen hundred years of interpretative efforts on the passage from Matthew, or views his own endeavour after the colour those words of Jesus had when Galilean peasants first heard them. For the sayings have had honour thrust upon them. To their candid garb white samite has been added. Now the whiteness of speech which lowly folk would understand is often not the whiteness with which later folk make its record. Both may have beauty; but the former has earliest beauty and truth. There is then no escape from work on these sayings which have been so singled out till that colour is found. The recent study by the Archbishop of Dublin is a witness to this endeavour.[1] He reaches therein two series of results on the passage. His general results appear to indicate positions from which critical scholarship ought not to go back, and his particular results have the piquancy of pioneer work. The first series of results, which might be laid down as canons of interpretation, may be put as follows: 1. The secular interpretation, and its strife to maintain the traditional text, has asked "gates" and "building" to do what they never could do —"a building cannot go forth to fight, any more than gates can"; 2. The propinquity of "keys" (ver. 19) does not call for "gates" in the previous saying of Jesus; 3. The crux of the passage is a textual one, and is in the word πύλαι. The Archbishop's particular results come, of course,

[1] Expositor, 1916. 402 ff: *Studia Biblica*, 1917, 1 ff.

from the third of his general conclusions. They are: 1. πύλαι cannot be translated as "powers"; 2. πύλαι could be emended to πηγαί on two grounds—(*a*) By analogy with Matthew vii. 24; there the house on the rock is assailed by the "floods"; (*b*) By a possible mistranslation of the Semitic original of the passage, שַׁעַר *gate* being used for שַׁעַר *storm*.

The first of these particular results raises no question. The rendering of πύλαι by the word "powers" means that the word has been excised by what in this instance is the neat surgery of interpretation. The second of this series of results raises more than one question. If Matthew was in Hebrew, an emendation would have been made, it seems, which was remarkable for its aptness. But πύλαι and πηγαί are Greek words; and they are to be viewed as possible errors in Greek codices. The difficulty of seeing the second in the place of the first word in a great uncial manuscript is a large one. Indeed, it may be said to be an insuperable one. Palæography will not thus lend its aid to solve the textual difficulty. Moreover, though a certain congruity of speech is brought into the saying by putting what is on the rock into contrast with floods which can assail, yet there seems to be little more reason for making this contrast than the knowledge that Jesus did this in the case of a house in one of His parables. The parable also had these features, as true parts the one of the other, in a very different context. There is no persuasion, on the side of Matthew vii. 24, that the like contrast should be made in Matthew xvi. 18, because the connotation of either term, or the context of both terms, offers reason for making conformity between the two passages. Even the joining together of "floods" and Hades, πηγαί Ἅιδου, raises a new problem. What could it mean? Is the rendering of the saying in these terms: "The spiritual floods of evil

cannot prevail against it," far removed from the process which made "gates" into "powers"? Is either more than a gloss on what seems to be an obstinate reading? Neither can throw the light from just that angle which brings into the sayings their true colour in speech and meaning. The problem is not one in a Hebrew text; it is in the Greek word πύλαι. The Von Soden Greek New Testament has no variant for the word. The solution then lies in the papyri copies of Matthew. Is it not one of the simplest questions and answers in the palæography of Greek Papyri?

An authority on this period of the history of writing[1] has recorded that the final *alpha*, in papyri of two centuries before and three centuries after the birth of Jesus Christ, is written in two ways. Either a short horizontal stroke is written over or from the head of the letter that is to precede the *alpha*, or a short cuneiform mark is made from the head of that letter—and thus the final *alpha* would be in the contraction. When the phrase in question of the Greek text of Matthew xvi. 18, πύλαι Ἅιδου, is written in a Papyri hand of the period mentioned, it will be plain at once how easy it would be for a scribe to elide a contracted *alpha* written over or from the head of the *iota* in the word πύλαι. Either mark of contraction, and whether written over or from the head of the *iota*, would make a *tau-like* letter. The word πυλατ, which would be the result to the scribe's eye, would, of course, convey no meaning. That makes the first reason for its rejection, and also why he should copy the word as πύλαι. Even if he had read the contracted *alpha* over or from the head of the *iota*, there are some reasons why his intelligence, if awake, should refuse to copy it. For example, the phrase he makes by rejecting the final *alpha*, that is πύλαι Ἅιδου, has biblical and extra-biblical warrant. Such instances of its use might occur to his

[1] Wilcken, *Observ. ad hist. Aegypti prov. Rom.*, 40.

memory as Isaiah xxxvii. 10, Pss. Sol. xvi. 2, and Iliad v. 646. Or, he could reasonably argue from his own craft of writing that an *alpha* added to πύλαι and read before the *alpha* of Ἅιδου was a case of his exemplar's fall into the fault of dittography. This literary possibility, or this palæographical possibility, does not require the subtleties of a modern palæographer's knowledge; either of them could be expected in an early scribe of moderate intelligence. There was then more than one way by which he might become father of as fine a line *cadet* of dogmatic views as ever gladdened the heart of a historian.

Let it be supposed that the problem of this famous passage from Matthew is not more complex than the rejection of a tiny mark of contraction. How will the passage run if that small error is repaired? Thus: καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτῃ τῇ πέτρᾳ οἰκοδομήσω μου τὴν ἐκκλησίαν, καὶ πυλαία Ἅιδου οὐ κατισχύσουσιν αὐτῆς. Is not the word an unusual one? Even the word πύλαι has been standing alone in the text of the New Testament. That is true; but it is a familiar word. Is πυλαία quite a strange word? A reader of Plutarch would not admit that. Moreover, that reader would have the right to remark also that Matthew xvi. 18 does not represent the only instance in this Gospel where the Plutarchean parallel is the one which is uniquely nearest to the Matthæan text.[1] But such a fact, even when given its full value, is not sufficient of itself to establish the new reading. To the palæographical test of the word's rightness must be joined the more searching test of the word's truth in its contextual relations. The restoration of a final *alpha* may perhaps satisfy the delicate demands of the palæographer's science; but it is the word's meaning, both single and associate, which is everything. An appeal can be made to

[1] E.g., Matt. x. 38, and Plut. *de Sera Num. Vind.* 9, Matt. xii. 14, and Plut. *Lucul.* 26, etc.

Plutarch for the single meaning of the word. There is a quotation from that genial writer which, if the lexical dust is blown from it, will be quick to speak the meaning that is sought. The sentence is :[1] *εἰ καὶ τἄλλα μύθων ἀπιθάνων παραφόρων ἐμβέβληκεν εἰς τὰ βιβλία παντοδαπὴν πυλαίαν*, and describes a promiscuous congregation of tales. Then *πυλαία* in Matthew means an unordered, mixed mob or mass ; and coupled with *Ἅιδου* it means that mob held in the thraldom of Hades. They make up the indescriminated and indescriminable crowd of the unloosed in Hades. This body is set over against the *ἐκκλησία*, the congregation of the freed in and through the Lord of Life. Thus the antithesis of binding and loosing, of the bound and the loosed, which is in the nineteenth verse, is anticipated in the eighteenth verse. The meaning of the process will explain the product ; the binding and the loosing will indicate the bound and the freed, the nucleary host of Hades and the congregation of the liberated.

What and whence is the function of binding or loosing on the earth and the consequent binding or loosing in the heavens ? Was a new spiritual process established in the world by Jesus Christ, and which these Matthæan sayings could be said to define ? Or was an older means taken by Him and given a loftier significance ? This was one of His ways. But the endeavour to place the older means in the Talmudic world has not brought light into the sayings. This seems plain from Archdeacon Allen's recent and able commentary.[2] There, as in other interpretations, the ground of these sayings of Jesus is found in Jewish legal terminology ; and the lively response, which should be between meanings and words when the right motive is found, is lacking. The words record more and other

[1] Plutarch, *Artaxerxes*, 1 (ed. Doehner), ii. 1206.
[2] Allen, *Gospel according to St. Matthew*, 1907, 177.

than a plan to rebuild a Sanhedrin according to a Judæo-Christian style. Is not the meaning of the sayings to be sought in the Enochic rather than the Talmudic world? The extraordinary twenty-second chapter of the Greek *Enoch* is the particular source whence help can come. The Ethiopic version is of no service here, for it is almost without meaning in the important parts of this chapter.[1] In it is told how Enoch was shown the Valleys of the Dead. There were three of them, and of the second it is written, xxii. 10: "And this one (of the three) was created [for the spirits] of the sinners when they die and are buried in the earth, *and no judgment has befallen them in their life* (καὶ κρίσις οὐκ ἐγενήθη ἐπ' αὐτῶν ἐν τῇ ζωῇ αὐτῶν). (11) Here their spirits are separated for this great torment until the great day of the judgment, of the sorrowings, and of the torments of the accursed for ever; *the requital of the spirits shall bind them there for ever* (ἡ ἀνταπόδοσις[2] τῶν πνευμάτων ἐκεῖ δήσει αὐτοὺς μέχρις αἰῶνος)."

The italicised sentences in this very important passage assert two things: 1. That a judgment, a binding or a loosing, should befall a man on the earth. 2. That if it has not befallen him there, the last judgment shall do the work of binding (δήσει; Matt. δήσῃς) him for ever. In contrast with these valleys where men are bound, there was another wherein the spirits of those who could be liberated from Hades were kept: (9) "And this one was separated for the spirits of the just, in which is the shining fount of the water (of life)." Jesus appropriates these familiar thoughts of the Palestinian mind. He omits here the Enochic or Palestinian topography of the under-world. That matters little. It is the dread enfolding power of Hades which

[1] Cf. Burkitt, *Jewish and Christian Apocalypses*, 1914, 67.

[2] Reading thus with Burkitt, 66. 1, instead of with Gizeh Fragment ηναναποδωσεις, or Charles, μέχρις (καὶ) τῆς ἀνταποδόσεως τῶν πνευμάτων.

matters much. That power threw its shadow over the mind of first century Palestine, whether Christian or un-Christian. This Jesus combines with the faculty of a two-fold judgment, and in so doing has He made familiar things of the mind unfamiliar ? For the powers of binding and loosing are given to the congregation of the freed, the affirmers of Christ's Godhead.[1] A little later in Enoch than the twenty-second chapter occurs the declaration that it is the " congregation " or " assembly of the righteous " (xxxviii. 1) which shall judge sinners on the earth, and that this judgment shall issue in Hades for the judged (xxxviii. 2). Then it can be claimed that the Palestinian mind had been prepared for the concept of ἐκκλησία just as for, and in relation to, the functions of binding and loosing. The Greek fragment of *Enoch* does not include the thirty-eighth chapter, so it is not known if the Greek term ἐκκλησία was actually there. The Ethiopic word can however be turned back into that term ; for its parallel in the *Ascensio Isaiæ* iii. 15 is rendered ἐκκλησίας in the Amherst Papyri version of that remarkable first century writing.[2] These factors, which have been found in *Enoch*, decompose the sayings of Jesus but to recompose them ; and, it is to be noted, not with any other values than those He used when uttering them. Since it will be made plainer that, though He threaded together matters with which Palestinian peasants were at home, the gold of His revelation is manifest in His sayings. The union of these factors seems to disallow the possibility that they could do aught else than most natur-

[1] Patristic commentators have realised a part of the meaning of the sayings where they speak of the whole Church as being meant here; e.g. Bede, *In Matt. Evang. Exp.* xvi. 8 (P. L. xcii. 79A.); or better still Isho'dad of Merv, *Comm.* v. 66 (ed. Mrs. Gibson, *Horæ Sem.*, 1911), " all congregations of believers," with which compare Origen, *Comm. in Matt.* xii. 11 (P. G. xiii. 1001B.).

[2] Cf. also Tisserant, *Ascension d'Isaiae*, 1909, 109.

ally ask for their own antonym, that is to say, the term *πυλαία Ἅιδου*. Now is that term wanted in first-century literature ? Was it there, and with it the interpretation of the sayings which has been suggested ?

There are at least two documents which can answer these questions. The first of these documents comes from the *Odes of Solomon*, and is the twenty-second of that exquisite collection of Christian songs. Its difficulties of meaning fall away now that it can be understood. It is the song of the *Congregation* (*ἐκκλησία*) *of the Freed* : (4) " He who gave me authority over bonds that I might loose them ; He that overthrew by my hands the dragon with seven heads " —that is Death in Hades, as Victorinus long ago made clear.[1] Thus the Congregation can sing for : (7) " Thy hand levelled the way for those who believe in Thee : (8) and thou didst choose them from the graves and didst separate them from the dead." And the singers did not forget to make music with the very words of the sayings when they sang : (12) " That the foundation of everything might be thy rock, and on it thou didst build thy Kingdom." The sayings which are so explicitly used in verse 12 of the Ode are the base of the other verses which have been quoted. For in them there is direct reference to the function of loosing as it is exercised by the Congregation ; and there is also as direct reference to the factor that the loosed are those who believe in Jesus Christ ; and again there is as direct reference as song can well make to the promiscuous crowd of the dead, the *πυλαία Ἅιδου*, the assembly of the bound. Before any other comments are made on the Ode, it may be proper to set by its side some early confirmations of its line of thought. That valuable document the *Acta Thomæ* offers this material. For example : " Thou didst descend into Sheol with mighty power, and the dead saw

[1] *Schol. in Apoc.* xii. 4 (P.L. v. 336D.).

Thee and became alive, and the lord of death was not able to bear (it); and Thou didst ascend with great glory, and didst take up with Thee all who sought refuge with Thee, and didst tread for them the path up on high[1] and in Thy footsteps all Thy redeemed followed; and Thou didst bring them into Thy fold";[2] and elsewhere in the prayers of Judas Thomas: "Jesus right hand of the Father, who hast hurled the evil one to the lowest limit, and gathered his bound ones into a holy congregation."[3] The πυλαία is here, and the means of life by which men are unbound from that throng; and also it appears that the writer of the *Acta* knew the congregational concept of the liberated as it is in the Matthæan sayings. It will be seen how these two witnesses are in exact line with the Enochic interpretations of the sayings of Jesus. It seems certain too that the two sayings recorded in Matthew xvi. 18–19, cannot, on any account, be separated[4] if they are to be understood. Further, the twelfth verse of Ode xxii. should settle the controversy of the equivalence of the two terms[5] "Kingdom" and ἐκκλησία.

The second document comes from the New Testament. A short while ago new meanings were discovered for that most difficult passage in Paul's writings, 1 Corinthians xv. 29. It was translated then: "and the baptized regarding (the assembly of) the dead what will they do? If so be the dead rise not, why then are they baptized regarding (the assembly of) the dead?"[6] The baptismal notion involved in

[1] Cf. Ode xxii. 7, "and thy hand levelled the way for those who believe in Thee."

[2] Wright, *Apocryphal Acts of the Apostles*, 1871, ii. 288, 217 and 155.

[3] Wright, ii. 187, who renders "and collected his possessions into one blessed place of meeting."

[4] Bernard, Expositor, 1916, 409, argues for their separation.

[5] For this view see Wellhausen, *Einleitung*, 105 f., against Allen, 177.

[6] Burch, Expositor, 1918, 435 f.

these words has been dealt with. It seems correct that the reason for that baptism was to ensure escape from the dead. Not from death, but from the throng of those bound together in death. The emendation of Matthew xvii. 18 gives now the Greek for the interpolation which must be made when the phrase *ὑπὲρ τῶν νεκρῶν* is translated—that is to say for the bracketed words in the phrase: "regarding[1] (the assembly of) the dead." Paul, like other first-century Christians, desired by all means to know that he might be released from the *πυλαία Ἅιδου*. Nor can that bound throng prevail by its power of imprisoning death over the gathering of the unbound, since Christ, who is the Life, is Head of and Gatherer into that *ἐκκλησία*; and the power to admit into it—to loose or to bind—which is given into the hands of its members is not juridical or arbitrary, but is a recognition on their part that the bound has made the affirmation of the loosed, which is in the belief that Christ is the Divine One, the Life. These sayings of Jesus are as far as can be from either that interpretation which had found in them rights of condemnation to be exercised by Peter over those who would not believe in a peculiar set of Petrine doctrines, or of the same rights to be exercised against those who raised objections to the later and prevalent ecclesiasticism of the West—the first of these illustrations is to be found in the *Clementine Homilies* xvii. 19, and the second may be represented by Theophylact[2] or Euthymius Zigabenus[3] when they comment on Matthew xvi. 18–19.

VACHER BURCH.

[1] For this use of *ὑπὲρ* cf. Souter *A Pocket Lexicon to the Greek New Testament*, 1916, s.v.

[2] P.G. cxxiii. 320B.

[3] P.G. cxxix. 468A.

EXPOSITORY NOTES ON ACTS.

(i.)

vii. 60 : *Lord, lay not this sin to their charge.*

Stephen's dying prayer for his persecutors tells its own lesson of generosity and Christian forgiveness. But there are two other thoughts which it suggests. One is, the inner self-control which enabled him to utter his prayer. He was surrounded by angry faces and fierce threats ; the stones were pelting upon him, as he knelt. But he was at peace within. His very persecution was due to a passion for peace, though it was a false passion. The Jewish authorities were determined to stamp out any new idea which tended to upset the existing position of their faith ; they were determined to have peace on their own terms, undisturbed by any novel propaganda about Jesus which would interfere with the settled creed and practice of their religion. That is, the peace they valued was one which resisted any fresh revelation of God, and they would go to any lengths in maintaining such a peace ; it was bound up with their vested interests and their ancestral traditions. Stephen may be said to have fallen a victim to this resolute desire for outward peace and quietness. His own peace was of a higher order. He could not have prayed as he did, without extraordinary self-command, and this inward self-control depended on a calm assurance that he was in harmony with the will of God—which is the supreme form of peace. Instead of raging at his persecutors, he prayed for them, because he was faithful to his convictions and certain that nothing they could do would avail either to crush the truth for which he stood, or the tie between him and his Lord.

The other thought, which may possibly lie in the words, is more searching still. It is best put by a novelist, not by a commentator. In his Creole story, *Madame Delphine*, Mr. G. W. Cable describes a sermon preached on this text by a Père Jerome in the cathedral of New Orleans. The preacher began by saying that the tender words of God's book are sometimes terrible. "Notice these, the tenderest words of the tenderest prayer that ever came from the lips of a blessed martyr—the dying words of the holy Saint Stephen, 'Lord, lay not this sin to their charge.' Is there nothing dreadful in that? Read it thus: 'Lord, lay not this sin to *their* charge.' Not to the charge of them who stoned him? To whose charge then? Go and ask the holy saint Paul. Three years afterwards, praying in the Temple at Jerusalem, he answered that question: 'I stood by and consented.' He answered for himself only; but the Day must come when all that wicked Council that sent Saint Stephen away to be stoned, and all that city of Jerusalem, must hold up the hand and say, 'We also, Lord —we stood by.' Ah! friends, under the simpler meaning of that dying Saint's prayer for the pardon of his murderers is hidden the terrible truth that we all have a share in one another's sins."

(ii.)

ix. 31. *Now all over Judaea, Galilee, and Samaria, the church enjoyed peace; it was consolidated, inspired by reverence for the Lord* (πορευομένη τῷ φόβῳ τοῦ κυρίου) *and by its invocation of the Holy Spirit* (καὶ τῇ παρακλήσει τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος), *and so increased in numbers.*

The first mention of a church in Galilee.

The *peace* means freedom from persecution, a quiet space which gave the church time to grow, undisturbed by outside interference. The point is, however, that they had not only time, but the will, to grow. The local Christians

did not relax their spiritual vigour, once the stress of hardship had passed; they put their newly found leisure to the best advantage. Persecution is often a means of consolidating a church; history has shown repeatedly that the sense of common danger tends to hold party-spirit in check, and the experience of suffering for the faith draws out prayer and faith vividly. But it is in some respects a higher proof of true church-life, if it ripens during peaceful times, instead of relapsing into a comfortable acquiescence. Luke, speaking of the church, writes that it *had peace.* We wonder what came next. For that is one of the most searching tests which can be applied to a community. Give people peace, and what do they do with it? When the strain is over, how do they use their *peace.* Luke proudly goes on to narrate that these churches throve in it. There was no reaction, but, on the contrary, advance.

The phrase τῇ παρακλήσει τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος probably means that the members of the Church constantly invoked the help and guidance of God's Spirit in their worship, though it might also be equivalent to "by the exhortation of inspired men," such as Peter (verse 32). But what is beyond doubt is that the increase of membership was a direct result of the heightened and sustained religious life within the church. Peaceful times often fill the church with members who are not acquisitions. Church-membership may appeal to people for other reasons than religious reasons. They may gravitate into a religious community under impulses that are less than spiritual. The healthy method is sketched in these words of Luke. He had in mind a church which thought of its duty to God first of all, and which attracted members to its fellowship by the glowing spirit of reverence and enthusiasm within its circle. Loyalty to a living God was its primary concern. *The fear of the Lord* is an Old Testament expression; *the invo-*

cation of the Holy Spirit is characteristic of the New Testament. The one denotes a reverent regard for God's control and orders, the other stresses the inner passion and power for this life of new obedience. And together they sum up the inherited and the new elements of the faith. Once these are vital, any Church will fill up, and fill up with members who are likely to be a strength and credit to its communion.

(iii.)

xv. 9–10. In his speech to the apostles and presbyters at Jerusalem upon the recent conversion of non-Jewish people, Peter asserts that *God, in cleansing their hearts by faith, made not the slightest difference between us and them. Well now, why are you trying to impose a yoke on the neck of the disciples which neither our fathers nor we could bear?* He had just called God ὁ καρδιογνώστης, and his argument is that external features like nationality and circumcision do not weigh with God, who looks to the heart alone. This was the first stage of the principle of unity in the New Testament. Both in Acts and in Ephesians, the main obstacle to be surmounted is the radical, deep-seated distinction of Semitic and non-Semitic. The third book, or rather class of books, which deals with the question of unity, is the Johannine, and here the principle is contending with a different situation; the problem is divergence due to social and private animosities, rather than to racial distinctions. It is no longer nationality which has to be transcended but party-spirit, class-feeling, and sectarianism inside the Church.

Τί πειράζετε . . .; Peter asks. He drew the inference from God's recent revelation of what was involved in faith, but they did not—as yet. The fresh advance seemed to affect the prestige of the older Jewish tradition and to

invalidate the ethical safeguards of the Law. These men at first hesitated. For the dawn of any fresh truth finds some unwilling to rise above conventional prejudices. Peter suggests that their unwillingness will not prove any obstacle to the new light spreading. You may *try*, but the attempt will fail. Distinctions which God has transcended cannot be maintained successfully by those who profess to be carrying out His will.

This assumes that the words τὸν θεόν after πειράζετε should be omitted. If they are retained, the passage runs: *Why then are you tempting God by fretting*, etc. Peter would then be warning the Jewish Christians against the sin of acting as if they knew, better than God, how people could be saved. Faith, on their principles, would be too easy a means, too unreliable; if non-Jewish people were to become Christians, they must not only believe but submit to the Jewish law, in order to make their Church-membership absolutely secure. Which, says the apostle, is an implicit disparagement of God. What had just happened, in the case of Cornelius and the Pauline converts, was a plain indication of God's will, a clear proof that the one condition of salvation was faith, irrespective of nationality. So Peter read the facts, and so he wished his friends to read them. To refuse was, to his mind, to disregard a recent and decisive statement of God Himself. Probably this is what is meant by *tempting God* here. If you decline to follow His lead, Peter argues, you are really provoking and thwarting Him, not only disparaging His methods but putting obstacles in the path of His saving purpose. How dare you hesitate to act without getting some fresh proof of His guidance and aims, when this recent, conclusive proof is before your eyes? You are calling in question His supreme power and will, challenging His decision.

(iv.)

xv. 36. *Some days later, Paul said to Barnabas, "Come and let us go back to visit the brothers in every town where we have proclaimed the word of the Lord. Let us see how they are doing."*

This was Paul's usual practice (see xiv. 21–22). He realised, as Wesley did, the need of keeping in touch with those who had been brought over recently to the faith, especially when they were likely to be suffering for their faith. Beginners should not be left long to themselves. It is part of a true care for souls to encourage them, in the difficult initial phases of their religious experience, by personal visits. This method was followed by Paul.

There is not much religious, or even literary, fruit in the volume of verse by R. L. Stevenson, which has just been published; but one stanza illustrates the spirit which breathes through this appeal of Paul to Barnabas.

> And you who doubt the sky
> And fear the sun—
> You—Christian with your pack—
> You shall not wander back,
> For I am hopeful—I
> Will cheer you on.

(v.)

xvi. 37. *They put us in prison, and now they are going to get rid of us secretly! No indeed. Let them come here themselves, and take us out!*

Paul did not always claim the privileges of his Roman citizenship, but at Philippi he did. He was not going to allow the magistrates to smuggle him out of prison, in order to cover up their breach of Roman law. That might have laid him and the local Church open to the very suspicion which had been unjustly cast upon them. He therefore

refused to accept the tardy offer of a secret release from these insolent officials.

George Borrow quoted this verse, when he too declined to leave the prison of Alcala, where he had been unjustly confined (*Bible in Spain*, ch. xl.). The local solicitor-general discovered that he had made a mistake in seizing a British subject, and tried to persuade Borrow that it was "the part and duty of a Christian to forgive," i.e., to leave the prison quietly, without giving any more trouble to the authorities. Borrow, like Paul, was too high-spirited to accept such an offer and sufficiently acute to take the Roman Catholic's advice about forgiveness at its proper value, as simply a piece of selfish policy. The British ambassador afterwards "sent me a letter," he says, "in which he highly commended my resolution not to leave the prison for the present."

Paul felt that Christian weakness is one thing, and condoning a piece of arrogant arbitrariness is another. These officials had to be taught a lesson, and it would do them good to learn it from a member of the sect they had affected to despise.

xviii. 18. *καὶ σὺν αὐτῷ Πρίσκιλλα καὶ Ἀκύλας, κειράμενος ἐν Κενχρεαῖς τὴν κεφαλήν· εἶχεν γὰρ εὐχήν.*

The English versions make the vow Paul's, but it was Aquila who shaved his head at Cenchreae, in fulfilment of some pledge which he had made. The vow was evidently a common modification of the ordinary Nazirite vow, which pledged the man, among other things, to abstain from the use of a razor. "We gather," as Robertson Smith puts it, "that the vow was generally taken in times of sickness or other trouble, and that it was therefore exactly parallel to the ordinary Greek vow to offer the hair on deliverance from urgent danger."[1] What Aquila's danger had been,

[1] *Religion of the Semites* (ed. 1907), p. 332.

Luke does not tell us. It may have been a serious illness. But it may also have been some critical situation, danger no less than disease; and the probability of this is confirmed by the fact that he and his wife had at some time, perhaps during the stormy days at Corinth, risked their lives to save their friend Paul. It is to this devoted service that Paul refers in Romans xvi. 3, when he speaks of the husband and wife having "risked their lives for me" (*οἵτινες ὑπὲρ τῆς ψυχῆς μου τὸν ἑαυτῶν τράχηλον ὑπέθηκαν*); there had been an occasion on which they had incurred deadly peril for the sake of the apostle, and he never forgot it. The only reason for hesitating to connect the two things is that Aquila alone made a vow. There is no mention of Priscilla sharing in it, and yet women did make such vows, as we know from Josephus,[1] who describes Berenice fulfilling a Nazirite vow at Jerusalem. Still, this is not an insuperable objection, perhaps. Vows are expressions of individual piety, and the man may have felt moved to show his sense of faith and need in a way which did not appeal to his wife.

The little incident brings out Aquila's conscientiousness. But Luke possibly records it for a special reason. Later on, he describes how the apostle was charged at Jerusalem with relaxing Jewish practices abroad (xxi. 21). This was evidently a false charge, if Paul had showed himself quite tolerant at Cenchreae of Jewish Christians observing old religious forms in a foreign country.

(vii.)

xx. 13. *He intended to travel by land* (*μέλλων αὐτὸς πεζεύειν*).

The others stayed on board and sailed round from Troas to Assos; Paul chose the land-route, about twenty miles

[1] *Bell. Jud.* ii. 15. 1.

across country. *Πεζεύειν* does not necessarily mean that he walked; but, whether it signifies "travel by land" or "walk," it points to an action for which no reason has ever been given that will satisfy the curiosity of the modern mind. Luke simply puts down this circumstantial detail, without troubling to go into the matter. No doubt, Paul had some reason; he may have wanted a change, after so much sailing lately; he may have wished to be more alone than he could be on board ship—the imagination can call up a dozen possible explanations of his conduct. But, if Luke knew his reason, he did not think it worth while to set it down.

Commentators, so far as I can see, have failed to notice a curious parallel in Plutarch's life of Marcus Cato (ix.). Cato is said to have admitted that there were three things he regretted in life. Most people would be glad if they could only recollect three occasions on which they had felt regret, and very few would be able or willing to point to any of Cato's instances. The three regrettable occurrences that he recalled were, having remained once *ἀδιάθετος* ("intestate") for an entire day, having once trusted his wife with a secret, and "once when he sailed to a place where he could have walked" (*πλεύσας ὅπου δυνατὸν πεζεῦσαι*). This last regret was probably due to Cato's thrifty, even parsimonious, temper. Why ever did he pay for his passage in a boat, when he could have walked the distance for nothing? Such a motive, we may be confident, did not actuate Paul, when he chose to walk across from Troas to Assos!

(viii.)

xx. 35. *Remember the words of the Lord Jesus, how he himself said, It is more blessed to give than to receive* (*μακάριόν ἐστι μᾶλλον διδόναι ἢ λαμβάνειν*).

Thucydides describes a Thracian people, the Odrysians,

who reversed this maxim of bliss. "They laid down for themselves a custom which is precisely the opposite of the custom in the Pierian kingdom, namely a custom of receiving rather than giving (*λαμβάνειν μᾶλλον ἢ διδόναι*). The custom was common to the rest of the Thracians, but it was practised far more widely by the Odrysians; you could get nothing done there unless you gave presents" (ii. 97). Thucydides contrasts this with the open-handed generosity of the Pierians. He "speaks bitterly," as Dr. Bigg observes; "perhaps in business he had himself suffered from the rapacity of the Thracian chieftains."

But the ethics of ancient paganism could supply parallels to this word of Jesus. Two deserve to be quoted. Musonius Rufus, the famous Stoic philosopher, in the middle of the first century A.D., sums up the essentials of a well-disciplined life by declaring that one must avoid the love of life and the fear of death, and also preferring to take rather than to bestow money (*καὶ ἐπὶ χρημάτων μὴ προτιμᾶν τοῦ προῖεσθαι τὸ λαμβάνειν*), ed. Heuse, p. 27). Pliny once wrote to his friend Caninius (*epp.* vii. 18. 5) about public benefactions, and after describing, with a considerable amount of self-satisfaction, how he himself had made a large present of money to his native district, adds: "A man ought to pay far more attention to his benefactions than to his own increase of wealth."

(ix.)

xx. 37. *They all wept sore.*

There is a contemporary illustration of this tearful, affectionate farewell of the Ephesian Christians to Paul. When Seneca left his friend Lucilius on the shores of Italy, the latter also wept. Seneca writes to him: "I can see you still, quite plainly. I am just about to leave you. I see you keeping back your tears and trying ineffectually to resist the emotions that well up even as you try to put them down."

(x.)

xxi. 23–27. In order to convince the Christian Jews at Jerusalem that he did not teach any laxity about the Law to Jews resident among Gentiles, Paul agrees, at the request of James, to associate himself with four Jews who were under a Nazirite vow, purifying himself ritually as they did, and paying their expenses.

This incident was brought up in the early days of the Scottish Reformation, and led to a curious discussion, which is of more than historical interest. In the year 1555, some of the less rigid Protestant leaders had agreed to attend Mass in Edinburgh, not to give needless offence to the Queen Regent and her party. They considered this simply as a formal recognition of the current fashion in Government circles, and as compatible with their private Protestant faith. Five of these men, including Maitland of Lethington, defended the practice to John Knox, and quoted this passage from Acts as a Scriptural warrant, as if attendance at the Mass meant no more to them than this deference to Jewish ritual meant to the apostle. If Paul went into the temple, at the bidding of the Jewish authorities, and went through this service of the vow, why should not they, with equal impunity, attend Mass ? So they pled, more or less ingenuously. Knox entered into the argument fully, and, according to his own account, forced Maitland and his friends to admit that their plea was a hollow pretext. Knox's points were : (1) Such a vow was not idolatry, as the Mass was ; such vows were sometimes commanded by God. (2) "I greatly doubt," he said, "whether either James' commandment or Paul's obedience proceeded from the Holy Ghost." He observed that, instead of conciliating the Jews, Paul brought himself into "the most desperate danger" at their hands ; he was mobbed and nearly killed. Now, said Knox, does not this show that God did not

approve of the plan which Paul had followed, at the suggestion of James? The untoward consequences of the plan were a proof that it did not meet with the divine sanction, and that it had not been inspired. Rather they made it clear that God "plainly declared, 'that evil should not be done that good might come of it.' Evil it was for Paul to confirm those obstinate Jews in their superstition, by his example; worse it was for him to expose himself and the doctrine which he had formerly taught, to slander and mockery; and therefore (concluded the said John) the fact of Paul, and the sequel that followed, appeared rather to fight against them that would go to the Mass than to give them any assurance to follow his example"—unless, he added ironically, they wanted the same misfortunes to befall them, "for obeying worldly-wise counsel."

What Maitland and his friends argued was the view of Calvin, though perhaps they were unconscious of this authority behind them. Calvin regarded Paul's action as a legitimate concession to the weaker brethren of the church; the apostle, he argued, was free to discharge a vow as part of God's worship, since a vow belonged to the class of things indifferent. On the other hand, Calvin expressly repudiated the practical inference drawn by Protestants—these "false Nicodemuses," who claim Paul's authority for continuing to patronise Popish rites. And at the same time he differs from Knox in his interpretation of the consequences. Some people hold that Paul's misfortune was the result of his failure to uphold Christian principles and liberty from the Law. But, Calvin adds, this is not true of Paul, who rather deserves praise for his courteous deference to James and the other leaders of the local church. That is, he declines to censure Paul's obedience, though he hints that James and his fellow-authorities might have been more firm, and that Paul might perhaps have dealt with them more faithfully.

JAMES MOFFATT.

THE MEANING OF THE ATONEMENT.

"I delivered unto you first of all that which also I received, how that Christ died for our sins according to the Scriptures."— 1 CORINTHIANS XV. 3.[1]

IN seeking to penetrate a little further into the idea of Atonement and of the Great Atonement as it is presented to us in the Bible, I think it may be well to start from a verse like this, which is a fixed point, a plain brief and definite statement of a fact not liable to any difference of interpretation. The First Epistle to the Corinthians was written in any case within a year or two of 54 A.D., or some five-and-twenty years after the Crucifixion. But the statement goes back some way earlier, in the first instance to the time when St. Paul first preached at Corinth—some four years before—and, behind that, to his first close intercourse with Christians soon after his conversion, which may have been less, and can hardly have been much more than five years after the Death of Christ. At that date he found a doctrine of Atonement commonly held and preached. So much is firm ground, a fixed landmark which cannot well be shaken. If we try to go back still further, we are left with a choice between two possibilities. Either the doctrine had arisen in that short space of about five years, or else we must cross the border backwards until we are brought within the lifetime of our Lord Himself and suppose that it had originated in some hint which had fallen from Him.

It would take too long to give all the reasons—for they

[1] A Sermon preached before the University of Oxford on February 16 1919.

are many—which lead me to adopt this second alternative and to infer that the Early Church derived its belief in the atoning quality of the Death of Christ from Christ Himself, and that it had its roots in the consciousness that He was Himself called upon to play the part of the Suffering Servant of Jehovah described in the fifty-third chapter of Isaiah. There would seem to have been a triple strain in our Lord's consciousness of His Divine Mission, expressed in those three terms, the Son, the Messiah, the Servant of Jehovah. The consciousness that He was Himself called to play the part of the Servant of Jehovah comes to light first in the predictions of the Passion which are represented as beginning immediately after St. Peter's Confession at Caesarea Philippi. We might say perhaps that as our Lord's consciousness of Sonship received its seal in the vision which accompanied His Baptism, and as His consciousness of Messiahship found an echo in St. Peter's Confession, so also His consciousness of a call to assume the character of the Suffering Servant was confirmed by another vision, the vision that is known as the Transfiguration, when Moses and Elijah "appeared in glory, and spake of his decease which he was about to accomplish at Jerusalem" (Luke ix. 31).

Now it is well known that there are two texts in the Synoptic Gospels—and I believe two only—which suggest that our Lord thought of His own Death as atoning. The second, of which I shall not say more at present, is contained in the words which embody the institution of the Eucharist at the Last Supper, "This is my blood of the covenant which is shed for many" (Mark xiv. 24, Matt. xxvi. 28, cf. Luke xxii. 20 *v.l.*). The other is the verse which appears identically in Mark x. 45, Matthew xx. 28, "The Son of man came not to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to give his life a ransom for many." I believe that this is one of the indications that our Lord had in His mind the thought of

the Suffering Servant of Second Isaiah. You will not fail to observe that " ministering " or " serving " is the proper function of the Servant ; and there are marked coincidences in the Greek of this passage with the Greek of Isaiah liii. 11, 12, which point to the same conclusion.

1. This at once sends us back to the original of that wonderful chapter and that wonderful group of prophecies relating to the Servant of Jehovah. Some difficulty has been caused by the apparent changes in the subject of the picture that is drawn for us. At one moment it is clearly and expressly Israel as a nation (Isa. xli. 8, 9 ; xliv. 1, 2, 21 ; xlv. 4 ; xlviii. 20) ; at another, it is not the nation as a whole but, as it would seem, the faithful few, the godly kernel of the nation, as contrasted with the " blind and deaf " who make up the main body (xlii. 18, 19) ; at a third, we are led to think rather of an individual leader or prophet (so perhaps especially in xlii. 1–3 and liii.). Really the Servant is an ideal figure, which is capable of expansion or contraction, according to the particular object which the writer has specially before his mind. Sometimes he is thinking of an individual whose mission it is to convert or reconvert his own people ; sometimes of a group who act together and suffer together in the same cause ; and sometimes he generalises yet more boldly and thinks of the whole nation in its ideal aspect as a missionary nation, which stands out as a witness for God among the peoples of the earth, a light to lighten the Gentiles. In this character it attains to the height of its mission especially through its sufferings. It is just as a broken, dispersed and exiled nation that it is able to do its work among the heathen most effectually.

The writer certainly has this larger view before his mind. And yet, in a case like this, the concrete precedes the abstract.

I have little doubt that the prophet's thought starts from what he had seen on the smaller scale and with his own eyes. This, I think, comes out especially in the first verses of ch. xlii. and in ch. liii. The traits of character in these passages are so distinct that they read like the biography of an individual. The picture is indeed in each case filled in with luxuriant poetry : the bruised reed and the smoking flax ; the tender plant out of a dry ground ; the lamb that is led to the slaughter, and the sheep that before her shearers is dumb. Metaphors like these add touches of beauty. But the human interest is predominant all through. The Servant will " not cry, nor lift up, nor cause his voice to be heard in the street." " He was despised and rejected of men ; a man of sorrows and acquainted with grief." " He was wounded for our transgressions, he was bruised for our iniquities : the chastisement of our peace was upon him ; and with his stripes we are healed." However much we may feel that this is applicable to Israel as a people ; however much we may think of the nation acting as a scapegoat for other nations—that could be only by an effort of thought, starting from more immediate observation and experience. I imagine that the prophet must have seen some one close at hand whose life-history could be described in these terms. He ends by sacrificing life itself, and there would seem to have been special circumstances in his death. In some conspicuous way it was clear that he was dying for others, and he died unresisting and uncomplaining. At the same time he was mixed up with common malefactors, and made his grave among them. Yet he did not die in vain. He left some converts behind him, and a prospect of more. " He shall see his seed "—his spiritual children ; " he shall prolong his days "—through this spiritual posterity ; " and the pleasure of the Lord shall prosper in his hand "—he will feel that he is an instrument for carrying out God's purposes.

In that he has his reward ; he sees of the travail of his soul, and is satisfied. If he perishes, he perishes that others may live.

I must needs think that in this picture a corner is lifted of the curtain of darkness which hangs over the Babylonian Captivity. We know so little about the circumstances of that Captivity that it is difficult for us to fill in details by any process of conjecture. It is easier to understand how events on a small scale might reflect the course of history on a larger scale. The life-story of an individual might well be a kind of epitome of the history of nations. Among the nations too the same sort of tragedy was being enacted ; and Israel was the hero of the tragedy. It loses its national independence. It is broken up and carried away captive. It is despised and rejected among the heathen. It is trodden down and trampled under foot of men. And yet, in the moment of its deepest humiliation, when it seems to be breathing its very last breath—in that very moment it is winning its greatest triumph ; it is dying that others may live, and with such a life as they had never lived before.

We know more about the internal condition of the Roman Empire than we do about the Babylonian. And if we wanted to translate the poetry of Second Isaiah into plain prose, we should not be very far from the mark if we were to adapt it to a description of the missionary labours of St. Paul.

> " Of the Jews five times received I forty stripes save one. Thrice was I beaten with rods, once was I stoned, thrice I suffered shipwreck, a night and a day have I been in the deep " (2 Cor. x. 24, 25).

St. Paul might have sat for the portrait of the Suffering Servant. His poor body must have been battered and scarred. We might well believe that of him too it was true in literal fact that " his visage was so marred more than any man, and his form more than the sons of men." With

good right did he say that he bore about on his person the branding marks of the Lord Jesus (Gal. vi. 17).

2. It is comparatively easy to illustrate the idea of the Suffering Servant from the career of St. Paul. The parallel would be even more complete with One who was greater even than St. Paul. That would be only what we should expect if there were truth in the view which I have already expressed that our Lord had deliberately taken to Himself the prophecy of the Suffering Servant and deliberately modelled the latter part of His own life on earth upon it. It is another question what place the idea of Atonement holds in the teaching of St. Paul. His contribution to the idea is very individual—perhaps the most individual contribution of all. It bears the stamp of a single mind, trained under peculiar conditions. We are never allowed to forget that St. Paul had been brought up at the feet of Gamaliel. We are not allowed to forget that he was " of the stock of Israel, of the tribe of Benjamin, a Hebrew of Hebrews; as touching the law, a Pharisee " (Phil. iii. 5). He had been brought up intensively in the most characteristic learning of his nation; and he had applied that learning with a very subtle, vigorous and enterprising mind. St. Paul stands out in history as perhaps the most intense personality that ever lived. His mind is always active in the highest degree; and it works on lines to which he was accustomed, to which he seems to have been almost born, and which had been strengthened in him by education. And then, with the processes of reasoning thus determined, he fuses the result of his own personal experience—an experience rich, deep and varied as we may well think had never before been the lot of any child of man. The personality and the experience together mark his astonishing greatness; the training marks his limitations. We speak of " limitations "; and such

they really are. But we must always remember that they are the limitations of a very powerful mind.

The whole St. Paul comes out in the body of theory which includes his doctrine of Atonement. It is part of another doctrine which is peculiarly his—the doctrine that we call that of Justification by Faith. It is hardly what we can expect to be in the fullest sense an article in everybody's creed. And yet it is a very great intellectual creation. It is built up out of that primary element of personal experience working upon and through the specially Jewish method of interpreting and applying the Old Testament scriptures. In a sense perhaps the method is not so peculiarly Jewish. We are all apt to be caught by the great texts of the Jewish Bible, and by one text at one time and another at another. Two such texts caught the attention of St. Paul. One was from the Book of Genesis, "Abraham believed God—had faith in God—and it was counted unto him for righteousness" (Gen. xv. 6). And the other was from the Prophecy of Habakkuk: "The just—or righteous man—shall live by his faith" (Hab. ii. 4). The word in the prophet does not quite mean what St. Paul made it mean: it meant "fidelity" or "faithfulness"; whereas St. Paul made it mean what he himself always understood by faith, "the faith which made him a Christian." Faith in both the Old Testament passages had a smaller meaning; but St. Paul filled it out to the utmost dimensions of his own rich and deep nature. It was that which brought him to Christ and that by which he had his hold on Christ, and through Christ on God. It was thus the bond of union between his human soul and the Divine. Now in both the two leading passages of which I have spoken "righteousness" was associated with "faith." Hence St. Paul, after his conversion, feeling himself carried away by this new order, also felt himself brought into a right relation to Christ

and to God. In other words, he was righteous in their sight. Apart from his actual record, apart from his progress in his Christian calling, the way was made clear before him; the handwriting that was against him was blotted out (Col. ii. 14); his sins were forgiven. If we ask how this state of things had been brought about, the answer is, because a great Divine act has intervened.

> "Being justified freely by his grace through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus: whom God set forth to be a propitiation, through faith, by his blood, to shew his righteousness, . . . that he might himself be just, and the justifier of him that hath faith in Jesus."

"Redemption," "propitiation," "by his blood": it is the language of sacrifice. As a rule St. Paul is sparing in the use of this language, which is far more characteristic of the Epistle to the Hebrews. To that Epistle I now turn.

3. But before I do so, I have a debt to discharge. I should explain that, through the kindness of Dr. Rashdall, I have had the privilege of seeing proofs of the earlier part of his forthcoming volume of *Bampton Lectures*. To me they seem to show a very special power of statement, which I think reaches its height in the treatment of the Epistle to the Hebrews which is the point now before us. The section is worked out with considerable fulness, and when the book comes out should be read and studied as a whole. If I may be allowed to quote two paragraphs, they will not indeed do justice to the original, but I believe that they will give a clearer and more adequate impression than I could myself do at greater length.

Let us first take the following as a broad external presenta-

tion of the main teaching of the Epistle in contrast to the method of St. Paul. Perhaps the opening words need to be qualified in view of the important passage just referred to.

> "The old sacrificial system never appears to have had much interest for St. Paul, though of course it was accepted as part of the law: in the Hebrews we hear little of the law except on its ritual and sacrificial side. And the writer exhibits this sacrificial system as originally intended to be merely a transitory and visible type of the new and only effectual mode of reconciliation with God which Christianity provided. To carry out this purpose he had to represent the death of Christ as the true sacrifice which would secure the remission of sins, symbolised, but not really secured, by the ritual sacrifices of the old law. The old ritual, as he says, was a 'parable referring to the time now present.' To develop the parallel, to emphasise the contrast, to show the infinite superiority of the one true sacrifice which Christianity provided, he fairly revels in sacrificial language; he makes the most of every detailed point both of outward similarity and of inward difference which he could discover between the old ritual and the one true sacrifice to which it pointed. As the sacrificial victims were slain without the camp, so Jesus suffered without the gate of Jerusalem. As the High-priest entered the holy of holies with blood not his own, so the great High-priest entered into heaven by the sacrifice of Himself. As the first covenant was not dedicated without blood, so the new covenant required the shedding of the Messiah's blood. And so on" (*op. cit.* p. 154).

And now let us turn to another paragraph which enters still more intimately into the mind of the writer and

presents a yet finer characterisation of it from the point of view of religious psychology.

> "It is difficult in reading this Epistle to say exactly where metaphor or symbol ends and spiritual reality begins. It represents a stage in the development of thought in which types, symbols, visible embodiments of invisible and spiritual realities, parallelisms between the past and the present, were things of no small importance. We may even say that there is a tendency almost to identify or to confuse the symbol with the thing symbolised. And that is because the symbol was often to him more than a symbol. The writer was full of the idea of mysterious spiritual influences exercised through the medium of visible things. Doubtless he believed in a mysterious necessity for the death of Christ which went beyond anything which he could articulately express" (*ibid.* p. 159 f.).

At this point the argument takes a turn that is less directly to my purpose. But I think I shall have quoted enough to show the keen and subtle insight brought to bear on the inquiry. And in the section as a whole there is much more of the same quality, to which I would invite special attention when the volume appears.

With this valuable help from without, I have done what I could to convey the idea of these three distinct groups of New Testament teaching. And now I must try rapidly to draw the threads together in an attempt to apply what has been said to our own attitude of thought and feeling at the present day. It is much in my mind that the difficulties which beset this question of the Atonement are largely due to the prevalence of what I suspect is a mistaken method of approaching the greater problems of Theology in general. I cannot help thinking that our method of theological study

in the past has been too predominantly dogmatic. We are still haunted by the old belief in the infallibility of scripture and by the method of authority in teaching. We are still too apt to interpret the Bible as if it were a code of law, as if the object to be sought were always of the nature of a legal definition—This thou shalt say, or This thou shalt do, and That thou shalt not do. This is what I call the dogmatic way of looking at things, which I venture to suggest is wrong. And then there is the further misfortune that, if we apply that method to the positive construction of our beliefs, it is only natural that we should apply the same method to the criticism of them: our constant attitude is one of affirming or denying, acceptance or rejection. This is what I venture to describe as a misfortune.

Should we not be more ready to take what we find as we find it? Should we not be content simply to dwell upon it—to follow naturally and without too much of criticism the processes of thought to which it gives expression?

That is just what we have been doing with reference to the idea of Atonement. We have studied it, in a brief and summary way, as it is embodied in the idea of the Servant of Jehovah, as it enters into St. Paul's doctrine of Justification by Faith, as it is worked up in the sacrificial teaching of the Epistle to the Hebrews. And now, let us ask ourselves what there is of deep reality in each of these three modes of conceiving of it.

(1) The Figure of the Servant of Jehovah embodies the idea of vicarious suffering; and some people shrink even from that. Why, the world is full of it; and not only is the world full of it but it is one of the most precious things that the world contains. It might be said that there are two kinds of vicarious suffering, the heroic and the unheroic. We are impressed by the former, and we are not much impressed by the latter—just because it is so common, and

a great deal of it never comes to light, or at least is not noticed if it does. But let us think a moment. The son or the daughter—more often I suppose the daughter—devoting and sacrificing his or her life to an exacting parent. Or, it may quite well be the other way on, an affectionate and unselfish parent, devoting his life or her life to an exacting child :—are not such things as these all round us ? And are they not all the more precious because they are not noticed, because they are so often uncomplaining, and because the very sacrifice is often even quite unconscious ?

And then there is the heroic kind. Surely the War has thrown a vivid light upon this. It is for such deeds that the Victoria Cross is given. We think of the Victoria Cross as the highest distinction that can be conferred or won. But there is one yet higher : at least the posthumous V.C. is a step higher than even the simple V.C., because the sacrifice has been of life itself. These deeds have not escaped notice ; and to a certain extent they have had their reward, because we—the nation—pursue both the deed and the doer beyond the grave with undying and unbounded love and gratitude and reverence and admiration. That holds good of those who are known ; and how many hundreds and thousands and even ten of thousands there must be who are not known—where the intention has been there all the same, and has only not come to the act, or not been observed, or lost in the crowd and forgotten.

Surely all this is reality. It is implanted deep in the nature of things. It is not only reality but it is the very best of reality. It stands high in the scale of values—of ultimate and objective values—as they are in themselves and in the sight of God.

(2) And then there is another kind of reality. Take the institution of Sacrifice in the earlier stages of the world's

history. How widespread it was; how almost universal. How instinctive it seems to have been as an expression of worship. Like so many of these primitive institutions, we may well believe that those by whom it was first invented would have been quite unable to explain what they meant by it, and yet it was full of meaning—and that right meaning, instinctively right and praiseworthy intention. That large-hearted prophet who is known to us as Malachi takes a wide survey of the world of his day and sees it everywhere prevailing, and everywhere acceptable and accepted by God.

> "From the rising of the sun even unto the going down of the same my name is great among the Gentiles; and in every place incense is offered unto my name, and a pure offering: for my name is great among the Gentiles, saith the Lord of hosts" (Mal. i. 11).

We may be sure that many an untutored heathen (as we call him) has stood at the altar with feelings at his heart in their essence very like our own.

No doubt the rite of sacrifice was capable of being corrupted. It was adjusted to an imperfect and progressive state of things. In its earliest forms it was very often crude. But it was on so vast a scale that we must needs think of it as God's appointment. It is part of the great scheme of things which begins in mystery and runs up into mystery. And from that time to this the idea and the practice have gone on being gradually refined and purified and adapted to higher and higher modes of living. They survive even to the present day.

If we take the idea of sacrifice as a whole, it includes, in greater or less degree, all the features to which exception is taken: it includes vicariousness; it includes propitiation; it includes even expiation. But there is no harm in these ideas if we did not read it into them. Why do we

so often put unworthy senses upon things, when we might put worthy senses upon them ?

I have already spoken of vicariousness. But, what of propitiation ? What is there wrong in seeking for the Divine favour ? The Hebrews had a beautiful phrase : they spoke of " making the face to shine," and even of God making His own face to shine. What they meant was to bring over the face a smile of tenderness and love.

There is doubtless truth in the " gift-theory " of sacrifice : but why should there not be ? We spoil it by imputing interested motives. But that is just our cynicism, and nothing else. Take a child, with its Christmas presents. A great amount of childish thought, and a great amount of genuine affection often goes to the making of those trivial offerings. They are made with the hope of winning that smile of which I have spoken. It is just love responding to love. The smile perhaps is all that is given in return, and it is not given because of the value of the offering, but in response to the motive which lies behind the offering. It is just one touch of human feeling awakening another.

And in the same way with " expiation." After all that too is only emphasised and intensified sorrow for sin, expressing itself in act.

Broadly speaking, there are these two great realities, or fields of reality, which converge upon and culminate in the Person of our Lord Jesus Christ.

There has been something strangely perverse about the constructors of dogmatic systems. I will do them the justice to say that they have not been without excuse—especially upon the old method of using, or misusing, scripture. The Biblical writings, and in particular perhaps the writings of St. Paul, do contain hints that were capable of being developed and pressed in the way that they have been. But they were the wrong hints to make use of, and

they were used in the wrong way. They were taken out of their context and carried to logical extremes for which they were not intended.

Let me rather suggest, or commend, a different method, which is in fact no other than that which we have been hitherto applying. We have (so to speak) spread before us a wide expanse of Biblical teaching. It is indeed only part of the whole; and yet even so how rich and varied it is! Whatever we have made it, the thought when it was first written down was living thought, and the development was natural development. Let us let our minds play over this. We shall spontaneously and instinctively assimilate what we find we can assimilate, some points more and some points less. Those on which we find that we can dwell most freely will stand out as so many centres or *foci* of reality from which our thoughts will shade away outwards and downwards. And much that we cannot perhaps assimilate directly we shall assimilate to some extent indirectly, by entering with sympathetic interest into the processes of thought by which they were originally formed. In this way there will be over the whole surface a certain play as of light and shade.

And the total effect will be a sort of sustained attitude and act of worship which will blend with the great *Benedicite omnia opera*, that immemorial and infinite chorus of praise which has been going on and rising up to heaven ever since the world began.

W. Sanday.

A CHURCH CRISIS IN THE FIRST CENTURY.

A Study in 2 Corinthians.

There are many questions arising out of St. Paul's Epistles to the Corinthians, and especially his Second Epistle, to which answers that command the unanimous assent of authorities have not yet been found. Did the Apostle write more than two letters to the Corinthian Church? If he did, have these letters been wholly lost, or partially preserved? Did he pay a visit to Corinth intermediate to the two visits recorded in the Acts of the Apostles? If so, where is it to be placed? Were his anxieties and sorrows regarding the Church of Corinth just his usual experience with regard to any Church emerging from paganism, aggravated perhaps by the specially immoral environment of a great commercial city? Or was there a time when the relations between the Apostle and the Corinthian Christians were so strained as to constitute a crisis in the history of that Church, and to fill his heart with the most poignant grief?—to all these questions commentators still give the most divergent replies.

To the settlement of these questions no help is to be got from the Acts of the Apostles, the authoritative document for the early history of the Church. Nor is this to be wondered at. The crisis, if crisis there was, was a mere episode in the life of a single community, extending over a few months at the most; and it was of such a nature that both parties, the one from charity, the other from shame, would be glad to bury it in oblivion. How few comparatively are the details in the life of the great Apostle that we learn from the Acts. When we read the catalogue of his exploits and sufferings which he himself gives in the eleventh chapter of Second Corinthians, we feel how little can be inferred from the silence of St. Luke with regard to the

happening or non-happening of any event in the history of an individual Church.

But there is one document to whose evidence on these questions sufficient weight has not been given, viz. 2 Corinthians itself. And in this paper we shall enquire what light that Epistle throws upon the problem.

Commentators have found the Second Epistle to the Corinthians exceedingly difficult to understand as a whole. It offers the greatest possible contrast to the First Epistle in that, while the latter pursues its way from point to point and from stage to stage of its argument by a clear, straight, well-beaten course, the former presents the aspect of a tangled forest, through which the traveller has to cut a path for himself.

But careful reading makes plain that the Epistle falls into two large divisions, and that the distinction between these is fundamental. It is not a distinction that can be accounted for by changefulness of mood or any merely subjective change in the writer. Nor is it due to the fact that the subjects dealt with are so different as to require altogether different treatment. It is the atmosphere that is so different. In both parts the Apostle has precisely the same situation in view, but he looks at it from different standpoints. In the one part he writes in an atmosphere of sorrow and conflict; in the other, of calm gladness and gratitude to God. In the one he is still struggling for his place in the hearts of his children in Christ; in the other he rejoices in his claim conceded and happy relationships restored. In the one he is out in the tempest battling with the wind and the rain; in the other the storm has become a calm, and the gloom of the sky has given place to the clear shining after rain.

Now this difference is most naturally explained by holding that there was a time of misunderstanding between the

Apostle and the Corinthian Christians, on their part amounting to a repudiation of his authority and a denial of his apostleship ; and that after a season of anguish of soul to the Apostle, the alienation passed away, and he was able to write to them in exuberant gladness, and to contemplate visiting them at no distant date. Of this time 2 Corinthians is the literary monument.

The two parts of the Epistle, however, do not follow this natural order. It is in the first part that the air is clear and serene ; it is in the latter part that the storm is still raging. The arrangement of the Epistle does not represent the natural sequence of events. In the order of time the second part should come first ; for it is there that struggle and conflict are in evidence, which pass into the happy conclusion of peace which pervades the opening chapters.

It is the first part of the Epistle that is specially valuable for the settling of the still unanswered questions. For in it we have a writing from St. Paul's pen which gives an *ordered and consecutive narrative* of the various incidents as they lingered in his memory. It is thus a piece of first-hand evidence of the greatest importance.

We shall approach the Epistle, with a view to examining its evidence, in a somewhat general way. Suppose that what we are taking for granted actually occurred, that after a period of grave anxiety on St. Paul's part, arising out of his relations with Corinth, word was brought to him that the cloud had passed away, that the Corinthians were heartily ashamed and sorry for what had happened, and that they were now eagerly expecting the visit that he so fervently desired to pay ; what course would the Apostle be likely to take ? There was never a man who could be better trusted to do the fitting thing and say the fitting word than St. Paul. We may be sure, therefore, that if he could not himself set

out immediately for Corinth, he would lose no time in acquainting them by letter of his joy and gratitude for the restoration of their confidence and love.

And as the sending of a letter was the right thing to do, we may be assured that the letter would say just the right word for the occasion. It would be a model of tact and delicacy. In all probability it would be short, for he expected to visit them speedily, and speak with them face to face. No word would be written that would cause irritation, or run the risk of rousing again the feelings and passions that had been allayed. No reproach would be used. The whole letter would breathe the sense of gladness and gratitude to God that out of the confusion He had brought a peace so serene.

And yet the Apostle could not be entirely silent with regard to what had happened. He could not treat it as if it had not been. With the utmost possible gentleness, yet with the greatest fidelity, must they be made to realise how deeply he had been wounded by their conduct. He was too deeply learned in the lore of the conscience not to know that, in the way of forgiveness and in the interests of righteousness, by-gones cannot always be allowed to be by-gones. Their newly discovered affection for him would become all the deeper and truer if they came to know the pain that they had caused him, and the greatness of his love for them even when they were most cruelly torturing him. Only a clear understanding of the past could issue in a satisfactory future. We should expect him then to make reference to what had happened, and especially to vindicate his own share in it, by shewing that he had acted from no mean and petty motives, but from the impulses of a strong and tender love.

But we have to remember also that the letter of the Apostle passes over in silence many a point that is needed to help us to understand clearly the course of events. St.

Paul was not writing for the information of future generations, not even to acquaint the Corinthians with what they were ignorant of. They knew the outward details of the story as well as he himself. The letter was an intimate, personal one, which perhaps he thought would never go beyond the Church to which it was written, or be used except for the immediate occasion which called it forth. Seldom does he make a statement that is fully intelligible without being helped out by conjecture. We are like those who listen to a conversation held over the telephone. We hear only one side of it. And though we may gain a general impression of what it is all about, we lack the knowledge of the other part that would enable us clearly to understand all that what we hear means.

We come now to examine what light the first part of 2 Corinthians has to throw upon the temporary misunderstanding between St. Paul and the Church of Corinth.

After an introduction in the form usual in his letters, the Apostle breaks into a doxology (i. 3–7), rich in thanksgiving to God, for that He comforted him in all his distress, and by means of the experience made him able to bring comfort to needy hearts. In this doxology he anticipates a reference to some trouble which he had recently passed through, by assuring his readers beforehand that God in His mercy had so overruled and blessed it as to make it the means of enriching him with a knowledge and sympathy that could open a way into the hearts of others. Thereafter he makes more definite allusion to a distress which had befallen him in Asia, of which he wished them to be aware (i. 8).

As to what the nature of the distress was, there have been many conjectures. Personal danger from persecution, perils of shipwreck, sickness of body from which he did not expect to recover, have all been pressed into the service to explain this distress. But all these conjectures labour under

the disadvantage of being unsupported by any evidence whatsoever.

Perhaps we may get closer to the nature of this distress if we approach the question along a different line. Why did the Apostle mention his affliction at all in this letter of reconciliation? And having mentioned it, why did he not specify it more distinctly? We may take the latter question first; and to it there can be only one answer, that the Apostle knew right well that his readers would understand perfectly what he meant. He does not tell them what they already know. The answer to the former question is that the distress that befel him in Asia was in some way connected with them. No doubt he could mention many distresses that befel him in Asia as everywhere else. His life was full of them. But he was not a man to make much of them. And we can conceive no reason why he should call special attention to any one of his general distresses more than another in such a letter as this. But we can understand why he must make reference to it, if it had come to him through them, and if it was good for them morally that they should know the result of what they had done. No outward perils, from persecution or sickness or sea, would weigh upon him for a moment in comparison with the burden of grief that would crush him through the breaking of happy relations between him and his spiritual children.

We conclude, then, that the distress has reference to some unhappy misunderstanding that arose between the Apostle and the Corinthian Church. The cause of the quarrel we can conjecture with some degree of probability. St. Paul had sent [1] a letter [2] (1 Cor.) to them, filled with earnest

[1] The proof that the misunderstanding arose after 1 Cor. was sent is given below. See page 264 and note.

[2] In this paper the name "letter" is given to the communications that St. Paul addressed to Corinth; the name "Epistle" is confined to 1 and 2 Cor. as they are in the New Testament. According to some commentators 2 Cor. contains parts of two or even three "letters." The first "letter" is that referred to in 1 Cor. v. 9.

warnings and rebukes, yet fraught with love as of a father for his children. It was a letter so rich in guidance and teaching that converts in perplexity and backsliding ought to have welcomed it with gratitude and loyal obedience. Doubtless they would have so received it had they been in their right mind. But St. Paul's messenger found them in just the temper to resent so outspoken and faithful a message. The Church was torn with divisions, and lukewarm in cleansing itself from sin ; and this low spiritual and moral condition evil and designing men were able to use for their own ends, the destruction of St. Paul's work and influence. They fostered feelings already adverse to the Apostle. They were able to capture at least a majority of the Church to their side. And Titus had to return to St. Paul at Ephesus with the unwelcome story of revolt from his authority and denial of even his right to lay claim to be an apostle.

The news must have come to him as a great surprise. 1 Corinthians gives no suggestion that the Apostle suspected the situation to be serious. When he wrote that Epistle he evidently expected that his instructions would be received with deference and obedience. The unlooked for news cut him to the heart. " He was crushed, crushed far more than he could stand ! "[1] Depression of spirit probably reacted on his bodily health in a sickness that brought him down to the gates of death. He himself was sure that he was dying. But God who raises the dead brought him back to life.

There seems to be no difficulty in understanding the distress that befel St. Paul in Asia in this way. Indeed, it seems the only natural explanation of it. In view of it we can understand why he mentioned it in his letter at all. We understand why he is so careful to set their minds at rest as to the effect of their treatment of him before he refers

[1] Dr. Moffatt's translation is used throughout.

to it. We see St. Paul possessed of the same nobility of soul as Joseph when he strove to soothe the sting of memory: "And now be not grieved, nor angry with yourselves, that ye sold me hither; for God did send me before you to preserve life" (Gen. xlv. 5). We recognise also the wonderful sensitiveness and delicacy of his nature. A man of coarser fibre would have "rubbed it in." Instead of the vague term, "the distress that befel me in Asia," a less tactful man might have blundered into some blunter phrase, such as "Your treatment of me." But with the Apostle it was enough to so suggest their past injury, that conscience would take part with him against their baser selves.

Thereafter the Apostle enters a claim of straightforwardness in his dealings with all men and particularly with the Corinthian Christians (i. 12–14). They had no need to read between the lines in his letters. They had no occasion to search for hidden and sinister motives to account for his actions. They ought to know that his one impelling desire was that they and he should be the ground of mutual pride in the Day of the Lord Jesus.

He tells them that, trusting that they had this knowledge and that they would not put a bad construction on his actions, he had meant to visit them first, to let them have a double delight; he intended to take them on his way to Macedonia, and to visit them again on his way back from Macedonia, so as to be sped by them on his journey to Judaea (i. 15–16).

Commentators have found some difficulty in the passage because it involves a change of plan from that laid down in 1 Corinthians xvi. 5–7 and from that which he ultimately followed. Some go the length of insisting that there was no intermediate journey but only the intention to pay one in which he was disappointed.

In view of 2 Corinthians ii. 1, xii. 14, xiii. 1, however,

most commentators agree that St. Paul had actually visited Corinth twice when he wrote this letter.

Some, however, whose names carry great weight, hold that the second visit was paid before 1 Corinthians, or even the letter mentioned in 1 Corinthians v. 9, was written. But it seems impossible to maintain this. The impression given by 1 Corinthians is that the Apostle's knowledge of the state of the Corinthian Church was not obtained through a personal visit, but was got at second-hand. It was Chloe's people that told him of the divisions among them. It was Stephanas and his companions that refreshed his spirit, perhaps by assuring him that things were not quite so bad as had been reported. It was the letter of enquiry that they brought from the Church that furnished the occasion for the writing of a considerable part of 1 Corinthians. Even the case of aggravated sin had come to his ears on the wings of common rumour. It is difficult to account for this impression of hearsay knowledge if St. Paul had been there only a short time before and had seen with his own eyes a state of things that filled his heart with pain. Nor can we believe that the Corinthian Church would have the "coolness," to put it mildly, to address to the Apostle a letter of enquiry about marriage, and the covering of the head at public worship, and spiritual gifts, if the memory of his anguished presence was still fresh with them. Therefore, the intermediate visit cannot have preceded the writing of 1 Corinthians.[1]

But if it cannot be placed then, when can it have taken place?

We must first of all examine what the passage i. 15–16 really means. In it we have an instance of St. Paul's well-known practice of condensation. He is not telling them that

[1] See note 1, page 261. If this visit cannot be placed before 1 Cor., neither can the distress which befel him in Asia, which is bound up closely with it.

he had intended to pay them a visit, but had not been able to do so. He is explaining why his plan of making the visit a double one had not been carried out. He had no need to mention a visit that had burnt itself in upon their memories. But he did need to explain why he had been compelled to deprive them of the "double delight."

Now, when the Apostle had recovered from the first shock of the news brought by his messenger, what more natural and likely than that he should go with all haste to Corinth? He felt that he had only to show himself there for those whom he loved with all the affection of a father to be won back to the allegiance of children. He was not the man to stay away from a place because there were some there who bore him no love. But that would mean that he changed the plan of which he had already given intimation! Well, why should he not change his plans to suit newly-emerging needs? In any case, we have to admit a change of mind on St. Paul's part. If, as some hold, he had formed this purpose and communicated it to the Corinthians in his first letter, he had already departed from it before he wrote his second, and that for no reason that we can know with any surety. But on our present interpretation the most reasonable thing for him to do was to visit Corinth as soon as possible so long as he thought he could do any good there, as he evidently thought he could. So he adopted this new scheme. He would bring his work in Ephesus to a close a little sooner than he had intended, cross the narrow sea to Corinth, quench the flames of revolt by his presence, pass on to visit the Churches in Macedonia, and return to Corinth, perhaps for a somewhat prolonged stay (cf. 1 Cor. xvi. 6), ere he took his journey to Judaea.

We conclude, then, that the Apostle carried out the first step in this new purpose. He went to Corinth. But something happened there to make him think it expedient to give

up his intention of going on to Macedonia. He did not need to tell his readers what it was, for they well knew. But he proceeds to reveal the very depths of his heart to them that they might know that he refrained from forcing upon them a visit on the return journey from no unworthy motives, but from the tenderest consideration for them.[1]

It has generally been taken for granted that in i. 17–22, the Apostle is defending himself against a charge of fickleness that had been hurled at him. He would probably announce the plan of his journey when he arrived in Corinth; and when after an unpleasant and stormy time he did not carry it out, it may have been that his enemies, on the look-out for anything and everything that they could bring against him, taunted him with fickleness and unreliableness.

But we think that it is by no means necessary to hold that the Apostle is defending himself from any such charge. The particle that he uses (*μήτι*) introduces a question that expects a negative answer; and this suggests that he confidently felt that whatever the Corinthians might put his action down to, they would never put it down to fickleness. He may be understood, then, as positing a reason which has only to be mentioned to be cast aside in order to bring into stronger light the real motive, his love for them. Nor is the impressiveness of his argument lessened by the solemn way in which he bases the denial of the one on what is the sustaining ground of the other. "Fickleness! No, not fickleness, as I am a minister of Christ." "I call God to witness against my soul, it was to spare you that I refrained from visiting Corinth. . . . I decided that I would not pay you another painful visit." Had he gone on to bask in the sunshine of the love of the Macedonian Churches and returned to the chill stormy atmosphere of Corinth, what ought to have been, both for him and them, a double

[1] The *πάλιν ἐλθεῖν* of ii. 1 corresponds to the *ἵνα δευτέραν χάριν σχῆτε* of i. 15

delight, would be turned into, for him a double sorrow, and for them a double shame. And his love for them prompted him to spare them that.

What were the outward circumstances that went to make his visit painful? With thoughtful and tender reserve St. Paul does not mention what his readers all knew. But incidentally he drops hints that enable us to form a not improbable conjecture. In ii. 5 he speaks of "a certain individual" who has been causing pain, not to him only, but to all of them, or, to keep within the mark, to the majority of them. This man had come under their censure, and Paul begs them to reinstate him in their love. And again, in vii. 12, he speaks of "the offender" and "the injured party," vague terms to us, but of the application of which they would not be ignorant.

It has been generally held that the Apostle is referring to the case dealt with in 1 Corinthians v. "The offender" has been understood to be the guilty person, and "the injured party" his father.

But 1 Corinthians v. says nothing to suggest that the father was still living when the sin was committed. The likelihood is all the other way. And it is hardly probable that the Apostle would speak thus of one who was beyond the reach of wrong. Besides, the spirit of the whole statement (ii. 5–11) fits in better with a personal injury of which St. Paul himself was the victim than with an aggravated sin such as is dealt with in 1 Corinthians v. It is quite true, as Dr. Denney says,[1] that men will differ to the end of time on the question "whether the language in 2 Corinthians ii. 5 ff., vii. 8 ff. is becoming language in which to close proceedings like those opened in 1 Corinthians v. 11." But it is hardly possible to believe that the Apostle, who began the case with a mental picture of the solemn session of the Church,

[1] *Expositor's Bible*, 2 Cor., page 4.

with himself in spirit presiding over it, armed with the authority of the Lord Jesus Christ to pass sentence on the offender, would in the end drop almost exclusively to the note of personal forgiveness. Hence many have come to the conclusion that the Apostle himself is "the injured party," and that he is referring to some wrong that he had suffered at the hands of an individual in the Corinthian Church.

That "the offender" was the incestuous person, though appearing in a new light, is not unlikely. From the fact that St. Paul has to accuse the Corinthian Christians of doing nothing to put an end to the scandal in their midst, we may infer that the sinner was a man of some standing in the Church and in the city. Now a man who was capable of such a crime, and whose position and influence could win the Church to an inactivity which amounted to a guilty acquiescence in it, would be just the kind of man to take a prominent part in opposing, defying and insulting the Apostle, while the rest of the Church lent him the support of the same guilty silence as they had done in the case of the original crime. Nothing else was needed to make St. Paul's visit a painful one. And it was his crowning triumph over the now repentant malignants, and over the crushed and humbled offender himself, that he intervened to intercede for him, and assured them that, however speedily and fully they extended forgiveness, their forgiveness could not anticipate or outgo his.[1]

In what heaviness the Apostle withdrew to Ephesus it would take a heart sensitive as his own to conceive. What could he do? To visit Corinth again was impossible. To send a messenger would be futile. Yet love for his children

[1] The taunt of his opponents: "Paul's letters are weighty and telling, but his personality is weak, and his delivery beneath contempt," gives the impression of an appearance in their midst which was still recent, and in which his enemies, to outward seeming at least, had the advantage over him. Even the order suggests that the letters had preceded the appearance.

in Christ would not let him allow matters to drift. One weapon still remained in his armoury, a potent weapon even on the admission of his adversaries. He would write them a letter, hot with his sense of wrong, setting forth the solid grounds of the apostleship which they were denying, and revealing the unsuspected depths of his love towards them. "He wrote that he might not come only to be pained by those who ought to give him joy" (ii. 3). It was a letter that did not mince matters, or speak smooth words. It was written "in sore distress and misery of heart with many tears"—not to pain them, but to convince them of his love, his special love for them. This description of it points to a more personal and passionate communication than 1 Corinthians, which some hold this letter to be. Grief enough he must have known at the frailties and sins that called forth the First Epistle. But it was not a letter the writing of which should have given him pain, or which it should have pained them to read. But the letter that was so hard for the Apostle to write did give them pain, so much so that his sympathetic heart felt the pang of the wounds that he had dealt (vii. 8); a pang that only the assurance that the wounds were salutary and healing was able to assuage (vii. 10).

This letter must have been written and dispatched when St. Paul had already decided to leave Ephesus; for Titus, the bearer of it, had his instructions to bring the answer by way of Macedonia. The Apostle himself went northward through Asia till he reached Troas (ii. 12). Here he found a wide opportunity for the preaching of the gospel. But he was too eager for news from Corinth to stay. His anxiety made what was probably a journey by forced marches for Titus too slow for him. He left Troas, and crossed over to Macedonia (ii. 13).

Omitting what has been called "the great digression (iii. 1–vii. 2), we again take up the thread of the Apostle's

narrative in vii. 3. Even in Macedonia, among the Churches that he loved and that loved him, and with the most evident signs of God's blessing on his labours (ii. 14–17), he found no rest. There were troubles all around, and fears and anxieties in his own breast. But in the end Titus arrived with good news from Corinth, and the Apostle's spirit revived. The letter had, in God's good mercy, accomplished its object. It had brought home to the Corinthians the warmth of the love that glowed in the heart of the Apostle towards them, and had awakened the slumbering love in their hearts towards him.

What else could St. Paul do than write a letter full of his joy and thanksgiving to God? One other thing remained to shew how fully his confidence in them was restored, to take up matters where they had been dropped on the outbreak of this cruel misunderstanding. Paul could not have given a more convincing proof of the unreservedness of his forgiveness than by giving directions, as he does in the eighth chapter, for the gathering of the collection for the relief of the poor saints, and by deputing Titus to superintend the work.

In the part of 2 Corinthians, then, which we have examined, we have a document of intensely human interest. It hangs together as the record of successive and closely related incidents which make up a compact whole which is not unworthy of being dignified with the name "crisis." It furnishes a body of evidence which is little short of conclusive proof that Paul had to face a time of anxiety and sorrow at the hands of the Corinthian Church which called for his full powers, and which he surmounted only by the undisguised simplicity and sincerity of his motives, by a tact and discretion that were unerring, and by the exercise of a love that bore all things, if only he might win men for Christ.

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EXPOSITORY NOTES ON ACTS.

(xi.)

xxiv. 24–27.

To begin with Felix had a genuine interest in Paul, even though it was an interest mainly based on curiosity. His wife belonged to the same religion as the prisoner, and the second century text of Acts, preserved in Codex Bezae, adds that his interview with Paul was due simply to a wish on his part to please his wife. "Being a Jewess, she wanted to see Paul and hear what he had to say. So, desiring to satisfy her, he sent for Paul." But we need not deprive Felix altogether of some personal interest in the matter. *After certain days Felix came with Drusilla his wife, who was a Jewess, and sent for Paul and heard him concerning the faith in Christ Jesus* He was at anyrate willing at first to listen to what Paul had to say about faith in Christ. But mere willingness is not enough. Felix failed to profit by his opportunity, owing to three flaws in his character.

(*a*) He became uneasy and alarmed at Paul's application of the Gospel. When Paul *argued about morality* (δικαιοσύνης, a good life), *self-control* (ἐγκρατείας, the mastery of one's passions), *and the future judgment, Felix was terrified and answered, 'You may go for the present; when I can find a moment, I will send for you'.*" It said a great deal for Paul that he dealt so straightly with Felix. True preaching ought to make some people very uncomfortable at times. To be made uneasy, to have their consciences disturbed, is their one chance. It does not always follow, however, that they act upon what they begin to see about their lives. Felix did not. He withdrew out of range of these arrears that were beginning to prick his conscience. But Paul was not responsible for that. The apostle had

spoken unflinchingly to the governor about the plain moral duties of religion. It is more easy to denounce the vices of the upper classes in public than to speak privately to them on the same subject, when a chance is offered; and the difficulty is increased when the speaker is, humanly speaking, at the mercy of his auditor, as in the case of Paul and Felix. But nothing deterred Paul from pressing the truth home to the conscience of the Roman Governor. "As I peep into George II's St. James," says Thackeray, "I see crowds of cassocks rustling up the back-stairs of the ladies of the Court; stealthy clergy slipping purses into their laps; that godless old king yawning under his canopy in his Chapel Royal, as the chaplain before him is discoursing. Discoursing about what?—about righteousness and judgment?" No, indeed! But what George II's servile chaplains failed to preach, Paul preached to Felix. And with Drusilla beside him, the wife he had seduced from her husband, Felix naturally trembled. He trembled and adjourned the interview.

(*b*) The second flaw in his character was greed. He did find a more *convenient season*; he found many of them. He sent for Paul often and *communed with him*, but always with the secret hope that *money would be given him by Paul.* He probably knew that Paul had funds with him, the proceeds of the great church collection which he had brought to Jerusalem. Or, he may have counted upon the apostle possessing wealthy friends, who might give him money to buy his release. It was, of course, illegal to take money in this way, but the governor would have stooped to it. With such a secret motive, Felix disqualified himself for getting any real good from what Paul told him about Christianity. "Though he heard again," says Wesley, "he was terrified no more." He had yielded to motives which prevented the deep impression being repeated.

(*c*) Finally, he had handicapped himself by his love of popularity. He had his own position to consider in the political world, and he weakly wished to ingratiate himself with his province. Two years had passed, during which he must have, or might have, convinced himself of Paul's innocence. But, instead of releasing the prisoner, *Felix, desiring to gain favour with the Jews, left Paul in bonds.* He had had more opportunities than almost any one else of receiving the last thing Paul had to give, and he lost his opportunities owing to these three flaws in his character. Poor Felix! Renan describes him as governing Judaea "avec les pouvoirs d'un roi et l'âme d'un esclave"; and this intercourse with Paul certainly shows that he was enslaved by his own weaknesses.

(xii.)

xxvi. 14. *You hurt yourself by kicking at the goad* (σκληρόν σοι πρὸς κέντρα λακτίζειν), like a restive animal which only hurts itself by kicking out as the driver prods it along the right track. Paul realised, he says, that he was only bringing trouble on himself by resisting the pressure of the Lord. He had believed it his duty to persecute the Christians (ver. 9). Probably, the more uncertain he was beginning to be inwardly, the more active he showed himself outwardly, endeavouring by vehement outbursts of fervour to stifle the rising doubts within his heart. Now, he felt convinced that it was worse than useless to oppose the Lord. God's control was too strong for him, and he had to yield. If he was not to injure his life further and damage his own soul, he must allow his Lord to point out the safe path.

The metaphor may be illustrated from the Jewish tractate, *Chagiga* 3b, which contains a remark made by Rabbi El. ben Azariah upon Ecclesiastes xii. 11, *the words of the*

wise are as goads. This rabbi was a contemporary of Paul; he died about 82 A.D. His remark was: "As a goad is what keeps the heifer in her furrow, so as to produce sustenance for the world, the words of the Law preserve those who learn them from the ways of death and for the ways of life." Paul found a more divine goad in the spirit of Jesus Christ, and it drove him away from the Law. This is a much closer parallel to the expression than most of those adduced from classical sources. Pindar, for example, uses the same proverb, but it is in a very different connexion; he is speaking of the foolish, restless envy that makes people resent a humble lot, as they see other people honoured (*Pyth.* ii. 173 f.). "It is profitable to bear lightly the yoke placed on one's neck, *ποτὶ κέντρον δέ τοι λακτιζέμεν τελέθει ὀλισθηρὸς οἶμος.*" Ovid's use of it (in *Amores* i. 2, 13–14 simply shows that it had become a familiar expression for the folly of refusing to yield to some overpowering influence, and this was the more natural as *κέντρον* had already been employed by the Greeks to denote an impulse. Thus Sophocles makes Philoctetes reflect that Wysseus and his fellows would never have put in to the island of Lemnos, unless some divine instigation had been at work—*εἰ μὴ τι κέντρον θεῖον ἦν' ὑμᾶς ἐμοῦ* (*Philoctetes*, 1039). When Paul describes himself as hearing the Lord say to him, *σκληρόν σοι πρὸς κέντρα λακτίζειν*, he means by *κέντρα* the sharp pricks of conscience which for some time had been rendering him privately uneasy about the justice and goodness of his cause as a persecutor of the church.

JAMES MOFFATT.

PHILO'S CONCEPTION OF GOD'S APPROACH TO MAN.

(*a*) The Grace of God.

In a former discussion of Philo's view of Faith, we found that it meant a complete turning away from the life of sense and the fixing of the soul's gaze upon God alone. This he regards as a supreme achievement of the spiritual life. But it presupposes an experience of the Divine working which is really the basis of its existence. Side by side with those abstract descriptions of God, which lay the emphasis on His incomprehensibility, and deny to Him as pure Being the possession of any qualities (ἄποιος), Philo reveals his place in the true succession of Old Testament piety by the prominence he assigns in the history of the soul's progress to the energies of the Divine Grace. Such prominence is in no sense accidental. From the readiness with which his conviction of Grace is introduced, as something self-evident to the religious mind, and the feelings of wonder and joy which it calls forth, it obviously belongs to the inmost texture of his devout experience. And it forms one of the many testimonies which his works supply that, in spite of his zeal for cosmological and psychological speculations after the model of his Greek masters, the crucial elements in his view of God and man belong to the spiritual heritage of his race. He does not attempt in any theoretical fashion, not even to the extent that Paul did, to divide the ground in this mysterious realm between God and man. He is content to accept as one of the most inspiring factors in the relation of God to His creatures the unceasing outflow of a Divine purpose of mercy, initiating all that is good in human life and opening up the highest possibilities to those who are conscious of nothing but imperfection.

This fundamental idea comes out in one of those ingenious verbal distinctions to which he is so strongly addicted. Again and again he refers the difference between the two leading names given in the Old Testament to the Existent (τὸ ὄν), namely 'God' (θεός) and 'Lord' (κύριος), to that between His two chief powers, the power of showing grace (χαριστική, e.g. *De Somn.* I. 163) or benefiting (εὐεργετίς, e.g. *De Spec. Leg.* I. 307), and that of exercising rule, which includes punishing (βασιλική, *De Somn., loc. cit.* : κολαστήριος, *De Spec. Leg. loc. cit.*), often summed up in the contrasted terms 'beneficent goodness' and 'authority' (ἀγαθότης and ἐξουσία, e.g. *De Cherub.* 27). The details in these discussions are often far-fetched, but his essential view emerges quite clearly. Each of these aspects of the Divine Being, which are combined in the Logos (*De Cherub.* 27), is to be acknowledged with reverence, but the 'older' is that of beneficence. In speaking of the sinners of the Patriarchal age, he observes that, while many individuals perished, God, 'in order that the human race might continue, mingles mercy [with judgment], using it to benefit even the unworthy, and not only does he show mercy after judging, but before judging he has mercy; for mercy is older with him [i.e. prior in his thought] than penalty' (*Quod Deus sit immut.* 76). How firmly rooted this conception is, appears from a fine passage (*De Plant.* 89), where he interprets the phrase 'everlasting God' (Gen. xxi. 33) as 'him who does not bestow grace at one time and withhold it at another, but is always and continuously the doer of kindness without interruption . . . who omits no opportunity of benefiting, while at the same time he is Lord, with the power also to hurt.' So inherent to God is the bestowing of kindness, that even in the case of those who have committed intolerable wrongs, He desires to have intercession made to Him on their behalf (*De Mut. Nom.* 129).

The Divine Grace is conceived by our author on the most spacious lines. Expanding the words, 'as for me, behold my covenant is with them' (Gen. xvii. 4), he says: 'There are many different kinds of covenant which bestow gracious benefits and gifts on those worthy of them, but I myself am the highest kind . . . I myself am the source and fountain of all experiences of grace. For to some God is wont to extend his benefits by means of other channels, earth, water, air, sun, moon, heaven, and other incorporeal powers, but to others through himself alone, declaring himself the portion of those who receive him' (*De Mut. Nom.* 58 f.). All that exists, in so far as it can benefit, is an expression of the loving-kindness of God, imparted freely to all His creatures. And so if one were to ask, What is the principle (ἀρχή) of the created universe, the most accurate answer would be, the kindness (ἀγαθότης) and grace of God (*Leg. Alleg.* III. 78).

But of supreme importance for human beings is the recognition that their own highest faculties are Divine gifts. Philo, as we know, regards man's spiritual nature in its supreme aspects as the in-breathing of the breath of God, and, in a very real sense, Conscience is, in his view, the energy of the Divine Logos actually present in the soul. 'God,' he declares, in a passage highly relevant to our present discussion, 'because of his gentleness and love for men, desiring to establish a shrine amongst us, found none on earth more fitting than our reason' (*De Virtut.* 188). But he is always sensitive to the actual situation. Man, with his power of self-determination, has misused his capacities. In his shallowness of judgment he has been allured by the superficial attractions of the sense-life, especially by pleasure, which has directed his strivings towards unworthy aims. In this situation the grace of God shines forth in all its splendour. 'God who is a lover of giving (φιλόδωρος, one of his favourite epithets for God) bestows his blessings

freely on all, even on the imperfect, summoning them to follow eagerly after virtue' (*Leg. All.* I. 34). Men's condition puts the loving-kindness of God to a severe test. But God's grace and mercy go far beyond the standard of mere justice. His beneficent power is all-pervasive (*De Vita Mos.* II. (III.), 238). The fitting penalty for the human race, because of its ingratitude towards Him, its Saviour and Benefactor, would have been annihilation, but He, by reason of His gracious nature, took pity and moderated their punishment (*De Op. M.* 169). His purpose for men is wholly good. He can, indeed, visit with calamity, but it is His special property to hold out blessings and to be beforehand with His gifts. Nay, even when penalty is deserved, God does not straightway visit it upon the sinner, but gives time for repentance and for the healing and amendment of his fault (*Leg. All.* III. 105 f.). In a word, His aim is nothing less than the redemption of men. The Father, who has begotten the soul, does not desire to leave it for ever imprisoned, but, in His pity, to loose its bonds and conduct it safely in its freedom even to its mother-city, and not to cease until the promises of His words are ratified by actual deeds (*De Somn.* I. 181).

But at this point we are inevitably confronted by the perennial problem of the relation of the Divine grace to human effort. Philo has no systematic treatment of the question, yet it is important to examine his general attitude towards the facts. To begin with, he is clear that all goodness in the soul is due to the Divine operation. 'It befits God to plant and build up the virtues in the soul: egoistic and impious is the mind which imagines itself equal to God, and presumes to be acting while it is really acted upon' (*Leg. All.* I. 48 f.); "what soul ever succeeded in putting out of sight and annihilating evil, save that to which God was revealed, which he deemed worthy of his ineffable mys-

teries ? ' (*ib.* III. 27). The progress of the soul, from its beginnings, depends on God's self-manifestation. In this whole province there is a remarkable parallelism between Philo and St. Paul. A most notable example of the position which they may almost be said to occupy in common appears in *De Migr. Abr.* 30 ff. : ' The fountain from which blessings stream is our communion (*σύνοδος*) with God who loves to give : this is why he puts the seal upon his benefits by saying, I will be with thee. What good thing, then, could be lacking, when God who never fails of achievement is present, with the virgin-powers of his grace ? In that case effort and toil and hard exertion are stilled, and all that can benefit is imparted in abundance. . . . The mind lets go its hold of those energies which are at the command of its own designs, and is, as it were, liberated from its purposes by reason of the gifts rained upon it in unceasing showers.' The context, indeed, suggests that this description applies primarily to the inward wrestling of the soul with truth. But since in Philo no valid distinction can be drawn between this search and the personal yearning after God, it seems legitimate to emphasise the striking resemblance to Paul, as regards the cessation of human effort and the complete dependence of the soul on Divine aid. The position is confirmed by such statements as *De Mut. Nom.* 138 : ' There are few whose ears are open to receive these sacred words which teach that it belongs to God alone to sow and to create (*γεννᾶν*) what is good.'

Sufficient evidence has been adduced to show that Paul's great watchword : ' By grace are ye saved, through faith, and that not of yourselves, God's is the gift,' can be rendered directly in terms of Philo's thought, if we discount the Apostle's definitely Christian background. Precisely as in Paul's view, Philo regards man as having nothing in which he can glory in God's presence. Even anything good which he

achieves—and Philo, like Paul, recognises the importance of such achievement—must ultimately be ascribed to Divine influence. For it is impossible for a human creature to rid himself of his defilement. 'What period would suffice to wash away these stains? I cannot tell . . . What eternity could transform the impurity of a soul into a well-ordered life? Not even an eternity, but God alone, to whom are possible the things which with us are impossible' (*De Spec. Leg.* I. 281 f.). The words have an extraordinary affinity with New Testament positions. If we may regard them as expressing an undertone of religious feeling beginning to appear in the more enlightened Judaism of the Diaspora, we are indeed moving in an atmosphere in which the way of the Lord is being prepared. Now, the clause, 'through faith,' in Paul's famous utterance, states the human condition of the saving process. God's gift of grace must not be mechanically conceived. The manner of the Divine activity is not to force an entrance into any heart. Apart from a free and glad assent of the soul, that which Paul calls faith, there can be no real contact between the grace of God and human need. Philo, from his own standpoint, frankly acknowledges this. He has various ways of describing the condition of receptiveness to which the Divine generosity can make its appeal. Once and again he finds the condition fulfilled in the *suppliant* attitude of the soul. 'When pleasure,' he says, 'loses its power, and the cause of our shocking and wanton life has, in a sense, died, we weep over and deplore our former career, because we preferred pleasure to virtue and linked a mortal to an immortal life. Then the only Gracious, taking pity on our unbroken confusion, draws near to our suppliant souls' (*Quod det. pot.* 95). Similarly, 'God will perform the work which belongs to him, having proclaimed release and freedom to the souls which supplicate him (*Quis Rer. Div. H.* 273). Often, in this connexion, it is the reaction

from an unworthy life, the recoil of the soul, which affords its opportunity to the grace of God. 'When God is gracious,' says Philo, 'he makes all things easy [reading ἐξευμαρίζει with Cohn]. Now he becomes gracious to those who feel shame and exchange dissoluteness for self-control and reproach a culpable life and loathe the base phantoms which they impressed upon their souls, who are eager for the quieting of passions and haste after calm and peace of life' (*De Praem. et Poen.* 116). So too in an important passage (*De Somn.* 1. 9), which we quoted in discussing Repentance, he emphasises the grace of Him, who alone is gracious, to those who lay bare their hidden thoughts and deeds, which are already exposed to the glance of the Father of all.

There are certain aspects of the Divine Grace which are singled out by Philo. That which we first note has an arresting kinship with the New Testament outlook. 'Very aptly [Moses says that] their supplication reached God. Now it would not have reached, if he who invited it had not been gracious. But some souls he goes out to meet: "I will come to thee and will bless thee" (Exod. xx. 24). You see how large is the grace of the Cause, who anticipates our hesitation and goes out to bestow the completest benefits upon the soul' (*Leg. All.* III. 215). Here we are not merely reminded of Paul but of Jesus Himself, and especially of the marvellous delineation of the Father in the Parable of the Lost Son. And Philo shows himself of the lineage of the great prophet Hosea in his emphasis on the unwearying ardour of the Divine pity. There is, in short, in the nature of God no limit to the outflow of His generosity towards men. More than once, this affluence of the Divine bounty provokes in Philo an outburst of praise. 'O thou Lover of giving,' he exclaims, 'without stint are the gifts of thy grace, having no limits or boundaries or end, like fountains which pour forth streams too plentiful to be borne away' (*Quis Rer. Div.*

H. 31). The only limit to the grace of God lies in the narrowness of men's capacity to receive it. Thus Philo lays down as the normative principle for human beneficence that which God imposes upon Himself because of human limitations: "Freely give not all that thou canst, but all that the needy is able to receive' (*De Post. Cain.* 142). 'For that which has come into being,' he observes in the same passage (*ib.* 145), 'is never without a share of God's gracious gifts . . . but it is unable to bear their abundant and lavish current. Wherefore, desiring us to be profited by his bounties, he measures them according to the capacity of the recipients.' Philo enlarges on the theme in dealing with Moses' prayer (Exod. xxxiii. 13 f.) for a vision of God and the Divine answer to his request. 'I freely bestow that which befits him who is to receive: for not all that I might easily give is it possible for man to take. Therefore I hold forth to him who is worthy of my grace all the gifts he is able to receive. But for a complete apprehension of me there is no room, not only in human nature, but even in all earth and heaven. Know thyself, then, and be not carried away by impulses and desires beyond thy powers . . . for in all attainable good thou shalt have a share' (*De Spec. Leg.* I. 43 f.). One further aspect of Philo's view of Divine grace may be pointed out, before we leave this phase of our discussion. It is important because it reminds us that Philo, so far from being absorbed merely in theoretical enquiries, has his gaze firmly fixed on the higher claims of practical life. He is laying stress on the proper use of the gifts, often unexpected, which men have received from God. 'For,' he says, 'the generous bounties of the Supreme Ruler, which he bestows on individuals, are for the general well-being: not that when they have received them they may hide them or misuse them to the hurt of others, but that, putting them into the common stock, as at a public

feast, they may invite as many as they can to their use and enjoyment' (*De Virtut.* 169).

(*b*) Mediation.

The statements we have collected from Philo to illustrate his conception of the Grace of God are remarkable for their directness, simplicity, and freedom from technical phraseology. That is thoroughly characteristic of the man. When he discloses the profoundest realities of his religion, he usually lays aside metaphysical and psychological arguments. But recognising, as we must, the constant emphasis he places upon the transcendence of God, and his invariable assumption that the Existent cannot come into direct contact with the world of created things, we are not surprised to find the idea of Mediation between God and man at the heart of his thought.

The philosophical drift of his age, which affected most of the serious thinkers on religion in the centuries immediately preceding and following the birth of Jesus, favoured this doctrine. The Ideas of Plato and the λόγοι σπερματικοί (generative rational forces) of the Stoics, both of which played so prominent a part in the later philosophy, were already conceived, especially in the more popular philosophical theology, as powers in a sense mediating between the Absolute God or the First Cause and the universe. Parallel movements may be traced in every direction. The Stoics themselves had, by means of allegory, used the popular mythology to establish the idea of subordinate spiritual powers which were manifestations to men of the Divine. The Hellenised theology of Egypt had, on similar allegorical lines, attempted to combine the myth of a creative Word with the Divine Reason pervading all things. And the Hermetic literature, also of Egyptian origin, makes Hermes, who represents the Egyptian Thoth, the amanuensis of the gods, the god of all wisdom,

who has invented 'the words of God' (i.e. the written characters), the bearer of a Divine revelation which he communicates to disciples that they may diffuse it abroad.

It may be said without undue rashness that Philo must have come into touch with these various currents of thought. But he was exposed to others at least as important, proceeding from his ancestral Jewish faith. The Alexandrian *Wisdom of Solomon*, written not long before his time, reveals the place given in cultivated Jewish minds to Wisdom, conceived almost as a Divine personality, subordinate to God, but 'a breath of the power of God,' 'an image of his goodness,' which 'has power to do all things,' 'renews all things,' and 'entering consecrated souls makes them friends of God and prophets, for God loves none but him who is in fellowship with wisdom' (*Wisd.* vii. 25 ff.). But while we know this conception to have been influential in Philo's immediate environment, the idea of mediation between God and the world had taken further shape in Jewish religion. A prominent figure in Old Testament tradition was that of the 'angel' or 'messenger' of Jahweh, through whom the Divine mind and purpose was disclosed to men. Angelology had been developed to an extraordinary extent within Judaism between the Exile and Philo's time, perhaps chiefly under the influence of Babylon and Persia: and the stress laid upon the Holiness of God in the post-exilic community gave the impetus to a large number of personifications of the Divine. The actual evidence for some of these belongs to a period later than Philo. But when we take into account their Old Testament basis, and remember that by his time the transcendence of God was a dominating idea both in Palestinian and Alexandrian Judaism, it is in no way improbable that he was acquainted with them at some stage in their evolution. Thus, the Rabbinic hypostasis of Mēmrā, the Creative Word of God, has its roots in passages of Genesis

(e.g. i. 3, 6, 9) and Psalms (e.g. cxlvii. 15) which describe the efficacy of the Divine utterance. The Shekinah, which is a sort of concrete embodiment of the Divine Presence, represents, of course, the 'glory' of Jahweh, described in the Old Testament as filling the Tabernacle and the Temple. Ezekiel's complex vision (ch. i.) became a favourite subject of speculation in various circles of Judaism, and the winged creatures which bore the moving throne of the Almighty were explained as the 'powers' of God. But from the description of the vision, the living creatures might be viewed as a unity, as well as in their individuality. When so regarded, the unified appearance, of which the several faces were aspects, was named in esoteric Judaism 'the charioteer.' It is impossible to avoid the supposition that Philo was directly influenced by this group of speculations, when he designates the Logos 'charioteer of the Divine powers' (*De Fuga*, 101). Further, as Siegfried has cogently pointed out (*Philo von Alexandria*, p. 221 f.), the dignity of the High-Priest had been immensely enhanced in the post-exilic community, so that to a degree never before conceived he stood as mediator between God and the people. The efficacy of his suppliant prayers is emphasised in several Rabbinic treatises, and also his intimacy with the All-Holy. A striking comment on the fact is Philo's ascription of the title 'High-Priest' to the Logos (e.g., *De Fuga*, 108 ff., *De Migr. Abr.* 102). And probably it is legitimate to regard this as one of the factors which set the Priesthood of Christ in the centre of the Epistle to the Hebrews, a document whose Alexandrian and Philonic associations are evident throughout.

Philo's attempts to bridge the gulf which he assumes between a God who is pure Being and the world of Becoming circle round the conception of the Logos, who is God's Thought or Reason: the powers (δυνάμεις) of God, which are manifestations of His energy, operating in the universe:

and angels, a considerably vaguer category. It lies outside our purpose to discuss these categories in their metaphysical bearings. The Logos-hypothesis itself, as it appears in Philo, is full of confusion. This is no doubt partly due to its composition from heterogeneous elements, Platonic dualism, Stoic monism, and Jewish monotheism, modified by the emergence of hypostases of God, of which the most notable was Wisdom. In part, it depends on the fluctuating boundary in ancient thought between personality and personification, and on Philo's own tendency to glide from what he conceived as truth to symbols of truth. To some extent it results from his failure in constructive power.

A few words on the cosmic significance of these Divine energies will serve as an introduction to their religious functions as suggested by Philo. Probably his most inclusive description of the Logos in this realm is that of 'the ideal world,' 'the image of God,' the pattern according to which the perceptible universe has been fashioned (e.g., *De Op. M.* 24 f.). As the Logos is the 'image' of God, so *par excellence* is human reason the 'image' of the Logos (e.g. *Leg. All.* III. 96). Not only has the Logos been God's instrument (ὄργανον) in creation, but he is, so to speak, the 'helm' (οἴαξ) by which the Almighty Steersman pilots the universe (*De Migr. Abr.* 6). A metaphor which he is fond of applying to the Logos is that of the Divine seal, by which each created thing is stamped and receives its permanent quality (*De Fuga*, 12 f.). Varying the details of the comparison, he speaks of the rational soul as stamped by the seal of God, whose impression (χαρακτήρ) is the eternal Logos (*De Plant.* 18). Roughly speaking, these descriptions tally with the conception of the Thought of God, more or less abstracted from His pure Being, and placed beside Him in a semi-personified form.

Philo usually conceives the powers as subordinate to the

Logos. Thus he speaks of God as having completely filled His Divine Logos with incorporeal powers (*De Somn.* I. 62). But perhaps the clearest instance is *Qu. in Exod.* 68 (p. 515 Aucher), where, in discussing the relation of the two primary Divine 'powers,' the gracious creative power (θεός) and the regal (κύριος), to the Logos, he speaks of these as 'flowing out from the Logos as from a spring,' and then he proceeds to show how other powers emanate from them. These Powers, which he classifies variously (e.g. *Legat. ad Gaium*, 6, 7), and of which we have just mentioned the most representative, he describes as stretched from the roots of the earth to the confines of heaven, holding together the entire universe (*De Migr. Abr.* 181). As in the case of the Logos, he so objectifies the Powers as over against God, that their inferiority is clearly manifested. Thus God uses them for the punishment of sin, a function unseemly for Himself. They were His instruments in creating the mortal elements of the soul, as contrasted with the rational. In some sense, also, they are responsible for the presence of conceptions of evil as well as of good in the human soul (*De Fuga*, 66 ff.).

Let us now turn to the more practical aspects of these mediating agencies, which give them an important place in the religious and moral experiences of the soul. Bréhier (*Les Idées philosophiques et religieuses de Philon*, p. 100) is true to the facts when he observes that in order to understand the real position of the Logos in Philo, we must leave on one side philosophical and cosmological theories and consider God and the Logos as objects of worship. In the progress of the soul towards the Highest, the apprehension of the Logos is an intermediate stage which must be passed through. 'It is a boon,' Philo says, 'for perishable mortals to have mediating and arbitrating Logoi (i.e. rational Divine powers), because of their own awe and shrinking before the Lord of all' (*De Somn.* I. 142). This is no mere dread of

punishment. It means their incapacity to receive God's overpowering and unmixed blessings, when these are given by His own hand (*ib.* 143). In these paragraphs we are face to face with a characteristic standpoint of post-exilic Judaism. 'God can only be grasped by means of the powers which accompany and follow him. For these do not present his essence but only his existence, to be gathered from what is accomplished by him' (*De Post. Cain.* 169). In distinguishing between the two instances of the word 'place' in Genesis xxii. 3 f., Philo remarks that 'the man who is under the guidance of wisdom arrives at the first of these two places mentioned, having found the Divine Logos who is the crown and goal of satisfaction' (*De Somn.* I. 66), and a few sentences later he speaks of the Logos as sent forth to heal and completely cure the ailments of the soul. Perhaps the most fundamental passage for his general working conception is *Quis Rer. Div. H.* 205 f.: 'The Father, who has begotten all things, granted as his choicest privilege to his chief messenger and most august Logos, that he should stand in the midst between the Creator and the created. Now he is, on the one hand, always the suppliant for transient mortals in presence of the Immortal, and the ambassador of the Ruler to his subject. Then he rejoices because of the privilege and prides himself on it . . . being neither uncreated like God nor created like you, but standing between the two extremes as a pledge to both, to him that created as an assurance that created beings will never wholly rebel or revolt, choosing confusion rather than order, and in the case of the creature to give him the bright hope that the gracious God will never ignore his own work.' This remarkable utterance reaches the heart of Philo's conception of the Logos. What has further to be said is simply an expansion of its ideas in various directions.

It will not help us much to discuss, in the light of such

statements, how far Philo regards the Logos as a 'personality,' in some sense, distinct from God, whose Thought or Reason or Utterance he is. We have already referred to the vagueness of the boundary in ancient thought between personality and personification. In the New Testament precisely the same problem arises: as, e.g., in the Pauline Epistles with reference to the relation between the Spirit and the exalted Lord. And it is needless to recall the numerous controversies in the early Church which sprang directly out of this region. Philosophical or religious thinkers, in attempting to make any affirmations at all within the realm of spirit, are compelled to formulate such distinctions, although reflexion at once reminds them that they are working with anthropomorphic categories, and that this picture-language must be recognised for what it is, an inadequate effort to express the inexpressible. Philo is no more and no less successful in his attempts than Christian theologies or idealistic philosophies. But it can scarcely be doubted that his particular differentiation of the Logos from the Supreme God had an extraordinary bearing on the subsequent Christology of the Church.

Philo gives prominence to the idea that those mediators, whether Logos, *δυνάμεις*, or *ἄγγελοι*, come to the soul's assistance in all its higher aspirations. 'He who follows after God,' he says, 'has . . . as companions on his journey those rational powers (*λόγοι*) who accompany God, who are commonly called angels . . . For as long as he is not perfected, he has the Divine Logos to show him the way . . . But when he has reached the summit of knowledge, having run eagerly he will equal in swiftness him who formerly led the way. For both will become attendants of the omnipotent God' (*De Migr. Abr.* 173 ff.). Indeed he implies that their very function is to consider and aid the spiritual needs of man. 'For help,' he observes, 'a succouring

power waits in readiness in God's presence, and the Ruler himself draws nearer for the benefit of such as are worthy of receiving benefits' (*ib.* 57). In the passage already quoted as specially typical, the Logos is described as 'a suppliant for transient mortals.' This is an aspect which occurs more than once.[1] And we cannot help finding traces of its influence in the primary place assigned in 'Hebrews' to the work of intercession in the priesthood of Christ.

In one important place (*De Confus. Ling.* 146) God's 'first-born Logos' is described as 'a being of many names.' We shall glance at some of these, from the point of view of their religious significance. Commenting on Genesis xlii. 11 (LXX), Philo asks: 'How could you hesitate, my friends, to hate war and love peace, you who are called by the name of the same father, not a mortal but an immortal, a Divine man, who, being the Logos of the Eternal, is himself necessarily imperishable?' (*De Conf. Ling.* 41). Now, whatever shade of meaning may have been here attached to the term Logos in Philo's mind: whether the idea of the Divine Reason in man predominates, or that of a vicegerent of the Eternal, who bridges the chasm between the seen and the unseen, it is plain that such a usage must lead even unconsciously to the personalising of the conception. We can never determine what point in the process has been reached, but the more powerfully the notion of religious value is present, the more concrete will be the shape which the Logos-idea assumes. An illuminating instance of how the various *nuances* of the term shade off into each other appears in *De*

[1] We entirely disagree with Drummond's position, that "in all these passages we are concerned only with certain functions of human reason and speech,' and that the term *ικέτης* excludes any idea of intercession (*Philo Judaeus*, II. 236, 235). The latter statement seems quite arbitrary when viewed in the light of the context of these passages. And to us it appears that no statements in Philo more clearly suggest the idea of personality than those in question.

Somn. I. 103 ff. Philo begins by observing that Logos, obviously in the sense of 'reason,' but sometimes gliding into that of 'speech,' is God's choicest gift to man, his 'bulwark,' his 'body-guard,' his 'protagonist,' the power that 'furthers his aspirations.' He is the 'saving remedy for the passions of the soul,' a 'counsellor and champion' whose presence gives joy and rest. But at the close of the passage, all that has been affirmed is merged in the figure of the 'Divine Logos,' whom the ascetic soul, renouncing itself, 'awaits as a visitant coming invisibly from without.' All through the paragraph we are inevitably reminded of the New Testament conception of the indwelling Spirit, which often can scarcely be distinguished from the renewed nature of the Christian, but at other times is viewed quite separately. Such a distinction appears plainly in *De Somn.* I. 86 : 'The Logos of God when he visits our earthly system of things helps and succours those who have kinship with goodness and tend in that direction (cf. John iii. 21), so as to provide for them a complete refuge and salvation, but on the enemies of good he launches ruin and incurable destruction.' Here the Logos is set over against God and men as the representative of the Eternal, acting for men's highest well-being. Once, in a discussion of the incomprehensibility of the Divine Nature, the 'Logos-interpreter' (cf. John i. 18) receives the remarkable appellation of 'God of the imperfect,' as opposed to the Eternal, who is God 'of the wise and perfect' (*Leg. All.* III. 207), a class which, probably for Philo as for the Stoics, remained no more than an ideal. Perhaps nowhere is the religious colour of the Logos-conception more visible than when he describes it, quite incidentally, as 'the heavenly, incorruptible food of the soul that longs for the vision of God' (*Quis. Rer. Div. H.* 79), or when he compares it to a river. 'As from the fountain of wisdom, the Divine Logos flows down to refresh and

water the Olympian and heavenly plants of souls that love goodness, a kind of Paradise.' This is 'the river of God, full of water,' referred to in Psalm cxv. 10, 'a stream of wisdom, which makes glad the city of God' (Ps. xlvi. 5), the soul of the wise, in which God is said to walk to and fro as in a city (*De Somn.* II. 242 ff.).

We have barely mentioned the important fact that Philo sometimes identifies the Logos with Wisdom. Referring, e.g., to 'goodness' as the genuine virtue, he declares that its source is the wisdom of God. 'That,' he adds, 'is the Logos of God' (*Leg. All.* I. 65). This identification cannot surprise us, as Philo was, of course, familiar with the commanding place occupied by the hypostasis of 'Wisdom' in the deeper thought of his Jewish contemporaries. It is possibly true that Greek influence accounts for the overshadowing of the latter conception by the former in his writings. But this influence may have been indirect rather than immediate in his case, inasmuch as the term Logos, as a mediating idea, covered a far wider range of relations than Sophia, and thus more adequately met the needs of his thinking. So far as their range is the same, the parallelism could scarcely be closer, and we cannot help believing that Philo's own extension of the application of Logos in certain directions was made possible by his acquaintance with the mediating function of Sophia in the Wisdom-literature of the Jews. One special use of Logos, although possessing affinities with that of Wisdom, may perhaps be traced more directly to his Egyptian environment, in which Divine 'words' were endowed with unique potency. In a few passages he uses it to describe the all-efficacious utterance of God. Thus, in referring to the account of Moses' death in Deuteronomy xxxiv., where it is ascribed (ver. 5) to the 'word of the Lord,' he says that by that 'word' the whole universe was created, that you may learn that God counts the wise man of

equal value with the world, by the same Logos both producing the totality of things, and leading the perfect man from his earthly environment to himself' (*De Sacr. Ab. et C.* 8). This and other instances are, however, isolated from the main trend of his usage, and he goes out of his way to assert that the Divine utterance has no point of comparison with the human (*Quod Deus sit immut.* 82 f.), preserving for it its fundamental significance of the ideal form which brings coherence into the universe. Yet we can easily understand how, in spite of this, a Jewish mind, accustomed from the Old Testament to the idea of God's all-powerful Word, might find in Philo's usage a significance which the author himself had barely suggested. That would be all the more likely if he was already sensitive to those personifications of the Divine Wisdom which represented her as pleading with men and offering them instruction in the name of God (e.g. Prov. viii. and ix.).

We must bear all these considerations in mind when we place beside Philo's conception of the Logos that which belongs to the Prologue of the Fourth Gospel. Dr. Rendel Harris, with remarkable skill and contagious enthusiasm, has tried to prove that the writer is entirely dependent on the Sophia of the Wisdom-literature, and he works out the influence of this conception through one and another of the Early Christian Fathers, as well as in St. Paul. No doubt he has succeeded in unravelling one strand of a variegated pattern. But the other threads must not be ignored. The demonstration of many remarkable parallels to Sophia in the famous Prologue by no means excludes Alexandrian features, for these parallels certainly come within Philo's horizon. No conclusive argument has been as yet produced to account for the Fourth Evangelist's choice of Logos in preference to Sophia. And that choice, in the light of Philo's employment of the term, affords a strong presumption in favour of

Alexandrian affinities. The progress of research in Hellenistic thought, whether Jewish, Pagan, or Christian, continually puts us on our guard against the tendency to trace kinship along a single line. Syncretism is the sign-manual of the period. And Ephesus, the home of Heraclitus, with his conception of Logos as the 'comprehensive principle of order in the unified world-process, was not likely to remain indifferent to the far-reaching developments of the idea, whether among the Stoics or in Philo. But one aspect of the question is not open to dispute. To Philo, as to any of his Pagan contemporaries, it would have appeared an inversion of all values, whether religious or metaphysical, when the Evangelist dared the tremendous assertion: 'The Logos became flesh, and dwelt among us.'

H. A. A. Kennedy.

THE HINDU DOCTRINE OF KARMA.

Of all beliefs which have been held by the Hindu mind it may be safely said that none is more deeply rooted or more widespread than that in Karma. It is a belief which is very foreign to our Western ways of thought, though as a result of the work of the Theosophical Society it has been made familiar to many people in the West in a greatly modified form. It is the purpose of this paper to present the Hindu doctrine as briefly and clearly as possible and to subject it to some examination.

By the doctrine of karma the effort is made to furnish an explanation of the relation of action and passion. "The deed does not die," it is said. The principle that whatsoever a man soweth that shall he also reap, is one that is familiar to people belonging to widely sundered schools of thought. It is this principle, applied however with a thoroughness strange to Western thought, that is central in the karma

doctrine. It is understood as working so inexorably that the simple converse of it is also true—whatsoever a man reaps, that must he have sowed. In this peculiarly Hindu form of the doctrine of the fruit of action belief in some form of transmigration is implied. It is implied in some way—and the accounts given of it are various—that after the death of the body the life of the individual is continued in another body, and so on in indefinite series until release is attained. The doctrine of karma may thus be stated abstractly in a form in which it is easily comprehended—Whatever a man suffers or enjoys is the fruit of his own deed, a harvest sprung from his own actions, good or bad, committed in previous lives.

But much misunderstanding has arisen in the minds of many people from the fact that the doctrine has been apprehended in this abstract way, apart from its more concrete expressions in Hindu thought. The Theosophists have presented the doctrine to the West in their own form. And apart from this it has become more familiar to the West in its Buddhist garb than in any of the forms which it has taken in Hinduism. By the Buddhists it was interpreted in a way more ethical and at the same time more logically consistent than it has been by most Hindu thinkers. The ordinary reader whose knowledge of Indian religions is of a general and superficial kind frequently owes what understanding he has of karma largely to such sources, and consequently fails to recognise how far it is from providing a solution of the ethical problem of the relation of conduct to its consequences.

We may glance, first of all, at the history of the doctrine. In the Rig-Veda it is taught that the spirits of the dead go, according to their deeds, to Heaven or Hell. In the last and latest book of the Rig-Veda we find the sacrifice, *iṣṭa*, and the gifts to the priests, *pūrta*, spoken of as a sort of

credit balance which the spirit carries with it to the other world. In one passage the departed is addressed thus:

"Do thou join the Fathers, do thou join Yama, join thy *iṣṭapūrta* in the highest heaven."[1]

In this we have what may be regarded as the dominant idea in the doctrine of karma—the idea that the effects of one's deeds remain with one as an inalienable possession, the capital with which one is established in a new sphere.

But it was only when this idea was brought into connection with that of transmigration that the doctrine of karma assumed its familiar form. It is possible that the belief in transmigration was held in India in pre-Aryan times, but of this we cannot speak dogmatically. In the Śatapatha Brāhmana the fear is expressed that the fruits of one's good deeds may not be sufficient to secure an immortality of bliss, and that the soul may die again; and rites were prescribed to ensure the continuance of its position in the other world. It is remarkable that up to this point the continuance of personal existence should have been considered the highest good. It is also worthy of attention that in the first reference which we find to the idea of rebirth in this world, in the same Brāhmana, the hope of such rebirth is held out as a reward; it is the reward of him "who knows that the spring comes to life again out of the winter." We do not know through what stages of thought the conviction was reached that the continuance of personal existence is an evil, but in the Upaniṣads the end of all attainment is escape from the trammels of individual existence; which is attained, according to the most characteristic teaching, in realisation of the oneness of the soul with Brahma. It is karma, now thought of as operating remorselessly, carrying the soul on through death to new forms of being, that is the great obstacle. It is it which binds one to finite

[1] Rig-Veda, x. 14, 8.

existence, and the breaking of the bonds of which means release. Even here, it must be noted, the belief still lingers of a future life in Heaven or Hell, and there are passages in which we see these two seemingly incompatible beliefs in the closest conjunction with each other. Hinduism is in some ways more than Catholic ; it holds together at times beliefs that to us seem utterly contradictory. And all down through the history of Hindu thought, though the doctrine of karma is accepted almost without question as the explanation of the vicissitudes of sentient existence, the doctrine is presented sometimes in combination with alien ideas, and sometimes modified in curious ways. It will be of interest to consider some of the ways in which the simplicity of the doctrine is thus interfered with.

To begin with, it is well to bear in mind that the kinds of actions that are supposed to produce good and bad fruit respectively are by no means always, or even generally, actions that most of us would regard as ethically good and bad. The telling of a lie is an act which produces an evil crop, but so does marrying before an elder brother.[1] Showing kindness to strangers is an act which produces good fruit, but so does the performance of many kinds of ritual and magical acts. Besides, the various forms of penance by which atonement is made for sins, in many of which it is impossible to see any ethical value, are supposed to have the effect of wiping out actions which otherwise would have evil consequences. Throughout the history of Hindu thought the ethical has been but imperfectly discriminated from the non-ethical, and the consequence is that the accounts that are given of the relation of act to fruit are often unsatisfactory from the ethical point of view.

Again the inevitableness of the connexion between act and fruit in the individual is interfered with in certain ways.

[1] Manu xi. 61.

A sentence from the Mahābhārata has sometimes been quoted as expressing the law of karma in its strictness—"that no man inherits the good or evil deed of another man." As a matter of fact, in primitive ethical thought the individual is regarded only within certain limits as separable or distinguishable from the other members of his family or tribe. We see this in ancient Hebrew customs, for example in the doom which Achan's sin brought on his whole family, all being thought of as sharing in his guilt. The same idea comes to expression in certain thoughts and customs which are found in the history of Hinduism. For example, Manu says that punishment "strikes down the king who swerves from his duty, together with his relatives."[1] Again it is stated that a faithful wife shares the fate of her husband.[2] Her own karma does not work itself out independently of his, but provided only she be faithful to him she shares his fate, irrespective of what her own action would otherwise have determined for her. There is another and very different way in which one may partake of the karma of another. In Manu much is said regarding the transference to the king of the guilt of acts which he has failed to visit with their proper punishment. Similarly transference of karma may take place under certain conditions from host to guest or *vice versa*. The belief is even found that it is possible for one voluntarily to transfer his good karma to another. In all this we see certain features that are characteristic of the conception of karma. A man reaps what he has sown not in accordance with the operation of a principle whereby each action contributes to the shaping of his destiny, or to the giving of his character such a bent that it is bound to lead him to a certain end. For the Hindu thinks less in terms of character than in terms of acts. And each act is thought of as a seed-bearing fruit,

[1] Manu vii. 28. [2] Manu v. 166, ix. 29

the seed or growing plant not being irrevocably fixed in a particular soil, but being capable under certain conditions of being transferred from one soil to another.

Hopkins[1] draws attention to another way in which the operation of karma in the individual is interfered with. He finds in the Mahābhārata the idea that the fruit of karma may appear in one's sons or other descendants. He thinks that this idea is the simple consequence of the evidence that forced itself upon men that a man's family shared with him the punishment of wrongdoing, as when a king's relatives suffered with him because of the wrong which he had done. It seems hardly necessary to go so far for an explanation. May it not be that the idea that the fruit of a parent's actions is inherited by his children is the outcome of experience of the simple fact which can hardly be ignored, that in some way the fruit of one's acts is passed on to one's descendants? The extraordinary thing is not that occasionally this should be recognised and admitted, but that anywhere where men have begun to think about problems of conduct it should not force itself upon their attention.

These are but some of the ways in which the doctrine of karma is crossed by or complicated with other ideas.[2] In his article on "Modifications of the Karma Doctrine," Hopkins has discussed the subject with some fulness. He has shown, for example, the incongruity with the doctrine of the old belief in sacrifice, repentance, and penance as destroyers of sin. But enough has perhaps been said at the present stage to make it clear that the doctrine of karma as we find it expressed in Hindu literature is not the simple thing that it is often supposed to be. Much might be made by the critic of the difficulties connected with this complication. But it is questionable whether

[1] *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1906, pp. 588 ff.
[2] *Op. cit.* pp. 588 ff.

it would be fair to lay great emphasis on these. For it might reasonably be held that there is in the doctrine a perfectly intelligible principle, which may at times have been inadequately stated, but which nevertheless is capable of being considered apart from the weaknesses which inhere in any particular statement. As a matter of fact, in discussing the problem with Hindus at the present time we do as a rule have the question narrowed down for us to that of the inseparable union between works and their fruits. So it is desirable that in our discussion of the validity of the doctrine we should deal with essentials, setting aside accidental ideas that have been connected with it.

Let us then examine the doctrine in its simple form, and let us first of all consider briefly the belief in transmigration, which is essentially bound up with the doctrine. There is no reason why the fruit of actions should be supposed to appear in the individual in another incarnation in this world, for the same principle of the relation of action to its fruit might quite well be supposed to work itself out in another sphere of being. But, as a matter of fact, in Hindu thought karma and saṃsāra (or transmigration) are bound up together. This belief in transmigration is not unique. It has appeared among various peoples at various times. For example, scholars have been impressed by the fact that the Pythagoreans held the belief, and attempts were made at one time to find some link of connexion between Pythagorean and Indian thought. It is now generally agreed that the belief has sprung up independently in various quarters. This is a fact which is full of interest, and the question of the origin of the belief is a fascinating one. But it need not detain us here, for questions of validity are different from questions of origin. We may also pass over arguments based on the idea of the intimate relation which undoubtedly exists between the psychical and the physical, by the use

of which some have sought to prove the impossibility of re-incarnation in another body. For any such argument might be met by the *argumentum ad hominem* that on the same grounds practically any kind of belief in the continuance of individual existence after the dissolution of the body would be untenable. Many of the arguments by which the Christian defends his belief in a "future life" would in this case do equal service to the believer in transmigration.

A more serious objection to the doctrine of transmigration is this, that it is capable neither of proof nor disproof. But here again we might be faced with the *argumentum ad hominem* that the same difficulty attaches to all forms that the belief in a future life takes. Some would go further and deny the truth of the assertion, maintaining that there have been men who have been able to recall experiences which they have undergone in former births. Both in Hinduism and in Buddhism this claim has been made. The evidence which has been offered in support of these claims has, however, seldom made a deep impression on the minds of men who have been trained to weigh evidence. It is when the fact that proof and disproof are supposed to be equally impossible is taken along with other considerations which remain to be considered, that its full weight will be felt.

It is on moral grounds that the belief in transmigration is most strongly defended by the modern Hindu. He holds that it is only on the hypothesis of successive rebirths that certain of the facts of life can be satisfactorily explained. The man born blind, it is explained, must have been born so on account of evil deeds done by him in a previous state of existence. Those who have discussed the problem with educated Hindus find that they continually come back to this, that all suffering and misfortune which the individual

experiences must have its root in his own actions. It may be safely said that this is one of the most profound convictions of the average Hindu mind, and one that to many seems beyond dispute. It is at least as deeply ingrained in the Hindu mind as the belief in God was in the mind of the Jew in Old Testament times. This is in a way surprising, for the belief involves the assumption that the Universe is constituted on moral lines. It is doubtful whether such an assumption fits in with the main lines of Hindu thought. It is by no means clear why the demand should be made at all for a justification of the suffering which humanity endures. It might well be but a moment in the juggling process by which conscious beings are misled and drawn away from reality, and any further explanation might appear superfluous. Indeed there are traces alongside the karma doctrine of an older theory that a man's lot is due not to himself but to the fate imposed upon him by the gods. Traces of this may be seen, e.g., in Manu, xi. 47, where is said that it is *daiva*, fate, which causes a man to sin, and the notion of a fate belonging to one apart from one's acts has been traced elsewhere down through Hindu thought.[1] Also the idea of the grace of God which is prominent in much of the literature of *bhakti* from the Bhagavadgita onwards is in contradiction to the karma doctrine of the equivalence of act and fruit from another point of view. Nevertheless the belief in karma remains deeply rooted in the mind of the average Hindu.

There is another difficulty, which may seem to be of minor importance, but which is still very real, which is closely connected with that just indicated. The whole tendency of Hindu thought has been to depreciate the physical. The highest life is one lived in indifference to the attractions of all earthly things. Yet the doctrine of

[1] See article by Hopkins, *J.R.A.S.*, 1906, p. 584.

karma assumes an attitude to the physical which elevates it to a position of great significance. The point of the difficulty may no doubt be turned by the argument that to him who has attained the goal, or who is on the last stage of the journey towards the goal, all good or ill fortune is indifferent. But this is an argument which rests on another rock of offence—that dualism which runs through so much of Hindu thought, according to which the life of every day is separated by a wide gulf from the kind of experience which has been held up as the ideal. What is relatively good or bad can be so even relatively from the point of view of rational beings only when it is in relation to what is really of worth. Good and ill fortune in this world in the end count for nothing.

"Verily the man whom these disturb not, indifferent alike to pain and to pleasure, and wise, is meet for immortality, O chief of men."[1]

Why, then, make so much of these as the fruits of actions?

It may still be maintained that after all the facts are on the side of the believer in karma. Sin leads to suffering. Whatsoever a man soweth, that doth he also reap. Experience, it is said, testifies to the truth of these principles. In a sense it does. We see these principles in operation about us, and it may well be held that we are justified on the ground of what we see in inferring that it is our expression of a wider principle of retribution by which the deeds of men meet with their due reward or punishment elsewhere. But if this inference is justified, the facts do not justify it in the form which it takes in the karma doctrine. The facts of life do not bear out the idea that "no one inherits the good or evil deeds of another man." Men are so linked together in human society that a good or an evil deed touches an indefinite number of men, bringing pleasure or pain,

[1] Bhagavadgita, ii. 15.

good fortune or ill, to many who have no responsibility for the deed. The doctrine of karma makes our admiration of pain and suffering endured by men for the sake of others absurd. It leaves no place for what has been called vicarious suffering, such as is exemplified in ordinary life in the bearing by men of one another's burdens, and which is seen in its most sublime form in the Cross of Christ. Wrong-doing certainly leads to suffering, but in the first instance it is often the suffering of persons other than the wrong-doer. It may be answered that the Christian believes equally with the Hindu that in the end the wrong-doer too will suffer. But that is not the point. What is here maintained is that the fact that an individual suffers does not prove that he has been guilty of sins either in this life or in another. And further, there is a thought regarding suffering which believers in the doctrine of karma have never clearly apprehended, but which is of the greatest importance. There is no such thing as *mere* physical suffering. Pain endured in a good cause may be accompanied by such spiritual exaltation that it ceases to be pain, while in the case of another who through wrong-doing has brought the pain on himself it may be almost insupportable. This is a distinction that can have no meaning to him who believes that all that is endured is the fruit of the individual's own acts.

Let us turn to another line of thought. It is frequently urged that the belief in karma has great practical value, inasmuch as the anticipation of reward and punishment for all one's good and evil actions must operate as a powerful motive to well-doing. There is no doubt something in this contention. It is generally admitted that anticipation of reward and punishment is an inducement to the living of a life at least outwardly decent, though it is less likely that such anticipations will conduce to a lofty moral life. Further,

we cannot deny all moral value to the belief that present experiences are the outcome of good or evil done in former lives. Its value may be impaired by other considerations, but the belief in itself has value. The effects of wrong-doing, to look at but one side of the case, are present with a man ; they are not something that may be in the future. This should stimulate a man so to live as to avoid in the future similar punishment.

But there are elements in the case that detract from the moral value of the doctrine. For example, one weakness has been laid hold upon by many writers on the subject of karma. They have held that an immoral element is introduced into the doctrine when it is held that a man is punished for sins which he committed in a former life and of which he has no recollection. This objection is sometimes pushed too far, and stated in forms in which it might be used with equal cogency to condemn the doctrine of heredity. Indeed with greater cogency ; for it might be maintained that it is far more unjust that a man should suffer for sins committed by progenitors, for which he had no responsibility and of which he has no knowledge, than it is that he should be punished for sins committed by himself which have escaped his memory. But the principle of heredity does not work in the hard, mechanical way in which karma is supposed to work. This is a fact that may be expressed in various ways. For example, it often happens that a man becomes strong on that side of his character on which by heredity he is weak. When a man knows that he has inherited a tendency to a particular vice, he often sets resolutely to combat it, and his character gains in strength from the combat. Or even when a man suffers some physical disability which is the result of the wrong-doing of some progenitor, it is not necessarily regarded as an unmitigated misfortune. It may be the occasion of activities for the

good of his fellow-men which otherwise might not have suggested themselves to him. And there is the other aspect of human suffering, to which Jesus referred in that most illuminating passage where He speaks of the man born blind. To those who asked whether his blindness was due to his own sin or that of his parents He replied, "Neither did this man sin nor his parents, but that the works of God might be made manifest in him." Suffering is not necessarily penal; on the contrary it may be an occasion for the exercise of certain virtues on the part of others, which otherwise might not have been developed in them.

So, then, suffering which one owes to evil heredity is in no real sense of the term punishment. According to the doctrine of karma, on the other hand, whatever one suffers is the direct fruit of one's own misdeeds. He suffers from various disabilities from which the sufferer from the evil deeds of his forbears is exempt. To begin with, he has no indication in the nature of the penalty he endures of the particular line along which he should seek to amend his character. There are indeed passages where it is said, e.g., that he who steals water will be born again as a duck, that he who steals corn as a mouse, and where other penalties of a similar kind are threatened.[1] But such penalties can hardly be looked upon as having a reformatory character. And as regards the great mass of suffering there is no means of knowing the precise nature of the sin which occasioned it. Again, if a man believes that his own suffering and that of others is a punishment for sin, that thought is in danger of arresting the impulse to the service of others in the alleviation of suffering. There can be little doubt that it is this belief, more than any other one factor, that is responsible for the backwardness of the people of India in the work of ministering to the unfortunate. In recent

[1] Manu xii. 62.

times it has been by men in whom the belief has been breaking down that the work of social service has been taken up most enthusiastically.

We may consider in somewhat fuller detail another difficulty which besets the doctrine of karma, a difficulty which has already been hinted at. In the characteristic form of the doctrine it has been seen that good and evil are thought of in terms of act rather than of character. Now, it is generally recognised that works are, when taken in isolation, but a poor criterion of what a man is. There are works formally evil which may be the outcome of stupidity, or of good intention unskilfully executed, as well as of evil purpose. And there are deeds apparently good which are the outcome of long-sighted wickedness. These are facts to which too little weight has been given in Hindu thought. In teaching regarding karma it is almost invariably deeds that are spoken of as persisting and producing fruit, not tendencies of character. "The deed does not die," it is said.[1] Good deeds form, as it were, the credit side, and bad deeds the debit side of an account, which every one of necessity incurs. The relation of this account to the individual is of a comparatively external kind. As we have seen, karma may be in certain ways transferred. It may be exhausted without any suggestion that the individual becomes in any way different. Good and evil deeds are thought of not as realities that may have infinite consequences but as having values that are definite and fixed. The Hindu would have but little understanding of or sympathy with the Puritan saying that "as one leak may sink a ship, so one sin may sink a soul." The evil deed is considered not as symptomatic of a disease, which it in turn aggravates, but as constituting a load or a debt involving various disabilities. This way of looking at conduct shows itself in

[1] Manu xi. 46.

many ways in the everyday thought of many Hindu people. To mention only one of these ways—newcomers to India have often remarked on the curious attitude that Hindus seem to take to cases of wrong-doing. They often argue that for a single lapse a man should not be punished, even when the deed is one that to the Western mind seems to indicate serious culpability. It is not that the benefit of a " First Offenders' Act " is sought, but, as one sometimes hears it put in so many words, that a single wrong act is of little importance.

Now, these are facts which have very important consequences for the doctrine of karma generally. If for " deed " we substitutute " character " in the various formulations of the doctrine, the whole situation is altered. Character certainly bears its proper fruit, but its most important fruit is itself. A man's destiny must be that for which he fits himself ; it cannot be the fruit of a series of external acts abstracted from the character of which they are the expression. Judgments passed on acts apart from the character of the agent are usually very precarious. We do speak of certain kinds of acts as good or bad, and we speak of the good and bad points in men's characters. But that does not alter the fact that character is a unity, and that it cannot be truly represented after the analogy of a balance sheet with its credit and debit sides. It is possible for us to think of the individual as migrating from one form of being to another, each new birth being determined by the bent which his character has received in the preceding life. It may seem to us that certain men have characters more suited to the life of the " tiger or the ape " than to that of man, and it may not require much exercise of the imagination to think of them as re-incarnated in such forms. But this is a conception different from that with which we are familiar in Indian thought. In all the varieties of state-

ment in which the doctrine is presented, it is the deed, not the character, which is supposed to persist. And this thought of deeds as existing in isolation from each other and from the character of the doer is one that is psychologically unsound.

There is another objection to the doctrine of karma, which has been put in various forms by many writers on the subject, viz., that the doctrine, as involving a fatalistic explanation of human conduct, does nothing to solve the problem of the inequalities of human fortunes. The problem, it is said, is merely shelved. One life is explained by reference to a previous life, and it by reference to another, and so on *ad infinitum*. This objection is presented with some hesitation, because it has been denied that the deeds that men commit are determined by their karma ; it is said that it is only those experiences which lie outside their own choice that are so determined. This is a point that raises the whole question of the attitude of Hindu thought to the problem of freedom. It may, at least, be safely said that popular thought is largely fatalistic. The average individual feels that his misdeeds are the outcome of the operation of forces beyond his control as are the misfortunes that beset him. And Saṇkarāchāryа, at any rate, among philosophers has definitely maintained that the actions that a man performs are determined by Karma. He says that the actions and sufferings of man are due to a cause inherent in himself. God apportions good and evil among men, having regard to the efforts made by them. " But," he asks, " can this regard to the efforts made by the souls exist together with the dependence of all activity on God ? Certainly. For though the activity depends on God, it is only the soul that acts, while God causes it to act when it acts ; and as He now in causing it to act pays regard to former efforts, so too He in causing it to act formerly had

regard to still earlier efforts ; for saṃsāra is without beginning." [1]

This is an admission which undermines the value of the doctrine of karma as a justification of the seeming injustices of life. On this admission the difficulty is indeed only shelved. No explanation is given of the problem which is supposed to be explained. The individual becomes the sport of an overruling fate, and the real cause of his good or ill fortune is as mysterious as ever. Saṃsāra is eternal—without beginning. Living beings have been through all time tossed about like the balls of the juggler, and the statement that man by his own actions determines his destiny may be as true, but it is as irrelevant, as the statement that the conditions of the ball's rising in the air determine its fall.

One more objection to the doctrine of karma is that it is incompatible with belief in the possibility of the forgiveness of sins. This is an objection that will have no weight with those who believe thoroughly in the doctrine. There are many to whom the idea of forgiveness appears an immoral idea, which contrasts very unfavourably with that of the inevitable union of work and fruit. They also point out that the idea of forgiveness involves a theory of the relation of sin to God which they cannot accept. This second point we may pass over for the present, but the first point deserves some attention. It really brings us back to an aspect of the question discussed above as to the moral adequacy of the doctrine. The question before us here is whether this rigid doctrine of the relation of work and fruit is necessary for morality, or whether the highest moral doctrine may not admit of, or even demand, the possibility of forgiveness. It is noteworthy that it is in the works which manifest the spirit of deepest moral earnestness that

[1] Translated by Deussen, *System of the Vedānta*, p. 323.

the tendency has been most marked to depart from the rigidity of the doctrine of karma, and to grant a place to the grace of God, given freely, not according to merit. For example, karma is believed in unquestioningly in the Bhagavadgita, but we realise at once that we are face to face with one of the many inconsistencies of the book when we come to such a statement as this:

> Whatever be thy work, thine eating, thy sacrifice, thy gift, thy mortification, make thou of it an offering to Me, O son of Kunti. Thus shalt thou be released from the bonds of Works, fair or foul of fruit; thy spirit inspired by casting-off of Works and following the Rule, thou shalt be delivered and come unto Me.[1]

This quotation does not refer to forgiveness, but it refers to grace, a conception which really is a denial of the doctrine of karma. The forgiveness of sins as it is understood by Christians is thought of as a particular expression of the grace of God, and it is connected with a distinctive way of regarding sin which one hardly finds in Hinduism. But what is of importance here is the fact that within Hinduism the forms of religion that have had the greatest influence in the production of a spirit of moral earnestness have been forms in which the doctrine of karma was superseded by a doctrine of grace. The real bearings of the case have not always been explicitly recognised, and the two antagonistic doctrines have been held alongside each other, as in the Bhagavadita; for belief in karma is deep-rooted in the Indian mind. But the fact remains that it has been the thought of a way of escape from the operation of karma that has given to men freedom and hope. It has done this only imperfectly, for the idea has been only imperfectly conceived. It has not been easy for the Hindu mind to get away from the idea of action as working itself out pitilessly and inexorably, to that of a God who is gracious and

[1] Bhagavadgita ix. 27, 28.

forgiving, with a forgiveness that does not make sin a light thing, but a thing abhorrent to him who has been forgiven.

If the criticisms which have been offered above are sound, then it has been shown that the doctrine of karma lacks justification on moral grounds. The doctrine of saṃsāra falls with it. It has been shown that it can be neither proved nor disproved when stated simply by itself. But the fact that moral justification for it is wanting serves to make a *prima facie* case against it.

JOHN MCKENZIE.

JESUS IN THE FOURTH GOSPEL.

(1) OUR present interest does not require us to attempt any comparison between the Synoptic and the Johannine record of the Passion; we are concerned only with the theological import of the narrative. (i.) In the story of the arrest the voluntariness of Jesus' death is emphasised. He presented Himself to His captors (xviii. 4, 5). He did not use the awe which His appearance inspired to attempt any escape, and showed His constant care for His disciples (6–9). He rebuked Peter's hasty attempt by declaring His submission to God's will (vers. 10, 11). Note the Synoptic parallel (Matt. xxvi. 39, 42). (ii.) Before the high priest He asserted the openness of His teaching, and His right to proper treatment (vers. 19–23). Before Pilate He offered the assurance that the kingship He claimed as of another order was no danger to the Roman government; and to remove any misapprehension declared His vocation to be the imparting of truth to all truth-loving men (vers. 33–37). There is no antecedent improbability that Jesus would seek in some such way to allay the governor's suspicions. Pilate's contemptuous question (ver. 38), indicating that he re-

garded Jesus as a harmless visionary (xix. 4), explains His silence when again questioned as to His origin by the governor, whose superstitious fears had been aroused by the accusation "he made himself the Son of God" (vers. 7–9). Pilate's assertion of his authority as judge was rebuked by the reminder that the authority as delegated involved responsibility, and so must not be arbitrarily exercised. The parts were changed; and the prisoner pronounced judgment on the judge, but tempered judgment with mercy in affirming the greater guilt of the Jewish high priest (vers. 10, 11). (iii.) The explanation of details of the Passion as the fulfilment of prophecy is not peculiar to the evangelist, and needs no further consideration. The committal of the mother of Jesus to the beloved disciple is recorded, not only from the personal interest the incident possessed for him, but doubtless also to emphasise Jesus' detachment from all human relationships (cf. ii. 4, vii. 6–8). The report of the confession of bodily need (ver. 28) is directed against the docetism which is referred to in 1 John i. 1, iv. 2; as is also the reference to the flow of water and blood from the pierced side (ver. 34), as evidence of the reality of the death, although the evangelist doubtless knew nothing of the physiological explanation of the phenomenon. The natural explanation of the fact is credible against the assumption that the evangelist is here indulging in symbolic fiction; and is preferable to Westcott's supposition (*in loco*) that here there is to be recognised a supernatural sign. "As He hung upon the Cross He was shewn openly to be the source of a double cleansing and vivifying power, which followed from His death and life." No symbolic meaning is indicated, although probably the editor in his confirmation of the truth of the record in verse 35 had in view the meaning afterwards attached in 1 John v. 6. Assuming even that the evangelist was the author of the

epistle, the fact remembered afterwards suggested the meaning which reflexion found in it ; it was not doctrine which posed as reality. Probably the saying " it is finished " (ver. 30) is not so much a sigh of relief, as a call of triumph at an accomplished task. (iv.) In the record of the Resurrection, Mary's failure to recognise Jesus (cf. Luke xxiv. 16) indicated a change in Jesus' appearance, and Jesus' restraint of her affection a cessation of the former earthly relationship of bodily contact, and a transition to the abiding heavenly relationship of spiritual communion (xx. 13–17). While the Ascension is not recorded in the Fourth Gospel, it is referred to in Jesus' declaration. While Jesus is represented as distinguishing His relation to the Father from that of the disciples (else He had said " our ") it is significant that He speaks of the Father as " my God " ; and we may ask whether the confession ascribed to Thomas, " My Lord and my God " (ver. 28) is quite consistent with this affirmation. Had Jesus' teaching prepared any of the disciples for such a declaration of faith ? The words in the Upper Room of gracious greeting and of renewed trust (ver. 21), raise no question. But does the evangelist antedate Pentecost in verse 22, " Receive ye the Holy Ghost," or was the act of Jesus a symbolic prophecy, the pledge of a promise to be afterwards fulfilled ? The first explanation would be quite consistent with the teaching about the relation of the Spirit to Jesus in the Gospel ; but we need not set the evangelist needlessly in opposition to the common tradition of the Church as preserved in Acts, and may accept the second explanation. While verse 23 does at once recall Matthew xvi. 19 and xviii. 18, it is not impossible that the symbolic prophecy did include this separation of the apostolic company for the function of Christ's representative in declaring to men God's forgiveness or judgment ; but we must beware of

reading into the words later ecclesiastical pretensions. The possession of the Spirit is the condition for the exercise of this or any other spiritual function in the Church of Christ ; and only as the Church is conscious of the gift can it without arrogance exercise the authority so entrusted. The test offered to Thomas (ver. 27) suggests that in His appearances Jesus could assume reality even to other senses than sight alone ; but probably this was a capacity only occasionally exercised for special purposes (cf. Luke xxiv. 39–43). The whole subject is one, however, on which no confident assertions can be made. Quite characteristic of Jesus as represented in this Gospel is the last saying ascribed to Him, exalting the faith which requires no proofs of sense over the faith that rests on such evidence (ver. 29).

(2) What are the characteristics of the Jesus presented to us in the Fourth Gospel ? (i.) He appears filled with holy enthusiasm, as one conscious of fulfilling a vocation, probably that of the Suffering Servant of Jahweh ; and confident that He can restore the religion which priests and scribes are destroying, can give men such a knowledge of God as will enable them to worship aright, and can satisfy man's deepest need. Assured of open communion with God, He exercises a searching insight into the moral and spiritual condition of men ; and guided by that insight, He chooses the followers who can receive His message, demands an entire inward change in the self-satisfied Pharisee, and distrusts the belief which His miracles excite in the multitude. Superior to, and confessed such, by His forerunner, He acts independently of human advice in constant and entire dependence on God's guidance. In doing His works of healing, even on the Sabbath, He is but imitating the constant activity of His Father, of whom He has perfect knowledge, by whom He is perfectly loved and to whom He ever renders perfect obedience.

(ii.) As His mission from God is certified by His forerunner, His works, His own self-knowledge, and even the Holy Scriptures, unbelief in Him must be due to an evil choice. He offers Himself as the full satisfaction of man's need of God, as the Bread from Heaven, the Living Water, and the Light of the World. To those who believe in Him He imparts abounding spiritual power, liberation from the bondage of sin, and deliverance from the grasp of death. Not only will He discharge the function of the Judge of men hereafter, but He is already exercising a present judgment. Resistance of Him reveals a nature from beneath, descent not from Abraham, but from Satan, and so involves final condemnation. Salvation, the possession of the eternal life, is possible only through faith in Him, who is the Door, and this faith God gives. His relation to believers is that of the Good Shepherd, watching over, caring for and even giving His life on behalf of His sheep, and of the Vine to the branches, the source of all their sufficiency for service. Intimacy with Him, dependence on Him, love for Him, and obedience to Him are the marks of His own sheep, His living branches.

(iii.) He anticipates His own death voluntarily endured, not only as a token of His devotion to His own sheep, and as a proof of His obedience to His Father, but as the necessary condition of His universal spiritual effectiveness among men. He must be lifted up on the Cross, from the Grave, to Heaven to secure eternal life for all men, and to win all to Himself. Not in His words and works only, but also in His sacrifice is He the sustenance of the soul of man. His death is His glorification, but also the world's judgment because of its unbelief, and Satan's overthrow.

(iv.) His death leads to His further glorification in His return to His Father; His recovery of the dignity that He had before the world was due to the eternal love of the

Father for Him. His consciousness of pre-existence is rooted in, and springs out of His sense of oneness with God, and gains certainty the more His claim is challenged. While His return to God in His death means a temporary separation from His disciples, He anticipates a speedy reunion, not under the former earthly conditions, but in their inward experience of His presence and power in the other Paraclete, the Spirit of truth, the Holy Spirit, recalling His teaching, unfolding the meaning hitherto holden from them, leading into all truth only to make Him the better known and the more real to them, and God the Father in Him, in a relation which will inspire confidence in prayer, and sufficiency for service, and will issue in a human unity of believers corresponding to the divine unity of the Father and the Son.

(v.) As He lives, so do those who are joined to Him by faith live the eternal life ; as He goes to Heaven, so He prepares an abode for them in Heaven. While on earth they will be persecuted as He has been ; but as He has conquered the world, so while still in the world God will keep them from the evil, and amid its trials and sorrows they will share the peace which He has won, while by their witness to Him they secure the world's acknowledgment of His relation to and mission from God.

(3) It would have been impossible to reproduce every detail of the self-witness of Jesus as given in the evangelist's reminiscences ; all that has been attempted is to convey the total impression of the person and work as presented in the Fourth Gospel.

(i.) It is necessary now to sketch as briefly the effect on the presentation of the evangelist's own reflexions. It is probable that the disclosures of Messiahship by Jesus, and the confessions of it by others are antedated. The faith of a later period of the ministry is thrown back to its beginnings.

(ii.) The supernaturalness of the knowledge of Jesus is exaggerated by the evangelist, so as to give the impression almost that he desires to ascribe omniscience to Jesus; and yet the record itself demands only an insight and foresight corresponding to the moral conscience and religious consciousness of Jesus, which we may call supernatural, if we will, but which we must not treat as a solitary miracle. Possibly, too, there is a tendency, as in the account of the raising of Lazarus, to emphasise the supernatural power unduly. As regards both the evangelist himself gives us the corrective evidence that Jesus did not primarily base His claims on these, but on the relation to God as Father of which He was conscious, and the function from God on behalf of man, with which He knew Himself to be entrusted.

(iii.) In several passages the apologetic interest of the evangelist leads him to ascribe to Jesus what cannot be otherwise described than as an artificial pose. For instance, in vi. 5–6 Jesus' questioning of Philip is represented as simply a test of him, and not allowed to be a proof of any anxiety in His own mind; in xi. 42 a most unlikely reason for Jesus' thanksgiving for answered prayer is suggested; in xii. 30 as unlikely an explanation of the voice is given; and in xiv. 29 Jesus is reported as assigning a motive for His warnings which seems remote from His dominating purpose.

(iv.) Less certain is it, but not altogether improbable, that there is a disproportion in the presentation of the teaching of Jesus. While it is not unlikely that to meet vehement opposition Jesus was driven to unusual self-assertion, and that to a chosen few He was led to intimate self-disclosure; yet is He likely to have spoken quite so much about His relation to God as the Gospel reports? His claim to be perfectly related as Son to God as Father we may confidently accept as the self-witness of Jesus, but as

the names Father and Son indicate, He makes no claim to equality as His opponents alleged (v. 18c); but he acknowledged subordination (xiv. 28), obedience, dependence.

(v.) In the passage in which the evangelist develops probably his own doctrine of the relation of Father and Son (v. 19–29 except verse 24), what is confessed first of all is absolute dependence, complete knowledge, and so entire resemblance. If equal honour is claimed for the Son, it is because He can quicken the dead even as does the Father, and the Father hath given Him all judgment. Whether we interpret these functions spiritually or eschatologically the statement does not go beyond what Jesus in the one case claimed for Himself, and in the other foretold and the Church believed about Him. And these functions, too, are exercised in dependence on the Father. If the other passage, which reads like an expansion of the meaning of the Supper (vi. 51c, 52–59) is not a reminiscence, but a reflexion, it does no more than affirm man's absolute dependence by faith on Jesus for his spiritual sustenance and satisfaction. Here already theology and religious experience blend together. Still more is there personal valuation in the passage (iii. 16–21) in which eternal life is declared to depend on faith in the Son as the gift of God's love, a contrast is presented between God's intention of salvation for all, and the result of condemnation on many, due to unbelief, and the explanation of faith or unbelief is sought in attraction to or aversion from truth and goodness. The severity of the evangelist's judgment on unbelief is the obverse of the intensity of his personal devotion to Christ, and the absoluteness of value which His personal experience of Christ led Him to assign.

(vi.) While we are justified in distinguishing theological reflexions from experimental, and assigning less significance for to-day to the one than to the other, the evangelist would

make no such psychological analysis, but would ascribe the total reproduction in His consciousness of the historical reality of Jesus to the instruction and the illumination of the Spirit whom Christ promised and whom the community of believers was confident of having received *not by measure* (iii. 34). An inference as to the inner life of Jesus from this consciousness of Spirit-filled life would be drawn by the evangelist, if the A.V. rendering, "God giveth not the Spirit by measure unto Him" were correct. It would show how far removed is his doctrine from metaphysical abstractions, and how close it keeps to experimental reality; but the interpretation cannot be pressed. Apart from it, however, there is abundant evidence for this characteristic of the Gospel.

(vii.) Hence the Prologue must be regarded as a porch to the temple of somewhat discordant style; but in so far as there is accord, it is because the Gospel has modified the borrowed philosophy, and not been determined thereby in either its contents or method. And yet if Jesus has the value for the moral and religious life of man the Gospel assigns to Him, it is not in contradiction to, but in consistency with that valuation, that the Prologue assigns to the Word of God incarnate in Him such metaphysical significance.

Alfred E. Garvie.

SOME PARABLES AND AN APOCALYPSE OF THE ROAD.

(Analysis of Luke xv. 1–xvii. 10; and xvii. 11–xviii. 14.)

I

The Parabolic Introjection (*xv.* 1–*xvii.* 10).

Luke's 'Journey Narrative' seems violently interrupted by chapter xv., and for a time we lose all trace of the road. With the words, "He that hath ears let him hear" (xiv. 35), the voice of the preceding witness dies away. And there follows a long section devoted to the recording of parables.

(1) *Editorial matter.* We are fain to ask, Is it Luke himself who, deserting the rôle of historian or recorder of testimony, is now inserting unplaced memorabilia from his journals and parchments? In the first of these studies of Luke's narrative of the Passion Journey we have given our reasons for concluding that it is so with regard to the Parables of Lost Things in chapter xv. Following Professor A. B. Bruce's attractive conjecture we would call them gems of the Master's table-talk at Levi's feast (Mark ii. 15 ff. = Matt. ix. 10 f. = Luke xv. 1 f.). Luke, constrained to find a place for these priceless tales, but without any definite chronological indication in his source, places them here partly on account of their kinship in theme with the dominant note of the story which we have attributed to Manaen (xiii. 1–xiv. 35).

It seems likely that throughout this whole section (xv. 1–

xvii. 10)—as was the case with the section which begins with chapter xi.—we have to do mainly with a documentary source. It is a record of Sayings rather than of incident. Both its pericopae and its single 'Words' are introduced vaguely and abruptly (xvi. 1, 16, 17, 18, 19; xvii. 1, 3, 5, 7). It contains no chronological data; and no clear indications of Journey information. Indeed, not only the Parables of Lost Things, but several other Sayings almost certainly belong to pre-journey days. Thus xvi. 13 (God and Mammon) is part of the discourse on Care (cf. Matt. vi. 24), linked editorially to a parable here, by Luke. xvi. 16 (storming the Kingdom) seems part of an early discourse on the Baptizer (cf. Matt. xi. 12 f.). xvi. 17 (the everlastingness of the Law) may be part of the first Synagogue discourse in Capernaum (cf. Matt. v. 18). And xvii. 1–4 (concerning Offences and Forgiveness) remind us of Matthew xviii. 6 f., 15, 21 f.,—though a discourse on Offences does seem to belong to the part of the journey immediately before us. And one might compare also xvii. 5 (small faith yet big results) with Matthew xvii. 20, though there *were* similar Logia in the closing period of Christ's ministry (Mark xi. 22 f.; Matt. xxi. 21).

The two non-parabolic transition passages xvi. 14-18 and xvii. 1–6 give the impression that Luke is violently abbreviating his documentary source. They are unattached Sayings, with little bearing on the context. The latter of the two might be an abbreviation of the source behind Matthew xvii. 20–xviii. 6–xviii. 22. But it is perhaps unlikely that Luke is using Q here. As for the other passage xvi. 14–18, verse 17 may be, as Bruce suggests, the text which the story of Dives and Lazarus is meant to illustrate (cf. xvi. 29). But verses 16 and 18 have no relevance to this.

(2) *Journey information.* Does it not look as if the Third Gospel were itself mutilated at this point (xvi. 14–18)?

One wonders whether it has come scatheless through the Marcion controversy, or whether its imperfection here was one of the points which attracted Marcion to Luke. For the only verse for which we can definitely claim connexion with the Peraean ministry is here (xvi. 18). It corresponds to Matthew xix. 3 ff. (cf. Matt. v. 31 f.) = Mark x. 2 ff.,—the 'Divorce' conflict, of which Luke has no further record. And be it noted that in the Petrine tradition this is the first recorded incident of the Great Journey, and it occurred after the crossing into the Peraea.

With this slight clue to guide, two alternative suggestions about 'journey' information here may be made. (*a*) One is that possibly xvi. 14–18 has been displaced. If it were placed at the end of the story of Dives and Lazarus, we would then have the following sequence :—(i.) Chapter xv.—early parables editorially inserted here. (ii.) The Wily Steward (xvi. 1–13), followed by Dives and Lazarus (xvi. 19–31), in which the abrupt commencement of the latter does not seem so awkward. And these two parables might then represent additional information, from another source, regarding Jesus' table-talk in the friendly Pharisee's house. The Wily Factor (cf. xvi. 9) harks back to xiv. 12–14—'Entertain the poor that you may be recompensed in the resurrection of the just.' Dives and Lazarus would illustrate the contrary fate. Or they might represent a conversation of Jesus with His disciples on the road soon after that feast, and as a consequence of what He had said there. (iii.) The *Disjecta Logia* (xvi. 14–18 ; xvii. 1–6) in which we may have a mutilated record (xvi. 18) of the hostile questioning about Divorce (Mark x. 1–12 ; Matt. xix. 1–9) ; followed by a discourse to the disciples about Offences and self-mutilation. Luke xvii. 1, (2) = Matthew xix. 10–12 (cf. Matt. v. 27–32). Matthew v. 29 f. is repeated at xviii. 8 f. But the latter is evidently a mnemonic collection of Logia concerning

Offences, and the two referred to are irrelevant to the context there. They are in their right place here in the Peraean episode. Luke is vaguely right, only he chooses a wrong example of the Offences (xvii. 2). The parable xvii. 7–10 would also be in place here. And indeed most of the other sayings, except xvi. 16 perhaps, might be defended in this connexion.

(*b*) The other suggested alternative is to regard 'Dives and Lazarus' as displaced, and to remove it to the end of the section (after xvii. 10). The sequence would then be (i.) The Wily Factor,—a parable from a documentary source (of 'journey' information ?), its chronological sequence being some time after xiv. 12–14. (ii.) Then the isolated Logia xvi. 14–18, xvii. 1–4 : these representing the 'Divorce' and 'Offences' episode. (iii.) xvii. 5–10–xvi. 19–31 might then stand chronologically proximate to the incident of the rich young ruler, which in the Petrine tradition follows rapidly upon the 'Divorce' controversy (Mark x. 17–27 = Matt. xix. 16–26 = Luke xviii. 18–27). Luke xvii. 5–6 ('Lord, increase our faith') would attach themselves to Mark x. 26–27. And the parable of the 'Servant bound to the utmost service' would fall not ineptly into place here. As for the Story of Dives and Lazarus, not only would it be apposite in itself after the story of the rich young ruler, but in the *Gospel to the Hebrews* that story links itself with this parable in an interesting way. After Jesus' command to sell all and follow,—so this Gospel runs,—" the rich young ruler began to scratch his head, and it did not please him. Jesus said, How sayest thou 'I have done the Law and the Prophets' ? Since it is written in the Law *Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself*' ; and behold many of thy brethren, though sons of Abraham, are covered with filth and are dying with hunger, while thy house is full of good things and nothing at all goes out of it to them." —There is

an air of verisimilitude about this, but even if it is only due to confusion with the parable, the connexion is suggestive.

These, then, are the alternatives we suggest to those who feel bound to find some information about the journey in this section. But it must be confessed that the text as it now stands gives us but the scantiest and most elusive grounds to build upon.

(3) *Character of the Source.* To try to determine the nature of the source from an internal examination of the parables leads, similarly, to no very convincing or satisfactory result. There is no doubt that Luke has here preserved for us much authentic material of priceless value ; but there are signs of considerable editorial working over,—indeed the authenticity of two of the parables—the Wily Factor and Dives and Lazarus—has been called in question by some. The former, which *seems* to commend immoral conduct, has perplexed sober-minded spiritual pedestrians. Yet this very perplexity which it creates is a stamp of its genuineness. Who but our Lord would have dared to use such an illustration ? And when we have understood that it is not one of the hall-marks of the religious mind to be devoid of humour, our difficulty here will vanish. But even in the text of the Gospel here we gather that the reporters of the parable, and Luke himself, were somewhat puzzled. From xvi. 8 to xvi. 13 no less than three lessons or morals seem to be heaped one on the other. Perhaps the misleading has been caused by verse 8 ; and this error has been heightened for us to-day by the epithet 'dishonest steward' which has become attached to the parable, and thus lends a false emphasis to the secondary feature of the story. It is the man's *shrewdness*, his wiliness, that is being thrust into the foreground by Jesus, not his dishonesty. Further, our translators have sought to tone down the objection by endeavouring to indicate that it was the factor's master that commended him.

Apart from the fact that it was the good graces of the people he had sought dishonestly to benefit that were alone of consequence to the factor now,—for he had already been dismissed from service,—the words which follow would be almost meaningless on the lips of his 'Kurios.' It certainly was not at all in *his* thoughts at the moment to be making comparisons between the children of the world and the children of light! No, 'the Lord' of verse 8 is certainly Jesus. (Cf. Luke vii. 13, x. 1, xi. 39, xii. 42, xiii. 15, xvii. 6, etc.). It is He who has intended this comparison. And the words, 'the Lord commended the unjust (or dishonest) steward' are obviously an indirect and euphemistic way of recording a humorous colloquialism from the lips of Jesus ('The rascal! but wasn't he clever!'); or perhaps no articulate word was spoken at all,—just a smile and a gesture, as much as to say, 'You see!' and then 'The children of this world are wiser in their generation than the children of light.' And then, to point the whole, He adds verse 9. The phrase 'Mammon of unrighteousness' is apt to mislead us there. Jesus thought of wealth as something secular, something to be classed with corruptible and passing things. That is what the phrase here means.[1] He certainly does not mean, 'Use wealth in dishonest ways in order to win the love of good people and so make your eternal welfare secure.' He means, 'The only right way of using filthy lucre is in order to bestow kindnesses on your deserving and needy dependants and neighbours.'—'Spiritualise wealth,' He seems to say. 'Did it never strike you that giving, bestowing, releasing from debt is a prudent practice? Shrewd, in the other-worldly sense. It secures your welcome in the everlasting habitations!'

[1] "When it fails" (ἐκλίπῃ)—the best supported reading here (xvi. 9)—would bear this interpretation of Μαμωνᾶς τῆς ἀδικίας out. Money never carries through to life's goal.

Then follow two other interpretations which are not from Jesus. The first is probably the interpretation of Luke's informant (the compiler of the document from which he borrowed),—xvi. 10-12. It is a laborious missing of the point. And, if they are words of Jesus, they belong more properly to the later parable of the pounds. xvi. 13 is probably Luke's own comment on the parable, as if he were still not satisfied that the bad impression had been removed![1]

The intrinsic interest of the problem here has caused us to digress. Our purpose is to scrutinise the workings-over and accretions of an editorial nature in this parabolic introjection, for possible hints as to the character of the source. And there is nothing very tangible in the foregoing, unless the subject matter of the parable itself is an indication of the mind of the man, or circle, who treasured it. It is preoccupied with the relations between wealth and poverty, the use of money by the followers of the spiritual life. And it is possible that the phrase 'Mammon of Unrighteousness' has been coloured and intensified by passing through the alembic of minds that took a more disdainful attitude to wealth than Jesus did (cf. xvi. 11 'the unrighteous mammon').

The story of Dives and Lazarus—an illustrative incident (*Beispielerzahlung*) rather than a parable—is also rejected, *in toto* by some critics, in part by others, as revealing a type of mind whose interests differed from those of Jesus as we see them elsewhere in the Gospels, particularly in other parables We see no conclusive evidence of this in the well-knit, well-told story. But again there may be elements in it which have acquired an exaggerated touch from the mind of the recorder,—the suggestion of antagonism against the rich as

[1] The presence of this verse here, and its absence from the discourse on Care (xii. 22 ff.), of which it is a part, indicates that this part of Luke's Gospel is more primitive than xii, 22 ff.

such, the absorption in picturesque schematism of the unseen world, the emphasis on the sanctity of the ancient Jewish scriptures.

When we lift our eyes to take a wider survey of Luke's special documentary source, it appears, as this whole section suggests, to have been mainly parabolic in character. And we are reminded that there are fifteen parables peculiar to Luke,[1]—sixteen, if we reckon 'The Master serving the Servants' (xii. 36–38) as a distinct parable. Five are in this section, three or four in the preceding narrative. And the special elements we have just mentioned have suggested to some critics a special documentary source in Luke betraying an Essenic, or perhaps an Ebionitic tendency. A special sympathy with poverty, an absorption in moral problems connected with money or wealth is characteristic of this Third Gospel (cf. i. 52 f., vi. 20 f., xii. 13 ff., xiv. 12 ff., xvi. 1 ff., 19 ff. etc.). Again there is a predilection for angelology and picturesque statements as to the paraphernalia of the other world (cf i. 11, 26, ii. 9 ff., x. 18, xii. 20, xv. 7, 10, xvi. 9, 22 ff., etc.). There is also a reverence for the authority of the Law and the Prophets (cf. xvi. 17, 29 ff. ; xxiv. 27, etc.) which is probably not a trait of Luke the Gentile. And along with the emphasis on repentance there are suggestions that there may be room in the new faith for true Pharisees who need no repentance (cf. xv. *passim*, the elder brother, etc.). Our suggested source for the testimony preceding this parabolic section, Manaen, with his Esseno-Pharisaic training, would

[1] The parables peculiar to Luke are :—New wine and old (v. 39), the two debtors (vii. 41 ff.), the good Samaritan * (x. 30 ff.), the midnight borrower (xi. 5–8), the rich fool * (xii. 16 ff.), the Master serving the Servants (xii. 36–38), the fruitless fig-tree (xiii. 6–9), the unfinished tower (xiv. 28–30), the ill-planned campaign (xiv. 31–32), the lost coin (xv. 8–10), the prodigal son (xv. 11–32), the Wily Factor (xvi. 1–9), Dives and Lazarus * (xvi. 19–31), the duty-bound Slave (xvii. 7–10), the unrighteous judge (xviii. 1–8), the Pharisee and the Publican * (xviii. 9–14).

* *Beispielerzahlungen.*

certainly be interested in all these questions. On the other hand there is a certain scorn of Pharisees (xv. 2, xviii. 9–14, etc.), which does not chime with our view of Manaen. And the marked sympathy with non-Jews, especially with Samaritans, makes it clear that the circle from which this supposed documentary source emanated cannot have been pronouncedly Jewish-Christian, nor can it be attributed to a single hand. Attempts have been made, without much success, to show that among Luke's sources were documents like the *Gospel to the Hebrews*, which may have had a vogue in the early Church in Eastern Palestine and Syria. Certainly it was there, in trans-Jordanic Jewry, that Jewish Christianity degenerated into Ebionitism, and ran to seed in the sects of the Nazarenes, Elkesaites, etc. But it is not necessary, nor on other grounds desirable, to date Luke's Gospel as late as the first noticeable appearance of such tendencies. These tendencies in Luke are only embryonic. And it is sufficient for our present purposes to remember that the early Church in Jerusalem was largely Jewish-Christian, and that its views at the beginning were not so pronounced as to be incompatible with sympathy towards Samaritan Christians.

Perhaps, in the long run, the simplest explanation of this parabolic introjection (xv. 1–xvii. 10) may be the truest,—that Luke was about to launch on the last stage of the Sacred Story, but found himself confronted here with some material which he felt impelled to engross in his Gospel, and used this his last opportunity for doing so. The other more elaborate conjectures are problematic and insecure.

II.

An Apocalypse of the Road. (*Luke xvii.* 11–*xviii.* 14.)

We have now reached the last point in the 'Journey Narrative' where Luke thrusts us definitely on the road

to Jerusalem again. 'Now it happened in the course of His journey to Jerusalem that He passed between (διὰ μέσον, i.e., through the borderland between) Samaria and Galilee' (xvii. 11). Strictly speaking this new section of 'journey' information ends at xviii. 14. Thereafter we are into the main stream of agreed Synoptic tradition, leading swiftly to the events of the Passion Week. And there Luke submits himself once more to the guidance of the Petrine order of events. Nevertheless, he interweaves with it so much original material that it will be well to make a note of it here. It may have some bearing on the question of the special source with which we have now to reckon from xvii. 11 onwards.

The story of Zacchæus (xix. 1–10); the definite chronological placing of the parable of the pounds (xix. 11); the definite prediction of the fall of Jerusalem (xix. 41–44, cf. xxi. 20); the *pericope adulterae* (John vii. 53–viii. 11) —in all probability a fragment of Luke, the original position of which may have been after Luke xx. 26: the naming of the two disciples who prepared the Upper Room (xxii. 8), 'I will break bread no more till the Kingdom' (xxii. 15 f.); 'I am among you as he that serveth' (xxii. 24–27); 'companions of my temptations,' etc. (xxii. 28 f.); 'Simon, Satan hath desired you' (xxii. 31 f.); 'Take purse, scrip, sword' (xxii. 35–38); 'Your hour and the power of darkness' (xxii. 53); the Lord looks on Peter (xxii. 61); particulars of the accusation (xxiii. 2); the sending to Herod (xxiii. 5–16); the weeping women (xxiii. 27–31); ['Father, forgive them' (xxiii. 34)]; the dying thief (xxiii. 39–43); [Peter's visit to the tomb (xxiv. 12)]; on the road to Emmaus (xxiv. 13–35); resurrection appearances in *Jerusalem* (not Galilee)— these twenty points at least are all peculiar to Luke in the synoptic account of the closing days.

(1) *Editorial accretions.* In this last section of Luke's

journey narrative, the illustration of the Pharisee and the Publican (xviii. 9–14) is almost certainly an editorial addition. It connects with the preceding parable on the general subject of Prayer. But it has no bearing on the particular subject which has just been rounded off by that parable—the Parousia. It might have been spoken on the occasion of the Zacchæus incident a little later in Jericho; but if so, it would almost certainly have found its place there. It belongs much more likely to an earlier time in Galilee.

One suspects that the parable of the Unrighteous Judge is here because it had been pressed by early Christian preachers to do duty in sermons on the Advent Faith. But in that case, for its association with such teaching here it is not Luke who is responsible but his informant.

There remains this first Parousia Discourse (xvii. 20–37) to be examined. xvii. 25 ('But first He must suffer, etc.') may be an editor's caveat. But the disciples were not as yet beyond the need of such reiterated instruction (cf. xviii. 31–34). They were still looking for a manifestation of the Messiah without an intervening death. xvii. 31 is almost certainly a fragment of the 'little Apocalypse' (in Luke xxi. = Mark xiii. = Matt. xxiv.) It is part of the prophecy of the destruction of Jerusalem, and is scarcely in place in an address on the Final Manifestation. xvii. 32 ('Remember Lot's wife') has all the appearance of being a preacher's expansion of the already completed illustration of Lot and Sodom. And it seems responsible for dragging with it into the text not only the preceding verse 31, but the succeeding verse 33 also. 31 prepares the way for 32, and 33 is the moral drawn. The latter certainly belongs to an earlier context,—the address at Caesarea Philippi (?). It is a doublet of ix. 24. xvii. 36 is generally regarded as a late interpolation from Matthew (xxiv. 40); Luke's version of the saying is already given in verse 34.

(2) *The Journey Information.* The story of the Ten Lepers (xvii. 12–19), and this Apocalyptical Discourse (xvii. 20–37), with the parable of the Unjust Judge which seems to round it off (xviii. 1–8), form the special testimony of the road to Jerusalem which Luke here offers, before the agreed narrative of the closing days of the Passion begins. And we can to some extent localise the incidents. We are carefully informed that the incident of the lepers occurred in the border-land between Samaria and Galilee. Jesus has travelled South from Tiberias down the Lake side and through the country West of Jordan as far as the neighbourhood of Scythopolis which is in the borderland between Samaria and Galilee. He is about to cross to the Peraea by the ford of Bethabara. And then, in Luke, comes the first actual persecution of Jesus since xi. 53. For xv. 2 belongs to an early day in Galilee. (It is another evidence of the earliness of these parables to note that it is only the murmuring and sneering of the approaching storm of opposition that is there recorded. By the time this journey began, the day for that tentative hostility had long gone by.) We may recall also the phrase which follows xi. 53 f.—'In the meanwhile' (xii. 1). It seems as though Luke were saying, 'But before we come to the persecution I have other stories of the road to tell'; and he proceeds to give us the testimonies which we have associated with the names of Mnason and Manaen. Then we note that in the parabolic introjection (xv. 1–xvii. 10) he gives us a mere hint of the persecution on the test-question about Divorce (xvi. 18). And we remind ourselves that according to Mark (x. 1 f.) this took place at the time of the crossing into Peraea. The persecution was continued, according to Luke, in this further question, which was half a malicious taunt, about the coming of the Kingdom (xvii. 20.) We would place it therefore after Jesus had crossed the Jordan.

The Apocalyptic discourse to the disciples, which follows, is not the same as that which Luke shares with the other Synoptists later (Mark xiii., Matt. xxiv., Luke xxi.). When we compare Mark xiii. with Matthew xxiv., we find that what Matthew and Mark have in common is—generally speaking—not that which is left to us here in Luke xvii. 22 ff. ; whereas what remains in Matthew, when the " little Apocalypse " and the Marcan parallels are extracted, corresponds roughly to what we have here in Luke xvii. 27 ff. ; Luke the historian seems again to be separating what Matthew the compiler has run together. What is peculiar to Luke is the illustration about Lot and Sodom, and the placing of the proverb of the vultures and carrion at the end. Matthew's version of the sayings certainly seems to be more authentic. But that should not invalidate Luke's claim to be giving reliable testimony as to chronological setting at least. Luke's variations from Matthew show that he is not dependent on the same source, and the ' Lot ' illustration is vivid, purposeful and in Jesus' manner. We seem here to have a real Parousia Discourse, undistracted (if we omit xvii. 31) by prophecy of coming disaster on Jerusalem, and throughout capable of a spiritual interpretation in keeping with the opening of the discourse.

(3) *The Source.* There is little in the section, taken by itself, to help us to a conjecture as to its source. On first thoughts we might consider the story of the Ten Lepers to be from the same source as the first part of the Journey Narrative (ix. 51–x. 42). For the special sympathy with the Samaritans which we noted there is obvious here also. The Samaritan borderland is mentioned ; and we are ostentatiously told that the only one of the ten who returned to speak his gratitude was a Samaritan—" a stranger " ; and that Jesus took special note of the fact. But the question then arises, Why is it isolated from that first testimony

of the road ? For we saw that that testimony contained incidents from various stages of the journey, some of them certainly later than this incident. The theory which we have had in view throughout our entire discussion, namely that Luke in his account of the journey does not break up the testimonies of his special witnesses, but sets each strand of information down by itself, arranging them in proximate chronological order, has been found to justify itself so far. And if we can find another source in which the interest in the Samaritans is also strong, it would explain the isolation of this story from that earlier testimony, and our view as to the employment by Luke of this leading principle in arranging his material can be maintained throughout the whole of the journey narrative where he is without guidance from the Petrine tradition.

When we begin to view this last portion of the journey narrative in the light of the special material which Luke interweaves with the Petrine tradition of the Passion days, another suggestion as to source begins to emerge. In addition to the twenty special features we have already mentioned from this latter part of Luke, certain important omissions must be noted. The story of the lawyer in Jerusalem who asked about the Chief Commandment of the Law is omitted by Luke probably because of its resemblance to that of the Jericho (?) lawyer who evoked the parable of the Good Samaritan. The suppression of the anointing in Bethany may be another instance of his fear of doublets. The omission of the cry of dereliction from the Cross is probably an instance of his anxiety to avoid anything that might be employed in derogation of our Lord. Perhaps the omission of the cursing of the fig-tree is an example of the same tendency. But the story as told in the other Synoptists is an unlikely story. Apart from the unusual nature of the miracle, it is out of keeping with the character

of our Lord. The story looks like a degenerate rendering of the parable which Luke alone records (xiii. 6 f.). But the suppression of the ambition of the wife of Zebedee and her sons, and the vaguer report of a strife at the Last Supper where some of the words of this incident are introduced, have a different motive behind them. Luke is careful, as a rule, of the reputation of disciples, and tender in his refer, ences to women followers. And when we remember how Jesus' interest in women is again emphasised in these closing pages (cf. [the *pericope adulterae*], the weeping women on the *via dolorosa*, the women haunting the garden of the tomb), we begin to surmise that there may be women in this last circle of informants.

And in particular Luke's regard for the susceptibilities of Zebedee's family here puts us on the alert when we begin to examine the original matter. For the general impression all of it makes on us is that all the time we are in close touch with informants who stood in the very innermost circle and remained there till the bitter end. Not only are there fuller reminiscences of the night of the Upper Room and of the way to Gethsemane, but also of the procession to Calvary and of the foot of the Cross. Immediately after the strife at the table with its echoes of the rebuke to the family of Zebedee, we have ' Ye are they who have continued with me in my temptations ' which suggests as their reporter one or other of the three who shared Jesus' inmost confidences. It records a generous word from Jesus' lips in place of the doubtful ' Can ye drink of my cup ? ' And the word which follows, ' I appoint unto you a Kingdom,' suggests a reporter eager to record a compensating word to set against the rebuff of ' To sit on my right hand and my left is not mine to give.'

Again, ' I am among you as he that serveth ' (cf. xii. 37) calls to mind the washing of the disciples' feet, recorded only

in the Fourth Gospel. 'Simon, Satan hath desired you' must have come from one of the three who were immediately about Him on the way to Gethsemane and in the garden. It has its echo in 'Simon, son of Jonas' in the Fourth Gospel. Then the full particulars of the accusation, and the report of that moving gesture 'The Lord turned and looked upon Peter' surely come from some one who was present, listening, and watching all that transpired. Further, the ears that heard Jesus' words to the weeping women on the road to Calvary, that caught the murmured prayer as they drove the nails through His hands,[1] and that, in spite of the cries and jeers, overheard the conversation with the dying thief, must have been in that circle of intimates who stood around the Cross. One might add to this the fact that Luke alone, outside the Fourth Gospel, records Peter's visit to the grave,[2] and he agrees with the Fourth Gospel also in placing the first resurrection appearances to disciples in Jerusalem.

Now, according to the Fourth Gospel, John is the only disciple who fulfils all these qualifications. He was present at the trial, and stood with the mother Mary and the other women at the Cross. He accompanied Peter to the Grave. There are so many other points of affinity between Luke's Gospel and the Fourth (*vid.* Harnack: *Luke the Physician*, Appendix IV.) that it may reasonably be inferred there was a genuine testimony of John to which both writers had access. Luke's naming of Peter and John as the two disciples sent. to prepare the Upper Room helps to confirm this suggestion And surely the witness whose tones reverberate behind all the words about Jesus' 'hour' and the 'power of darkness' in the Fourth Gospel is the same witness who remembered

[1] Surely an authentic word of Jesus, even if its place in Luke is doubtful.

[2] May not some of these supposed interpolations in the closing chapters of Luke be notes which he himself added to a later edition of his Gospel when he regained contact with the Johannine circle in his closing years?

the word in the garden which Luke alone records (xxii. 53). Luke is no doubt indebted to other witnesses for some of these details. Manaen, for example, may be responsible for the account of Jesus' appearance before Herod. But surely there is a high probability that Luke's main special source for these original details of the Passion is the Johannine circle.

Extra-canonical tradition helps to confirm the probability of Luke's close association with this circle. John is said to have reached Ephesus ultimately, after the scattering of the Jerusalem Church. Other " great luminaries " of the early Church were in the company. Mary Magdalene is traditionally associated with Ephesus ; and Philip and his virgin daughters were there before removing to Hierapolis. Luke's Gospel did not receive its final form till after the fall of Jerusalem. And Luke himself is said to have returned to the East about that time. Not only, therefore, might he have had intercourse with John and the circle of the holy family in the days when he visited Jerusalem with Paul, but also in Ephesus in his closing years.

What is the bearing of all this on the portion of the journey narrative now before us ? It is natural to suppose that this circle, or part of it, was among the company of Christian refugees who fled from Jerusalem before its fall. What was the course of their wanderings ? Almost certainly it was not direct from Jerusalem to Ephesus. The whole country was disturbed. Sailing from its ports (Joppa or Caesarea) would be difficult owing to the Roman garrisons. Their first thoughts would be towards Galilee, their native land. But Western Galilee was in turmoil. Preparations against the Roman arms were being proceeded with there. Jotapata, Gischala, Sepphoris, Tiberias, Tarichaea, etc., were being fortified by the rebels. The shores of the Lake to the North and West were in the war zone. They would go

as near as possible, but off the track of the storm, hoping by and by to slip home. Why not to the Peraea where Jesus had conducted His last great campaign, and where there were still, doubtless, many sympathisers ? History confirms this expectation. James the brother of the Lord was martyred in Jerusalem about 62 A.D. A successor was elected to the vacant bishopric in the person of Symeon, a cousin of Jesus. There followed a few feverish agitated years for the Church in the holy city. The commotion of rebellion crept nearer and nearer. And in May 66 A.D. the first bloodshed occurred within the walls. The rebel party gained complete possession of the city on the 8th November. And a general exodus took place of those who could not in conscience join the rebels. The Christians were among them (cf. Matt. xxiv. 20). Eusebius tells us that they left Jerusalem " in consequence of a divine admonition " (*κατὰ τινα χρησμὸν τοῖς αὐτόθι δοκίμοις δι' ἀποκαλύψεως ἐκδοθέντα, κ.τ.λ.* Eus. *H.E.* III. 53) ; and that the place where they came to was Pella, on the East side of Jordan far up the valley towards the Sea of Galilee, not far south of the crossing at Bethabara. Pella was just out of the war zone, for Gamala was about the only town on the East side of Jordan which the rebels were fortifying, and it lay North of the crossing at Bethabara—on the East shore of the Lake. But why Pella in particular ? Is it unreasonable to suppose that this was one of the main centres from which Jesus conducted His campaign in the Peraea ? Such a conjecture begins to be exciting when we remember that the Fourth Evangelist is not ignorant of this Peraean mission. He gives us precisely this locality as the place to which Jesus returned " *again*," after one of His visits to Jerusalem ; and he adds, " there He *abode*." The descriptive phrase by which the writer indicates this locality is full of suggestion. It is " the place where John at first baptized " (John x. 40), which we know was in the

neighbourhood of " Bethabara *beyond* Jordan " (John i. 28). It was the scene of Jesus' own baptism,—the place where the conviction fell on Him in full luminous flood that He was 'the Son' called to be 'the Servant.' Hither He came on His last great journey to Jerusalem,—as if He sought to quicken memory, and confirm His vision ere He faced the last dread issue of His vocation.

But may we not go further? Observe the remarkable nature of Eusebius' words above quoted. The Christians left Jerusalem " in consequence of a certain warning issued to those in authority there, *through an apocalypse.*" Now in the Synoptics we have a long eschatological discourse (Mark xiii. = Matt. xxiv. = Luke xxi.) in which criticism has discovered what is known as the " Little Apocalypse," [1] interwoven with other logia. This Apocalypse bears the obvious marks of being a product of the tumultuous and bloody days which preceded the flight of the Christians from Jerusalem. May it not be the very Apocalypse to which Eusebius refers as occasioning the flight? That the authority of this warning was recognised by the Jerusalem Church means that it must have been based on authentic words of Jesus. The scene of the utterance of this apocalyptic discourse of Jesus, which the Synoptists have engrossed in their Gospels, is Jerusalem. And any definite prediction about the fate of Jerusalem from Jesus' lips would doubtless have been spoken there. But now along with this prediction of national catastrophe the disciples associated Jesus' other sayings about His own Parousia (*vid.* Mark xiii., Matt. xxiv.). The Jerusalem Church in these closing days would have been excitedly expecting the two to coincide. Is it unnatural to suppose that the goal of their flight may have been in part determined by the memory of Parousia predictions

[1] It is Mark xiii. 7–8, 14–20, 24–27 = Matthew xxiv. 6–8, 15–22, 29–31 = Luke xxi. 9–11, 20–27.

spoken in Pella by Jesus? Perhaps He would appear to them where He had foretold His coming like lightning flashing from horizon to horizon.

This brings us back to the last section (xvii. 11–xviii. 8) of Luke's story of the road. Here we have an Apocalyptic discourse concerned with the Parousia pure and simple,—though it may not be without significance that in the form in which it has reached us it contains one fragment of "the Little Apocalypse" (xvii. 31). But note again precisely where it is placed by Luke. Removing the parable of the Pharisee and the Publican, and regarding the parable of the unjust judge as part of the Parousia discourse, we observe that it occurs immediately *before* the blessing of the children, and immediately after the incident of the lepers which is carefully placed in the borderland between Samaria and Galilee, as Jesus passed through on His way to Jerusalem. Compare this with the verses in Mark (x. 1) and Matthew (xix. 1) which record the departure from Galilee and the coming into the coasts of Judaea beyond Jordan; and note that in these Gospels the blessing of the children follows an attempt to trap Him on the question of Divorce, and that these are the first incidents of the Peraean journey which these evangelists record. Now, if, as we may infer, His route across Jordan was viâ Bethshan (Scythopolis) in the borderland between Samaria and Galilee, and the crossing at Bethabara, the first cities of the Peraea which He would reach would be Gadara or Pella. The latter lay more directly on the road to Jerusalem. We arrive therefore at this result: this Parousia discourse which Luke alone records was spoken probably in this neighbourhood. It is the central feature of this last section of journey information.

Jesus' sojourn here and His excursions out into the other towns and villages of the Peraea probably extended over

months. Mark summarises the course of events as a second great popular movement,—'the crowds resort to Him again, and He taught them *again as He had done before*'; and Matthew adds that He performed healings. It is against that background that we have to set in bold relief the few incidents of this sojourn which the evangelists record. And, as is the rule in these parsimonious records, they are the salient, the significant incidents of this part of the Great Career, and are probably all to be located in the place which He made His headquarters. There is the attempt to trap Him on the question of divorce; the sceptical challenge about the coming of the Kingdom (Luke xvii. 20 f.); the discourse to the disciples on the Parousia (xvii. 22–xviii. 8); according to the Fourth Gospel there is a journey up to a feast at Jerusalem from here and back (John x. 40); probably the return of the last of the Seventy was here (cf. xvii. 24 with x. 18); and there is the blessing of the children—probably a farewell incident as He was bringing His Peraean ministry to a close, and preparing to set out down the river valley for Jericho and Jerusalem. A brief ministry in Jericho, and then comes the week of the Passion and the Cross.

From whom then would Luke be likely to receive this last testimony of the road, the outstanding feature of which is a Parousia discourse (at Pella ?), if not from the scattered remnant of the Jerusalem Church which sojourned for a troubled, feverishly expectant time at Pella ? The source behind this story is the source behind most of the original features of Luke's Passion narrative, the circle of which the Apostle John is the brightest star. This view satisfactorily explains the presence of the story of the ten lepers. For we find (Acts viii. 14) that the two disciples who were sent down from Jerusalem to enquire into the work of Philip the evangelist in Samaria were Peter and *John*; and that they

themselves preached in many villages of Samaria (Acts. viii. 25 ; cf. John iv. 37 f.).

But the chief feature of the theory is the light it sheds on the Parousia discourse (at Pella). For this Johannine circle had a deep interest in Apocalypse. On the authority of Apocalypse they left Jerusalem. Under the excitement of Apocalyptic hopes they must have tarried at Pella. And without accepting it as an evidence of authorship one must take cognisance of the early tradition which assigns the Book of the Apocalypse (Rev.) to this circle under the name of John. In the Book of the Revelation we find reverberations of the fall of Jerusalem (xi. 1 ff.). And in this Apocalypse of the Road we have already found hints that it was a testimony such as a ' prophet ' might give in the course of a sermon to a primitive Christian congregation. xvii. 31–33 looks like a sermonic expansion. The parable of the unjust judge (xviii. 1–8) may owe its presence here to the same cause. The concluding verses (7–8) remind us again of similar conceptions in Revelation (vi. 9 ff., xi. 10).

Nor is it unduly trespassing into the realm of conjecture to add the suggestion that Silas was one of the circle. Silas was a prominent Jerusalem Christian, possessing the charism of prophecy. Almost certainly he was a follower of Jesus in the days of His flesh.[1] He was one of the deputation of two sent to Antioch (Acts xv. 32, 34). He succeeded Barnabas as Paul's missionary companion.[2] Luke joined them just

[1] Silas was apparently entitled to the designation "apostle" (1 Thess. ii. 6)—one of those who had 'seen the Lord.' Tradition makes him one of the Seventy.

[2] The second part of the account of Paul's experiences in Philippi (Acts xvi. 25 ff.) may come from Silas ; and in the Epistles where Silas is associated with Paul (1 and 2 Cor., 1 and 2 Thess.), the interest in eschatological questions (cf. 1 Cor. xv. 20 ff., 2 Thess. i. 7 ff., ii. 1-12) may in part be due to the influence of Silas. Later, he was Peter's amanuensis ; and the frequent references to our Lord's Parousia in 1 Pet. may again, in part, be due to him.

before they crossed to Europe. It seems probable that Silas accompanied Paul and Luke to Jerusalem, and that he remained there in his old spiritual home. He would in all probability have been one of the fugitives from Jerusalem in 66 A.D. It is significant that the sect of the Montanists who sprang up in Phrygia a century later, and one of whose main occupations was watching for the Parousia, claimed to be the direct spiritual descendants of the prophet Silas (who came to Asia Minor with Peter's letter), and the daughters of Philip who were prophetesses.

Conclusion.

It may be fitting to close these studies of Luke's 'Journey Narrative' (ix. 51–xviii. 14) by briefly reviewing the results. On the theory which we have sought to carry through the entire analysis, the apparent chronological chaos has been found to be not so dark and bewildering as is generally maintained. Apart from the two large passages (xi. 1–52; and xv. 1–31) the first of which is certainly pre-journey material, and of the nature of a prefatory afterthought to the story which follows it, we have found a body of fresh facts and words, which, with the removal of a very few editorial intrusions, forms a consistent, orderly, and absorbing story of the last great journey of Jesus to Jerusalem.

In the narrative thus purged of alien matter we have attempted to find three or four separate testimonies of the road set down in their proximate chronological order. Sometimes separate incidents in one testimony may have been found to overlap in time events in the others. But each separate testimony has been found to contain one main feature, and these represent in true chronological order the salient features of the journey to Jerusalem. If we may be permitted to use the names we have associated with these

separate testimonies,—they are (1) Philip the Evangelist's Testimony concerning the sending of the Seventy as heralds of the great campaign. (2) Mnason's testimony concerning the last farewell to followers in Galilee, with the striking parables of the Return. (3) Manaen's testimony—the story of the Pharisee foster-brother of Herod who sought to save Jesus from the wiles of Antipas, if not also from the consequences of His mission of Reform to Jerusalem, but who himself was saved. (4) A possibly fragmentary or mutilated parabolic introjection containing some conversation of the road and possibly a reference to the brush with adversaries over the question of divorce. (5) The testimony of the Apostle John (or of Silas), whose main feature is the Parousia discourse (at Pella) in the Peraea.

In conclusion we may briefly outline the conjectural itinerary which the journey thus indicated pursued. Jesus first attempted to go to Jerusalem through Samaria; but finding a closed door there, conceived a plan on a vaster scale and turned back to Galilee to get followers to be His outrunners. Bidding farewell to the rest, perhaps on the South-Western edge of the plain of Gennesaret, He moved South along the Lake shore past Tiberias. Then leaving the Lake behind He passed down through Lower Galilee some distance West of the river, until coming to the borderland between Samaria and Galilee, He crossed viâ Bethshan and Bethabara into the Peraea. There He made Pella the headquarters of an extensive mission, in the course of which He may have gone up to Jerusalem to attend a feast and returned perhaps by Jericho, where He answered the lawyer who asked about eternal life. Setting out finally from Pella, He travelled down the river and crossed to Jericho; whence, after a brief mission full of incident, He climbed the steep ascent to Bethany, Jerusalem, and Calvary.

J. A. Robertson.

PHILO ON UNION WITH GOD.

All careful readers of Philo must agree with the statement of Windisch that "Religion is for him an inward impetus of the soul, a quest for and delight in Divine revelations, a craving after fellowship with God, an experience of God" (*Die Frömmigkeit Philos*, p. 80). How to attain communion with the Unseen is the question which absorbs his spirit. Now the very presuppositions of his thinking about human nature encourage him to press towards his goal. For if anything can be called fundamental in his view of the constitution of things, it is the conviction which he assigns to "those who have gone deep into the meaning of the laws" that "God gave man as the best of his gifts a share with himself in his rational nature" (*De Op. M.* 77). Man starts, therefore, with a real kinship to God. It is inevitable that in proportion as the Divine element asserts itself, he will strive after more complete union with the Fount of his being.

(*a*) *Fatherhood and Sonship.*

In this connexion it is worth while briefly to examine Philo's application of the categories of Fatherhood and Sonship to the relation between God and men, as that may shed some light on the background of the New Testament. He is fond of ascribing to God the name of "Father," and this under various aspects. By far the most fundamental of these is that of Creator. "The mind of the unseen," he says, "has begotten the whole: but the Creator is superior to the created. Hence he cannot be borne along in the inferior, apart from the unfitness of a father being contained in his son: rather must the son grow through the care of his father" (*De Migr. Abr.* 193). Similarly,

in *De Cherub.* 49, God is named "Father of all" as "having begotten them." We do not need to look for the origin of this conception, as some scholars have done, to the Platonic notion of "God" as Father of the universe. It is, of course, familiar from the Old Testament; e.g., Deuteronomy xxxii. 6: "Do ye thus requite the Lord . . . Is not he thy father that formed thee? Hath he not made thee and established thee?"; Malachi ii. 10: "Have we not all one father? Hath not God created us?"; Isaiah lxiv. 8: "But now, O Lord, thou art our father; we are the clay, and thou our potter; and we are all the work of thy hand."

We do not clearly understand what Principal Drummond means by saying that when Philo represents man as a "son" of God, he gives it an explanation "which reduces it to an ordinary figure of speech," and that "the term is used as a designation of spiritual worth, and is not connected with the ontological relations of man" (*Philo Judaeus*, II. 281–2). Can it ever be fruitfully used in the province of religious thought except as "a designation of spiritual worth"? If we attempt to regard it under the category of "ontological relations," can we arrive anywhere? Even Jesus, for whom the conception is so central, has no interest in "ontological relations." "Love your enemies," He enjoins upon His followers, "and pray for them that persecute you, that you may become sons of your Father who is in heaven" (Matt. v. 44 f.). This, surely, must be called "a designation of spiritual worth." Indeed, one of the most interesting passages in Philo bearing upon the subject has some affinities with that famous utterance. "Those," he says, "who act upon their knowledge of the One," a phrase explained in what follows as "estimating the noble alone to be good," "are fittingly called sons of God" (*De Conf. Ling.* 145). But this he regards as a difficult achieve-

ment, to be reached by stages. Therefore he adds: "But even if a man be not yet actually worthy of being called a son of God, let him aim at being ranked in that relation to the Logos, God's first-born son, the oldest of angelic beings" (*ib.* 146). Like Jesus, Philo seeks to raise the mind from earthly to heavenly relationships. "Why should we remember only our human father? We have the uncreated, immortal, Eternal" (*De Jos.* 265). "The law," he says, "confirms my suggestion when it declares that those who do what is acceptable . . . and noble are sons of God, for it declares, Ye are sons of the Lord your God, obviously indicating that they are to be deemed worthy of such providence and solicitude as a father bestows. Now this care will differ as greatly from human care, I believe, as he who cares differs [from a human father]" (*De Spec. Leg.* I. 318). A very illuminating utterance, in view of the matter we have been discussing, is *Quaest. in Gen.* § 92 (p. 66 Aucher): "Sometimes, indeed, he (Moses) calls the angels sons of God, seeing that they were not made incorporeal by any mortal man, for they are spirits without bodies. But with preference that great teacher names sons of God the noblest of men, those endowed with virtue." Here Philo makes his position plain, and it certainly approaches the standpoint of the New Testament. Recognising, then, that we can only interpret such a relationship ethically and spiritually, we find real religious significance in his comment on the well-known words of Genesis xviii. 17, "Shall I hide from Abraham my friend (τοῦ φίλου μου, not in known MSS. of LXX)?" "He who possesses this portion has passed beyond the limits of human well-being: for he alone is high-born who can inscribe God as his Father and has become his only adopted son" (*De Sobr.* 56). It would be easy to trace the parallel between such an utterance and some of those in which St.

Paul sets forth the unique privileges which belong to "adoption" in the Christian sense. We cannot describe a relation of this kind by any other term than "personal," and so, mainly in virtue of his Old Testament conception of God, Philo has something more intimate in view than the Stoics when they designated the "wise man" as a son of God. It is from this standpoint that he can speak of "the Father and Saviour" as "having pity" on the soul that yearns to behold Him (*De Praem. et Poen.* 39). But while we have pointed out affinities in this realm of thought between Philo and the New Testament, we fully recognise that his tendency to resolve God into hypostases has detracted from the unity and power of an otherwise most impressive Theistic conception.[1]

(*b*) *The Spirit of God.*

It comes natural to those who approach the great Jewish thinker from a New Testament standpoint to ask what place he assigns to the Spirit of God in his analysis of the process by which the human soul strives to attain fellowship with the Divine. We have seen that he does recognise, although far less prominently than the New Testament writers who have caught the inspiration of Jesus, the possibility of a filial relation between man and God. Is this in any way associated, as in the New Testament, with a doctrine of the Spirit? Or, does the conception of the Spirit exercise any important influence on Philo's idea of communion between the finite and the Infinite? We certainly cannot accept off-hand Dr. Bigg's unqualified statement that "the doctrine of the Holy Spirit . . . has no place in his system" (*Christian Platonists of Alexandria*, p. 25). The evidence fails to justify it. But an examina-

[1] See Windisch, *op. cit.* pp. 97, 98.

tion of the facts may bring out some interesting features of Philo's outlook.

One of his fundamental positions is that man could have formed no conception of God, had God not breathed into that part of his nature which was endowed with higher potentialities His own "breath" or "spirit" (πνεῦμα). Thus, he says, "there comes about a union (ἕνωσις) of the three," i.e. of God, the human νοῦς, and the Divine πνεῦμα (*Leg. Alleg.* I. 37 f.). This, of course, represents man's highest capacity, whether it be afterwards developed or not. It cannot be compared with the specifically Pauline use of πνεῦμα, but seems closely akin to what the Apostle calls νοῦς or ὁ ἔσω ἄνθρωπος. Its predominant characteristics appear to be rational. It is the essence of the "governing element" in human nature, and he identifies it with λογισμός, reason (*Quis Rer. Div. H.*, 55 ff.). In another place he speaks in notable terms of the "rational soul" of man as "the genuine coinage of that Divine and invisible spirit, marked and stamped by the seal of God, whose impress is the eternal Logos" (*De Plant.* 18). That is to say, the rational element in the soul is the stamp on human nature of the Divine Spirit, the impress of the Logos, which cannot here be distinguished from the πνεῦμα of God. On the same lines, the Divine part of man, "the noblest aspect of the soul which is called νοῦς and λόγος, mind and reason," he designates by the general description of τὸ πνεῦμα (*Quod det. pot.* 83). In these instances we are not dealing with an attainment in the religious life, but with an original endowment. But in the most interesting and elaborate of all the passages in which he discusses the Divine Spirit, he unfolds a wider outlook. Discussing the statement of Genesis vi. 3 (LXX): "My spirit shall not dwell with men for ever, because they are flesh," he comments: "He does remain sometimes, but he does not dwell always with

the most of us. Who indeed is so irrational . . . as never either voluntarily or involuntarily to receive a notion (ἔννοιαν) of the Highest? Nay, even over the reprobate there often hovers the impression (φαντασία) of the good, but they cannot grasp it and keep it by them. For it vanishes at once, turning away from those . . . who have abandoned law and right. Indeed, it would never have visited them, except to convict them sharply of preferring the base to the noble. Now, according to one usage, the air that rises from the earth is called Divine πνεῦμα . . . but according to another it means that pure (ἀκήρατος) knowledge in which every wise man fully shares." He proceeds to illustrate this aspect of the Divine Spirit by the special equipment of wisdom and understanding bestowed upon Bezaleel for the construction of the Tabernacle, and by the imparting to the seventy elders of the spirit of Moses, which he describes as "wise, Divine, indivisible, noble, without any defect" (*De Gig.* 20 ff.).

Here he recognises a physical sense of πνεῦμα, equivalent to "air," which recalls Stoic descriptions of God as the "aëry essence" (οὐσία ἀεροειδής) which permeates all existence (e.g. *Diog. L.* vii. 148). Indeed his language throughout this paragraph has various echoes of Stoicism, as when he speaks of "receiving a notion" (ἔννοιαν λαβεῖν) of God, and refers to the "impression" (φαντασία) of the good. And the influence of Platonic terminology is evident when he calls the Divine Spirit in its highest aspect "that pure knowledge in which every wise man shares."[1] But the passage shows that he is fully sensitive to the Old Testament conception of the Spirit as a Divine equipment, a Divine gift, an experience not to be identified with that natural endowment which he also calls the in-

[1] See *Phaedrus*, 247 D: διάνοια νῷ τε καὶ ἐπιστήμῃ ἀοράτῳ τρεφομένη (so Bekker).

breathing of the πνεῦμα. Obviously it will be as a rule impossible to distinguish the Divine Spirit in this sense from the Logos. And in all likelihood the reason why the conception is not more prominent is just that the Logos absorbs its functions. But it is straining the evidence to say, as Zeller (followed by Drummond) does, that Philo only speaks of the Divine Spirit when the idea is presented to him by some text of Scripture (*Phil. d. Griechen*[1], III. 2. 2, p. 432, note 2). There is nothing artificial or awkward in his employment of the category. His most arresting references occur quite incidentally, and their basis is not theory but experience. "The invisible Spirit which is wont to commune with me unseen whispers to me and says" (*De Somn.* II. 252). Here is an instance from his own life of fellowship with God. In another place he appears to include himself when he recounts what happens to "prophetic" natures: "The mind (νοῦς) in us departs at the coming of the Divine Spirit, and when it leaves, returns to its abode. For it is not fitting that mortal should dwell with immortal. Thus the sinking of reason and the darkness which encompasses it beget ecstasy and God-inspired frenzy" (*Quis Rer. Div. II.* 265). In these passages, in which he speaks most intimately of the Divine Spirit, he is in no sense influenced by some direct allusion in Scripture.

Further light is shed upon his conception by the references he makes to the conditions of the Spirit's indwelling. "Let us keep still from wrong-doing," he says, "in order that the Divine Spirit of wisdom may not easily remove and depart, but may abide with us for a long, long time, as with Moses the wise man" (*De Gig.* 47). It may be noted that in the context the "Spirit" is identified with ὀρθὸς λόγος, an identification common in Philo. In the same treatise (53) he declares that "among the majority, i.e.

those who set before them many ends in life, the Divine Spirit does not abide, even if for a short time he may sojourn, but only with one type of men does he dwell, that which has stripped off all that belongs to the world of becoming and the inmost veil and curtain of opinion, and with unrestricted and open mind reaches God." Moses is adduced as an example of this type, one " who enters into the darkness, the unseen place, and abides there while he is initiated into the most sacred mysteries. Indeed, not only does he become an initiate, but also a hierophant of mystic rites, a teacher of Divine things, in which he gives instruction to those whose ears have been purified. With such a man the Divine Spirit is ever present, showing him the way in every straight path " (*ib.* 54 f.).

But while there is a real approximation in Philo's use of the conception of the Spirit of God to that in the New Testament, we not only feel that in his thought it is secondary, but also that as an energising power it is grasped with far less vigour and discerned in a dimmer light than, e.g., by St. Paul. We have no doubt that for Philo also it represents the formulation of an experience, but that experience lacks the sureness and depth and permanence which characterise the Apostle's endowment. And surely the reason is that in Philo the Divine Spirit is one special description of a fluctuating and elusive category like the Logos, while St. Paul indissolubly associates it with that which has the most concrete reality for his spiritual life, the person and activity of the living Lord.

(*c*) *The Vision of God.*

For Philo, the crowning achievement of the pious spirit is the Vision of God. " What lovelier or more fitting garland could be woven for the victorious soul than the power,

with clear vision, to gaze upon Him who is ? Truly splendid is the prize held out to the wrestling soul,—to be equipped with eyesight so as to perceive without dimness Him who is alone worthy of contemplation " (*De Mut. Nom.* 82). That man has reached the heights of blessedness to whom it is granted not merely by knowledge to apprehend all that belongs to the natural order, but to behold the Father and Maker of the universe. For there is nothing higher than God : he that has succeeded in stretching his soul's vision as far as Him may well pray to abide there without change (*De Abr.* 58). For such vision is no mere passing rapture. It must prove a unique support of all goodness. " If the sight of elders or instructors or rulers or parents move the beholders to reverence and orderly conduct and the desire for a self-controlled life, how great a bulwark of virtue and honourable living may we expect to find in souls which, reaching beyond all that is created, have been trained to behold the Uncreated and Divine " (*Leg. ad Gaium* 5). This fundamental conviction lets us see into the heart of Philo's religious aspiration.

It is a good thing, he holds, for the soul to seek God. For even the striving after goodness brings a sort of preliminary satisfaction. But it is a matter of uncertainty, whether the search will reach its goal. Many never attained. God did not reveal Himself to them (*Leg. All.* III. 47). Here is the crux. The highest stage of religion, the only fully satisfying attainment, means revelation. Philo does not so much discuss the idea of revelation in itself as presuppose it in what he affirms concerning the spiritual vision of God. But in speaking of some whose search is not fruitless, he describes God as " Himself, by reason of his gracious nature, going forth to meet them with his virgin-graces, and revealing himself to those who crave to behold him, not as he is—for that is impossible . . . but in so

far as it was possible for a created nature to approach his incomprehensible power" (*De Fuga*, 141).

What, then, are the *conditions* in which the spirit can attain the Vision of God? Philo has much to say on this problem. We shall try to select some crucial examples of the positions which he occupies. In a set of reflections on Genesis xv. 5, where he takes the words, "He [God] led him [Abraham] forth," in a spiritual sense, he proceeds: "The mind that is to be led forth and set at liberty must withdraw from all things, from bodily necessities, from the instruments of the senses, from sophistical reasonings, from plausible arguments, finally from itself. . . . For it is not possible for one who dwells in the body and among mortal men to have communion with God, but only for him whom God delivers out of his prison" (*Leg. All.* III. 41 f.). This conception appears in a specially impressive form in *Quod det. pot.* 158 f. "Will you then assert, O senseless man, that if you are deprived of bodily and external advantages you cannot reach the vision of God? I tell you that in that event you will surely attain to it: for you must be released from the iron fetters of the body and from bodily concerns if you are to receive the vision of the Uncreated. . . . For it was when [Abraham] left his whole house that the Law says, 'God appeared to him' (Gen. xii. 7), showing that God distinctly appears to him who escapes from material things and retires into the incorporeal soul of this body of ours." Philo sheds light upon his position in distinguishing between God's manner of revealing Himself to corporeal souls and those which are bodiless. "To these souls which are incorporeal and worship him it is natural that he should appear as he is, talking as a friend with friends. But to those still in the body he resembles angels, not indeed altering his proper nature, for he cannot suffer change, but impressing upon them

who behold him the notion of a different shape, so that they suppose that this image is not a copy, but that what they see is the original itself" (*De Somn.* I. 232). Philo goes on to say that for the benefit of dull natures God has to be represented in Scripture by anthropomorphic descriptions, for in this way alone can they be disciplined. But the more accurate statement is that of Numbers xxiii. 17: "God is not as a man." Hence, to mortals, He must reveal Himself in angelic guise. And His angel, as found in Scripture, is really His "image," the Logos (*ib.* 236 ff.). But while life in the thraldom of the body is an insuperable barrier to the undimmed vision of God, he does regard it possible, as passages quoted above plainly indicate, for a soul which has completely detached itself from the hampering conditions of mortal existence (and this he also assumes as a possibility) even now to attain the goal of its yearnings. He can speak of minds so "completely purified" that the Lord of all, "silently, unseen, alone, sojourns with them," while "with the spirits of those who are still being cleansed and have not yet completely washed away the stained and defiled life they have lived in burdensome bodies, angels may dwell, Divine Logoi, making them bright and pure by the doctrines of high virtue" (*ib.* 148). Abraham, the wise man, the stable soul, is the true pattern for those who would commune with God. "For in very deed only the unchanging soul can draw near to the unchanging God, and the soul in such a condition veritably stands beside the Divine power" (*De Post. Cain.* 27).

Now the purified soul has a certain *élan* or urge towards the beatific vision. "When the eyes formed of corruptible material reach so far as, from the region of earth, to scan remote heaven and touch its limits, how spacious must we suppose to be the sweep of the eyes of the soul? For these, winged by an eager longing to behold the Existent in his

radiance, not only stretch to the utmost ether, but passing beyond the bounds of the entire universe hasten to the Uncreated." These are the souls which cannot be satiated with wisdom and knowledge. They are said to be "summoned up" to God. "For it is meet that these should be called up to the Divine, who have been inspired by him." Thus it is by the Divine Spirit that the *νοῦς* is lightened and lifted up to the highest heights (*De Plant.* 22 ff. : cf. the fine description of a similar experience in *De Spec. Leg.* I. 207).

Let us try to ascertain how Philo conceives the Vision of God to be attained. We have seen that a presupposition of the achievement is the liberation of the mind or spirit from bodily entanglements and all material complications. It has, in a sense, to withdraw from the body in order to reach the Uncreated. Further, as a matter of experience, it is only a few who reach the goal. But this small number are "so mighty in energy that not even the whole round of earth can contain them, and they reach heaven; for, possessed by an unquenchable longing to behold and to be ever in fellowship with the Divine, when they have closely investigated and scrutinised the whole of visible nature, they go at once in quest of the incorporeal, ideal world, taking none of the senses with them, but leaving behind all that is irrational in the soul, and only making use of that which is called mind and reason" (*De Praem. et Poen.* 26). It is important to note that in all that Philo says of what is plainly an "ecstatic" experience, he makes the "rational" capacity of man the chief human factor. But even the purified human spirit is unfit to pursue this arduous quest alone. "There is danger for the soul in ascending to the vision of the Existent by itself, for it knows not the way, and may be puffed up by ignorance and rashness. . . . Wherefore Moses prays that he may have the

guidance of God himself for the path that leads to him, for he says, Unless Thou go with me, take me not up hence " (*De Migr. Abr.* 170 f.). God Himself, therefore, comes to the aid of the yearning soul. He will further its pursuit of Him. This is exemplified in the experience of Abraham. When his understanding had dispelled the mists of sense which confused it, he was scarcely able to grasp, as in clear air, the impression of the Unseen. But God " by reason of his philanthropy, did not turn away from the soul as it came to him, but going forth to meet it, revealed His own nature, in so far as it was possible for the beholder to see it. Hence it is said, not that the wise man *saw* God, but that God *appeared* to the wise man. For it was impossible that any one should grasp by himself the truly Existent, unless he had manifested and revealed himself " (*De Abr.* 79 f.).

What, then, is Philo's conception of the Vision? It need scarcely be said, in view of statements already discussed, that contradictory utterances are to be found. " When the soul that loves God searches into the nature of the Existent, according to his essence, it enters into an unseen and invisible search, for which the chief benefit that accrues to it is to comprehend that God is incomprehensible and to see that he is invisible " (*De Post. Cain.* 15). The classical example is the experience of Moses as narrated in Exodus xxxiii. 13 ff. All that is vouchsafed to him is a vision of the environment of the Divinity. " His nature does not admit of being seen : and what wonder that the Existent cannot be grasped by man, since even the mind in each of us is unknowable by us. For who ever beheld the essence of his soul? " (*De Mut. Nom.* 9 f.). Yet very important statements occur of an opposite drift. And these probably bring us as near as we can reach to an analysis of a mystical experience which is really beyond analysis.

"There is," he says, "a more perfect and more completely purified type of spirit [again exemplified by Moses], initiated into the Divine mysteries, which does not reach a knowledge of the First Cause from created things, of the substance, as it were, from the shadow, but overleaping the created, receives a clear manifestation of the Uncreated, so as to *grasp Him from Himself*" (*Leg. All.* III. 100). Some light is shed upon the meaning of this vague phrase by several remarkable utterances. Describing the discipline of the wrestling soul, Philo speaks of a point at which "a bright incorporeal ray, purer than ether, suddenly shining upon it, revealed the ideal world as under guidance. But the Guide, encompassed by unstained light, was hard to behold or to divine, for the soul's vision was obscured by the splendour of the rays. Yet she, despite the streaming towards her of intense radiance, endured through her extraordinary craving for a vision. Then the Father and Saviour, seeing her genuine longing and yearning, pitied her, and imparting power to the approach of her sight, did not withhold the vision of himself, in so far as it was possible for a created and mortal nature to contain it" (*De Praem. et Poen.* 37 ff.). He seems to feel, however, that his description is quite inadequate. And so he returns to the experience. "How this approach [i.e. of the eyes of the soul to God] has taken place, it is worth while observing *by means of a simile*. Can we behold this sense-perceived sun by any other means than the sun itself? Or can we behold the stars by any other means than the stars? In a word, is not light seen by means of light? In the same fashion God also, who is his own radiance, is seen through himself alone, no other co-operating or being able to co-operate towards the pure apprehension of his existence" (*ib.* 45). We may connect with this a noteworthy affirmation in *Quaestt. in Gen.* iv. § 1 (p. 238, Aucher): "Since God is incompre-

hensible, not only to the race of men but also to all the parts of heaven which surpass men in purity, he caused a certain radiance to flash forth from himself, which we may rightly call his form, scattering incorporeal rays about the mind and filling it with super-celestial light. Under this guidance the mind is led, through the mediating form, to the Prototype."

Some further clues to the meaning of what he conceives as the most intimate experience of union with God may be found in certain descriptions of moments of spiritual rapture. And first let us recall his famous account of his own spiritual illumination as a thinker. "I am not ashamed," he says, "of recounting my own experience. . . . At times, when I proposed to enter upon my wonted task of writing on philosophical doctrines, with an exact knowledge of the materials which were to be put together, I have had to leave off without any work accomplished, finding my mind barren and fruitless, and upbraiding it for its self-complacency, while startled at the might of the Existent, in whose power it lies to open and close the wombs of the soul. But at other times, when I had come empty, all of a sudden I was filled with thoughts showered down and sown upon me unseen from above, so that by Divine possession I fell into a rapture and became ignorant of everything, the place, those present, myself, what was spoken or written. For I received a stream of interpretation [reading, with Markland, ἔσχον γὰρ ἑρμηνείας ῥεῦσιν], a fruition of light, the most clear-cut sharpness of vision, the most vividly distinct view of the matter before me, such as might be received through the eyes from the most luminous presentation" (*De Migr. Abr.* 34 f.). Such illumining of his spirit means for him the direct impact of the Divine. And no doubt it has contributed materials to his attempt, acknowledged by himself as inadequate, to delineate the soul's

vision of God. Of similar import is his remarkable appeal to the soul in *Quis Rer. Div. H.* 69 f.: "If a yearning come upon thee, O soul, to possess Divine blessings, forsake not only thy 'land,' the body, and thy 'kindred,' the life of sense, and thy 'father's house' (Gen. xii. 1), the [uttered] word,[1] but escape from thyself also, and go forth from (ἔκστηθι) thyself, filled with a Divine frenzy like those possessed in the mystic rites of the Corybantes, and holden by the Deity after the manner of prophetic inspiration. For when the mind is filled with God and is no longer self-contained but rapt and frenzied with a heavenly passion and driven by the Truly Existent and drawn upwards to him, while truth goes in front and removes obstacles that it may tread the highway,—this is thy [Divine] inheritance." Here is an impressive description of spiritual ecstasy, and perhaps it delineates with as much definiteness as Philo could reach what for him, on the basis of real experience, was the content of his most intimate union with God. He makes a like appeal in *Quaestt. in Exod.* II. § 51 (pp. 505–6, Aucher), in which, after laying down certain conditions, the cutting off of desires, pleasures, despondencies, fears, and the casting aside of folly, wrong-doing, and cognate evils, he shows the soul how it may be consecrated to God a living temple. "Then he may appear to thee visibly, causing incorporeal rays to shine upon thee, granting visions of his nature undreamed-of and ineffable, which are the overflowing sources of all other blessings." In such experiences it is plain, as Bréhier fitly expresses it, that "Philo's contemplation [of God] is . . . an inward rapture in which all precise knowledge disappears in the feeling of the existence of a Being incomprehensible and without limitations" (*Les Idées philosophiques et religieuses de Philo*, p. 296).

[1] See *De Migr. Abr.* 2: λόγου τοῦ κατὰ προφοράν. That passage explains the symbolism here.

Attention has been already called to Philo's opposing statements regarding the possibility of an *immediate* apprehension of God, statements which have their parallels in the writings of many mystics. Possibly he is quite aware of these apparently contradictory standpoints. And some important utterances on the more and the less direct vision of the Existent may be an attempt to suggest a *via media*. Of special significance is that in *De Abr.* 119 ff., a section in which he explains the symbolic meaning of Abraham's three heavenly visitants (Gen. xviii. 1 ff.). "When the soul, as at broad noon, is encompassed by the Divine radiance, and being wholly filled with spiritual light, welcomes [reading *ανγὰς ἀσπάσηται* with Wendland] the rays poured forth around, it receives a threefold impression of the one essence, the first as of One who is three, the other two as of shadows cast by him. . . . Let no one, however, suppose that we can properly speak of shadows in the case of God. We only use this expression to bring out more clearly what has to be explained. . . . But as one might say in close accord with the truth, the Father of all stands in the midst, who in Holy Scripture is called by his proper name, the Existent, while on either side are his highest Powers, those closest to the Existent, the creative and the ruling. . . . With these, then, as his attendants, He in the midst presents to the spirit that has vision at one time the impression of one, at another of three; of one, when the mind is in the highest state of purification and not only passing beyond the multitude of numbers, but also beyond the Two which is the neighbour of the One, hastens to the unmixed and uncompounded Idea, which needs no other than itself; of three, when the mind has not yet been initiated into the Great Mysteries, but still only knows the lower grades, and cannot grasp the Existent *from himself alone* without the help of another, but only through what he does, either

as creating or ruling." This paragraph is full of interest as indicating how Philo attempted to satisfy his own mind as to the relation of the mediate to the immediate vision of God. The spirit which is "in the highest state of purification" is that which is able fully to renounce itself and to yield wholly to the Divine influence. Not that Philo appears ever to adopt the conception, characteristic of mysticism, of a complete fusion of the individual soul with God. But its self consciousness is suppressed, and, as in prophetic inspiration, which seems powerfully to have influenced his conception, it becomes simply the receptacle or the instrument of the Divine Spirit.

Thus the two poles of thought stand over against each other. On the one hand the transcendent God cannot be grasped by finite creatures. Yet no other goal will satisfy. Perhaps, as Zeller suggests (*Philos. d. Griechen*, III. 2. 2, p. 463), "the very transcendence of Philo's conception of God arose, not from the attempt to cut off all relations between men and God, but rather from the very opposite effort, to reach the Deity, whom he could not find in himself or in the world, beyond the bounds of all finite existence." That could only be realised in a Divinely inspired ecstasy, in which the finite, for the moment, transcended mortal limits, and was virtually endowed with infinity.

H. A. A. Kennedy.

A NEW CHRONOLOGY OF THE LIFE OF ST. PAUL.

THERE are few subjects that possess more attraction for the New Testament scholar than the chronology of the Apostolic times, and more particularly of that period which is covered by the Christian career of St. Paul. It is somewhat strange, therefore, that since the publication of Wieseler's *Chronologie des Apostolischen Zeitalters* in 1848, just over seventy years ago, only one book has made its appearance which is entirely devoted to this subject, viz., Hoennicke's *Die Chronologie des Lebens des Apostel Paulus* (1903), and this is only a collection of articles contributed to various journals and bears clear marks of its origin. The nearest approach to anything like an adequate discussion of the chronology of New Testament times is to be found in the various Bible Dictionaries and Encyclopædias, notably in Dr. Turner's masterly article on "Chronology" in *Hastings' Bible Dictionary* and in a most valuable contribution from the pen of Dr. A. C. Zenos under the heading of "Dates" in *Hastings' Dictionary of the Apostolic Church*, which is more up to date than Dr. Turner's and is indispensable for the English student. The subject occupies a prominent place in the first volume of Harnack's great work *Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur*, and monographs on many special chronological factors are scattered in great profusion over the pages of theological and classical journals, English, American, and Continental. Past volumes of the EXPOSITOR bear witness to the interest taken in the subject by English-speaking scholars, and Sir William Ramsay has in this, as in every other department of Paulinism, rendered most valuable service by his numerous

contributions to this journal. But a volume solely and completely concerned with the chronology of the life of St. Paul was still among the *desiderata* of the New Testament scholar, and it is, therefore, with particular gratification that we hail the appearance of *De Chronologie van het leven van Paulus* (The Chronology of the life of Paul) which has been recently published by Dr. Plooij, of Leiden, one of the leading Biblical scholars in Holland, and a writer whose name is by no means unknown to the readers of the EXPOSITOR. It is a matter of regret that a volume dealing with a subject of absorbing interest and containing so much valuable material should only be accessible in Dutch, a language with which comparatively few English students have a close acquaintance. The book is the work of a scholar who has read all the best literature bearing upon the subject in whatever language it be published, who has neglected no source of valid information and is fully abreast of the latest research. As some considerable time may elapse before an authoritative English translation makes its appearance it occurred to me that a fairly detailed description of the book and its most characteristic features might prove of considerable interest and value to the readers of the EXPOSITOR.

Dr. Plooij considers that the present is a most opportune moment for producing a Chronology of St. Paul's life, and for the following reasons:

1. The reaction in favour of the historical trustworthiness of the Acts, due primarily to the labours of Ramsay and Harnack, enables the author to use that book as a basis of a sound chronological scheme, a procedure that was extremely difficult to adopt as long as the Tübingen theory, which regarded the Acts as a "tendency" document of little historical value, held the field.

2. The discovery of the Gallio-inscription at Delphi and

its publication in 1905, which throws an entirely new light upon the date of Gallio's proconsulship of Achaia.

3. The publication of the so-called "New Chronology," now associated with the names of Harnack and Holtzmann, but in reality as old as Petavius, which is based on the "Chronicon" of Eusebius, where the beginning of Festus' procuratorship is dated 56, and, therefore, several years earlier than the date assigned to it in the current chronological schemes.

4. The adoption of the "South-Galatian" theory, which demands a reconsideration of the date of the Epistle to the Galatians and of the incidence of St. Paul's visits to Jerusalem.

The first point that strikes the reader of the book is the extreme caution exercised by Dr. Plooij in drawing deductions from his facts and premises. He will not proceed a hair's breadth beyond what is completely justified by the evidence at hand, and in this respect he presents a most salutary example to scholars who are engaged in this particular form of investigation. There is generally in work of this kind too great a tendency to make assumptions, and then to build upon this very uncertain foundation an elaborate theory which when it is put to the test collapses entirely. A striking illustration of what I mean may be seen in an article of Ramsay's, written it is true twenty years ago, in the EXPOSITOR, V. 3. pp. 318 ff., entitled "A fixed date in the life of St. Paul." In this article he claims to have found one date which can be fixed to the year, the month, and the day. And yet the whole of his argument rests on the assumption that the expression "And we sailed away from Philippi after the days of unleavened bread" (Acts xx. 6) can only mean that St. Paul started on his journey to Jerusalem on the very first morning after "the days of unleavened bread." It is true that the Apostle

was most anxious to reach his destination before Pentecost and that he would, therefore, waste no time unnecessarily, but it is a very rash proceeding to assume that he left Philippi the very moment the Feast was over. And yet if he delayed the start but one single day the whole of Ramsay's argument and the elaborate calculation he bases upon it are entirely vitiated. A chronology based on such bold assumptions as this can have little real value, and we, therefore, warmly commend Dr. Plooij for the wise caution that he has exercised in this direction.

The book is divided into two fairly equal sections, the one dealing with "Absolute Chronology" and the other with "Relative Chronology." In the former our author is concerned with the pivotal points which connect the story of St. Paul's life with secular history, the dates of which can be ascertained with a tolerable degree of accuracy from sources outside the New Testament. The events that he has selected for discussion are those usually chosen by all authorities who have dealt with the subject, and there is inevitably in his treatment of these a considerable quantity of material and comment which is perfectly familiar to those who have studied the question, but there are few cases where he fails to bring new light to bear upon the point under review and none where his use of his resources is not fresh and most suggestive.

We will take his chapters one by one, pointing out as we proceed what is of particular interest and value in his exposition.

I.

Absolute Chronology.

Chap. 1. *Aretas IV. King of Nabataea.*

Aretas is mentioned by St. Paul in connexion with his escape from Damascus in 2 Corinthians xi. 32, 33, an in-

cident which is also described in Acts ix. 23–26. This escape our author associates with the Apostle's *second* visit to Damascus, and is, therefore, placed by him at least three years after the conversion. Aretas was, therefore, on the throne of Nabataea three years after the conversion of St. Paul. Again, the fact that the death of Tiberius, which took place on March 16, 37, was announced to Vitellius when he was on his way to attack Aretas proves that the latter was alive in that year. The beginning of Aretas' reign cannot be fixed with certainty, but Nabataean inscriptions show that he began to reign somewhere between 8 B.C. and 12 B.C., and competent authorities fix upon 9 B.C. as the most probable date of his accession. The length of his reign, viz., forty-eight years, can however be established by means of coins and inscriptions of the period, and Dr. Plooij publishes an interesting Aramaic inscription which reads "Forty and eight years reigned Harithath, King of Nabataea, the friend of his people" (C. I. Sem. II. 214, 215). If he began to reign in 9 B.C. he died in 39 A.D., and 40 A.D. is established as *terminus ante quem* for St. Paul's escape from Damascus. The most interesting feature in this chapter is Dr. Plooij's discussion of the meaning of the statement of St. Paul in 2 Corinthians ii. 33 that "the ethnarch under Aretas the king guarded the city of Damascus in order to take me." This has been generally explained as implying that at the time of the Apostle's escape Damascus was not under direct Roman rule and that Aretas was in supreme power over the city. The fact that Damascene coins of the years 33–34, and 62–63 bear the heads of Tiberius and Nero respectively but that during the intervening period there is a break in which no Imperial heads are found on Damascene coins, has been held to prove that from the year 33 to the year 62 Damascus was ruled by a subject king, who in this case was the king of Nabataea. Dr.

Plooij is, however, inclined to question this interpretation, and chiefly on the ground that if the ethnarch in our quotation was governor under Aretas his jurisdiction would certainly not end at the city gates and that St. Paul would have been in as great peril of his life outside as inside the city. He suggests that the expression *ἐφρούρει τὴν πόλιν Δαμασκηνῶν* need mean nothing more than the parallel expression in Acts ix. 24, where the Jews are said to have "watched the gates" (*περετηροῦντο τὰς πύλας*). He also maintains that *ἐθνάρχης* is rarely if ever used to denote a "governor," and that inscriptions, of which he instances the following—*Ἀδριανοῦ τοῦ καὶ Σοαίδου Μαλέχου ἐθνάρχου, στρατηγοῦ νομάδων* (*Ins. G. et L. en Grèce et en Asie Mineure*, Tom. III. 2196) show that the term was used to denote a chief of nomads, a Sheik, who was more or less an independent prince and whose rank was below that of a king. Dr. Plooij argues then that the reference in 2 Corinthians xi. 33 has to do with an ethnarch in the sense of a Sheik, who co-operated with the Jews in the attempt to take St. Paul prisoner, but whether on his own responsibility or at the bidding of Aretas cannot be decided. He does not believe that Aretas exercised sovereign rights in Damascus after the year 33 because it is most improbable that Vitellius, when he proceeded from Antioch to attack Aretas in 37, would have marched by Jerusalem to Petra (Jos. *Ant.* xviii. 5. 1) and leave Damascus behind him if Aretas was ruling there. Neither does he favour the suggestion put forward by many authorities that Caligula had ceded Damascus to Aretas, because the latter was far too independent a character to appeal to such an Emperor as Caligula. Aretas had ascended the throne of Nabataea without consulting Augustus and had made little of the fact that Antipas was a vassal of Rome when he set forth to punish that treacherous king. And further, while other

subject kings are described one as φιλορώμαιος and another as φιλόκαισαρ, Aretas is invariably designated on coins and inscriptions "the friend of his people," showing that he was a person of strong nationalistic sympathies, and, therefore, the last man to have been invested by Caligula with the dominion of Damascus. It must be confessed that our author does not take us far on our quest in this chapter because all that he will allow us to deduce from 2 Corinthians xi 32, 33 is that St. Paul's escape from Damascus must have taken place during the lifetime of Aretas, and, therefore, before 40 A.D., a fact which no one has ever questioned.

Chap. 2. The death of Herod Agrippa and the Famine in Palestine.

Dr. Plooij prefaces his discussion of these two incidents by premising that St. Luke in his narrative in Acts xi. and xii., which treats of the prophecy of Agabus concerning the impending famine (xi. 27 28), the collection at Antioch (xi., 29), the mission of Barnabas and Saul to hand over the proceeds of the collection to the Church of Jerusalem (xi. 30), the martyrdom of St. James and the arrest and deliverance of St. Peter (xii. 1–19), the death of Herod (xii. 20-23), the growth of the Church (xii. 24) and the return of Barnabas and Saul to Antioch (xii. 25) is not observing a strict chronological sequence, but is dealing with the events synchronistically, so that the death of St. James, the deliverance of St. Peter, and the death of Herod did not occur between the arrival and departure of Barnabas and Saul as the sequence of the narrative in the Acts might lead us to suppose, but were contemporaneous with the events described in chap. xi. What this means is that the events narrated in Acts xii. 1–24 took place during St. Paul's residence of a year in Antioch and that the journey

to Jerusalem followed the death of Herod, when the Church in the Holy City was at rest.

(*a*) *The death of Herod Agrippa.*

Josephus provides us with a picturesque description of the death of Herod, which is in general accord with that given in the Acts, and also supplies us with the means of establishing the date of that event with tolerable accuracy. He died, we are told, at the age of fifty-four, in the ninth year of his reign, three of which fell during the reign of Claudius, which brings us to 44 as the year of his death. Josephus also informs us that the festival in the course of which Herod died was εἰς τὴν Καίσαρος τιμὴν ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐκείνου σωτηρίας. This must have taken place at least three years after the accession of Claudius, i.e. three years after January 24, 41, and to this we can add the statement in Acts xii. 3 that St. Peter's imprisonment lasted beyond the Days of Unleavened Bread, but how long after we cannot tell. To determine the date of Herod's death with any degree of accuracy it is necessary to define the precise character of the festival alluded to by Josephus. Some authorities identify it with the birthday feast of Claudius, which fell on August 1, but according to Dio-Cassius (lx. 5. 3) the Emperor had issued instructions that his birthday was not to be honoured by any special celebrations. Others again suggest the *quinquennalia* established by Herod the Great, but a careful calculation shows that this would fall in 43 and not in 44.

The occasion of the festival was, therefore, some victory gained by Claudius, and as he returned to Rome at the beginning of 44 after an absence of six months, during which he had waged a very successful campaign against the Britons, we are justified in associating the festival at Caesarea with the triumph of Claudius and the thanksgivings for his safe return which were celebrated at Rome. The date of Clau-

dius' return—and of the festivals which followed it—cannot be precisely determined. The campaign in Britain was opened in 43 but the triumph was not celebrated until 44, during the consulships of Caius Passienus Crispus II. and T. Statelius Taurus, and consequently before the 4th of May, 44. This agrees with Acts xii. 3, which indicates that the death of Herod and, therefore, the festival at Cæsarea, occurred after, and apparently soon after, the Days of Unleavened Bread. Now the 15th of Nisan fell that year on April the 1st, Herod therefore probably died soon after the Passover, in the month of April or at the latest during May 44. Since Barnabas and Saul returned to Antioch from Jerusalem after the death of Herod this event must, therefore, be placed after May, 44.

(*b*) *The Famine.*

Barnabas and Saul journeyed to Jerusalem in order to place at the disposal of the Church in that city the proceeds of a collection made at Antioch in view of the famine foretold by Agabus. Some time must have elapsed between the prophecy and the arrival of the delegates in Jerusalem because the procedure in connexion with the collection would be that recommended under similar circumstances in 1 Corinthians xvi. 1, and the relief would hardly be sent until the first signs of suffering were apparent. Dr. Plooij's position in this matter is that all the events narrated in chaps. xi. and xii. of Acts, from the prophecy of Agabus to the arrival of Barnabas and Saul at Antioch from Jerusalem, when their mission had been completed, were included within the year of St. Paul's stay at Antioch mentioned in Acts xi. 26. There is no trace in secular history of a famine at this time answering to St. Luke's description of it as a great famine "over all the world," a phrase which invariably connotes the whole of the Roman Empire. Josephus in

Ant. xx. 5. 2 mentions a famine in Jerusalem, but his evidence is complicated by the fact that there are two rival readings in the passage, ἐπὶ τούτοις and ἐπὶ τούτου. If we accept the first reading the famine occurred during the procuratorships of both Fadus and Tiberius Alexander and towards the end of Fadus' term of office. If the second reading is preferred, the famine commenced after Tiberius Alexander's accession to office. Now we know from an Imperial decree quoted in Jos. *Ant.* xx. 1. 2, in which the name of Fadus is mentioned, that he was procurator on June 28, 45. How long he remained in office after that date is difficult to tell. Josephus also mentions the famine in *Ant.* iii. 15. 3 as having occurred when Claudius was Emperor and Ismael High Priest. The second statement is probably a mistake, for only two high priests of that name are known, one of whom held office in 15–16 A.D. and the other in 59–61 A.D., both impossible periods as far as our immediate purpose is concerned, so that this statement of Josephus gives us no help. Again in *Ant.* xx. 2. 6 Josephus mentions a famine in connexion with the visit of Helena, Queen of Adiabene, to Jerusalem. Her visit and its results are placed under Fadus, but Josephus' sequence of events at this point is very complicated and the more reasonable conclusion is that Helena arrived in Jerusalem while Fadus was still in office, but that the famine continued after the arrival of his successor. In that case ἐπὶ τούτοις is the correct reading, and Dr. Plooij accepts it as such.

Suetonius tells of a condition of continued scarcity which prevailed under Claudius, due apparently to a succession of bad harvests in Egypt, which caused a famine in Rome and elsewhere, but gives no date.

Dio Cassius mentions a famine in Rome in 41–43 and Tacitus speaks of another in 51–52, while Eusebius speaks of a famine in Greece in the ninth year of Claudius, i.e.

in 51. These would explain Suetonius' statement quoted above as to the general conditions prevailing during the reign of Claudius. Hoennicke aptly suggests that while the prophecy of Agabus had in view a definite famine in Palestine the more comprehensive description in Acts is due to St. Luke with his knowledge of the general state of scarcity that prevailed in the Empire at that period. The famine in Palestine, according to Josephus, broke out in the days of Fadus and Tiberius Alexander, in ± 46. The absence of strict chronological sequence in St. Luke's narrative at this point makes it extremely difficult to establish the precise chronological connexion between the incidents mentioned by him. Herod died in 44, the famine broke out apparently in 45–46. After Herod's death the Church in Jerusalem enjoyed a period of rest. From these data we gather that the journey of Barnabas and Saul to Jerusalem took place after the death of Herod and, therefore, after 44. They arrived there after the famine had commenced and while the Church had rest and, therefore, apparently in the winter of 45–46. But all this does not enable us to establish an absolutely fixed date either for the famine or for the collection, and the matter will require further elucidation when the relative chronology of this particular period of St. Paul's activity comes to be dealt with.

Chap 3. *Sergius Paulus, Proconsul of Cyprus.*

The Sergius Paulus who was proconsul of Cyprus when St. Paul reached that island on the First Missionary Journey is apparently identical with the person of that name who is mentioned in a Roman inscription where he is described as "curator riparum et alvei Tiberis." (C.I.L. vi. 31545.) Gatti, who was the first to publish the inscription in 1887, was of opinion that the boundary stone on which the inscription is found was placed in that position on the day

when Claudius became Censor, i.e. in 47, but many authorities, and among them Dr. Plooij, hesitate to adopt this suggestion, and our author is not prepared to attach much importance to it. All that he will allow us to deduce from the inscription is that Sergius Paulus became proconsul after he had held the less dignified office mentioned therein. But there is another inscription that may possibly afford a clue to what we are seeking, which was found at Soli and published by Cesnola in his *Cyprus, its Cities, Tombs, and Temples* (1877), and was carefully edited by D. G. Hogarth in his *Devia Cypria* (1882). The inscription ends with the words *τιμητεύσας τὴν βουλ(ὴν διὰ) ἐξάστων ἐπὶ Παύλου (ἀνθυ)πάτου*. It is dated "25 Demarchexousios of the year *ιγ'*," i.e. 13, and our problem is to define what particular system of reckoning is followed here. The number 13 might have in view the year when Cyprus was first formed into a Roman Province, viz. 58 B.C. or the year when it changed its status from an Imperial to a Senatorial Province, viz. 22 B.C. If we select the later alternative, Mommsen suggests that the Paulus of the inscription is not the Sergius Paulus of the Acts but Paulus Fabius Maximus, who was consul in 11 B.C. and proconsul of Asia in 4 B.C. If he is the person referred to in the inscription he would have been proconsul of Cyprus in 10 B.C. That he did hold this office seems to be implied by an inscription set up by the senate and people of Paphos in honour of his wife (C.I.G. 2629). Against this suggestion of Mommsen it is argued that the Paphos inscription, while confirming the idea that he was proconsul, does not explicitly refer to him as proconsul of Cyprus, and further, that it is somewhat unusual that among a number of official names the proconsul alone should be designated by his *praenomen*, which would be the case if Paulus Fabius Maximus were the official referred to in the Soli inscription. It appears also that

there are inscriptions where the year number is manifestly the tribunate year of the reigning Emperor, although this may not be expressly stated, and Dr. Plooij quotes two inscriptions from Cyprus where this is the case, viz. C.I.G. 2134 and 2632. The second of these is dated 52. If the number 13 in the Soli inscription denotes the year of Claudius' reign, we arrive at the year 53 as the date of its publication. But Dr. Plooij maintains that it is quite certain that Sergius Paulus was not proconsul of Cyprus in that year because in the second inscription mentioned above (C.I.G. 2632) we are told that in the twelfth year of Claudius the proconsulate was held by L. Annius Bassus, and that he was carrying out the decisions of his predecessor in office, Q. Julius Cordus, and, therefore, Sergius Paulus must have been proconsul before 51. I must confess that I cannot follow our author's argument at this point because it does not seem to me that the fact that Bassus and Cordus were proconsuls of Cyprus in 52 and 51 respectively affords the slightest proof that Sergius Paulus could not have been proconsul after 52 as well as before 51. Why not 53, as the inscription seems to imply ?

According to our author, then, the Soli inscription gives no real evidence as to the date of Sergius Paulus' entrance upon the proconsulship of Cyprus, but we do learn from another Cyprus inscription that he must have held that office before 51.

Chap. 4. *Gallio as Proconsul of Achaia.*

The most interesting and the most valuable chapter in this section of the book is that in which Dr. Plooij discusses the Delphine inscription in which Gallio's name is found. This inscription was published in 1905 by Émile Bourguet, who was the first to realise its importance in connexion with Pauline chronology, although its existence was known

before. Its publication aroused considerable interest and was followed by the issue of a large body of literature devoted to its elucidation. Ramsay has a lucid description of it in the EXPOSITOR for May 1909, pp. 467 ff. The inscription is a letter from Claudius Cæsar to the city of Delphi, and in it he mentions the name of Junius Gallio, his friend and proconsul of Achaia. It is unfortunately much mutilated and very fragmentary, and in that very section which concerns Gallio the "Ju" of Junius, "Achaia" and "friend" are reconstructions of gaps that exist in the original. Bourguet only published four fragments in 1905, but three others were added by him later as forming the concluding portion of Claudius' letter. The seven fragments have been put together by Dr. Plooij, who claims to have discovered what Bourguet failed to find, viz., the exact places where the three later fragments join on to the other four, and the complete inscription as far as it exists is published in this volume with the text as reconstructed by Dittenberger. The following are the points of essential importance in the inscription which concern Gallio and the date of his proconsulship.

1. Gallio's name.

2. It is dated in the 26th acclamation of Claudius as Imperator.

3. The rescript is a reply to a report from Gallio as proconsul concerning a dispute about boundaries between the city of Delphi and its neighbours.

The name of the reigning Emperor is unfortunately obliterated, but there is little reason to doubt that the first word in the inscription, viz. Tiberius, refers not to the Emperor of that name but to Tiberius Claudius. We start then with the statement that Gallio was proconsul of Achaia when Claudius had been acclaimed as Emperor for the 26th time. Now these acclamations generally followed a victory

gained either by the Emperor himself or his generals, and they would as a rule fall in that part of the year which was favourable for campaigning, i.e. after the beginning of spring and before the autumn. The number of the tribunate year is also missing in the inscription, so that the date must be established by discovering when the 26th acclamation fell, and of this we have no documentary evidence at present. The *terminus ad quem* can, however, be fixed by means of the 27th acclamation, the date of which can be arrived at with some degree of accuracy from two other inscriptions, the first of which is given in Dessau, *Ins. select. Lat.* 1. 1986, and the second in C.I.L. VI. 1256. The following data are given in the first inscription, the 12th year of Claudius, i.e. January 25, 52–January 24, 53, the 27th acclamation, the consulships of F. Cornelius Sulla Felix and L. Salvidienus Rufus, Salvianus, and the particular day, iii. Idus December. The consulship of Felix covered the whole of the year 52, that of Salvianus the second half of that year. The iii. Idus Dec. in the inscription must, therefore, be Dec. 11, 52. The second inscription is found on an arch of the Aqua Claudia, and from it we gather that the 27th acclamation had taken place before the consecration of the Aqua Claudia, which Frontinus dates August 1, 52. Combining this with an inscription of the city of Kys (C.I.L. xiii. 254) we find that the 26th acclamation took place between January 25 and August 1, 52.

The *terminus post quem* is also arrived at by the same method of investigation. Inscriptions (C.I.L. iii. 476 and 1977) show that the 22nd and 24th acclamations fell in the 11th year of Claudius, i.e. in 51. The 25th acclamation is mentioned in an inscription which only contains the name of Claudius and the number of the acclamation. We thus gather that between January 25, 51 (the beginning of the 11th year of Claudius) and August 1, 52 must be placed the six

acclamations of Claudius from the 22nd to the 27th inclusive. It is more than probable that this somewhat unusual crowding of so many acclamations within a comparatively short period of time was due to the victories of Ostorius over Caractacus in 50 and in a later campaign against the Silures which Tacitus describes as having been brought to a successful issue in 51–52. There were also the successful campaign of Quadratus in Palestine and the overthrow of the Clitae by Antiochus of Commagene, both in 52, to be celebrated. We have seen that the 22nd and the 24th acclamations belong to the year 51 and that the 27th fell before August 1, 52. It is a reasonable deduction, therefore, that the 26th belongs to the first half of 52. We are thus able to fix a date for the Gallio inscription with a better claim to accuracy than is generally possible in ancient chronology and we may accept the reconstructed text of the inscription which places it in the 12th year of Claudius as correct.

(*c*) *Gallio as Proconsul of Achaia.* Gallio was the elder brother of the more renowned Seneca, who returned from exile in 49 and became consul in 56. It has been generally assumed that the former was appointed Proconsul of Achaia soon after Seneca's restoration to power, and this is confirmed by the Delphine inscription which shows that he was in office in 52. He was back again in Rome when Claudius died on October 13, 54, for Dio Cassius relates how he perpetrated a witticism on the Emperor's death (lx. 35). Seneca relates that during Gallio's period of office the latter had to take a sea voyage for change of air, and many authorities suggest that his term of office was prolonged for a second year to compensate for the break caused by his absence during the first year. Dr. Plooij, however, insists that this would have been a most unusual proceeding, and more especially in view of the fact that Achaia had become in 44 a senatorial

province, and that we are not justified in assuming that Gallio's term of office was extended beyond the normal single year. But even allowing this it is not easy to establish firmly the date of his accession to office, because the proconsul remained in office until his successor arrived in the province and was held responsible until he himself arrived in Rome. As these changes of office generally involved sea voyages the summer was the normal season in which they took place. Tiberius had ordained in 15 that the newly appointed governors should leave Rome not later than the New Moon of June following their appointment, and Claudius, having in view the more distant provinces, had in 42 substituted for this date the New Moon of April. On the strength of these regulations Mommsen suggested July 1st as the normal date of a proconsul's arrival in his province, but in those provinces less distant from Rome the date might have been considerably earlier. Dr. Plooij, therefore, claims that we shall not be far wrong if we place Gallio's arrival in Achaia in the month of May. Assuming this to be correct we are then faced with the further difficulty of deciding the exact year of his arrival. We have seen that the 26th acclamation must have fallen in the first half of the year 52 and, therefore, not very far from the month of May in that year. It is possible then that the Delphine inscription may belong to the *end of Gallio's proconsulship*, which would in that case have begun in May 51, but it is also possible that it belongs *to the beginning of his year of office*, which would in this case have to be placed in May 52. So far as the inscription is concerned, then, Gallio's year of office might have covered either May 51–May 52 or May 52–May 53. The balance of probability is, however, in favour of the earlier alternative, because the rescript of Claudius is a reply to a report from Gallio on the situation at Delphi, and this implies that he must have been in office

for a longer period than the few weeks which would be all that was possible under the second alternative, before the decision of Claudius was published. His proconsulship may, therefore, be dated with some degree of confidence May 51–May 52, while the alternative, 52–53, still remains a bare possibility.

(*d*) *St. Paul at Corinth.* Accepting the earlier date for Gallio's proconsulship it may now be helpful to see what light the relevant passage in Acts has to throw on this particular point. In Acts xviii. St. Paul is stated to have spent a year and a half in Corinth, to have been attacked by the Jews "when Gallio was proconsul of Achaia," and to have departed from the city *ἡμέρας ἱκανάς* after his appearance before the judgment-seat of Gallio. There are in this narrative three chronological points which have to be defined. 1. The termination of the period of the Apostle's residence in Corinth. 2. The length of time implied in the expression *ἡμέρας ἱκανάς*. 3. The interval between the Apostle's arrival in Corinth and his appearance before Gallio.

Beginning with the third point, the wording of the phrase *Γαλλίωνος δὲ ἀνθυπάτου ὄντος τῆς Ἀχαίας* with *ὄντος* instead of the usual *γενομένου* gives the impression that the Jews made their attack upon St. Paul soon after Gallio's arrival in Corinth. If they did this, their method of procedure would have been an exact parallel to that of their brethren in Jerusalem who a few years later demanded of Festus almost on the very day he assumed office that the Apostle should be handed over to them. It is very probable, therefore, that St. Paul was brought before Gallio in the early days of his proconsulship, say in June–July 51. 2. The question then arises what proportion of the one and a half years of stay in Corinth is covered by the phrase *ἡμέρας ἱκανάς*? In itself the expression is exceedingly vague, and in the Acts stands in one place for three years (ix. 20) and

in another for quite a short period (xxvii. 7). Here again Dr. Plooij attaches much weight to the impression created by the narrative and premises that the Apostle, feeling that his continued presence in Corinth would be more of a hindrance than of a help to the young Church in that city, would not delay his departure unduly but would leave for Ephesus after a reasonable interval of time. He therefore suggests the following as the probable sequence of events. Gallio arrived in Corinth in May 51. St. Paul appeared before him in June–July 51. The Apostle departed for Ephesus July–August 51 and must, therefore, have arrived at Corinth about the beginning of the year 50. But as Dr. Plooij points out, these dates cannot be established with absolute certainty because there always exists the bare possibility that Gallio's term of office ran not from 51–52 but from 52–53. All that we can assert to have been proved beyond all doubt is that St. Paul must have appeared before Gallio somewhere between May 51 and May 53, which involves the possibility that the Apostle, and especially if he were anxious to avoid crossing the sea during the "close" season, did not leave Corinth until after the winter of 52–53. All historical probability points, however, to July–August 51 as the period of his departure.

(*e*) *The expulsion of the Jews from Rome.* In Acts xviii. 2 we read that when St. Paul reached Corinth on his second Missionary Journey he found that Aquila and Priscilla had arrived there quite recently, (προσφάτως) having been as Jews expelled from Rome by an edict of Claudius. The edict in question must, therefore, have been published only a comparatively short time before the Apostle's arrival at Corinth. There were several disturbances among the Jews in Claudius' reign which led to repressive measures on the part of the Roman authorities. One such measure is mentioned by Dio Cassius (lxx. 6. 6) in connexion with the

year 41, but this cannot be the edict mentioned in the Acts, although Dio Cassius' chronology is generally so vague that he may have associated with a particular year what was a common feature during the whole of Claudius' reign. Suetonius also mentions an edict expelling the Jews from Rome in the famous passage from the *Vita Claudii*, c. 25, which reads: "Judaeos impulsore Chresto assidue tumultuantes Roma expulit," and a comparison of Suetonius' language here with that of Dio Cassius referred to above would seem to suggest that they both had the same incident in view, although the latter does not explicitly refer to an edict. Now Suetonius gives no date for the edict recorded by him, but Orosius states categorically, on the authority of Josephus, that the edict mentioned by Suetonius was published in the ninth year of Claudius. Now Orosius in his history follows closely the chronicle of Eusebius but also adds other data derived in particular from Julius Africanus, and it is probable that he borrowed all he knew about Josephus, and consequently the statement about the edict, from these two writers. But there exists a difficulty in the fact that in our text of Josephus there is no mention of this edict. Dr. Plooij is, however, prepared to accept this date of the edict supplied by Orosius as based on a genuine source, and, therefore, places the edict in the year 49. He is not disposed to attach much weight to the argument that might be based on Ramsay's assertion that Orosius is systematically a year late in his dates, (*St. Paul the Traveller*, p. 68) which would bring the edict into the year 50, for the reason that even if Orosius in his own statements is guilty of this error, in this particular case he is quoting an outside authority who is not likely to have erred in the same way.

Accepting Dr. Plooij's dating of the Delphine inscription as correct, St. Paul arrived at Corinth in the New Year of 50 and found Priscilla and Aquila already established there,

The edict, therefore, cannot be later than November 49 and may be some months earlier if Aquila and Priscilla reached Rome before winter. Thus the evidence of two absolutely independent authorities, the Gallio-inscription at Delphi and the statement of Orosius, are in complete accord.

MAURICE JONES.

(*To be continued.*)

A GREAT JEWISH SCHOLAR.

THE LATE DR. LUDWIG GEIGER OF BERLIN UNIVERSITY.

THE latest German papers which have reached us contain obituary notices of Dr. Ludwig Geiger, who has passed away in his seventy-first year. The career of this Jewish scholar has been associated for forty-five years with Berlin University, and his literary work falls into two well-marked divisions. The *Berliner Tageblatt*, on the morrow of his death, hailed him as one of the most popular Goethe experts, and the Goethe Year Book had been under his control since 1880. The *Tageblatt* does not mention either in this first notice, or in the account of the funeral, that Geiger won his reputation, at the age of twenty-one, by his learned and fascinating biography of John Reuchlin, the reviver of Hebrew learning in Europe at the dawn of the Reformation. Geiger's *Life of Reuchlin*, and his edition of Reuchlin's Correspondence are among the sources for the youth of Philip Melanchthon, grand-nephew of the celebrated Hebraist.

Ludwig Geiger was the son of a Breslau Rabbi, Dr. Abraham Geiger, who was famous in his day as a reformer within the community. German papers describe the father as "the Reformer of Judaism." In 1870 he removed with his family to Berlin, the new Imperial capital, and the brilliant son was at once engaged at the University as a "Privatdozent." His studies from boyhood were chiefly concerned with Jewish and Renaissance history. In 1882 he published for Oncken's Universal History series a large book entitled *Renaissance and Humanism in Italy and Germany*.

George Ellinger, in the notes to his *Life of Melanchthon* (1902), remarks that Geiger's *Renaissance* had not been appreciated as its merits deserve. The fact is surprising,

for the illustrations from old pictures and prints, reproduced on fine thick paper, are an education in themselves. The letterpress is clumsily displayed, and the absence of an index is irritating. Oncken's Histories were in some respects badly planned. The appeal was to the general reader, the illustrations were superb, the bibliographies of priceless value to the student, yet there was no one on the staff who cared to provide the necessary assistance of an index.

Dr. Geiger turned his attention, after 1880, to the popular field of Goethe research, and his early work is practically forgotten.

Because of his Reuchlin book we lay a humble wreath on his grave. His two-volume history of Berlin "from 1688 to 1840" may disappear with a mass of other ephemeral publications, but the world outside Germany will think of this laborious scholar as a guide and helper in Reformation study.

Perhaps the strangest pages of the *Life of Reuchlin*, which was completed amid the agony of the Franco-Prussian war, are those in which the young Jewish writer discusses his hero's work: *De Verbo Mirifico*, ("On the Wonder-working Word") and tells us that that word was the Name of Jesus.

Reuchlin was a Christian, and amid his Cabbalistic studies his heart's affection clung closely to his Lord. We can trace his influence in the simple, sincere piety which ran through Melanchthon's life. It is with something of a thrill, as we can see, that Geiger approached the study of Reuchlin's masterpiece.

The mysterious name of Jehovah, was sacred and unpronounceable, with its four consonants JHVH. The angel Gabriel announced to the Blessed Virgin that her Son would be called Jesus (IHSVH). Even in the earliest

times that Name, Reuchlin said, had wrought miracles, preserved men in dangers and averted ruin. The Cross is the symbol of that miraculous Name. The word of the Cross is the greatest of all secrets; it is whispered in the ear of the faithful, but is inaudible to others.

Erasmus, who loved the Cabbalistic writings of Reuchlin, sent a present of his books to Dean Colet, but our divine answered:

"O Erasmus! of books and of knowledge there is no end. There is nothing better for us in this short life than to live holily and purely, and to make it our daily care to be purified and enlightened, and really to practise what these "Pythagorica" and "Cabalistica" of Reuchlin promise; but in my opinion, there is no other way for us to attain this than by the earnest love and imitation of Jesus. Wherefore leaving these wandering paths, let us go the short way to work."

Professor Ludwig Geiger was buried by the side of his father, the Rabbi Abraham, in the old Jewish Cemetery in the Schönhauser Allee, Berlin, amid the mourning of many friends and pupils.

J. T. S.

THE DATE OF ACTS.

The early date proposed for Acts by Professor Harnack in 1911 and since then accepted by various scholars, British, German and American, carries with it important consequences for early Christian literature. It is Professor Harnack's view, it will be remembered, that Acts was written in the lifetime of Paul, presumably during the Roman imprisonment in the midst of which the narrative breaks off. Since Luke preceded Acts and Mark preceded Luke, this finding gives new dates to an important series of Christian documents.

Now if we take up a book on the Great War, it is not difficult to determine from its general attitude whether it was produced before or after the signing of the Armistice on November 11, 1918. It would not be necessary for the writer to relate the signing of it, to disclose this. His point of view would inevitably be so affected by that event that it would throw his work into quite a different perspective. And this should be true of Acts. If Paul has suffered martyrdom when Luke writes, the knowledge of that fact must inevitably colour what Luke reports about him, and condition the attitude he assumes towards him. It is a suggestive fact that Xenophon in his Memorabilia of Socrates nowhere relates the death of Socrates; the narrative ceases with Socrates still alive and conversing with his friends. But the work explicitly refers to his condemnation and death. In this of course it goes beyond what Acts says of Paul. But Acts is not the Memorabilia of Paul but the story of the Rise and Progress of the Greek Mission; and the lesson of the Memorabilia is that we must not too readily assume that an ancient hero-narrative, if written after its hero's death, must necessarily report it. Moreover

Paul is by no means the hero of Acts in the sense in which Socrates is of the Memorabilia.

If the subject of Acts is the Rise and Progress of the Greek Mission, it has reached in Paul at Rome, a climax beyond which it could not go. No one can think that an account of Paul's evangelisation of Iliberris or some other Iberian town would have rendered Acts any more complete. Similarly an account of Paul's death would have made the book end in anticlimax and have blunted its point, through confusing its aim. Acts is at least in intention history, not biography, and to judge it by its conformity with what we think are the rules of biography will always lead to very precarious results.

We may not then conclude from the failure of Luke to relate the death of Paul that Paul was still alive when Luke wrote, for Acts is not the Memorabilia of Paul, nor if it were need it have contained an account of his death. But we may assume that if Paul was dead when Luke wrote, and Luke knew the fact, it would certainly have coloured his account of Paul, even though he did not explicitly report it. It is difficult to see how Luke could have helped reflecting knowledge of it. What he chose to report of Paul's utterances and relationships ought to reveal at east whether Paul was dead or alive when Acts was written. Especially if, as tradition says, Paul suffered martyrdom at Rome, at the end of a period of imprisonment, Acts, if written after it, cannot but reflect it. We have no right to expect from Acts direct testimony as to Paul's fate, but lindirect testimony we have every right to expect. We must therefore interrogate Acts as to its indirect testimony to the fate of Paul.

Thus interrogated, Acts is anything but silent. All the way from Macedonia to Cæsarea Paul's journey is beset with warning, foreboding and farewell. At Troas Paul

talks with his Christian friends from evening until dawn. At Miletus he makes to the Ephesian elders a farewell address which probably sums up what Luke considered the substance of all the farewells of this farewell journey. Paul declares in a tone of unmistakable foreboding that he does not know what fate awaits him in Jerusalem, but that he must go there ; that in every city he visits on his way the Spirit warns him that prison and persecution await him ; but he sets no value on his life, provided he can accomplish his course and perform his service to Christ. And he solemnly adds, " I know that none of you will ever see me again." He knows too that after he is gone, fierce wolves will get in among them and worry the flock, and schismatic teachers will rise among the brethren themselves. At the close of this touching farewell discourse the Ephesians wept, not so much at the immediate parting, says Luke, as at Paul's ominous declaration (which Luke is careful to repeat) that they would never see him again.

We are not here concerned with why Paul uttered these words or even whether he uttered them at all, but solely with the question why Luke reported them. If we have lost a friend in the War, any words of foreboding which he may have uttered before going or after reaching France become at once precious and memorable. If he has returned in safety, or if he is still abroad but unharmed, we say nothing about them and they are soon forgotten. It is precisely the fate of Paul which gives this farewell to the Ephesians all its point and propriety. If Paul is still alive and well when chapter xx. was written, this gloomy forecast becomes gratuitous and ineffectual. Its value even for us virtually hinges upon our consciousness of the martyrdom of Paul. And if the earliest readers of Acts were not aware of the death of Paul, all this pathos must have been quite beside the mark. For if Paul were alive and well

when Acts was written, even if he were in prison, what could Luke's reporting his sorrowful words to the Ephesians that they would never see him again, mean? Only that he had definitely determined not to return to them, which would have no very edifying sense for Luke's readers. But if Paul had in fact died without ever having seen these elders again, then Luke's report of such a farewell address to them becomes natural and moving. What we have to consider is, why out of all the things Paul said or might have said on this journey, Luke chose an utterance of just this kind to report. There can be but one answer. He chose it because subsequent events had made such an utterance of Paul's extremely significant and touching. Mere imprisonment would not have done this unless it were an imprisonment that ended only with his death; and that brings us to the same conclusion by a slightly different way. In short, Luke's inclusion in Acts of this farewell to the Ephesians, especially in the emphatic and detailed way in which he gives it, can only mean that Paul is no longer alive.

The other elements in the address confirm this very strongly. Paul's personal uncertainty and apprehension, his resignation, and especially his prediction that schismatic and heretical teachers would arise to trouble the Church (or the churches) all have a decidedly posthumous tone. We can hardly push the beginnings of the rise of the sects as far back as Paul's imprisonment; that is the unmistakable atmosphere of the last years of the first century at the earliest. This prediction is a conspicuous example of the reading back of contemporary conditions into an earlier time of which one is writing, and in its way it is quite as strong a hint that Luke is writing long after Paul's death as is the tragic note in Paul's farewell. The vagueness of the polemic reminds us of the atmosphere of the Pastorals and some of the later Catholic epistles.

This heavy atmosphere of apprehension pervades the further narrative of Paul's journey. Out of a week's conversations at Troas Luke only reports that the disciples told Paul by the Spirit not to set foot in Jerusalem. The solemn and tearful farewells continue (Acts xxi. 5, 13; cf. xx. 37, 38). At Cæsarea Agabus again warns Paul against entering Jerusalem, and Paul declares his readiness not only to be imprisoned but to die at Jerusalem. The warning at Cæsarea that the Jews will deliver Paul up to the Gentiles recalls the words in which Jesus forecast His own fate (Luke xviii. 32), and the resignation of Paul's friends finds expression in words almost identical with those of Jesus in Gethsemane: the Lord's will be done.

It would take more than an indefinite imprisonment from which Paul might at any time be released to satisfy Luke's emphasis of these forebodings. It is not to Paul's imprisonment but to his death that Paul's friends are made to resign themselves in the journey to Jerusalem. And if these forebodings had turned out to be groundless, Luke would not have recorded them. It is clearly because they have turned out to be only too well grounded that he selects them for detailed and repeated emphasis.

Without spoiling the end of his book, Luke thus skilfully conveys what most of us would have used much clumsier means to communicate. When Acts is written Paul is a hallowed memory, and already the sects are beginning to appear.

Edgar J. Goodspeed.

EARLY NOTES ON THE RESURRECTION NARRATIVES.

The earliest (Ante-Nicene) Fathers supply us occasionally with valuable or at least interesting, pieces of exegesis of the Resurrection narratives in the Gospels, dealing sometimes with what are points of controversy even now. The only one, however, who deals at all systematically with these is Eusebius, in his work on "The Apparent Discrepancies of the Gospel," the third book of which, addressed to Marinus, is entitled, "Questions and Solutions concerning the Saviour's Passion and Resurrection." We have this, however, only in a confused and imperfect state. Cardinal Mai published from Vatican MSS. an epitome and a number of large fragments from the complete work in *Nova Patrum Bibliotheca*, vol. iv.; this is reprinted by Migne,[1] We have to do a considerable amount of piecing together in order to get all of Eusebius' view on some points.

Other Fathers give only occasional help. It is doubtful whether Origen's Commentary on St. John ever went beyond the end of chapter xiii.; his Commentary on St. Matthew, even in its Latin version, breaks off at end of chapter xxvii. But we have a few valuable notices elsewhere, especially in his work against Celsus. There are also occasional notes in Tertullian, Dionysius, and other writers.

Eusebius is very unequal. Not only does he often give alternative solutions of very differing merit, but while some of his explanations commend themselves at once, others are very forced. Thus in attempting to reconcile or combine the accounts of the Four Evangelists as regards the appearances to the women at the tomb he finally holds that each evangelist records a separate visit and appearance, and tries to arrange these in order. The mention of "Mary

[1] Vol. xxii. (Eusebius iv.)

Magdalene" by more than one forms a difficulty; the solutions he offers are, (1) she remained near the tomb, and joined in several visits; (2) the name "Magdalene" may be genuine only in one place, and have come in elsewhere by some clerical error; (3) there may have been more than one Mary Magdalene (!)

He accounts occasionally elsewhere for discrepancies by supposing a clerical error (*σφάλμα γραφικόν*). One of these cases is very attractive, being at least as good a solution of the problem as any other yet offered. He holds[1] that the discrepancy between Mark's third hour (xv. 25) and John's "sixth hour" (xix. 14) rests on the confusion of two very similar figures or letters, "gamma" and "episemon" (*Γ* and *F*.) Mark's statement is correct; John originally gave the same hour, but the copyists have corrupted it.

The question of the precise time of our Lord's Resurrection had a practical bearing, as it would be natural to break off the Fast at this point. Dionysius of Alexandria, writing to Basilides on this matter, says that the evangelists give different notes of time for the visits to the tomb, but all agree the Lord was risen already; we do not know the exact time. He explains the difficult phrase *ὀψὲ σαββάτων* (Matt. xxviii. 1) as meaning, not, according to the ordinary use of the word, the evening of the Sabbath, but deep night, *ὀψέ* denoting lateness and long lapse.

Eusebius deals with this same point at length. He once[2] suggests that *ὀψὲ σαββάτων*—not *σαββάτου*—might mean at the end of the *week*. But his main point is that the interpretation of the evening of the Sabbath is ruled out, partly by Christian tradition, for we do not break off the Fast at that point; and partly by the facts of the case, for had the resurrection occurred at that time, when every

[1] Migne, Col. 1009. [2] Col. 941, Migne.

one was up, there would have been a crowd flocking [1] to the tomb, and the soldiers' story would have been impossible. He takes the phrase to mean the late part [2] of the night following the Sabbath; for so, he says, do we use ὀψὲ τῆς ὥρας, ὀψὲ τοῦ καιροῦ, and ὀψὲ τῆς χρείας. (What is the exact force of ὀψέ in these phrases? can it mean "later than, too late for, far behind? Lexicographers disagree as to this use of ὀψέ.[3]

Hence Matthew, as though explaining himself, added "at the dawning," denoting the hour and period of the night after the Sabbath, which is about the dawn of the first day of the week; for he says "at the dawning, viz., hour, already just breaking and dawning to the Lord's day, which was later than and far behind the Sabbath."

The question why the angel rolled the stone away is dealt with by Origen.[4] Celsus had said, "The Son of God, it appears, could not open the tomb, but needed another to roll away the rock. Origen replies that it is obviously more seemly for the inferior and the attendant to have rolled away the stone than that He who was rising to help men should have done this.

Eusebius [5] says, "The angel did not move away the stone with a view to the resurrection, nor appeared as he did for the sake of the stone, but in order to drive away the guards and welcome the women. . . The Saviour rose before the angel came, and did not wait for the removal of the stone; but while this was still lying before the door sealed with the signets of the chief priests, and the guards were surrounding the place, he vanished from the tomb, having by divine power wrought the resurrection from the dead at an hour known to none. . . The angel came to men as a

[1] συνδρομή. [2] τὸ ὀψὲ καὶ βραδύ
[3] See Grimm-Thayer s.v.; also Moulton, *Prolegomena* 72.
[4] Celsus v. 58 [5] Col. 984.

messenger of good tidings, not contributing by his presence anything to the Resurrection."

Eusebius appears successful in his attempt[1] to reconcile the angel's words in Matthew and Mark, "He goeth before you into *Galilee*, there shall ye see Him," with the fact that Luke and John record appearances at or near *Jerusalem*. He gives a double solution, preferring the first alternative. (1) Suppose only the Eleven to be in view, it is not unreasonable if, in His tenderness for His disciples, who so far did not believe the promises of the women, He once and again appeared to them in concealment at Jerusalem, before appearing more openly in Galilee (i.e., the appearances at Jerusalem were vouchsafed in condescension to the Apostles' lack of faith). (2) The message was not for the Apostles alone; there was a second order besides them, that of the Seventy; and besides these, many other adherents,[2] mentioned 1 Corinthians xv. 6; these also had been counted worthy of being called "disciples." It was not possible for Him to appear to all these together at Jerusalem: therefore the angel bade not only the Eleven, but absolutely all the disciples, to hasten into Galilee.

Either of these solutions seems to meet a real difficulty.

Eusebius[3] shows the evidential value of the Apostles' slowness to believe. "If Thomas disbelieved the Apostles, we can scarcely blame the rest, because not having as yet beheld Him, they disbelieved the women. The Scripture shows much examination and carefulness on the part of the disciples; they did not readily assent to the women's words, but at first hesitated until after full recognition of the truth they were able to say 1 John i. 1."

In one place[4] Eusebius thinks that all that Peter and John believed after their visits to the tomb was Mary's words, "They have taken away my Lord." But elsewhere he

[1] Col. 1004. [2] γνώριμοι. [3] Col. 988. [4] Col. 989.

takes a higher view. He also brings out the witness of the grave-clothes.[1] "The clothes lying within both furnish a proof that the body had not been taken away by men as Mary supposed; for no men taking away the body would have left the clothes, nor would the thief ever have run the risk of his being caught by waiting to remove them; and at the same time they establish the resurrection of the body from the dead. For God, who transforms the bodies of our humiliation so as to be conformed to the body of Christ's glory, changed the body, as an organ of the power that dwelt in it, into something more divine, but left the linen clothes as superfluous and foreign to the essence of the body."[2]

The difficult verse, John xx. 17, "Touch me not, for I have not yet ascended to the Father," is treated mystically and obscurely by Origen (*John*, tome vi. p. 155). "The Lord, strong and mighty in war, having slain His enemies by His Passion, but needing cleansing which can be given Him only by the Father after His exploits, with these words forbids Mary to touch Him; but when He proceeds[3] victorious and triumphant with His body risen from the dead (how else can we understand 'I have not yet ascended to My Father' and 'I proceed to my Father'?), then some powers say. 'Who is this that cometh from Edom?' . . . and those who escort Him say to those at the heavenly gates, Psalm xxiv. 7."

Elsewhere[4] he points out that a woman was not allowed the firstfruits of the touch of Christ; it was to be said to *Thomas*, "Bring hither thy finger. . . ."

Eusebius[5] says that the Lord refuses Mary "because she was eager to come to Him as still a Teacher and not as God. Her ideas being still only mortal, she was not able to handle[6] His deity; it was not fitting for her who was

[1] Col. 986. Cp. Latham, *The Risen Master*. [2] οὐσία.
[3] πορεύεται. [4] Tome xiii. p. 240. [5] Col. 949. [6] θιγεῖν.

still weeping and seeking Him among the tombs as still dead, and holding human and mean conceptions of Him, to be privileged to touch Him. He displayed the reason, viz., that as far as lay with her He had not yet ascended to the Father, since she did not believe this to have taken place, but thought He was lying somewhere dead." (When meeting Him with the other Mary she worships Him as God she is allowed to touch Him.)

Elsewhere (*Prophetic Selections*, iii. 3) Eusebius says that after having said these words to Mary He subsequently appeared to His disciples, associating with them for forty days; surely having ascended to the Father and descended again because of the ministry[1] He was accomplishing.

Thus Eusebius seems to believe in an Ascension before the final one; but it is not clear whether he conceives this as at the moment of the Resurrection before the appearance to Mary, or after it.

There are very few comments on the Emmaus narrative. Origen repeatedly (five times) calls the two disciples *Simon* and Cleopas.

On the other hand there is a good deal on the Lord's appearance to the assembled disciples. Marcion, according to Tertullian,[2] explained "A spirit hath not flesh and bones as ye see me having" as "A spirit has not flesh and bones as ye see me having none." Tertullian says this is an awkward twist; it could have been expressed much more simply. 'But why did He show them His hands and feet—limbs consisting of bones? When they still did not believe He asked for food, just in order to show Himself to have also teeth."

Eusebius[3] fits together excellently Luke's and John's narratives of this appearance. The events in Luke come first; John does not give the reason why He showed them

[1] *οἰκονομία*. [2] Against Marcion iv. 43. [3] Col. 1000 f.

His hands and side, since Luke has already given it, because they supposed they beheld a spirit. The more august and divine acts are as used recorded by John; the more human things by Luke, as a subordinate.

The retention and remission of sins is discussed by Origen, Cyprian and Firmilian, but must be passed over here.

Much is said on "Receive ye (the) Holy Spirit." The author of *Rebaptism* emphasises that the apostles did not, upon their baptism, straightway receive the Holy Spirit, which was not yet, because Jesus had not yet been glorified; but only a long time after—after His Resurrection.

Origen (Celsus vii. 51) thinks a difference of degree is implied from "Ye shall be baptized with the Holy Ghost." Eusebius[1] holds that the Lord gave now some partial power and spiritual grace, not to raise the dead and to work miracles, but to forgive sins; but after the Ascension the Spirit Himself came down and bestowed on them powers and workings of signs and of every other gift. Here "Holy Spirit" without the article points to some partial operation of the Spirit; but of the Spirit Himself He says, "Ye shall receive power on *the* Holy Spirit coming upon you."

The Lord[2] renewing man and restoring to him the grace from God's inbreathing what he had lost, breathed into the faces of the disciples, saying, "Receive ye Holy Spirit."

Origen in his answer to Celsus (ii. 61) has a valuable note on Thomas. A modern explanation of the Lord's appearances regards them as simply cases of the apparition of deceased persons—regarded as real appearances, not as mere hallucinations. F. W. H. Myers took this line. Origen, however, thinks this was Thomas's original idea, but not the reality. "He thought it was not impossible for the soul of the dead to be seen, but did not regard it to be

[1] Col. 1016. [2] Col. 1013.

also true that He had risen in a substantial body. . . .[1] But Jesus was by His Resurrection something between the density of the body before the Passion and the appearance of the bare soul of such a body."

Tertullian and Origen differ in interpretation of "Blessed are they who have not seen and have believed. Tertullian[2] has the usual interpretation "*More* blessed"; this is repudiated by Origen,[3] who calls it a perversion. It would mean that those coming after the apostles are more blessed than the apostles, which is most foolish. The blessing of those who have not seen is welcome,[4] but yet an inferior one.

Origen (on Proverbs viii. 17) says that ἀγάπη is greater than φιλία. Hence in John xxi. 15 f., on the Saviour saying to Peter, Ἀγαπᾷς με; he knowing to whom he is speaking, ascribes less to himself, saying φιλῶ σε. But on hearing the third time "Simon, son of Jonah, φιλεῖς με; he was grieved because the third time He ascribed less to him.

He notices also (*Romans*, Book v. 10, p. 568) that the profession of no other virtue is required from Peter but *love*.

Eusebius[5] thinks that after this, the third appearance, the Lord appeared for a fourth time to the Eleven on a mountain; then to the Eleven and to the Seventy together; but Paul records that He appeared to still more than these.

On Matthew xxvii. 17 we have a catena fragment of Origen,[6] "They worshipped, they did not pray; but those who did not worship also doubted—perhaps Thomas or Philip."

The Trinitarian passage in verse 19 is read, and in nearly all cases established by comment or context, by Irenaeus iii. p. 208; Hippolytus, *Against Noetus*, 14; Clement,

[1] ἀντιτυπος. [2] *Resurrection*, 34. [3] John, Tome x. p. 209.
[4] ἀγαπητόν. [5] Col. 1005. [6] Cramer.

Excerpts from Theodotus, 76; Origen, *Greek Fragments on John* iii. 5 and xi. 4, besides repeatedly in Rufinus' version of the Commentary on Romans; Tertullian (Baptism 13, Prescription 20, Praxeas 26); Cyprian e.g. Ep. lxxiii.; several bishops at the Council of Carthage, e.g., Monnulus of Girba (10); and in two writings printed with Cyprian's works *Rebaptism* and *To Novatian.* Eusebius stands absolutely alone in his repeated quotation, "Go and make disciples of all nations in my name." This may be compared with another repeated quotation of his: "On *the* rock I will build my church." The reason why the Apostle in Romans vi. speaks only of baptism in the name of Jesus Christ is discussed by Origen on that passage. "Paul is dealing here not with the method of baptizing, but with the death of Christ, and it was not fitting that when speaking of death he should mention either the Father or the Holy Spirit." See also *Rebaptism,* 7.

HAROLD SMITH.

ST. PAUL'S USE OF TESTIMONIES IN THE EPISTLE TO THE ROMANS.

The epistle to the Romans is marked by an extraordinary transition when we come to the ninth chapter, where Paul turns from the lofty statements of Christian experience to discuss the problem of the salvability of the Jews, either in the present time when the writer is occupied with them or in some future stage of a Divine economy. It might seem at first that this point of transition is the point where the inquiry should begin as to the use of written testimonies against the Jews by St. Paul, for there are the Jews definitely introduced and their standing definitely discussed, and here also are the *Testimonies* with regard to them, and the only question is whether the Jews and the Testimonies have met before Paul introduced them to one another. The question does not, however, really arise at this point ; for on reading the Epistle through two facts present themselves at once to our notice : (i.) that from the opening of the epistle to its close the writer has in view the presentation of the Gospel by the method of prophetical *Testimonies*, though he is confessedly acting as an Apostle to the Gentiles, to whom such a method might seem to be not the natural one ; (ii.) that even in the part of the letter which belongs more properly to the Gentiles, he cannot keep his hand off the Jews, nor avoid using towards them the Testimony method ; he does more than talk to Gentiles apart, he mixes them with Jews ; he does more than accidentally quote Scriptures, he uses Scriptures fashioned definitely for a special warfare

of missiles. We shall see a curious instance of this presently. Meanwhile we note the first of the two points is established by Romans i. 1: "God promised the Gospel aforetime by means of prophetical men operating with Scriptural matter"; and by this pre-Evangel he means, as he says in Galatians iii. 8, that Christ was foretold as the benediction of *all the Gentiles* (Gen. xii. 3). In the contentious days when the Church was still in the Synagogue, the promise in Genesis is anti-Judaic because it is pro-ethnic. If this is the keynote of the opening of the Epistle, it is the keynote also of its close in chapter xvi. 26, where the preaching of Christ is described as a mystery now disclosed *by means of prophetic Scriptures* and made known to *all the Gentiles*. Here, then, we are again in a region of pro-ethnic apology, and the medium of the defence is prophetical testimony. It would not be too strong a statement to say that the structure of the epistle is consistent with a scheme of prophetical demonstrations which should be pro-ethnic and, to that extent at least, anti-Judaic.

Now let us turn to the second point: we note that the writer of the epistle not only accomplishes the great *volte-face* at the opening of chapter ix., but that he has a similar abrupt transition of a less easily recognisable character in the second chapter. Here, after explaining the certainty of Divine Judgement in accordance with human desert to every one alike, he breaks out with "What! you call yourself a Jew and are the superior religious person, the milestone that shows the way and never takes it! I tell you, my Jewish *confrère*, that *God's name is blasphemed on your account among the Gentiles!*"

It cannot be denied that this is Anti-Judaic; equally it is anti-Judaic by way of testimony, for the passage Isaiah lii. 5 is cited. So the question at once arises whether the passage thus quoted is from the armoury of the apostle's

own acquaintance with the Scriptures and his own interpretation of the same, or whether he borrowed his shaft from the quiver of the Church. That is the question to which we now address ourselves.

The first thing to observe is that the citation is from the Septuagint : the words " among the Gentiles " are not in the Hebrew, nor the Syriac. Assuming them to be the true reading of the LXX we notice that they accentuate what was already involved in δι' ὑμᾶς (another expansion on the part of the LXX), the blasphemy of the Name *on your account.* The point should be noted, because the passage of Isaiah might have quite a different colour, as a quotation, in the first century, from what it would have when the Church and the Synagogue had gone different ways. When the interpolator of the Ignatian Epistles uses it, it is an address to the Trallians not to give occasion to the Gentiles for blaspheming of the Divine Name. Here the Trallians have displaced the Jews, and the Gentiles are no longer the outside people with regard to Judaism, but with regard to the Church itself.

Is there any evidence that the text in Isaiah formed a part of the primitive collection of *Testimonies ?*

Let us turn to Gregory of Nyssa and the collection which passes under his name. We find as follows : in his sixteenth chapter he discourses in Scripture language *On the unbelief of the Jews and on the Church of the Gentiles.* Here is a specimen of the see-saw argument for the Gentiles and against the Jews :

" Of the Gentiles (David) says : I will declare thy name unto my brethren ; in the midst of the Church will I hymn thee. Of the Jews : on your account my name is blasphemed continually among the Gentiles. Malachi says : I have no pleasure in you, saith the Lord Almighty (sc. in the Jews) ; but of the Gentiles he says, From the rising of

the Sun, etc., my name shall be great among the Gentiles" (cap. 16, ed Zacagni, p. 321).

There is no reason to suppose that the writer of this collection of Testimonies is quoting St. Paul: he is evidently following a traditional line of attack. Here is a similar antithesis in the *Dialogue of Timothy and Aquila* (ed. Conybeare, p. 95):

"The Lord God gives eternal consolation to Zion, while he reproached the children of Israel for their unbelief: but he made Zion glad and said, Behold, I will comfort thee, Zion, etc. (Isa. l. 3); and of the Children of Israel he said: *On your account my name is blasphemed among the Gentiles.*"

These references are sufficient to show that the passage in Isaiah lii. 5 was used in an anti-Judaic and pro-ethnic manner, and they suggest that the same thing occurred in Romans ii. 24 by way of the *Testimony Book*, though they are not held to be of sufficient proof in themselves of the use of such a book. All that we affirm at present is that they are consistent with the use of such a book, and if we should find a strong case made out for the use of a *Testimony Book* in the chapters of the epistle which deal with Judaism, we should be entitled to say that the method of *Testimonies* and the use of a *Testimony Book* are probably characteristic of the whole epistle.[1] We suggest, then, to the inquirer who wishes to know if there really was a primitive *Book of Testimonies*, and if St. Paul had it and used it, that we should conduct the inquiry in the following manner.

[1] Those who are interested in the examination of the passages in which the Fathers refer the words "my name continually every day is blasphemed" to the Jews, will note that Eusebius in his *Demonstratio Evangelica* (vi. 24) comments upon Isaiah lii. by saying that "the Lord said *to the people of the Jews* . . . I called and there was none to answer, and in the passage before us he says *to the very same people*, On your account my name is blasphemed among the Gentiles.

It is almost universally recognised that there is some connexion between the Petrine use of passages, where Christ is foretold as the Foundation Stone and the Stone of Stumbling, and the Pauline use of the same passages. The marginal references in Romans ix. 32, 33 direct us to Isaiah viii. 14, and xxviii. 16, and to 1 Peter ii. 6, as using those very passages : and the marginal references in 1 Peter ii. 6, 8 will direct us to the very same references and to Romans ix. 32, 33, as having employed them. Hence it is commonly but erroneously said, that Peter has been borrowing Paul's arguments and proof-texts. He has either been doing that or there is some other explanation of the coincidence. The way to determine the true explanation is to read a little further on in Peter and a little further back in Paul, when we shall find a further agreement *plus* a significant difference in their treatment of a passage from Hosea.

In 1 Peter ii. 10, we have the quotations from Hosea i. 6, 7,

οἳ ποτε οὐ-λαός, νῦν δὲ λαὸς Θεοῦ,
οἳ οὐκ-ἠλεημένοι, νῦν δὲ ἐλεηθέντες,

and here the marginal annotator touches us on the sleeve and tells us to look back to Romans ix. 25.

When we do so we find the passage,

ὡς καὶ ἐν τῷ Ὡσηὲ λέγει·
Καλέσω τὸν οὐ-λαόν μου λαόν-μου.
καὶ τὴν οὐκ-ἠγαπημένην ἠγαπημένην.

One does not need much acquaintance with Hebrew to observe that there can be no question of a derivation of one of these passages from the other : they contain variant translations of the famous Lo-Ruḥamah of Hosea. The very same variant translations can be detected in the text and the MSS. of the LXX. All that we are concerned to maintain at this point is that Peter is not transcribing Paul. It is almost equally certain that Paul is not working directly or only from the LXX. In that case why has he replaced ἐρῶ

by καλέσω ?[1] The textual situation invites the hypothesis of a disturbing planet which has affected both luminaries. For it is clear that, however much Peter and Paul may differ in detail, they agree in interpreting the People of God in Hosea as the New People, instead of what Hosea meant, viz. : that God would reconcile His ancient people to Himself.

So much for the examination of the supposed Petro-Pauline coincidence. Now let us return to Romans ix. 25, and ask whether this passage ever turns up in collections of *Testimonia adv. Judaeos.*

We examine Cyprian on this point : and we find as follows :

Test. i. 19.

> Item apud Osee prophetam :
> Vocabo non-populum-meum populum-meum et non-dilectum dilectum : erit enim quo loco dicetur non-populus-meus, illo loco vocabuntur filii Dei vivi.

In the nature of the case Cyprian is not quoting from the N.T. : if he ever does that he does it in a supplementary manner and names the source of his quotation. He says he is quoting Hosea : and it is almost the same language as St. Paul's.

But what of the *Item* with which Cyprian begins ? this takes us back to a previous quotation and a chapter-heading as follows : (I spare myself for the present the task of re-editing the Cyprianic testimonies as given in Hartel's incorrect edition.)

> Quod duo populi praedicti sint, maior et minor, id est vetus Judaeorum, et novus, qui esset ex nobis futurus.
> *In Genesi :* et dixit Dominus Rebeccae : duae gentes in utero

[1] He found καλέσω in his text, from whencesoever he derived it ; for he leads up to it,

> ἐκάλεσεν ἡμᾶς οὐ μόνον ἐξ Ἰουδαίων,
> ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐξ ἐθνῶν· ὡς καὶ ἐν τῷ Ὡσηὲ λέγει,
> Καλέσω, κτέ.

tuo sunt et duo populi de ventre tuo dividentur, et populus populum superabit et maior seruiet minori.

This is the famous early Christian doctrine of the two peoples. It underlies the argument in St. Paul in the first part of the ninth chapter of Romans, but it cannot be derived from thence; it differs from it too widely, and moreover, it is widely diffused in writings that have no possible conjunction with Paul. For instance, it is the epistle of Barnabas which no one will credit with dependence upon the Pauline epistles, or being anything else than Anti-Judaic, and that, too, by way of *Testimonies* (see Barnab. c. xiii.).

In the tenth chapter of Romans the use of definite Testimonies is very marked. In v. 16 the Apostle is speaking of the unbelief of some at least of those to whom the primitive message of the Gospel came; and confirms his statement by a suggestive "Isaiah says, Lord, who hath believed our report?" and we at once notice that the very same text is used anti-Judaically in the Fourth Gospel: we may put the passages side by side, thus:

John xii. 37, 38.	Romans x. 16, 17.
They (sc. the Jews) believed not on him; that the word of Isaiah the prophet might be fulfilled, which he spake, Lord, who hath believed our report? etc.	They have not all obeyed the gospel: for Isaiah saith, Lord, who hath believed our report?

Thus both of these writers are making similar use of a primitive testimony from Isaiah, which was not necessarily meant to be employed in such a manner. And it is remarkable that Justin Martyr, in his *Dialogue with Trypho*, uses the passage in the same sense, as we may see from the following:

Dial. 43. And Isaiah, speaking in the person of the Apostles, who tell Christ that they do not believe their report (nor) the power

of him that sent them, says on this account as follows, Lord, who hath believed our report ? etc.

Thus Justin uses Isaiah liii. in an anti-Judaic manner exactly as Paul does ; and on looking closer at Justin's text, we see that he had a little before quoted as descriptive of the Apostolic message the passage in Psalm xix., which follows immediately in Romans, "Their sound is gone out into all the world, etc."

The very same passage is quoted by Justin in his *Apology* (i. *Ap.* 40) in a similar sense : he tells the Roman senators to listen and hear the prediction which was made of those who announced his (Christ's) teaching and indicated his manifestation.

In quoting the opening words of Isaiah. liii. twice with this peculiar interpretation, he naturally invites us to assume that he had this view of the passage as a part of his intellectual stock-in-trade, and that his collection of *Testimonies* included a section which related to the Apostles and the Apostolic preaching. That there was such a section in the *Testimonies* which Cyprian re-edits is betrayed by the heading of the first chapter in the second book : it runs thus :

Quod sapientia Dei Christus et de Sacramento concarnationis eius et passionis et calicis et altaris et *apostolorum qui missi praedicaverunt*:

here Cyprian should have said "*et de Apostolis*," and so with preceding genitives, which all betray a Greek περὶ governing all the substantives that follow in the genitive case. Here then are the apostles and the apostolic preaching : Cyprian proves it from Proverbs ix. 1, but does not actually quote from Isaiah liii. He establishes for us the existence of a chapter or section dealing with the subject.

Now let us look a little further into the text of Romans : in *vv.* 19, 20 of the tenth chapter, to which we now come,

we have two passages from the O. T. introduced by the formulae

Μωϋσης λέγει (Moses says),
Ἡσαΐας λέγει (Isaiah says),

which are proper for the introduction of the authoritative testimony of bard or seer, only St. Paul has inserted in the second case the words which we put in brackets,

Ἡσαΐας [ἀποτολμᾷ καὶ] λέγει, Isaiah (is daring and) says,

after which a definitely and deliberately anti-Judaic quotation from Isaiah is introduced :

Unto Israel he saith, All the day long, etc.—(Isaiah lxv. 2).

We need not doubt that these passages were actually incorporated in collections of anti-Judaic testimonies, for on turning to the collection attributed to Gregory of Nyssa, we find as follows :

Moses says, "They provoked me with that which is not God. They irritated me with their idols ; and I will provoke them with that which is not a nation ; and I will irritate you with an unintelligent people " :

which is Romans x. 19 : and then after a brief inserted quotation we have Isaiah : " I was manifest to them that do not seek after me," etc., which is Romans x. 20, the sequence being exactly the same in the collection of *Testimonies* as in the epistle : (see Greg. Nyss. c. 16, the chapter which is headed," On the unbelief of the Jews and the church of the Gentiles.") We shall find the other quotation also (from Isa. lxv. 2), but not in the immediate connexion : it is almost a commonplace in the Fathers, on account of its furnishing a supposed prediction of the crucifixion.

We have shown, then, that all the latter part of Romans x. is an adaptation of a group of already existing *Testimonies.*

We come now to chapter xi., where in the first part of the chapter the question is discussed whether God has

abandoned His people. It is answered by St. Paul by a general negative, accompanied by the admission that there was an abandonment, but it was (a) partial, (b) temporary.

Now if we were to turn to the *Dialogue of Timothy and Aquila* from which we quoted above, which certainly contains in a half-dramatic form the tradition of the anti-Judaic *Testimonies*, we should find a long section introduced with the inquiry, "Why do you say that God has put away (*ἀπώσατο*, the same verb as in Romans) the race of Abraham?" The language is biblical but it is also so closely Pauline, that one's first impression is that the author of the *Dialogue* has been borrowing from Romans: but this would contradict the whole tenor of this anti-Judaic work which practically never refers to St. Paul or his writings. Moreover, the treatment of the subject which follows in the *Dialogue* is not the Pauline treatment.

We suggest that the inquiry is the heading of a *Testimony* section, perhaps in the following form,

εἰ ἀπώσατο ὁ Θεὸς τὸ γένος Ἀβραάμ;

and when we put it in that way, in harmony with the *Dialogue*, we see why St. Paul goes on to prove that he is himself "an Israelite, *from the seed of Abraham*."

The next few verses of the epistle are occupied with the doctrine of the Remnant, according to the election of Grace. The Scripture proof is made at this point from the story of Elijah and the 7,000 in Israel who had not bowed the knee to Baal; but the doctrine had already been adumbrated in c. ix. 27, 28, and proved from certain passages in Isaiah (x. 22, 23; i. 9). Now we shall find Justin Martyr, in his *Dialogue*, using this very passage in an anti-Judaic manner: he says:

"Elijah, interceding for you to God, says as follows: 'Lord, they killed thy prophets, etc.'"

Justin goes on to argue that the Remnant for whose sake judgement is deferred are the Christians who have become disciples of Christ, etc.

Now here one naturally remarks the coincidence between Justin's introduction of the quotation, and the quotation itself, with the same things in St. Paul. Both of them talk of intercession with God ; one says it is *on behalf of Israel :* the other that it is *against Israel,* which latter form has the true anti-Judaic note.[1] Is Justin here making use of Pauline matter ? The answer will be in the negative ; Justin has his own doctrine of the remnant ; for instance, in c. 35 of the *Dialogue* he tells us that " God has left a remnant for salvation, that your race might not perish utterly like Sodom and Gomorrah." This quotation is not taken from Romans : Justin introduces it by the words, " Isaiah says," and is evidently working from the Scriptures at first hand. St. Paul and Justin have both taken the same passages from a handbook of quotations. The student will find that in almost every passage where Justin has been credited with a quotation from the Pauline writings, the reference is really to a passage in the Old Testament.

Perhaps we have now said enough to show that the anti-Judaic matter in the epistle to the Romans is not altogether original ; it is based upon a conventional treatment of certain passages in the Old Testament. This does not mean that the arguments based upon them are not original, but that they are largely deduced from quotations which are not made in the first instance by the Apostle himself, but were the common inheritance, as a collection, of the Christian Churches of his day. This view of the matter humanises, indeed, the interpretation of certain parts of the Pauline

[1] In fact, the passage is part of the stock-in-trade of the anti-Judaizers. Thus Cyprian, *Test.* 1. 2, " In Regnorum Tertio Helias ad Dominum : aemulando aemulatus sum . . . animam meam auferre a me."

writings, but that is gain and not loss. Even the Fathers of the Church were aware that even though he was Paul, he was also a man; and we of later days are not to decry any means of understanding him more thoroughly, and appreciating the conflicts in which he was engaged, and which resulted in the evolution of the Christian Church. Our business is to find the missing links in the evolution wherever they can be detected. The *Testimonies against the Jews* are one of the missing links in Biblical interpretation.

We may be sure that the recognition of the source from which St. Paul was working, and of the manner in which he uses his source, will re-act powerfully upon the criticism of the Epistle. Let us take a single instance. It has been noticed that St. Paul frequently introduces into his argument an imaginary objector, and by the refutation which he makes of what seems to be a mere lay-figure, he reduces part of his argument to the form of a dialogue. Exactly similar treatment will be found in the *Dialogue of Athanasius and Zacchaeus* to which we have been referring, and elsewhere. St. Paul commonly introduces the imaginary opponent with the formula λέγω οὖν, accompanied by a negation of the supposed Pauline doctrine, or a question which is supposed to be answered in the negative: e.g. xi. 1;

λέγω οὖν, μὴ ἀπώσατο ὁ Θεὸς τὸν λαὸν αὐτοῦ;

where it is assumed that some one has been saying or implying that God had abandoned His people. Or we may take xi. 11:

λέγω οὖν, μὴ ἔπταισαν ἵνα πέσωσιν;

where the question is provoked by the previous references to the stumblingblock provided for the unbelieving Jews. But what are we to say of this passage, c. x. 19:

λέγω οὖν, μὴ Ἰσραὴλ οὐκ ἔγνω;

Here the statement that has been made or implied is contained in the words,

Ἰσραὴλ οὐκ ἔγνω.

But there is nothing of this in the preceding verse, nor is it confuted in what follows, which relates to the calling of the Gentiles. On the other hand, the student of *Testimonies* recognises at once that the words "Israel doth not know" are from the opening verses of Isaiah, a passage which is very commonly in use by the Anti-Judaisers. For instance, in Cyprian, *Test.* i. 2, we have a whole section on the theme that "it was foretold that they would neither *recognise*, nor *know*, nor receive the Lord," and the first proof-text is in the opening verses of Isaiah (Isa. i. 3),

> Israel did not *recognise* me,
> The people did not *know* me,

a verse which was latent in the title of the section.

It appears, then, that the objection in x. 19 relates to the use of this famous Anti-Judaic passage, and something has, therefore, dropped from the context, which is unintelligible as it stands. It should be printed with marks of a lacuna, for there is certainly something missing.

Here is another curious result which follows at once, on placing the *Testimony Book* over against the passages parallel to it in the epistle. The section of the epistle between xii. 1 and xv. 7 is on a new theme; it is concerned with Christian ethics and not with prophecy; but when we come to xv. 8–13, we have again a change of subject and a series of arguments for the calling of the Gentiles, with the proof-texts from the Psalms and Isaiah. It would be easy to show that these are a group of conventional testimonies in a consecutive argument. In that case, this section has been displaced. It should have come further back. It will probably be found that it is a displaced page in the making

up of the roll of the epistle, and that Romans ix. 1–xi. 36 contains fifteen such pages, and Romans xii. 1–xv. 7 eleven such pages. We have not yet found out where the misplaced page ought to be inserted. It is not necessary to draw a positive conclusion: what is clear is that for the arrangement of the text and for its interpretation, the epistle is likely to gain in lucidity by the recognition of the employment of a *Testimony Book* by its author.

Rendel Harris.

ON THE SAYING ATTRIBUTED TO OUR LORD IN JOHN II. 19.

Λύσατε τὸν ναὸν τοῦτον καὶ ἐν τρισὶν ἡμέραις ἐγερῶ αὐτόν.

THREE questions may be considered in connexion with this Saying :—

(i) The historical truth of the John [1] version.

(ii) The relation between the Matthew and Mark versions in the trial before the High Priest.

(iii) The interpretation of the Saying.

(i)

Is St. John relating an actual saying of our Lord's, obtained from an authentic source, or is he putting one into His mouth in order to explain the charge brought against Him at His trial ?

The latter view is popular with some modern critics,[2] and seems to be accepted by Dr. A. H. McNeile,[3] who in his comment upon Matthew xxvi. 61 writes, "In John ii. 19 He is reported to have said, *λύσατε τὸν ναὸν τοῦτον*." . . . "The original utterance, whatever it was, probably contained a veiled reference to His future action as the Messiah." It seems to me clear, however, both from the charge brought against our Lord,[4] and from the jeers of

[1] I use "Matthew," "Mark," "John" throughout for the sake of brevity, and not as prejudging questions of authorship.

[2] See e.g. Abbott (*Diatessarica*, Part X, Section V, p. 519), "Christ's doctrine was probably not expressed exactly in the Johannine words, or at the early date assigned to it by John"; but Dr. Abbott expresses his belief that though Jesus did not speak thus, He certainly must have thought thus.

Plummer (*Exeg. Comm. on the Gospel accord. to St. Matthew*, p. 377) adheres to the traditional view.

[3] *The Gospel according to St. Matthew* (1915), p. 400.

[4] Matthew xxvi. 61, *οὗτος ἔφη, Δύναμαι καταλῦσαι τὸν ναὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ, καὶ διὰ τριῶν ἡμερῶν οἰκοδομῆσαι αὐτόν* : Mark xiv. 58, *Ἡμεῖς ἠκούσαμεν αὐτοῦ λέγοντος ὅτι Ἐγὼ καταλύσω τὸν ναὸν τοῦτον τὸν χειροποίητον, καὶ διὰ τριῶν ἡμερῶν ἄλλον ἀχειροποίητον οἰκοδομήσω.* I quote from the Revisers' text, but there are

the crowd at His crucifixion,[1] that the original utterance must have contained much more than "a veiled reference to His future action as the Messiah"; it must have had, to the Jews at least, a quite definite allusion to the possible destruction of the Temple and His own power to raise it up in three days; and if so, it must have been very much what St. John says it was.

Also the John form of the Saying is the shortest; the tendency of such sayings is to increase[2] and to become more detailed by repetition and in the light of after-experience. The simple

Λύσατε τὸν ναὸν τοῦτον καὶ ἐν τρισὶν ἡμέραις ἐγερῶ αὐτόν

is easily intelligible as the basis of the longer forms,

Δύναμαι καταλῦσαι τὸν ναὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ διὰ τριῶν ἡμερῶν οἰκοδομῆσαι αὐτόν (Matt.);

Ἐγὼ καταλύσω τὸν ναὸν τοῦτον τὸν χειροποίητον καὶ διὰ τριῶν ἡμερῶν ἄλλον ἀχειροποίητον οἰκοδομήσω (Mk.);

but it is difficult to image that St. John, having the Mark form of the Saying before him (as most modern critics suppose), should have compressed and altered it by changing *καταλύειν* into the weaker *λύειν*, by eliminating the contrast between the *χειροποίητον* and the *ἀχειροποίητον*, and by changing the precise *οἰκοδομεῖν* into the vague *ἐγείρειν*.[3]

no variant readings of any importance; in Mark xiv. 58 the Western text (D *a c d ff*$_2$ *k*) reads, *ἄλλον ἀναστήσω ἀχειροποίητον* for *ἄλλον ἀχειροποίητον οἰκοδομήσω*, but the *ἀναστήσω* looks like an echo of St. John's *ἐγερῶ*.

[1] Matthew xxvii. 40, Ὁ *καταλύων τὸν ναὸν καὶ ἐν τρισὶν ἡμέραις οἰκοδομῶν, σῶσον σεαυτόν*: Mark xv. 29, Οὐά, ὁ *καταλύων τὸν ναόν, καὶ οἰκοδομῶν ἐν τρισὶν ἡμέραις, σῶσον σεαυτόν*. The *διὰ τριῶν ἡμερῶν* of the charge has now become assimilated to the *ἐν τρισὶν ἡμέραις* of St. John.

[2] Compare Acts ix. 5, 6 with xxii. 8, 10, xxvi. 16–18; Matthew iv. 9 with Luke iv. 6, 7; Matthew v. 11, 12 with Luke vi. 22, 23; Matthew v. 25, 26 with Luke xii. 58, 59.

[3] Ἐγείρειν is vague; it could be used either of raising the dead or of building a house; so Bengel, "Aptum verbum, de aede lapidea et de templo corporis"; see 1 Esdras v. 43, *εὔξαντο ἐγεῖραι τὸν οἶκον ἐπὶ τοῦ τόπου αὐτοῦ*; also T. H. Weir in the *Expository Times*, vol. xxi. p. 192 (=Jan., 1910). The original Aramaic was probably, as Canon Box

I venture, therefore, to adhere to the traditional explanation that St. John has recorded an actual Saying of our Lord's, and has therefore given us the needed key to the charge brought against Him at His trial. The Jews asked warrant for His authority in cleansing the Temple; He replied, *Λύσατε τὸν ναὸν τοῦτον καὶ ἐν τρισὶν ἡμέραις ἐγερῶ αὐτόν.* They treated His answer with contempt at the time, but later found it useful, and employed it as their chief charge against Him; it needed but little alteration to make it effective.

(ii)

The charge, however, appears in two forms—

Οὗτος ἔφη, *Δύναμαι καταλῦσαι τὸν ναὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ διὰ τριῶν ἡμερῶν οἰκοδομῆσαι αὐτόν* (Matt.).

Ἡμεις *ἠκούσαμεν αὐτοῦ λέγοντος ὅτι Ἐγὼ καταλύσω τὸν ναὸν τοῦτον τὸν χειροποίητον καὶ διὰ τριῶν ἡμερῶν ἄλλον ἀχειροποίητον οἰκοδομήσω* (Mk.).

It is of course possible that both these forms may be primary; our Lord's words may have been inaccurately remembered, and reproduced differently by different witnesses; if St. John has recorded the incident in the right place chronologically, the lapse of time may also account for the variation [1]; and we get an explanation of St. Mark's puzzling statement, *καὶ οὐδὲ οὕτως ἴση ἦν ἡ μαρτυρία αὐτῶν* (xiv. 59).[2]

But nearly all the commentators explain the variation

informs me, the verb קום which, "in the causative conjugation (Afel =Hebrew Hiphil), is used of rearing up a building (e.g. Exod. xl. 2 Targum) or of raising the dead. For the latter usage," Canon Box adds, "the Targum of the classical passage Hosea vi. 2 is clear and an excellent example. Here the Targum reads, 'In the day of the revival of the dead He will raise us up (יקימיננא) and we shall live before him.'"

[1] See Meyer-Weiss, *Krit. Exeg. Kommentar ü. d. N.T.*, 7te Aufl., Bd. 2, p. 139.

[2] See also Plummer, *Exeg. Commentary on the Gospel acc. to St. Matthew*, p. 377.

on the usual lines of Synoptic criticism, i.e. that one account is primary and the other derived ; and almost unanimously they decide for the priority of the Mark form.[1]

Dr. Salmon,[2] however, judges the priority to lie with the Matthew form ; and Dr. Bruce (as quoted by Swete) inclines to the same opinion. They are surely right ; the variations explain themselves more naturally that way. The Matthew form is shorter, and though that evangelist habitually abbreviates narrative, he does not, as a rule, abbreviate speeches [3] ; editorial additions are not unknown in St. Mark, and this passage may furnish a case in point.[4] The simple *οὗτος ἔφη* has been expanded into *ἡμεῖς ἠκούσαμεν*

[1] So Plummer : "Matthew tones down 'I will destroy' (*Ἐγὼ καταλύσω*) to 'I am able to destroy' (*δύναμαι καταλῦσαι*), and it is the same Temple (*τὸν ναὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ*) which is destroyed and built. The distinction between 'this Temple made with hands' and 'another made without hands' is omitted. Matthew appears to think that this charge of saying that He was able to destroy and rebuild the Temple was one of the charges on which Jesus was condemned to death, and therefore he omits 'And not even so did their witness agree together' (Mark xiv. 59), which shows that this charge had failed" (p. 377).

Similarly Archdeacon Allen (*St. Matthew* in *Intern. Crit. Comm.*, 3rd ed., p. 283), "Matthew seems to have interpreted the 'Temple' of Mark[58] of the literal Temple, and adds *τοῦ Θεοῦ*. At the same time he seems to have found difficulty in attributing to Christ even in the mouth of false witnesses a direct threat to destroy the Temple, and alters the words into an assertion that Christ has power to do so (*δύναμαι καταλῦσαι*), and to build another in three days. The insertion of *δύο* in v.[59] (it should be v.[60], H. J. W.) carries with it the omission of Mark [59], because the consent of two witnesses in the statement was sufficient to make it a ground of accusation."

Dr. Swete (*Gospel according to St. Mark*, p. 357) throws his weighty authority on the same side ; so also Clemen (*die Entstehung des Johannesevangeliums*, p. 86).

Dr. Mc Neile (pp. 399, 400) thinks that Matthew may have wished to soften Mark's "*I will* destroy this temple," etc., but admits that the *χειροποίητον* and *ἀχειροποίητον* may possibly be later additions in Mark.

[2] *Human Element in the Gospels*, p. 501.

[3] There is a possible instance in Matthew xxvi. 18 compared with Mark xiv. 13.

[4] See also Hawkins, *Horae Synopticae*, pp. 125, 126 ; Sir John Hawkins includes Mark xiv. 57 in his list of "context-supplements" characteristic of that Gospel.

αὐτοῦ λέγοντος ὅτι, the ναὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ into ναὸν τοῦτον τὸν χειροποίητον, and the αὐτὸν into ἄλλον ἀχειροποίητον; as Salmon remarks, "it may seem less likely that St. Matthew should have omitted these adjectives than that a companion of St. Paul's should have introduced them."

We may therefore regard the adjectives χειροποίητον and ἀχειροποίητον as being interpretations of the ναόν. If we hold the view that the Matthew and Mark forms are equally primary, these interpretations must have been added by some of the Jewish false witnesses; if one is derived from the other, the interpretations are the work of primitive Christian tradition expressing itself even in the utterances attributed to Jewish adversaries.

Thus I venture to maintain that the order of development in the forms of this Saying is not, as many commentators assume, Mark, Matthew, John, but exactly the opposite, John, Matthew, Mark; that is, St. John, though writing last, has incorporated the true version of what our Lord actually said; St. Matthew, though for his *narrative* dependent on St. Mark, has here reproduced from another source the account of what the false witnesses first asserted; and St. Mark gives us the account amplified either by the later false witnesses or by primitive Church tradition.

(iii)

What did our Lord mean when He said to the Jews, "Destroy this temple and in three days I will raise it up"?

This is obviously one of His cryptic utterances; and that He frequently and intentionally spoke in this style seems clear not only from the fourth Gospel but also from the Synoptists; St. Matthew records a similar saying in answer to the demand of the Pharisees for a sign.[1] Yet as

[1] Matthew xii. 40, ὥσπερ γὰρ ἦν Ἰωνᾶς ἐν τῇ κοιλίᾳ τοῦ κήτους τρεῖς ἡμέρας καὶ τρεῖς νύκτας, οὕτως ἔσται ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ τῆς γῆς τρεῖς ἡμέρας

to the meaning of this Saying, St. John at any rate had no doubt whatever—"he spake of the temple of his body" (ii. 21); though apparently the disciples did not realise this till after the Resurrection (22), and it is therefore probable that for a time they thought, with the Jews, that our Lord was referring to the Jerusalem Temple.

St. John's interpretation, however, has been attacked by Wendt [1]; it is, he holds, one of the numerous cases in which that evangelist has given an explanation of our Lord's words which does not suit their true sense. The expression "this temple" must refer to the temple at Jerusalem, and the active voice in ἐγερῶ forbids the application of the word to the body of Jesus; the *real* meaning of verse 19 is that the "Temple of Jerusalem, which ought to be the place of the true worship of God, may be destroyed by the hierarchs, as by its degradation to a house of merchandise (ver. 16), which they permit and encourage, it is indeed being destroyed; but Jesus, in the shortest space of time (cf. Hosea vi. 2), will raise in renovated state that worship which they have abased."

Dr. Lock [2] criticises the assertion that ἐγερῶ forbids the application of the words to Jesus, and pleads that the claim does not go beyond that of x. 18, "I have power to lay it down, and I have power to take it again." But on the whole he accepts Wendt's exegesis, though he tries to save St. John's reputation by supposing that this is

καὶ τρεῖς νύκτας. On this saying see Montefiore, *The Synoptic Gospels*, p. 630.

[1] *The Gospel according to St. John* (Engl. Trs.), pp. 66, 67.

[2] "A partition theory of St. John's Gospel" (*Journal of Theol. Studies*, iv., p. 200); cf. Abbott (*Diatessarica*, Part iv., § 1309, p. 113), "It must not be forgotten that the only saying in the Fourth Gospel about the Resurrection and 'three days' is alleged to have been uttered by Jesus about the raising up of 'the Temple.' And 'Temple' is there expressly explained as referring *to the Temple of His Body, which, according to the method of Christian speech in the first century, would best mean the New Temple, that is, the Church of Christ*" (the italics are Dr. Abbott's).

what the evangelist meant, and that by "the temple of his body" he referred not to the literal body but to the spiritual body, the Church, which had become the new scene of worship. He would therefore paraphrase the saying, "Destroy yonder scene of worship, and when raised by God from the dead I will raise another temple in its place." [1]

I must confess that this explanation seems to me unsatisfactory; the *αὐτόν* must refer to the *ναόν* destroyed, not to another object.[2] As a spiritual adaptation of the words it is no doubt possible, and the Church could well, in the light of after-events, so interpret them. The charge brought against St. Stephen,[3] even St. Stephen's own words in his apology,[4] look very much like a reflection of the Saying, still understood literally by the Jews, but invested with spiritual meaning by the Christians. But that this was its *original* meaning, I cannot bring myself to believe; the laboured, complicated interpretation of Wendt carries its own condemnation with it; and St. Paul, as he penned 2 Corinthians v. 1,[5] was very probably thinking of Mark xiv. 58, but still applying it to the resurrection-body, not to the Christian Church.

Our Lord's words in John ii. 19 might have been clear

[1] Sanday's interpretation is much the same ("Jesus Christ," in Hastings' *Dict. of the Bible*, II. p. 613*a*); he holds that our Lord's reply to the Jews "seems to be rightly glossed by Mark xiv. 58—the Jewish Church with its visible local centre should give place to the Christian Church with its invisible and spiritual centre (cf. John iv. 21 f.). The saying made an impression at the time, and was brought up at the trial of Jesus to support a charge of blasphemy; the disciples at a later date referred it to the Resurrection."

[2] So Meyer-Weiss *ad loc.*

[3] Acts vi. 14 *Ἀκηκόαμεν γὰρ αὐτοῦ λέγοντος ὅτι Ἰησοῦς ὁ Ναζωραῖος οὗτος καταλύσει* (cf. Matt. xxvi. 61; Mark xiv. 58) *τὸν τόπον τοῦτον, καὶ ἀλλάξει τὰ ἔθη ἃ παρέδωκεν ἡμῖν Μωϋσῆς.*

[4] Acts vii. 48, *Ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁ ὕψιστος ἐν χειροποιήτοις κατοικεῖ.*

[5] *Οἴδαμεν γὰρ ὅτι, ἐὰν ἡ ἐπίγειος ἡμῶν οἰκία τοῦ σκήνους καταλυθῇ, οἰκοδομὴν ἐκ Θεοῦ ἔχομεν, οἰκίαν ἀχειροποίητον, αἰώνιον, ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς.*

to us could we only have watched Him when He spoke, and seen His gesture; all would have depended on whether He pointed to the Temple or pointed to His own body, as He uttered the Aramaic equivalent of *Λύσατε τὸν ναὸν τοῦτον*.

Wendt indeed maintains[1] that the answer of the Jews in verse 20 is incomprehensible on the supposition that Jesus attached His allusion to His own body. But it is most improbable that our Lord uttered this Saying without some gesture,[2] though as the excited Jews were crowding round Him they may not have noticed it; and it seems clear that the Aramaic word translated *ναός* was ambiguous and could refer either to the human body or to a building,[3] just as we have seen that *ἐγείρειν* was similarly capable of a double interpretation.[4]

I venture therefore to explain the Saying thus:—Our Lord used two words which were ambiguous; that translated *ναός* would naturally suggest a building but might quite well be applied to the human body; that translated *ἐγείρειν* could be used either of rearing a building or of raising the dead. He accompanied these words with a *gesture*, and pointed to His own body. The Jews, not

[1] P. 67.

[2] So Bengel, "Non dubium est quin Iesus id quod evangelista v. 21 addidit, adhibito nutu gestuve Judaeis non observato, suppleverit."

[3] The Rev. T. H. Weir (*Expository Times*, vol. xxi. p. 191 = Jan., 1910) suggested that our Lord used היכל of which *ναός* is the regular equivalent in the LXX.; היכל originally meaning "something colossal," "a large body," and being applicable either to a body or to a building.

The Rev. Dr. C. J. Ball, in a later number of the same journal (vol. xxi. p. 281 = March, 1910), maintained that היכל or היכלא means rather "a large house," and is applicable to either a king's house or a god's house, a palace or a temple; but he agreed with Mr. Weir in thinking that there would be nothing surprising in our Lord calling His body "this temple," as St. Paul's language in 1 Corinthians iii. 16, vi. 19 shows that the metaphor was a natural one. Dr. Ball suggested that our Lord's actual words may have been:—

סתרו היכלא הדין ובתלת יומין אקימניה.

[4] See above.

marking this, interpreted them as referring to the Temple at Jerusalem; but the disciples, or at least one of them, did mark the gesture and, though not understanding it at the time, perceived its reference afterwards. Later, the Christian Church saw a yet deeper meaning in the Saying, and applied it to the destruction of the Old Covenant of the letter and its replacement by the New Covenant of the Spirit; and this interpretation in turn may have affected the form in which the charge against our Lord was cast in St Mark's Gospel.

H. J. White.

A NEW CHRONOLOGY OF THE LIFE OF ST. PAUL.

(*Continued.*)

Chapter 5. The Date of the Procuratorship of Porcius Festus.

The year in which Festus entered upon the procuratorship of Judæa is by general consent the most important date in relation to Pauline chronology. When this point has been satisfactorily settled long stretches of the Apostle's career can be placed within their proper chronological limits with a remarkable degree of accuracy. It is, therefore, only fitting that Dr. Plooij should devote the longest chapter in his book to the elucidation of this matter. And the chapter is of double significance, for not only does it deal with what is the crucial date in relation to the story of St. Paul's life but it also effectually disposes of the basis underlying the so-called "new chronology" of Harnack and Holtzmann, which involved a considerable departure from most of the chronological systems in vogue. Dr. Plooij sets out upon his inquiry with an examination of St. Luke's statement in Acts xxiv. 27, *διετίας δὲ πληρωθείσης ἔλαβε διάδοχον ὁ Φῆλιξ Πόρκιον Φῆστον*, which is generally understood as implying that two years after St. Paul's arrest Felix was succeeded in office by Festus. But some scholars, notably Schwartz and Wellhausen, following the old exegesis of Petavius, take the phrase as indicating the length of Felix' term of office, in which case it has, of course, nothing to do with the Apostle's imprisonment and renders no help whatsoever towards the solution of our chronological problem. But this interpretation is decisively rejected by our author for reasons which appear later in the chapter, and he accepts the statement as of essential importance in the task of arriving at a satisfactory chronological scheme

of St. Paul's life. He also finds the narrative in the Acts which follows this statement serviceable inasmuch as it seems to indicate that Festus entered upon his office in the course of the summer. The data given in Acts xxv. 1–8 show that St. Paul's first appearance before Festus must have been within less than a fortnight of the new procurator's arrival in Caesarea. Some days later than this came the Apostle's defence before Agrippa, which is followed after no great interval of time by the voyage to Rome. In the course of this voyage we light upon a definite date in the statement that when the ship arrived in Crete the Great Fast (which took place on 10th Tisri, in October) was just over. Dr. Plooij considers that we must allow at the least two months for the events that happened between the coming of Festus to Caesarea and the arrival of St. Paul's ship at Fair Havens, so that we cannot be far wrong if we place the entrance of Festus as procurator in July or August of that year.

Now the particular year that we are looking for is definitely mentioned by Eusebius in his *Chronicon*, and it was on this statement of Eusebius that Harnack, following the example of Bengel and Süskind, based his new system of chronology, which found many admirers. Dr. Plooij is entirely at one with Harnack in regarding the date of Festus' procuratorship as quite the most important in relation to the chronology of the life of St. Paul, and more particularly of the later years of that life, but he adduces the most convincing reasons in support of his contention that Harnack's chronological scheme arose out of a misunderstanding of the evidence of Eusebius. The *Chronicon* of Eusebius is now available in an Armenian version, in a Latin edition worked over by Jerome, and in a Syriac Epitome. Now in the synchronistic tables found in the Armenian and Hieronymian versions the accession of Festus

to office as procurator of Judea is placed in the former in the fourteenth year of Claudius, the tenth year of Agrippa II., and consequently in the year 54 A.D., whereas in the latter, the corresponding dates are the second year of Nero, the twelfth of Agrippa II., and 56 A.D. It has been assumed by most authorities that Eusebius was at fault in dating the event as early as the reign of Claudius, seeing that he expressly states in his *Hist. Eccl.* II. 22, 1 that Festus, the successor of Felix, was sent by Nero. The dates in Jerome's version were, therefore, regarded as intentional corrections of Eusebius' mistakes on the part of that writer, and Harnack accepted the modified fate of Festus' procuratorship, viz. 56 A.D., as being true and historical and adapted his chronology to fit in with this new starting point, a proceeding which involved the shifting of the later years of the Apostle's life to a period some years earlier than they occupied in most of the current chronological schemes. Dr. Plooij, however, takes quite a different view of the significance of Eusebius' dates. Following the critical rule "praestat lectio ardua" he accepts the date in the Armenian version as the original and regards Jerome's dates as corrections by that writer of what appeared to him to be palpable mistakes, but corrections which on further inquiry prove to have no historical value. The Armenian version places the procuratorship of Festus in the fourteenth year of Claudius, the tenth of Agrippa II., and in 54 A.D., and that there is an error here seems beyond all doubt. The solution of the difficulty was first discovered by Erbes ("Die Todestage der Ap. Paulus u. Petrus," *Texte u. Untersuchungen*, N.F. Bd. iv. Heft I. 1899), who suggested that Eusebius must have originally based his chronological scheme upon a Jewish source in which the dates of the Jewish kings were the most important factor. Hence the ruling item in his synchronistic table is the year of the Jewish king. In the particular

case with which we are dealing the procuratorship of Festus is placed in the tenth year of Agrippa II., and Eusebius, knowing that Agrippa I. died in 44, assumed that the tenth year of his successor's reign fell in 54, and, consequently, in the fourteenth year of Claudius, which, as we have seen, is an impossible date. What Eusebius had forgotten was that Agrippa II. did not succeed his father immediately and that he had to wait five years before he eventually became king. The date of Festus' accession to office, if the source of Eusebius' information was correct, should, therefore, be 59 and not 54, and this completely disposes of Jerome's correction and of Harnack's chronology which was based on it. Ramsay also accepts Erbes' solution, and has some very interesting comments upon it in the EXPOSITOR, VII. vii. pp. 467–469, and Dr. Plooij looks upon it as the sheet anchor of his chronology. Having satisfactorily disposed of the Eusebian question our author then goes on to inquire how this date of 59 stands with respect to the voluminous evidence of Josephus on the same point. Josephus provides a list of the procurators of Judea but seldom gives definite dates, so that we are compelled to reach our goal by indirect methods. The following are some of the chronological factors to be found in Josephus which take us some way towards the point in view.

The procuratorship of Felix. (a) *His appointment and recall.*

The immediate predecessor of Felix was Ventidius Cumanus, who apparently succeeded to office in the eighth year of Claudius, i.e. in the year 48. (*Ant.* xx. 5. 5.) He was superseded because both the Samaritans and Jews complained of his misconduct, and at the request of Jonathan, the High Priest, who was in Rome as a member of the Jewish deputation that impeached Cumanus, Felix was appointed procurator in his stead. There are certain indications in Josephus' narrative which help us to fix an approximate date for

Felix' appointment. In *Ant.* xx. 7. 1 the account of the sending of Felix to Palestine is followed by that of the bestowal of Batanea and Trachonitis on Agrippa II., and the latter took place, we are told, after the expiration of the twelfth year of Claudius, i.e. after January 24, 53. It is a reasonable supposition, therefore, that Felix' appointment preceded that date, so that we may with some degree of confidence place it probably in 52, but possibly in 53. Tacitus has, however, a different tale to tell. According to him Felix had previously shared the government of Palestine with Cumanus, the former in charge of Samaria and the latter of Galilee, and both were equally responsible for the misgovernment which ended in the supersession of Cumanus. Felix, however, found favour in the eyes of Quadratus, the governor of Syria, and his misdeeds were ignored. Dr. Plooij is of opinion that Tacitus was mistaken in asserting that Felix was co-ruler with Cumanus and considers that Josephus is the more trustworthy witness in this matter. He allows, however, that the request of Jonathan that Felix should succeed Cumanus shows that the former was already known in Palestine, but he suggests that Felix may possibly have held a military command in that neighbourhood previous to his appointment as governor. Now if Harnack's date for Festus' accession to office, viz. 56, had been correct it would have been difficult to explain St. Paul's compliment to Felix in Acts xxiv. 10, "I know that thou hast been *of many years* a judge unto this nation," if the latter had only become governor in 53, just a year before St. Paul's speech was delivered. It was, therefore, assumed by those who adopted Harnack's views that the Apostle included in the expression "of many years" a comparatively long period of office in Palestine before he became sole governor, and a very short period in that capacity. But if we place the date of Festus' accession in

59, St. Paul's remark was made in 57, giving Felix four years at least as governor of Palestine, a period long enough to justify St. Paul's utterance, if it was meant for anything more than a forensic compliment from a defendant to his judge. There is, therefore, no real difficulty in placing the date of Felix' procuratorship ± 52–53.

If the phrase διετίας πληρωθείσης in Acts xxiv. 27 refers to the length of St. Paul's imprisonment at Cæsarea and not to the duration of Felix' procuratorship, the natural interpretation in view of the fact that St. Luke's interest was centred upon the Apostle and not on Felix, and also that in xxiv. 10 Felix is said to have held office "of many years," Festus must have succeeded Felix after the lapse of at least two years from the date of the latter's accession ± 52–53. That Felix was in office after Nero became Emperor in October 54, also appears from the fact that Josephus in *Ant.* xx. 8. 1 ff. first mentions the date of Claudius' death (Oct. 13, 54) and then goes on to relate the events that happened in the first year of Nero, among which are several connected with Felix' government in Palestine. The recall of Felix must, therefore, have taken place after Nero's accession. Now Josephus (*Ant.* xx. 8, 9) tells us that Felix was recalled by Nero because of his offences against the Jews, but that he was saved from punishment by the intervention of his brother Pallas, whose influence with Nero was then at its height. But Pallas fell from power at the very beginning of 55 (Tac. *Ann.* xiii. 2 and 15), and if Felix was saved by his influence the latter must have arrived in Rome not later than January 55, three months at the furthest after Nero's accession. But there are several weighty objections to this conclusion. It has already been demonstrated that the arrival of Festus and the departure of Felix must have taken place in the summer, and if Felix was in Rome at the beginning of 55 he must have left

Cæsarea in the summer of 54, i.e. while Claudius was still Emperor. But both Eusebius and Josephus agree in placing Felix' recall under Nero, and even if, as is sometimes suggested, the procuratorship ended automatically with the death of the reigning Emperor there would not be sufficient time between the death of Claudius in October 54 and the fall of Pallas very early in 55 for the information to reach Felix in Cæsarea and for his return to Rome, not to mention that the voyage would have had to be undertaken at a time when travelling by sea was practically unknown. Josephus is, therefore, apparently mistaken in putting the recall of Felix before the fall of Pallas. Ramsay, however, maintains that the language of Josephus does not necessarily imply that Felix' recall preceded his brother's fall from his official position. Pallas, even after the loss of office, was a very wealthy man, "and a millionaire is a great power even in the best state of society that has ever been attained, how much more in the corrupt, legacy-hunting age of Nero!" (Expositor V. v. p. 134). Josephus' remark might, therefore, according to Ramsay be true of any year up to 62, when Pallas was put to death, and we are consequently not tied down to ± 53–54 as the period of Felix' recall.

(b) *The revolt of the Egyptian.*

Dr. Plooij finds a *terminus post quem* for Felix' recall in the narrative in Acts xxi. 38, which shows that St. Paul's arrest followed quickly upon the revolt of the Egyptian. Josephus places this revolt beyond a doubt in the reign of Nero because in *Ant.* xx. 8, 1, 3, 4, after he has mentioned the death of Claudius and the accession of Nero he narrates several incidents in Jewish history and among them the rising led by the Egyptian which is expressly stated to have taken place under Nero (κατ' αὐτόν). Now the Apostle's arrest was in the neighbourhood of Pentecost and the revolt of the Egyptian probably only a very short

time before that, so that we get Pentecost 55 as the earliest date for the Apostle's arrest and consequently Pentecost 57 as the *terminus post quem* for the recall of Felix and the arrival of Festus.

(c) *The marriage of Felix and Drusilla.*

Some light is also thrown upon the chronological problem by Acts xxii. 24, where we learn that Felix was already married to Drusilla when St. Paul arrived as a prisoner at Cæsarea. Drusilla was the daughter of Agrippa I., and at her father's death in 44 was six years old, having been born, therefore, in 38. In 53 she was married to Azizus, king of Emesa, but the marriage was soon dissolved and she very shortly afterwards became the wife of Felix. We have no evidence to enable us to fix the precise date of the later marriage, but it must have been after 53 and before 55, because Azizus who died in 55 was alive when the second marriage was celebrated. Felix, therefore, married Drusilla in 54, and his recall, at least two years later, could not have been before 56.

(d) *Josephus' visit to Rome.*

A notice given by Josephus in his *Vita*, chap. iii. only provides us with the vaguest clue towards an approximate *terminus ante quem*. In this chapter the historian is describing a mission to Rome on behalf of certain Jewish priests who had been sent there by Felix and had been detained there apparently for some years. Of this mission he was himself a member, and he was at the time in his twenty-seventh year. Poppaea, the wife of Nero, was induced to intercede on behalf of the interned priests and they were set free. Now Josephus was born in the first year of Caligula's reign, i.e. between March 37 and March 38, and in the second half of that year, for when he finished the *Antiquities* in the third year of Domitian (Sept. 93–Sept. 94) he was in his fifty-sixth year (*Ant.* xx. 11. 2). His twenty-

seventh year, therefore, began between September 14, 63, and March 15, 64. He must have reached Rome before 65 because Poppaea died in that year. If we knew how long the priests had been detained in Rome we should be in possession of very important information concerning the limits of Felix' term of office, but Josephus throws no light on that point.

(e) *The procuratorship of Festus.*

The following are the facts that we cull from Josephus bearing on this question. Festus died during his period of office and between his death and the arrival of his successor, Albinus, there was a period of anarchy which was aggravated rather than lessened by the new governor's notorious misgovernment. His successor was Gessius Florus, and in the second year of his procuratorship = the twelfth year of Nero = seventeenth year of Agrippa II. = before April–May 66, the Jewish War broke out (*B.J.* 33. 14. 4), giving us 64–65 as the year of Albinus' retirement. Again Albinus was present at the Feast of Tabernacles four years before the outbreak of the war, when Jesus, the son of Ananos, uttered the " woes " over Jerusalem (*B.J.* vi. 5. 3). Seven years and a half later he died, during the siege of Jerusalem in 70, so that the Feast of Tabernacles in question must have been that of 62. How long before this date he became procurator does not yet appear, but the narrative of the death of James the Just in Hegesippus, if compared with the description of the same event in Josephus, may afford a further clue. Hegesippus, as quoted by Eusebius (*Hist. Eccl.* ii. 11 and 18), describes James as having met his death during the Passover, and then goes on to remark, " and immediately Vespasian besieged them," showing that he regarded the siege as a judgment on the Jews for the murder of James, an opinion which is also shared by Eusebius. Josephus, on the other hand, tells us that James was put

to death during the state of anarchy that prevailed after the death of Festus and before the arrival of Albinus. Combining the two narratives and selecting we might take the Passover of Hegesippus and the year mentioned by Josephus, viz. 62, as representing the facts, and so we might assume that Albinus entered upon office soon after the Passover of 62, in itself a perfectly satisfactory result. But Dr. Plooij is not disposed to attach much weight to the evidence of either authority, because Hegesippus is evidently astray in the matter of the year and the passage in Josephus is gravely suspected of being an interpolation. Ramsay (Expositor VI. ii. p. 93 f.) has another way of determining the date of Albinus' accession to office. Following Lorenzen he notes that it is a well-known fact that a number of different eras were in use in the reign of Agrippa II., according as one or another of various important events in this reign was made an epoch, the year in which the epoch-making event happened becoming the year 1 of that particular era. One of these eras dates from the re-foundation of Cæsarea Philippi by Agrippa under the new name of Neronius, and a calculation shows that Neronius must have been so named in the autumn of 61, or the spring of 62. Now if Neronius received its name in 61, an event, which according to Josephus took place after Albinus had succeeded Festus as procurator of Palestine, it follows that the former was present at the Feast of Tabernacles of 61. But Dr. Plooij is doubtful whether the beginning of this particular era can be identified with the re-foundation of Cæsarea Philippi, and as Ramsay's argument depends entirely upon that identification any failure at this point deprives his theory of any value it might have possessed. Our author is, therefore, not satisfied that the data furnished by Josephus lead to any more definite conclusion than that Albinus was procurator of Judaea before the autumn of 62.

There are also certain *indirect* indications of the limits of Festus' procuratorship supplied by Josephus. In *Ant.* xx. 8, 10–9, 1, certain events are related as having taken place during Festus' term of office, such as the story of the charlatan who under the pretence of putting an end to all oppression induced crowds to follow him into the wilderness, and also the story of the quarrel between the Jews and Agrippa II., after which follows the announcement of the procurator's death while still in office. Beyond the fact that at least three months must have elapsed before his successor arrived in Judaea we can derive no further *direct* information of any value from what Josephus has to tell us about Festus. The conflict between the Jews and Agrippa may perhaps furnish us with a few indirect hints. The dispute arose out of some building operations on the part of Agrippa which were obnoxious to the Jews, and the matter in dispute was referred to Nero, who at the instigation of Poppaea, described by Josephus as the wife of Nero and a God-fearing woman, decided in favour of the Jews. Ismael, the High Priest, who headed the deputation to the Emperor, was kept as a hostage in Rome and Joseph Kabi was appointed High Priest in his stead by Agrippa. Some time later when Festus died Joseph was deprived of his office by Agrippa and Annas chosen in his place. It was this Annas who after the death of Festus initiated such a reign of terror in Jerusalem that a deputation was sent to meet Albinus, who was then on his way to Judaea, to complain of the High Priest's misdoings, with the result that he was deposed before Albinus reached his destination, and Jesus, the son of Damnaios, appointed to succeed him. The following are then the chronological data with which we have to deal. We know that Albinus was in Jerusalem in the autumn of 62 and Annas must, therefore, have been appointed High Priest not later than June 62, seeing that the duration of his period of office

was three months only. The embassy must have left for Rome during the summer of 61, because the High Priest could not have been absent from the Temple before Pentecost. For the same reason Kabi must have been made High Priest before the Feast of Tabernacles 61. His period of office must have been longer than that of Annas, whose three months are emphasised as being exceptionally brief and whose early deposition is regarded as the strongest proof of a misgovernment that had become unbearable. Now Festus was alive when the embassy started for Rome, i.e. at the beginning of the summer of 61, and, further, Josephus leads us to understand that the whole of the dispute between Agrippa and the Jews, from the very beginning of the building operations, belonged to Festus' term of office. Reckoning back from the appointment of Kabi as High Priest in the autumn of 61 we have to include between the beginning of Festus' procuratorship and that date the building of the tower by Agrippa, the counter building by the Jews of the high wall, the long dispute between the Jews and Agrippa, the subsequent dispute between the Jews and Festus, and the journey of the embassy to Rome and its return to Jerusalem. Dr. Plooij considers that a year is the very least that we can allot to this long sequence of events, and that two years is probably nearer the mark. This would bring us to 59 as the date of Festus' procuratorship, which, as we shall remember, is also the date in the *Chronicon* of Eusebius. There is one possible objection to this date as far as the story we have been dealing with is concerned. The embassy to Rome which was fortunate enough to secure the services of Poppaea on its behalf is assumed to have arrived there in 61. Now, Josephus in his narrative describes the lady as "the wife of Nero," a position to which she did not actually attain until May 62. But the embassy could not possibly have reached Rome

later than May 62, because it had returned to Jerusalem, and Joseph Kabi, Annas, and Jesus, the son of Damnaios, had all succeeded each other in the High Priesthood before October 62, when Albinus was beyond all doubt present in Jerusalem. Also Annas had been High Priest for three months, Kabi for a longer period, and Jesus for some weeks at least before the arrival of Albinus. Josephus must, therefore, have either used the word *γυνή* of Poppaea in a proleptic sense or as a compliment to one who had proved a good friend to the Jews and a fitting companion to the second epithet *θεοσέβης*. The mention of Poppaea in connexion with this embassy gives us at any rate one definite chronological point. It could not have appeared in Rome before 58, the year when Poppaea became Nero's mistress.

Reviewing the evidence of Josephus as a whole we are justified in saying that as far as it goes it confirms the date given by Eusebius for the accession of Festus to office, viz. 59 A.D.

Chapter 6. Some Isolated Data.

In this, the last chapter of the first half of the book, Dr. Plooij is concerned with some subsidiary points which might possibly offer some guidance towards the settlement of our chronological problem. The three points are :

1. *Burrus.* In *Ant.* xx. 8. 9, Josephus states that when the representatives of the Jewish and Syrian inhabitants of Cæsarea, who had quarrelled among themselves, appeared before Nero the Jewish embassy was able to enlist on its side *βήρυλλου· παιδαγωγὸς δὲ οὗτος ἦν τοῦ Νέρωνος, τάξιν τὴν τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν ἐπιστολῶν πεπιστευμένος*. But in all the published texts of Josephus, with the exception of that of Niese which is based on a careful examination of the MSS., the name appears as *βοῦρρος* instead of *βήρυλλος*. Dr.

Plooij, however, decides in favour of the restored text, because he fails to see how a name like that of Burrus, the *praefectus praetorio*, who was universally known and is mentioned by Josephus a few pages earlier, could possibly have been displaced in favour of that of Beryllus, an individual of no public note, whereas the opposite procedure, the replacing of Beryllus by Burrus, is perfectly intelligible. Now the quarrel between the rival factions at Cæsarea took place during Felix' term of office, and if the name in Josephus had been in reality that of Burrus the date of Burrus' death would have supplied a *terminus ante quem* for Felix' recall. But if we (with Dr. Plooij) reject this reading the statement of Josephus has no value as a guide to chronology. Our author, however, does think that the Western text of Acts xxviii. 16, as is given by von Soden, ὁ ἑκατόνταρχος παρέδωκεν τοὺς δεσμίους τῷ στρατοπεδάρχῳ, if the στρατοπεδάρχος in question was Burrus may be much more valuable for our purpose. Burrus was the last *praefectus praetorio* who held that office singly, and after his death two prefects were appointed. Dr. Plooij suggests, therefore, that the use of the singular στρατοπεδάρχῳ in the passage quoted above points to Burrus as the officer in view, and if so, St. Paul must have arrived in Rome before January 62, when Burrus apparently died. Now St. Paul could hardly have arrived at Rome before the end of February, so that if Burrus was alive when he reached the Imperial city this February could not have been later than that of 61, which would thus form a *terminus ante quem* for the Apostle's appearance in Rome. Dr. Plooij makes no reference here to the Old Latin rendering of this text where στρατοπεδάρχος = *princeps peregrinorum*, an official whom Mommsen suggests to have been in command of the *Castra Peregrinorum* on the Caelian Hill. If the Old Latin gives the correct interpretation of the term then the passage has no reference to the *praefectus praetorio* and is

just as valueless from the chronological standpoint as the so-called "Burrus" passage from Josephus.

2. *The Lord's Day which St. Paul spent at Troas.* Acts xx. 7.

Sir William Ramsay's attempt to determine the year of St. Paul's arrival in Jerusalem on his last visit to that city by fixing the exact day on which he left Philippi is familiar enough to the readers of the EXPOSITOR (see EXPOSITOR, V. iii. p. 336 ff.) and does not call for a detailed explanation. He finds that if his calculation is correct the last day of Unleavened Bread (21 Nisan) must have fallen on a Thursday and that, within the limits of the period in question, 57 was the only year which fulfilled this condition, which would give 59, viz. two years later, as the date of St. Paul's release from Cæsarea and also of Festus' procuratorship. Dr. Plooij accepts Ramsay's argument as far as it is valid, but points out that it is based on two very uncertain factors, viz. the assumption that the Apostle must have started from Philippi on the day immediately following the Days of Unleavened Bread and that the last of the seven days spent at Troas was a Monday. He also remarks that Ramsay's claim that 57 is the only year which satisfies the conditions of the problem is not borne out by the latest research. The elaborate calculations of F. K. Ginzel in his *Handbuch der mathematische und technische Chronologie*, 1911, and of Sidersky in his *Etude sur l'origine astronomique de la chronologie juive*, Paris, 1911, show that 21 Nisan fell on a Thursday in 54 as well as in 57, so that even if Ramsay's assumptions are justified we still have the choice of 56 or 59 as the year of Festus' accession to office, as far as this particular argument is concerned.

3. *St. Paul's voyage to Rome.* Workman in the *Expository Times*, xi. pp. 316–319, claimed to have found in the statement in Acts xxvii. 9, "The voyage was now dangerous because

the Fast was now already gone by," a guide to a definite chronology of St. Paul's voyage to Rome. Dr. Plooij does not consider that the data on which Workman relied in working out his theory are quite dependable, and does not, therefore, regard the theory as affording a safe guidance towards defining the exact chronology of that eventful period of St. Paul's life.

II

Relative Chronology

Chapter 1. Galatia and the Galatians

(a) *The relation between the Acts and the Epistle to the Galatians.*

Dr. Plooij premises that before we proceed to draft a chronological scheme of St. Paul's life and activity it is essential that we should arrive at a fairly general agreement upon certain preliminary questions. Chief among these is the question of the route taken by St. Paul when, according to Acts xvi. 6, he and his companions *διῆλθον τὴν Φρυγίαν καὶ Γαλατικὴν χώραν*, and the subsidiary problem associated with it, viz. by what name the inhabitants of the cities visited by Paul and Barnabas on the First Missionary Journey, i.e. Pisidian Antioch, Iconium, Lystra, and Derbe, would most naturally be designated at that period. Upon a satisfactory solution of this problem depends very largely, in Dr. Plooij's view, the trustworthiness of the Acts as a historical document as well as an intelligible explanation of the relations subsisting between the Acts and the Epistle to the Galatians, in those sections of the two documents where they seem to be concerned with the same historical incidents. Dr. Plooij has many wise and suggestive things to say concerning the comparative historical values of these two books. He recognises that the writer in each case

claims to present an accurate record of actual facts—St. Luke as a historian fully conscious of the responsibility of his task, and St. Paul because his argument at this point is based fundamentally upon his narrative representing the absolute truth. He makes no attempt to ignore the variations between the two narratives nor to conceal the difficulties surrounding the relations between them, but he does insist that the problem is not insoluble except at the expense of sacrificing the historical trustworthiness of one or other of the two documents in question. He has little sympathy with the many scholars who hold firm to St. Paul's own narrative in Galatians, but, in spite of their high opinion of the historical value of St. Luke's work as a whole, condemn it as unworthy of credence at this particular point, and he parts company completely from that small group of Dutch scholars who follow Van Manen, viz. Van Eysinga, Van der Loeff, and Hookyas who incontinently consign the Epistle to the Galatians along with other Pauline letters to the realm of pseudepigraphic literature. Dr. Plooij also enters a most energetic protest against the very common assumption that Van Manen and his narrow circle of followers are in any way representative of Dutch theological and critical scholarship at its best. Although himself a pupil of Van Manen he dissents radically from his methods and conclusions, and claims for the real Dutch school a high reputation for sobriety of judgment and fidelity to historical principles.

For our author the Epistle to the Galatians and the Acts are authentic documents, the work of St. Paul and St. Luke respectively, the Epistle in virtue of this very fact being entitled to our fullest confidence, and the Acts, and more particularly the latter half of it, being a historical document of first rank. He pleads strongly that we should accept the evidence of both documents as trustworthy, and

reminds us that even in those distant days men of standing like St. Paul and St. Luke were not devoid of ordinary honesty or of common sense, as so many writers would have us believe. He also insists that when the two documents are covering the same historical ground and can consequently be compared it is of the utmost importance that we realise what St. Luke's object was in writing the Acts, and St. Paul's point of view in relating the biographical details. Both writers have a definite purpose, not a "tendency" in the old Tübingen sense of "fraud" (even if we add the word "pious"), and it is this particular purpose that will in each case explain the precise form the narrative has taken.

(b) *The South Galatian Theory.*

Dr. Plooij gives us a very full and instructive discussion, on fairly familiar lines, of what is now generally known as the "South Galatian theory." He traces the story of Galatia from the days of the Celtic invasion of Asia Minor towards the end of the third century B.C. down to the time when, on the death of Amyntas its last subject king, it was made a Roman Province by Augustus. The geographical boundaries of the province at the time of St. Paul's journeys are then given and the story of the province is carried down to 372 A.D. when the name "Galatia" had come again to mean practically nothing more than the region occupied by the Celtic tribes.

In order to arrive at some decision as to what St. Paul meant by "Galatians" he traces the usage of the term "Galatia" in secular writers like Strabo, Pliny, Dio Cassius, Tacitus, and Ptolemy of Alexandria. He also quotes three inscriptions, two in Latin (*C.I.L.* III. 291 and Sterret; The Wolfe Expedition, No. 365) and one in Greek (Sterret, u.s. No. 532), in which the term is manifestly used in the official sense of the Roman Province of Galatia. From these inquiries he concludes that as a rule from the time of Strabo

downwards Galatia points to the Province of that name, and that it is, therefore, quite possible that St. Paul, who was a Roman citizen, would also use the term in the Roman sense. The possibility that when St. Paul wrote to "the Churches of Galatia" he had in view the Churches of Antioch, Iconium, Lystra, and Derbe is also confirmed by an inscription (*C.I.G.* 3391) where a benefactor of Iconium is described as ἐπίτροπος Γαλατικῆς ἐπαρχείας. St. Paul's own use of the term "Galatia" elsewhere affords no definite evidence of what particular region he has in view, nor does his practice with regard to other names lend any strength to the notion that he invariably employs them in the Roman provincial sense, so that all that Dr. Plooij claims in this matter is that St. Paul might have used the term "Galatia" in the Roman sense of the Province, without excluding the possibility that he might have had the Churches of North Galatia in his mind. Now once it is granted that when St. Paul wrote to the "Galatian Churches" he was in reality addressing the Churches of Antioch, Iconium, Lystra, and Derbe most of the difficulties that used to face the student when he compared the Acts with the Epistle and were so detrimental to the reputation of the former as a trustworthy historical document disappear. The difficulty of harmonising the chronological statements of the Acts with those of the Epistle was in the majority of cases due to the supposition that the Pauline letter was addressed to Christians dwelling in Celtic Galatia, who were not evangelised until the Second Missionary Journey and after the Apostolic Council, and although the "South Galatian theory" does not rid us of every crux it does enable us to approach the question with renewed courage and from a more favourable standpoint.

Chapter 2. The Collection-journey and the Apostolic Council.

A very important point in connexion with Pauline chronology is the identification of St. Paul's visit to Jerusalem described in Galatians ii. 1–10. Is it to be identified with the visit of Acts xi. 27–30, or again with that described in Acts xv., or finally is it a visit which was unknown to St. Luke or ignored by him and, therefore, has no place in the Acts? Our conception of Pauline chronology will depend very largely upon which of these three solutions we pin our faith to. Dr. Plooij decides unhesitatingly in favour of the first solution, and identifies the journey in Galatians ii. 1–10 with what he calls the "collection-journey" of Acts xi. 27–30, and the present chapter is in substance a justification of that decision. But before approaching the main position he first of all disposes of the preliminary question, viz. how many visits had the Apostle paid to the Galatian Churches before the Epistle was written to them? It has been generally taken for granted that this point is determined conclusively by Galatians iv. 13 where πρότερον is supposed of necessity to refer to the earlier of *two* visits. This supposition is, however, vigorously contested by our author, who contends that New Testament usage in no way countenances the idea that πρότερον can only mean "the earlier of two." In the only other three passages (1 Tim. i. 13, St. John vi. 62, ix. 8), where the term is found in the New Testament, it merely indicates a condition of affairs in the past in contrast with the existing situation, and Dr. Plooij might have added that this is the invariable force of the term in the "koiné." He is justified, therefore, in insisting that in the passage in question in Galatians nothing more is implied than the contrast between the present attitude of the Galatian Churches towards St. Paul, with its un-

worthy distrust and suspicion as compared with the extraordinarily warm reception given him when he first arrived among them, and their affectionate and enthusiastic loyalty towards him while he was present with them. This marked change, St. Paul himself remarks, had been of rapid growth (ταχέως Galatians i. 6) and the Apostle's reference to it has nothing to do with a first or second visit to the Galatians but merely emphasises the difference between the atmosphere that prevailed while he was still with them and the situation that exists now that he has left them, if the information at his disposal is accurate. Thus in Dr. Plooij's opinion Galatians iv. 13 has nothing to do with the number of visits paid by the Apostle to the Galatian Churches previous to the writing of his Epistle, and any argument based on the supposition that St. Paul must have been in Galatia at least twice before he wrote is entirely *ultra vires*. Now in the days when the "North Galatian theory" held the field the date of Galatians had of necessity to be placed later than the journey of Acts xvi. 1 ff., when, according to this theory, the Apostle first came in touch with the Galatians; and further, if the πρότερον of Galatians iv. 13 implied *two* visits the date had to be pushed forward still further, after the journey of Acts xviii. 23. But now that the "South Galatian theory" has been shown to possess claims at the very least equal to those of its rival, and we are satisfied that πρότερον has no bearing upon the number of visits paid by the Apostle to Galatia, our author tells us that we are at liberty to place the writing of Galatians at any point later than the return of Paul and Barnabas to Antioch at the close of the First Missionary Journey, after allowing a sufficient interval to elapse to account for the change in the attitude of the Galatians towards the Apostle. He, therefore, promptly comes to the conclusion that the Epistle was actually written *before the Apostolic Council*. I am

aware that many scholars agree with him on this point, and I can only refer the reader to a paper of mine in the Expositor, V. vi. pp. 193 ff., where I have striven to show that this date for the Epistle utterly destroys any faith we may have had in St. Luke's qualities as an accurate historian and demands that St. Paul was the most successful *camouflageur* of his day. If, however, we follow Dr. Plooij's lead in this matter the contention that the visit of Galatians ii. 1–10 is identical with that of Acts xv. is completely disposed of.

Dr. Plooij's own position is, as we have already remarked, that the visit of Galatians ii 1–10 is the same as that of Acts xi. 27–30, xii. 25, and against this contention I have nothing to allege. He attaches no great importance to the theory advocated by Vernon Bartlet and others that the visit of Galatians ii. 1–10 preceded the "collection-visit" of Paul and Barnabas and is not recorded by St. Luke. He pleads that an unprejudiced study of the facts as contained in the two documents can lead to no other conclusion than his. Neither the Apostle nor the historian had any desire to mislead their readers and our author is inclined to believe that St. Luke in this part of his narrative may be speaking of events in which he himself was personally concerned. The "we" section in the usual text commences at Acts xvi. 10, but the "Western Text" has "we" in xi. 27, *συνεστραμμένων δὲ ἡμῶν*, so that according to this reading the historian is recording events leading up to the collection at Antioch which were within his own personal experience. The suggestion that the "Western Text" may represent the original here is supported by Irenaeus, who reads *διελθόντες δὲ τὴν Μυσίαν ἡμεῖς ἤλθομεν εἰς Τρῳάδα* in Acts xvi. 8 and also *ἡμεῖς δὲ* in xv. 40, from which it might be gathered that St. Luke was at Antioch with St. Paul, accompanied him to the Apostolic Council in Jerusalem, and then returned

with him to Antioch when the Council was over. If that is so we may regard Acts xi. 27–30 as the narrative of an eye-witness and as consequently possessing more than ordinary accuracy. On the truth of St. Paul's statements in Galatians i. 17, 18–24 ; ii. 1–10 rests the whole of his argument in these two chapters, and even if we did not possess his solemn asseveration " Behold, before God, I lie not " we are bound to regard his narrative at these points as reaching the highest degree of accuracy. All this makes it most improbable that there is in the Acts no journey corresponding to that of Galatians ii. 1–10, or that when St. Paul was assuring the Galatians that he had only visited Jerusalem twice and appealing to God in support of his statement he was as a matter of fact concealing from them a third visit to that city.

MAURICE JONES.

(*To be concluded.*)

THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY.

II. In Philosophy.

The doctrine of the Trinity as formulated in dogmatic theology has previously been considered. It was found to be purely modalistic, and doubtfully serviceable for the purposes of distinctively Christian theology. In the present article we are to consider the use which has been made by philosophers and philosophic theologians of the same Trinitarian conception of God, and its adequacy for meeting some of the needs of philosophy of religion. It will be argued that the orthodox modalism in terms of which the traditional dogma has hitherto been authoritatively expressed, is as incapable of satisfying the wants of the philosopher in dealing with such problems as the eternal self-consciousness and ethical Personality of God as we found it to be of interpreting the Scriptural basis of Christian theology in its redemptive and religious aspects.

It is, of course, essential to Christian theism that God be regarded as personal. And it is for philosophy to lay down what are the requisite preconditions of personality.

The relevance of the Trinitarian conception of God to such philosophical inquiries is apparent when the question is raised, whether God can be conceived as eternally a Person, a self-conscious and ethically perfect Being, without it being necessary to advance from the monarchian idea of Him as a solitary Divine Subject to the notion that God is rather a Divine Society. And this is the question which is here to be discussed.

It has been pointed out in a previous article that the first condition of personality, whether human or Divine, is self-consciousness. Personality indeed, even in the human being, is usually understood to include much more than this;

but the fundamental requisite is self-consciousness. This, therefore, will occupy us first.

A self or subject does not necessarily depend, as to its being, upon any object which it may know. But in order that a subject may know itself, that it may not only experience but be aware that it has experience which is its own, it is necessary that there be other existents from which it distinguishes itself. An eternal self-conscious subject implies therefore an eternal object, however eternity be understood. What then is the irreducible minimum of the objective—of an 'other' than the pure ego of the Divine subject—which is essential to constitute Divine experience? Lotze deemed God's own states of consciousness sufficient to provide the objective factor of His experience. That *our* states of consciousness are mediated by the external world, or are due to stimulation, may indeed be a condition pertaining to our finiteness, and no such condition may exist in the case of the Deity. But when Lotze further insists that the 'feeling of self' need not originate through opposition of a non-ego, because what enters our consciousness is never the reality by which the state of consciousness is brought about, but some inner state belonging to the spiritual being, he rejects the possibility that, as the realist contends, there is direct apprehension of extra-mental reality. In any case the states of which he speaks are not merely subjective modifications, like feelings of pleasure, but are in the psychological sense objective.

Again, it has been maintained, the non ego or 'other' need not be existent, much less another self; a potential other, the idea of what as yet is non-existent, would suffice as the condition of self-consciousness. So the minimum requisite for bare self-consciousness in God would be the contemplation of a world yet to be realised, of the eternal and necessary laws of thought—supposing these to be real

rather than valid, which is a doubtful matter—and of His own states of consciousness. Still, this bare self-consciousness is far short of what constitutes personality such as we enjoy, and such as theology must attribute to God. The eternal contemplation of His own states, of His unrealised purposes, and of eternal truths *possibly* independent of Himself, does not provide a very full life for a perfect Being. Intellectually meagre, it is ethically destitute : self-centred, self-engrossed, loveless. The life of such a personality, comparable to Aristotle's God, would seem to be imperfect on account of its narrowness ; and He would need to be conceived as but potentially personal.

However, even so much of objective 'otherness' as has been asserted above to be the essential condition of bare self-consciousness is dispensed with by the view that the self is immediately apprehended, or that the pure subject is its own object. This view was discussed in a previous article, and its disputableness pointed out. Much more might be said in objection to it ; but it will be sufficient here to observe that even if it were tenable, it would only serve to establish bare self-consciousness, the mere minimum of foundation for personality, and not personality in the fuller sense such as is ascribed to man and to God.

With us, indeed, personality involves recognition of the external world and of other selves ; and it deepens as knowledge of these increases. To provide for God the condition of fuller capacity for self-knowledge than the minimum for bare self-consciousness just now indicated, the eternity of the finite world has often been postulated. Thus an eternal 'other' is found, and one which serves to enlarge the scope of the Divine self-knowledge beyond the meagre amount of it secured by considerations such as have as yet been mentioned. It will be contended that an eternal finite world is inadequate as a condition of the perfect personality of God,

especially when the ethical aspect of His personality is taken account of. But the necessity of the postulate itself, apart from its adequacy to the purpose which now concerns us, may first be examined.

We have previously seen that overwhelming difficulties attend any conception of eternity which involves the denial of the reality, in some sense, of change and time; and in order that it may be relevant to the problem before us, we must rather interpret the 'eternity' of the world to mean its beginninglessness, its 'co-eternity' with God. Of course if we reject the eternity of the world, in this sense, we are faced with the difficulty of accounting for the world's beginning at one time rather than at another, or at least at one phase of the supra-temporal life of God rather than at another: we admit, in some degree or to some extent, into the Divine life, that transition from potentiality to realisation which theology has been wont to resent, and for the motivation of which it becomes hard to account. Given a world already in existence, its events and developments may be regarded as partial causes of Divine acts; but if there was a time when the world was not, or a part of the Divine life in which God was without a finite world, how can we explain the production of a world at all? What was the ground of the Divine self-limitation which creation involves? It is such considerations as these which have led many philosophers and theologians to believe the eternity of the world to be necessary for theistic thought, and to say that God without a world is not God. One cannot but feel their weight; but perhaps these suggested difficulties are merely the outcome of that static conception of the eternal perfection of God which was criticised in a former essay, and shewn to need much qualification if our conception of God is to satisfy the demands of Christian theology; if, that is to say, God is to be regarded as a Spirit with a life. Provided

there be other fulfilled conditions of perfect personality than those which the postulate of an eternal world was intended to supply, so that God can be conceived, throughout endless past time or independently of time, as having been what it is the Divine nature to be, there would seem to be no need to deny new phases in the life of God, any more than new purposes in the growing or expanding life of the finite human person. Certainly the Christian must look upon the actual and temporal incarnation of the Logos as such a new movement in the life of God, whatever eternal or supra-temporal verities that temporal act imply. And if the Incarnation were an actualisation in time of an eternal and potential purpose, why should not the creation of the world be a similar, and similarly motived, passage from the potential to the actual ? It is only when God is conceived as a single Being, an isolated transcendent subject, that an eternal finite world seems necessary as a condition of His personality ; and only when He is conceived as a solitary Being with a life prior to the existence of a world, that it becomes impossible to account for the transition from His loneliness to His Creation of a finite order. If God be a Divine Society, on the other hand, both personality and origination of new phases of life such as are involved in creation and incarnation, need no further explanation than do new ventures and undertakings in the life of a human being. Life and experience, spirit and God, are meaningless terms if they do not imply change, development, movement.

It must not be *assumed*, then, that the eternity or beginninglessness of the actual world is a necessity for theistic thought ; and it will presently be argued that the supposition is not the only resource available to theistic philosophy whereby to explain the possibility of eternal Divine personality.

We now return to the question whether the supposition of

the eternity of the world, even if tenable or necessary in itself, is adequate to the purpose for which theists have made use of it, viz. to explain the eternity of God's personality.

We have seen that there must be somewhat of transition from potentiality to actualisation in the Divine, as in human, life, if God is to have any relation to human history: if progressive revelation, providence, incarnation, and so forth, are to be real. But at the same time, for God to have eternally been God, there must ever have existed the conditions on which it is alone possible that He could be an ethically perfect Being, and all else that it essentially belongs to the Divine nature, as such, to be. *These* conditions, whatever may need to be said of others, cannot have ever been merely potential. So much truth, we previously saw, must be allowed to the static conception of the Divine perfection. These conditions could never have been non-actual, unless God be evolved from what was not God. But an evolved God who 'comes to Himself' in time would be no God in the theistic sense. Now it must be contended that the eternity of the finite world is not adequate to supply these necessary conditions; still less is the supposition of God's solitary existence prior to a finite world. This is most manifest when we pass from self-consciousness to that other essential of Divine personality—eternal love. Love is a relation between spirits. Hence, in order that the finite world may supply a possible object of the eternal love of God, it is necessary that the world *ab initio* contained spiritual beings. The physical world would be in itself no object of what is properly called love. It is only a world containing and crowned by spirits such as human beings, over and above brute matter and impersonal organisms, that could constitute the object of Divine love from eternity. Yet, so far as our knowledge of human life goes, it appeared but comparatively lately in the time-series, and only, according to science,

after ages of cosmic evolution. Pre-existence of souls may be a fact, and hierarchies of other than human spirits may exist, for all we know ; but we have no knowledge on such matters. Therefore unless we *assume* what is beyond knowledge, and postulate other worlds than that with which alone we are acquainted, the supposition of the eternity of the finite world does not suffice to furnish the necessary condition of the eternal love, and the eternal personality, of God.

And the supposition is insufficient in another respect. If we may say of the Divine experience, as we must of our own, that self-knowledge is proportional to knowledge of the not-self, and that the fullest self-knowledge can only be mediated through knowledge of a being or of beings of the same order as the knower's own, then it may be affirmed that God's self-knowledge can only be said to be perfect—in the sense of adequate to the capacities of His nature, rather than in the sense of complete or statically finished—if we regard God as comparable to a society or as in some sense over-individual. It is, of course, precarious to argue to the conditions of the perfect self-knowledge, by analogy, from the known conditions of our own imperfect self-knowledge ; because it is not easy to draw a safe line between what belongs to finitude as such and what belongs to self-knowledge as it exists apart from all limitations such as beset finite and bodily life. But if analogy hold here at all, it follows that a really adequate 'other,' whereby the self-conscious Divine Subject may know Himself fully, is only reached when we seek it in the complex or differentiated Being of God Himself ; that is, in the reciprocal relations of Father, Son, and Spirit, and the eternal intercourse of these eternal hypostases. Further, however it may stand with the conditions of Divine intelligence, about which it is rash to speculate save tentatively, we are perhaps on safer ground when we apply similar reasonings and analogies to the ethical

life of the Deity. If we are to maintain that goodness and holiness are essential and eternal attributes of God, if we are to ascribe to Him the perfection and blessedness implied in the phrase 'Divine love,' then the Trinitarian conception of God seems to be indispensable, and in no mere modalistic sense. An ethically perfect being must ever have been able not only to love, and have had an eternal object to love, but also to realise in the highest degree the capacities for love with which His essential nature was eternally enriched. And this implies that there must eternally have been in or along with Himself that which can call forth all that wealth : something to be known and loved with all the plenitude of His power to know and to love. The imperfect finite world is not an adequate medium for God's self-revelation and self-communication and love ; it cannot exhaustively express, reveal to Himself, or engross, a Being to whose capacities we can set no bounds, and Whom therefore we should call infinite but for His self-limitation in creation. But when we affirm an eternal Logos who was in the beginning with God and who was God, the express image or the expression of His essence, in Whom dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead, in Whom are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge, we make the conception of an eternal and ethically perfect Father possible. Such scriptural phrases as those just cited suggest the thought of love not only eternal but boundless, of reciprocity of thought and will, of perfection yielding itself to and being apprehended by perfection ; the thought of God as knowing and being known, loving and being loved, by God. Then is God's eternal love distinguishable from self-love and also perfect or adequate to His essential nature. With any other conception of God, with the monarchian or unitarian conception (even if accompanied by the notion of an eternal finite world) these combined possibilities do not seem to be provided for. The

world being imperfect, God could not, through interaction with it alone, know Himself to be what He is ; or at least we could not assuredly assert the possibility. More certainly can we affirm that the imperfect world would be inadequate to exhaust God's capacity for love. For perfect love there must be a perfect recipient or perfect recipients—the perfectly loveable, such as can only be found in God Himself. There must also be perfect communicability and reciprocity ; and this again a world of finite or imperfect spirits does not provide for. This is so, at least, if perfection be regarded not so much to be the comprising of everything finite, as to be the full mastery of self-consciousness and the realisation of the furthest reach to which self-communication can be carried. Knowledge of an other, so long as the other is really other in order of being and capacity, must always be incomplete and relative. The reciprocal knowledge of finite selves through acquaintance such as we possess, is necessarily beset with restrictions. But in God as Trinitarianism, taken seriously, endeavours to conceive Him, and as He must be conceived if He is to be regarded as eternally personal, the 'other' is what He Himself essentially is : with equal sympathy, equal insight, equal capacities of every kind. Only in God as thus conceived is there pure activity combined with receptivity, and only for Him as thus conceived is there an eternally adequate object. Short of such a conception of God it would seem necessary to postulate a supreme Being who comes to self-consciousness through consciousness of an imperfect world, and therefore attains only to imperfect self-consciousness and love. And with such a view theism of other than the Christian type must needs try to be satisfied. Professor Ward quotes Aristotle as having said, "He who has no need of society because he is sufficient for himself must be either a brute or a god" ; but we who know much more than could Aristotle about the

conditions of personal life can doubt whether such a being as he imagines could be a God, in the theist's sense. "God is only God," as Hegel remarked, "in so far as He knows Himself"; and the Christian would add that He is only God in so far as He is eternal and perfect love. For both self-knowledge and love in their perfection, social life would seem to be an essential condition.

Such is the philosophical argument for the doctrine of the Trinity. It is an argument based on the eternal personality of God. And it obviously implies a Trinity of subjects, a Divine Society. But philosophers who, unlike Hegel, have resorted to the Trinitarian conception in its *orthodox* sense to crown their theism, and philosophically inclined theologians who have resorted to philosophical conceptions and arguments whereby to elucidate or demonstrate their Trinitarian dogma, have not ventured beyond an interpretation of that dogma as modalistic as that which dogmatic theology has elaborated. Their Logos is but the same Divine Subject as revealing Himself to man or as mediating the creation of the finite world; and the Holy Spirit is but the self-same Divine Subject and agent regarded as energising within the Church. Or, more frequently, philosophical writers regard the Persons of the Trinity as what are called the 'moments' of the Divine self-consciousness. These 'moments' are *ideal* stages, partial aspects of a fact which is only actual in its totality, elements distinguishable by analytic thought but not separable in concrete life. They are not stages in an historical process or progress, not independent facts. The moments of the Divine self-consciousness therefore do not represent periods in the Divine life, through which the one subject has passed. Still less are they personalities in the sense of distinguishable subjects. They are even more abstract and further from actuality than the relations into which traditional theology resolved the hypostases. Writers

of the new-Hegelian school who use the term 'moments' and see an analogy in them to the Persons of the Trinity, also favour the phrase 'self-diremption of God,' when describing the mediation of the Divine self-consciousness. God, they say, "dirempts Himself" in the Son, and "returns to Himself" in the Spirit. If this be more than mere empty jargon, making obscurer the matter to be explained, it is misleading. 'Diremption,' for instance, seems to suggest a prior bare subject positing its own object, or a pre-existent unity differentiating itself into a multiplicity which originally was not forthcoming. But as Dr. McTaggart has observed, a self-differentiating unity is not a blank which produces diversity out of its inner nothingness; its multiplicity must be as eternal as its unity, and logically as fundamental. 'Self-differentiation' or 'self-diremption' is a misleading phrase because it suggests a logical, if not a temporal, process: whence indeed its plausibility, like that of the term 'moment.' It would, however, be just as logical and true to speak of a 'self-unifying multiplicity' as of a 'self-differentiating unity'; and, for a similar reason, just as improper. 'Self-differentiated' is objectionless; for the differentiation in self-consciousness is as ultimate as the unity, and we cannot go beyond either. Similar objections, it may be observed in passing, apply to the orthodox theological phrases 'sole fount of Deity' applied to the Father, 'generation' and 'procession' applied respectively to the Son and Spirit. For all such terms, to which the word 'eternal' is added as a predicate, can only denote the logical, not the historical; the analytically found, not the actually present or the genetically progressive. All such phrases, whether of abstract philosophy or of dogmatic theology, do but refer to the implications of thought, not to actual process. But idealists and dogmatic theologians have often used them *as if* they did refer to actual process.

The idealistic philosopher, then, has given no interpretation of the doctrine of the Trinity, acceptable to Christian theology, such as does not conduct to thinner abstractions than those of Aquinas or Duns Scotus. There is no analogy between the 'moments' of self-consciousness, even if there can be self-consciousness without awareness of a real 'other,' and the Divine Persons of the Trinity of whom St. John and St. Paul speak. And, if the argument of this article have any force, it is necessary that the Divine Persons be not relations of one subject to Himself, but subjects between whom reciprocal relations of knowledge and love subsist. Only in this form does the Trinitarian doctrine furnish any explanation of the eternal personality of God.

But this result, it will be said, is tritheism; and 'tritheism' will be intended to convey the same evil associations as 'polytheism.' To such charges, however, there is a reply; at least in so far as they are religiously or theologically objectionable. Polytheism is a degrading and false enough belief if conceived after the type which flourished in ancient Greece or Rome, and which survives to-day among barbarous peoples. For the 'gods many' were individuals with diverse wills and purposes, apart from their undivine characters and habits. But such diversity of nature and will, such antagonisms as characterised the supposed gods of classic antiquity, are not essential accompaniments of the possible existence of a society of Divine subjects. And once such irrelevant associations are eliminated, and perfect harmony of will and perfect equality of nature are postulated, there would seem to be nothing philosophically or religiously shocking in the supposition that the ultimate unity or world-ground is a perfect and Divine society rather than a sole perfect and Divine subject. In Dr. Ward's *The Realm of Ends* occurs a passage which shows that at least one serious philosopher, who always evinces the utmost respect for and

sympathy with Christian doctrine, feels no aversion to such a supposition. The law of continuity—which I would prefer to call not a law, but rather an æsthetically pleasant and rather gratuitous belief—is said by him to encourage "the pluralist to assume, though lacking sufficient direct evidence, that there exist individuals of a higher order, or rather a hierarchy of such orders, a speculative view with which Leibniz and Fechner have made us all familiar. But human beings owe their pre-eminence on this planet to social organisation, which we regard not merely as an aggregate but as an over-individual unity. The law of continuity then would seem to suggest that individuals of a higher order in like manner are organised into over-individual unities, and so on —possibly *ad indefinitum*. This view would thus lead up to a society rather than to a person as the supreme unity of all. But apart from other difficulties that we shall have presently to consider, it might readily be brought into line with the Christian doctrine of a tri-personal God."

A tri-personal God such as is evidently conceived in this passage is not merely tri-personal in the sense of traditional Christian doctrine, which, as we have seen, resolves the Divine hypostases into relations or modes of the existence of one subject and agent; but in the sense which would be called tritheistic (with half truth) or which would imply that the Trinity is a Divine Society. And the several recent theologians who have ventured so far as to speak of God as a Social Being, and to attribute to Him predicates which can only be applied to a society as distinguished from an individual, evidently countenance the same supposition to some extent, and are alive to the advantages which flow from it. That they take back with one hand what they have given with the other, is perhaps due to the fact that the monarchian Trinitarianism in which they have been nurtured has clung with the more tenacity to severe Hebrew monotheism

because that is almost the only Old Testament idea which has exerted any profound influence upon Christian doctrine.

When, then, it is said that " ' God ' is a word which defies the possibility of a plural," [1] the statement needs qualification. The word is incapable of a plural if the resulting denotation is to be something comparable to Ormuz and Ahriman, or to Jupiter, Juno, and the rest. There cannot be a plurality of discordant and conflicting world-grounds, from the theistic point of view. But there would seem to be no reason why the one unity embracing the universe should not, like the universe, be a many in one, a society of equally self-subsistent but harmonious subjects. With this qualification, the idea of three Gods, or even of many Gods, need not shock anything but inherited preconceptions. Moreover, the objectionableness attaching to the plural form of the word ' God ' is dispensed with ; for, on such a view as is here advocated, God would be the Divine Society, and the term would not be strictly applicable to the separate subjects. or Persons in the Godhead.

This implies that God would not be *a* Person. But God would be personal ; and *that* is the truth which Christian theology and theistic philosophy are concerned to affirm. A human society is not a person, though as an unity composed of persons, it is personal. And just as many individuals can be of one heart and mind, of one will and of one voice, though each individual has his own, and no one else's, mind and will and voice ; so in the Trinity as here conceived, there can still be one Divine purpose, though each Person has a knowledge and a will of His own. The Unity comprising this Trinity is an unity of concurrent wills, of joint purpose, of moral harmony, of co-operating agencies. The Persons will of course be of one substance or essence ('essence' being a class-concept) and that essence will be per-

[1] Moberly, *Atonement and Personality*, p. 154.

fect and Divine Spirit. And such a conception of the Trinity is compatible with a doctrine of real *perichoresis*. For the Divine hypostases which it includes, though distinct subjects and agents, may conceivably be each much less 'individual' than are finite human persons. They may be more 'penetrable' or less 'impervious' than the selves which we know, or rather know in part. A human self cannot know directly another self's experiences. But though it is incompatible with the very notion of a subject that one subject *have* another subject's states, it is conceivable that one subject, free from the limitations of human selves, may directly cognise another subject's states; for to have a state and to be aware of a state are, logically at least, distinct and different relations. It is not necessary, if the Divine hypostases be conceived as subjects, to suppose that they must consequently be individuals or *atomoi* in the same degree that we human beings seem to be. Among Divine subjects there may well be such mutual coinherence, in respect both of cognitive and volitional experience, as enables each to be concerned in the activities of the others without the merging of the separate subjects in one another. They may conceivably be transparent, so to speak, to one another, and not completely divided or sundered, as are we, in self-determination. Of course one is here feeling after a conception which is full of mystery and scarcely imaginable; but if it be free from self-contradiction, this is no objection to it. The idea of creation, of course, is full of mystery and involves the unimaginable; it implies something to which human experience affords no helpful analogy: though it is perforce adopted, misgiving or no misgiving, by every theist. It is no objection, again, that such a conception transcends the knowledge which we possess of human personality: for, in the first place, there may well be self-conscious beings essentially different from human individuals; and, further,

our knowledge of human personality cannot be assumed to be as yet final and complete.

Just as it is a little inapt, in view of the *homoousia* of the Divine subjects or hypostases as here conceived, to use of them the word 'Gods,' with its tritheistic ring, so also, in view of what has just been said as to the possibility of a real *perichoresis* or coinherence, will it appear now to be a little inapt to speak of the Trinity or triune Godhead as a Divine 'Society.' If the Persons of the Trinity be less 'individuals' than are we, and in a much greater degree members one of another, then 'Society,' with its human associations, will insufficiently connote the closeness of union which will exist between the Divine hypostases. This needs to be pointed out; though the term 'society' can hardly be discarded, for none better suggests itself. But it should be borne in mind that the Divine Society which God has here been conceived to be, is rather something intermediate between a society and an individual, as these two kinds of entity are known to us.

According to this conception of the Trinity, which is submitted tentatively and with a view to eliciting criticism, we are at least able to endow each of the Persons with the totality of the Divine attributes, and to speak of each of them as exercising His own wisdom and love. The orthodox doctrine certainly cannot combine these two positions. As we have seen, it abides by the former and rejects the latter of them. But theology seems to be committed to both; and its interests will be better served by regarding the Trinity, not as one sole subject related to Himself and to the world in three different ways, but as comprising three conspiring centres of activity; three hypostases with wills, not to make one another's, but eternally and necessarily harmonious, because belonging to three members of the same class, three beings of specifically the same essence—Deity.

F. R. Tennant.

THE EARLIEST BAPTISMAL FORMULA AND CREED.

It has usually been assumed that the structure of the Creed followed that of the Baptismal formula, its threefold divisions being modelled on the triple Name invoked in the sacrament. And this general way of describing the achieved result may be admitted, provided that, adhering to our documentary evidence, we realise that there were earlier forms both of Creed and of Baptismal formula than those with which we are now familiar. Both possess a history of practically parallel evolution.

The following paper is an attempt to examine the evidence at our disposal with regard to the Baptismal formula and confession of faith employed in the case of the early converts to Christianity whether Jews or Gentiles.

We begin with the accounts given in the Acts, where we find

1. That the Pentecostal converts were baptized "in the Name of Jesus Christ" (ii. 38)—*ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ.*

2. That the Samaritan converts had been baptized "in the Name of the Lord Jesus" (viii. 48)—*εἰς τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ κυρίου Ἰησοῦ.* With this we compare viii. 12, "When they believed Philip preaching good tidings concerning the kingdom of God and *the Name of Jesus Christ*, they were baptized."

3. That the Gentiles of Cornelius's circle of relatives and friends were baptized "in the Name of Jesus Christ"—*ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ* (x. 48)—subsequently to their reception of the gift of the Holy Spirit; indeed the gift already bestowed was made the ground for not refusing them baptism.

4. That the Ephesian Johannist disciples were baptized

"in the Name of the Lord Jesus" (xix. 5)—*εἰς τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ κυρίου Ἰησοῦ*.

5. No formula is given in the case of the Ethiopian eunuch (viii. 38).

When we pass to St. Paul's Epistles we find that the phrases he uses imply, or are most naturally understood as implying, the use of the same single Name in the ceremony of the baptism.

1. "As many of you as were baptized into Christ, *εἰς Χριστόν*, did put on Christ" (Gal. iii. 27).

2. "As many as were baptized into Christ, *εἰς Χριστόν* [*Ἰησοῦν*], were baptized into His death" (Rom. vi. 3).

3. The argument in 1 Corinthians i. 13 seems more natural if the single Name of Christ had been employed in the baptism of the Corinthian converts. "I of Paul . . . I of Christ. . . . Was Paul crucified for you? or were ye baptized into the name of Paul?"

The indignant interrogation in James ii. 7 points to the same conclusion; for it cannot be doubted that the Name which was blasphemed by the *πλούσιοι* was that of Jesus Christ which had been invoked at the initiatory sacrament: *οὐκ αὐτοὶ βλασφημοῦσιν τὸ καλὸν ὄνομα τὸ ἐπικληθὲν ἐφ' ὑμᾶς*;

We may gather, then, that the earliest baptismal formula was not of fixed rigidity, but usually was "into (or in) the Name of Jesus Christ," or "into the Name of the Lord Jesus."

But baptism was always accompanied by a confession of faith on the part of the baptized. What light do our documents throw upon the form of this confession? There are several passages which help us to an answer. Belief in the Divinity of Jesus was clearly a part of this profession of faith. Saul was told by Ananias, "Be baptized and wash away thy sins, *calling upon His Name*" (Acts xxii. 16).

Now "to call upon the name" means in Hebrew usage to adore, to proclaim oneself a devotee of, and to implore the protection of, the one invoked. Doubtless Saul called upon Jesus as LORD (Acts ix. 17). Indeed, the earliest and simplest "creed" seems to have consisted in this confession of the Divinity of Jesus—*ΚΥΡΙΟΣ ΙΗΣΟΥΣ* (Romans x. 8). That constituted "the word of faith" which Paul preached and the confession of faith which the converts proclaimed. There is a persistent play upon the use of the word *ῥῆμα* as applied to this formula which cannot be understood apart from its reference to some well-known and recognized signification. At the risk of occupying too much space the passage must be set out at length. St. Paul first quotes Deuteronomy xxx. 14: *ἐγγύς σου τὸ ῥῆμά ἐστιν, ἐν τῷ στόματί σου καὶ ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ σου*, and proceeds *τοῦτ' ἔστιν τὸ ῥῆμα τῆς πίστεως ὃ κηρύσσομεν. ὅτι ἐὰν ὁμολογήσῃς τὸ ῥῆμα ἐν τῷ στόματί σου ὅτι ΚΥΡΙΟΣ ΙΗΣΟΥΣ, καὶ πιστεύσῃς ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ σου ὅτι θεὸς αὐτὸν ἤγειρεν ἐκ νεκρῶν, σωθήσῃ.* Here the *ῥῆμα* is not only the matter of the Christian preaching, but also the matter of the convert's confession of faith. In Ephesians v. 26 the employment of the word seems to be the same. The Church is cleansed *τῷ λουτρῷ τοῦ ὕδατος ἐν ῥήματι.* The *ῥῆμα* here is both the formula of Baptism and the "creed" professed by the baptized. The same brief pregnant phrase recurs in 1 Corinthians xii. 3, *οὐδεὶς δύναται εἰπεῖν ΚΥΡΙΟΣ ΙΗΣΟΥΣ εἰ μὴ ἐν πνεύματι ἁγίῳ.* And we may compare the exhortation to the Philippine jailer, Acts xvi. 31, *πίστευσον ἐπὶ τὸν κύριον Ἰησοῦν καὶ σωθήσῃ . . . καὶ ἐβαπτίσθη αὐτός*, while Philippians ii. 11 points to this confession as the climax of God's glory: *πᾶσα γλῶσσα ἐξομολογήσηται ὅτι ΚΥΡΙΟΣ ΙΗΣΟΥΣ ΧΡΙΣΤΟΣ εἰς δόξαν θεοῦ πατρός.*

We conclude, then, that the first baptismal "creed" followed the lines of the earliest baptismal formula, and was expressed in the words,

I believe that Jesus is Lord, or
I believe on the Lord Jesus Christ.

Very soon these simple elementary formulas began to assume the shape of question and answer. This appears in the gloss Acts viii. 37, which could easily be recast into the form "Dost thou believe with all thy heart?" "I believe that Jesus Christ is the Son of God."

If we put together 1 Timothy vi. 13, 2 Timothy ii. 8 and iv. 1, and look to their context and the solemnity of the adjurations, we shall be constrained to feel that the writer had in his mind Timothy's own baptismal confession, and we may infer that his primary catechism had included belief in God the Creator, and in Jesus Christ of the seed of David, who suffered under Pontius Pilate, rose from the dead, and will come to judge quick and dead.

A further development may be detected in 1 Peter iii. 15–22, where the writer evidently has the baptismal profession in view as an *ἀπολογία* and an *ἐπερώτημα*, in his direct references to Christ as having suffered for our sins, died, descended into Hades, risen, ascended into Heaven, and being now seated at the right hand of God.

Very early, then, the chief facts about the work of Jesus Christ as Lord were added to the original simple statement as to His Divinity. The "creed" so far deals only with the Incarnate Second Person of the Trinity.

We come now to the Trinitarian formula generally held to be explicit in the Lord's command to baptize in Matthew xxviii. 19. It will not be necessary to discuss either the date of the first Gospel, or the genuineness of the text of the verse in question, or the accuracy of the report of the Lord's words. The fact meets us baldly that in none of our New Testament documents is the Trinitarian formula used or referred to in connexion with baptism. We ask, Did the first preachers know of those words as an utterance of the

Lord ? Or, knowing them, did they not regard them as intended to prescribe a baptismal formula ? It is true that the longer form did, perhaps by the beginning of the second century, supplant in ordinary use the earlier simple single form ; but it is not possible to hold that the phrases in the Acts and Epistles above cited are to be explained away as denoting Baptism with the full Trinitarian formula, since the persistence of the earlier use forms matter of comment in Cyprian (Epistles 73 and 75), Apostolic Canons (canon 50), Basil (*de Spiritu Sancto* 12, 28), and Ambrose (*de Spiritu Sancto* i. 4, 43 f.). Moreover, if the triple formula had been known, it would have been most natural for St. Luke to have referred to it in connexion with the Ephesian disciples whose ignorance of πνεῦμα ἅγιον could thus have been immediately and pertinently corrected.

No doubt after the circulation of the Matthaean Gospel the use of the Trinitarian formula became general ; but previously to that, we must infer either that the Lord's words were not known, or that they were not understood to enjoin a baptismal formula.

When the Church had adopted the use of the triple Name it became necessary to uphold the validity of the earlier baptisms in the Name of the Second Person only of the Trinity. This was achieved by the doctrine of the περιχώρησις (circumincessio, circuminsessio) interpenetration, coinherence, of the Three Persons, whereby to name One Person was by implication to name the Others also. This is the position taken by Ambrose in the passage referred to above, who found the idea in Irenaeus or some earlier writer. Ambrose's words are : " When it is said they were baptized in the Name of our Lord Jesus Christ [Acts xix. 5 ff.], the mystery is complete through the Oneness of the Name. . . . He who has named one has signified the Trinity. If you name Christ you imply both God the

Father by whom the Son was anointed, and the Son Himself who was anointed, and the Holy Spirit with whom He was anointed. . . . And if you name the Father, you denote equally His Son and the Spirit of His mouth. . . . And if you speak of the Spirit, you name also God the Father from whom the Spirit proceeds, and the Son inasmuch as He is also the Spirit of the Son." The germ of this doctrine is found, though used in a quite different connexion, in Irenaeus iii. 10, 18. " In the Name of Christ is understood He who did anoint, and He who was anointed, and the Unction itself wherewith He was anointed. And as the Father did anoint, so the Son was anointed with the Spirit which is the Anointing: as speaketh the word by Isaiah [lxi. 1], signifying the anointing Father, and the anointed Son, and the Unction the Spirit." Basil too has copied this *de Spiritu Sancto* 12, 28. Commenting on the omission of any mention of the Father and the Spirit in the Pauline references to " baptism into Christ," Galatians iii. 27 and Romans vi. 3, he says, " The title Christ is a confession of everything, because it indicates God who anointed, and the Son who was anointed, and the Unction the Spirit " ; and cites Acts x. 38, Isaiah lxi. 1, Psalm xlv. 7. The idea is reproduced so late as the end of the ninth century in the treatise of Moses bar Kepha " On Baptism," which is based on early Syrian rituals and looks back to the times when Baptism was performed into the single Name of Christ. Commenting on the prayer " O Trinity, sign Thy Messiah on those who are about to be regenerated," he says, " The Name of the Messiah symbolises the whole of the Trinity ; for it is the Father who anoints and the Son who is anointed, and it is the Holy Spirit who is the anointing. . . . And because the Name of Messiah signifies the whole Trinity the priest says ' Sign the Messiah' on those who are being baptized." (See the Expositor viii. 10 338 ff., October 1911.)

One might indeed argue from St. Paul that some recognition of the Trinity was always involved in the very nature of baptism into Christ. If we look at 1 Corinthians vi. 11 we see that St. Paul certainly had Baptism in his mind. "Ye were washed, ye were sanctified, ye were justified *in the Name of our Lord Jesus Christ*, and in the Spirit of our God." Here the cleansing and hallowing of the converts involves the action of the Three Persons of the Trinity. And the same thought of the Trinity in connexion with Baptism underlies Titus iii. 4–7: "When the kindness and philanthropy of God our Saviour appeared . . . according to His mercy He saved us through the washing of regeneration and renewing of the Holy Spirit which He poured out upon us richly through Jesus Christ our Saviour."

But to return to our immediate point. About the validity of Baptism in or into the single Name of Christ there was felt to be no doubt, because the utterance of that Name carried with it the invocation of the whole Trinity; though whether the users of it were conscious or unconscious of this is not determined. At any rate both shorter and fuller formulas were recognised as valid by representative writers from Ambrose to Aquinas. (Compare Baeda *Super Acta Exp.* x. 8; Concil. Frejus A.D. 792; Aquin. *Summa* iii. 66. 6.) Absolute fixity of formula is absent even in the Acts of the Apostles, and was probably no more to be expected in the case of Baptism than in the consecration of the Eucharist. Signs of the transition from the earlier form to the later are seen in the *Didaché*, where both forms occur. "Baptize in the Name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit in living water" (vii.): "Let none eat or drink of your Eucharist but they that are baptized into the Name of the Lord"—εἰς ὄνομα K. (ix.). Even Justin Martyr does not give the Trinitarian formula in the identical words of the first Gospel. He says: ἐπ' ὀνόματος

γὰρ τοῦ Πατρὸς τῶν ὅλων καὶ δεσπότου Θεοῦ καὶ τοῦ Σωτῆρος ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ καὶ πνεύματος Ἁγίου τὸ ἐν τῷ ὕδατι τότε λουτρὸν ποιοῦνται, καὶ γὰρ ὁ Χριστὸς εἶπεν Ἂν μὴ ἀναγεννηθῆτε οὐ μὴ εἰσέλθητε εἰς τὴν βασιλείαν τῶν οὐρανῶν (*Apol.* i. 61). It is curious that Justin should ignore Matthew xxviii. 19 and quote (very loosely) John iii. 3 as the authority for this form of baptism.

Let us now assume that the Trinitarian form was fully established by the beginning of the second century. This by no means proves that the words of Christ were intended to prescribe a formula. Dr. Chase has argued very forcibly (*Journal of Theological Studies*, vi. 481 ff., July, 1905) for the view that, while we have no reason to regard Matthew xxviii. 19 as representing later tradition, or as giving other than a substantially accurate report of words actually used by Christ, yet His words were not intended to prescribe a formula : they were rather a revelation of the inner spiritual meaning of the rite as a sacrament of incorporation into the Divine. The Name of the Trinity of Persons is the element into which the baptized are plunged. The Name stands for the revealed Nature of God, and the water represents God Himself as the spiritual power of cleansing and regeneration. The use of the name for the person can be abundantly illustrated, not only from Hebrew usage but from the New Testament and papyri and ostraka. Hence St. Paul does not hesitate to substitute for the Name the Person into whom Christians are incorporated and whose leadership they accept. They were baptized εἰς Χριστόν (Gal. iii. 27 ; Romans vi. 3). By a bold metaphor in order to enforce the analogy, he even speaks of the Israelites as being " baptized into Moses " (1 Cor. x. 2). But it is obvious that whether in Matthew xxviii. 19 we translate " into the Name " or " in the Name," there is nothing to indicate that the words were intended to denote a formula. " Into

the Name" will emphasise the idea of incorporation and unity: "In the Name" will give the assurance of the Divine authority for the rite. If our Lord had said "Make disciples of all the nations, baptizing them with these words," or "using these words" . . . there could have been no question as to His meaning; but it is precisely the lack of some such definite instruction that leaves the matter open.

Opinions will always differ as to whether any great stress is to be laid on the preposition εἰς in the Matthaean phrase. The Dean of Wells (Dr. Armitage Robinson) regards it as equivalent to ἐν: the late Dr. Westcott, with whom Dr. Chase agrees, maintained that it gave a far deeper meaning than "by the authority of" or "in the name of." All depends upon the force given to ὄνομα. If ὄνομα stands for the Divine Personality, εἰς will certainly demand to be treated as something very different from ἐν. It will imply that the baptized one has been graced with a new life in the sphere of spiritual activities where Father, Son, and Spirit reign, and whose sovran dominion enfolds and penetrates his inmost being. And this surely expresses that mystic union which St. Paul envisaged and experienced.

It may be noted that the Eastern form of Baptism emphasises what our Western form tends to obscure. Instead of ". . . I baptize thee in the Name of . . ." the Eastern officiant declares that ". . . the servant of God, is baptized into the Name of . . ." This is one of those instances in which Western individualism has usurped, in verbal form at least, the office of the Great High Priest acting through His Body the Church.

Dr. Chase's paper was criticised by Dr. Robinson in the *Journal of Theological Studies* vii. 186 ff., January 1906, and replied to, *J. Th. S.* viii. 161 ff.; but the dean concerned himself chiefly with defending his contention that εἰς and ἐν were practically interchangeable, and did not touch

upon the question whether an actual formula was or was not enjoined in the Lord's command to baptize.

Subsequent development of the baptismal creed naturally followed the adoption of the Trinitarian formula. To a brief statement of the facts of Christ's life and work was added an acknowledgement of belief in God the Father and in the Holy Spirit ; and these additions were expanded as need arose either to exclude a heresy or to develop a teaching or to incorporate a further truth. A fairly full creed can be framed out of the writings of Justin Martyr, representing the faith of the Church of Ephesus before A.D. 130 (see the writer's *Oecumenical Documents*, page 60). Dr. Burn would date the early Roman creed about A.D. 100. Mr. T. Barns (*J. Th. S.*, vi. 40 ff.) suggests an Asiatic creed of great interest, dating about A.D. 160, rescued out of its Marcosian perversions, which included the clause *εἰς κοινωνίαν τῶν ἁγίων*, which is generally suppose to be of fourth century Dacian origin.

It was, of course, no great step from the baptismal creeds to the conciliar creed of Nicaea and the imperial liturgical creed of Constantinople. They were indeed based upon earlier baptismal creeds, though employed for a different purpose. With these later developments the present paper is not concerned.

T. Herbert Bindley.

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